Science Blogging: Networks, Boundaries and Limitations
There is limited research into the realities of science blogging, how science bloggers themselves view their activity and what bloggers can achieve. The ‘badscience’ blogs analysed here show a number of interesting developments, with significant implications for understandings of science blogging and scientific cultures more broadly. A functioning and diverse online community (with offline elements) has been constructed, with a number of non-professional and anonymous members and with boundary work being used to establish a recognisable outgroup. The community has developed distinct norms alongside a type of distributed authority and has negotiated the authority, anonymity and varying status of many community members in some interesting and novel ways. Activist norms and initiatives have been actioned, with some prominent community campaigns and action.

There are questions about what science blogging – both in the UK and internationally – may be able to achieve in future and about the fragility of the ‘badscience’ community. Some of the highly optimistic hopes which have been associated with science blogging have not been realised. Nonetheless the small group of bloggers focussed on here have produced significant achievements with limited resources, especially when one considers this in the context of community values as opposed to some of the expectations attached to science blogging within scientific cultures more broadly. While the impacts of this science blogging community remain uncertain, the novel and potentially significant practices analysed here do merit serious consideration.

If you're wanting to read a bit around the subject, Alex Holmes and I summarise some of the challenges to this report - and associated PR - in an earlier Guardian Science Blog post. The blogger James Hayton's Guardian piece is also recommended.

I'm going to be talking about some social media responses to the report - which I have been able to effectively collate links for in writing this post, perhaps reflecting the temporality of this type of discussion. I'm hoping to write up this at a later date (and have been doing some work on science blogging with Hauke Riesch, which isn't entirely unrelated) - so, while I appreciate that this may not make sense as a stand-alone post, if you would like to discuss any of this further please do get in touch.

Looking forward to the RGS session tomorrow!

300,000 additional households into work due to Universal Credit – fanciful thinking?

The Universal Credit was announced with much fanfare in late 2010 – with the aim of ‘radically simplifying the system to make work pay and combat worklessness and poverty’ [1]. A key claim made in the DWPs Universal Credit White Paper is that the new measure will reduce the number of workless households by around 300,000 within two to three years of its implementation. This claim – sourced to “internal analysis using the Department for Work and Pensions’ Policy Simulation Model” – has been widely picked up and reiterated in the media, including by Nick Clegg in The Guardian [2].

Sceptical about this 300,000 figure, we used a Freedom of Information request to get details of the analysis the DWP used to generate it. Closer inspection shows that this figure was generated by inappropriate use of a fairly narrow piece of research and by making and sandwiching together broad assumptions and best-case scenarios – giving an over-optimistic prediction. There is evidence that some in the DWP were aware of how tenuous such conclusions are, but this uncertainty was hidden in what was presented to the public.

In the DWP’s analysis, 250,000 of the predicted reduction in workless households is accounted for by the assumption that 1,300,000 workless households will ‘respond’ to the introduction of Universal Credit, 500,000 of whom will be financially better-off because of its improved ‘incentives’ and that around half of this sub-group will move into part-time jobs. These figures are based on ‘research evidence and assumptions about future levels of conditionality and support’. However, the DWP document fails to note what evidence this is or to make clear the assumptions upon which these inferences are based, especially the presumption that half of this sub-group will move into part-time jobs (why half and why part-time jobs?)

The DWP's simulation draws broad conclusions about why In-Work Credit was effective, based on a much narrower study of the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) which makes explicit – on p. 1 – that “findings are illustrative but not statistically representative” [3]. The aspects of the New Deal assessed were optional, involved relatively few people and were resource intensive; they offered a lot help with getting into work and staying in work. These characteristics probably help to explain why the transitions into work from NDLP lasted on average for three years (most transitions from welfare to work don’t [4]) but it would be wrong to assume that this will apply to those affected by the Universal Credit.

It is assumed that 1,930,000 people will receive a form of Better-Off Calculation under Universal Credit, that most of them will be in workless households, that 20,000 people make the transition into work every year for three years as a result of the Calculations and that these transitions last for three years on average. Again, these projections draw on research involving optional and resource-intensive aspects of NDLP. It is unrealistic to apply the same assumptions to the nearly two million people who are expected to receive a form of Better-Off Calculation under Universal Credit.

The DWP goes on to assume that 1,330,000 people will be eligible for In-Work Credit and that this will smooth the transition between benefits and work to the extent that 40,000 of them will move into employment, which will be sustained on average for three years. Again, the DWP applies research from NDLP to a much larger and more diverse group of nearly two million individuals who are believed to be in workless households.

The 300,000 figure generated by the DWP analysis is thus over-optimistic and based on unsound analysis. It should, at a minimum, come with clearly specified ‘health warnings’ regarding the uncertainly surrounding such estimates: after all, the Policy Simulation Model is acknowledged to be a ‘simplification of the real world and subject to a number of sources of uncertainty’. It appears that some within DWP did feel that strong caveats were needed: Tracked Changes in the internal analysis released to us show that an earlier draft made clear that “we think this is a plausible estimate, but recognise the true impact is very uncertain”; however, the final draft simply states that “we believe this is a plausible estimate based on reasonable assumptions”.

It is very worrying for the DWP to be complicit in producing and publicising unsubstantiated claims. These claims are used to justify reforms that will disproportionally hit the most vulnerable members of society – those who already stand to lose most from the recession and government cuts. If the Coalition really cares about getting more people into work, there is a real need to move beyond catchy but unsubstantiated headline figures – and to make better use of high-quality research in order to assess what benefit reforms might achieve and who they might hurt.

1: http://www.dwp.gov.uk/policy/welfare-reform/legislation-and-key-documents/universal-credit/
2: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/nov/09/nick-clegg-benefits-jobless-reform
3: http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports2009-2010/rrep712.pdf
4: http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0708/supporting_people_to_stay_in_w.aspx

what is currently taking place in and emerging from Afghanistan could go well beyond any failing American imperialism. This projection – this throwing forwards – of globalisation will tend to ‘land’ in unexpected places, will tend to exceed the ambitions of those seeking a straightforwardly pro-US version of globalisation. Moreover, the forms of organisation currently in play in Afghanistan mean that – in the projection or throwing forwards of globalisation – it is no longer at all clear who is doing the throwing: instead of globalisation being US-led, a certain kind of project of globalisation may be an emergent property of the networks currently active in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Given the efficacy of such networks it could well – once again – be the case that networks flowing from, within, over and through Afghanistan are able to defeat a superpower.

I argue (p. 733) that non-Western states are often and inappropriately seen as primitive and disconnected:

Moving away from the assumption of a Western norm can open up other ways of thinking about certain processes. Sidaway argues that African states “are configured not simply by an absence of connection, power and capital, but by a particular form and experience (conceivably a surplus) of these” [2]. Analogously, it would be wrong to conceptualise Afghan networks as a failed representation of an external model…the startlingly ‘successful’ networking and globalisation taking place there may point to other potential models and futures.

Various networks are, it seems, also proving highly significant in the emerging unrest. The role of online social networks has captured a great deal of attention: these have been used in significant ways by many involved in the protests. As Peter Beaumont argues

Precisely how we communicate in these moments of historic crisis and transformation is important. The medium that carries the message shapes and defines as well as the message itself. The instantaneous nature of how social media communicate self-broadcast ideas, unlimited by publication deadlines and broadcast news slots, explains in part the speed at which these revolutions have unravelled, their almost viral spread across a region. It explains, too, the often loose and non-hierarchical organisation of the protest movements unconsciously modelled on the networks of the web.

However, what we’re seeing here is not some virtualising move beyond space and place. Instead, for Beaumont

the importance and impact of social media on each of the rebellions we have seen this year has been defined by specific local factors (not least how people live their lives online in individual countries and what state limits were in place). Its role has been shaped too by how well organised the groups using social media have been.

In my article on networks (p. 740), I note that

Painter advocates a move beyond any network-territory dichotomy: network and territory discourses should be conceptualised as different aspects of the same reality [3]. [Certain] network discourse can be read as an overlay network: a network that overlays territorial discourses, and functions across and over such discourse…Interactions between networks and territories are complex and it is not simply a case on one replacing the other [4]. In Smith’s terms, “Power is never deterritorialized; it is always specific to particular places. Reterritorialization counters deterritorialization at every turn”.[5]…One should therefore not ‘just’ focus on the problems that territorial and network discourses face in coexisting. Instead, networks can overlay territorial discourses in particular ways: networks can both draw on territorial discourses and play important roles in these discourses.

These networks were not simply technological. As Beaumont argues:

In Egypt, details of demonstrations were circulated by both Facebook and Twitter and the activists' 12-page guide to confronting the regime was distributed by email. Then, the Mubarak regime – like Ben Ali's before it – pulled the plug on the country's internet services and 3G network. What social media was replaced by then – oddly enough – was the analogue equivalent of Twitter: handheld signs held aloft at demonstrations saying where and when people should gather the next day.

It is not clear what will be (or, even, what has been) achieved with these networks. I argue, after Arquilla and Ronfeldt, that

unpredictability…is an inherent part of the efficacy of networks in conflict. Netwar works so well because it “tends to defy and cut across standard spatial boundaries, jurisdictions, and distinctions between state and society, public and private, war and crime, civilian and military, police and military, and legal and illegal. A netwar actor is likely to operate in the cracks and gray areas of the society.” [6]

Writing about the protests, Hardt and Negri argue that:

the multitude is able to organise itself without a centre – that the imposition of a leader or being co-opted by a traditional organisation would undermine its power. The prevalence in the revolts of social network tools, such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, are symptoms, not causes, of this organisational structure. These are the modes of expression of an intelligent population capable of using the instruments at hand to organise autonomously.

Networks and connectivity seem likely to offer populations valuable tools with which to organise and to campaign for social change. As the project of globalisation develops, it is increasingly unclear where its impacts will project to: these networks bring significant inherent unpredictability. Networks and connectivity offer powerful tools, though, for those seeking to express grievances or drive social change – and, to repeat the Ani di Franco quote which is used as an epigraph for Empire, “Any tool is a weapon if you hold it right”.

Notes:
1: I appreciate that it’s rather navel-gazing to be quoting myself at such length here. I’m (selfishly) interested, though, in looking at how some of my ideas around networks and connectivity might usefully be applied in other contexts. I understand that others may not share this interest, however.

2: J. D. Sidaway, ‘Sovereign Excesses? Portraying Postcolonial Sovereigntyscapes’, Political
Geography 22/2 (2003), p. 16

3: J. Painter, ‘Territoire et Réseau: Une Fausse Dichotomie?’, in M. Vanier (ed.), Territoires,
Territorialité, Territorialisation: Controverses et Perspectives (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes
2009).

4: In the article, I use the example of Al Qaeda. I should make very clear that I am in no way suggesting that current protest movements are in any way linked to Al Qaeda nor that they use the same type of violence. What is of interest, though, is the use of networks by very different movements.

5: N. Smith, The Endgame of Globalization (New York: Routledge 2005), p. 51

6: J. Arquilla and D. F. Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Santa Monica: RAND 1996), p. 13

Afghanistan is often thought to be a failed state because it is isolated from the networks of globalisation: for example, Afghanistan is viewed as part of Thomas Barnett's Non-Integrating Gap. On the contrary, the article will show that Afghanistan has - for decades - been very much integrated into a range of international networks. These networks have played major roles in Afghanistan and have also spread to have significant impact across the world: offering an example of what Friedman has referred to as the flattening of the world. Afghanistan is thus an example of the substantial role which networks and connectivity can play in 'failed' states and of the unpredictable outcomes that can result from such networks.

As I argue in the article (drawing on James Sidaway's work), it is not helpful to view Afghanistan as a failed replica of a Western state model. Instead, it's important to consider what these networks and this connectivity are able to do and what effects they might have in the future.

Dear Lord Drayson,

We have written two pieces for the Times and Guardian concerning issues around the Science: So What? (SSW) campaign and its use of a Fast Future report [1,2].

We are concerned that practices within the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS) unintentionally undermine their outreach. We have shown that the SSW web campaign was grossly cost ineffective and that internal measures of success were poorly conceived.

We consider these failings institutional (rather than simply part of the previous Government) and intend to submit DBIS and the current Government’s use of research to further scrutiny. With this aim we will be writing to David Willets to inform him of our findings, ask him about his problematic engagement with research while in opposition and seek his views on DBIS outreach strategies. We have noticed that you are willing to engage in criticism of the department now that you are no longer part of government and would welcome comment on the following:

• Whether DBIS adequately assessed the Fast Future report before using it.
• Whether it was wise to heavily promote such weak research, especially given DBIS’s role in research in the UK.
• Whether DBIS responses to criticism of the report were appropriate.
• Whether this approach was prevalent throughout BIS (or more widely in Government), or specific to the SSW campaign.
• Whether there are any lessons to be learnt from this episode – we would welcome any thoughts regarding either Government practice or better ways for researchers to engage with Government.
• Any other issues which you feel we should address.

Thank you in advance for your time. We would welcome a reply via e-mail or post. Alternatively, this letter will be posted at http://www.watsonblogs.org/jmendel and you can comment there; you can also tweet Jonathan Mendel @JonMendel. We will assume that any replies are ‘on the record’, unless specified otherwise.

Yours Sincerely,

Dr Alexander Holmes
Dr Jonathan Mendel

[1] http://timesonline.typepad.com/science/2010/06/research-so-what-prbased-research-science-communication-and-the-waste-of-185m.html
[2] http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/blog/2010/sep/07/science-future-jobs-research

In a climate of prospective “ground zero mosques,” clamor about President's Obama's religion, and escalating pre-election rhetoric, this month's anniversary of the 9/11 attacks evoked particularly passionate responses. In Florida, a rural pastor pledged to hold a “Burn a Koran Day” on September 11 to mark his belief that “Islam is of the Devil.” Pastor Terry Jones' congregation was small, and his beliefs were not reflective of mainstream Christianity. Under no circumstance should Jones' words or actions have had any influence beyond his own, small following. But they did. As September 11 approached, he attracted increasing media attention, which he seemed eager to use to propagate his own extreme views. Nearly all observers opposed Jones' planned Quran-burning. From Afghanistan, General David Petraeus said that his planned actions were already inciting violent opposition and presented a threat to U.S. troops. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called Jones to express his opposition personally. Ultimately, Jones canceled his event, claiming that he had already been successful in conveying his anti-Muslim views.

Jones used the media, however, for more than just that.. Deliberately or not, his planned Quran-burning inspired other radicals to turn their ideology into action. In Texas, Christian activists inspired by Jones held their own Quran-burning event. But as a Quran was about to be burned, a skateboarder named Jacob Isom grabbed the book and prevented its destruction, informing the would-be book burner, “Dude, you have no Quran!” Isom became a modest internet celebrity, and he represented an example of ordinary individuals not propagating hateful speech, but rather squelching it.

Some individuals seek to do more than simply spread an idea, or instead have a much different vision for how to do so. In recent years, several al Qaeda-inspired attacks on the United States have been carried out by individuals with more exuberance than training, acting on their own. Last year, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives in his underwear on a flight to the United States, and earlier this year, Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square in New York. Neither attempt was successful, and although both individuals had plenty of enthusiasm, they lacked the skills and training (and perhaps luck) that would have been necessary for them to succeed.

Whether an individual hopes to carry out (or prevent) a hateful action, or whether they literally seek to harm other people, several things are clear. Ordinary individuals, acting on their own, find it very difficult to influence foreign policy in a direct way. Terry Jones and Jacob Isom are minor figures, with very limited followings, no coherent agenda, and limited means to realize on a larger scale whatever their agendas might be. Their words and actions can inspire or motivate others, or win the attention of powerful figures, but they need a vehicle to carry their agenda to a wider audience. Technology can assist in these efforts, of course, but the mainstream media was still necessary to give Jones' small-bore ideas the national and international attention they ultimately received. Naturally, Abdulmutallab's and Shahzad's attacks received media attention, and security-screening protocols were adjusted as a result. But the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy did not change. Had their attacks been successful and killed hundreds of people, it is not unreasonable to assume that U.S. policy could have shifted dramatically—it certainly did after 9/11.

These recent examples of individual efforts to affect foreign policy stand in contrast to other recent efforts that featured individuals who were better organized, funded, and trained. Compare Jones' efforts to those of the key players in the Park51 debate in New York, which arguably spurred the rash of would-be Quran burnings. The chief proponent of the Park51 center is Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, who has a long reputation as a conciliatory leader in New York and has the support of influential figures in the Muslim community, in the media, and from the State Department itself. Opposition to Park51 has been spurred (if not directly led) by political figures such as Sarah Palin and Newt Gingrich. Not only do these individuals command the loyalty of significant political constituencies, but they have years of experience in crafting public messages and leveraging media attention. Although the Park51 dispute is far from resolved, the key players on each side of the debate stand a much greater chance of affecting the course of U.S. foreign policy than either Terry Jones or Jacob Isom..

In a similar vein, although Abdulmutallab and Shahzad received modest inspiration and training from others, they carried out their attacks on their own, and in isolation. Their failure as individuals stands in stark contrast to the dramatic success (from their perspective) of the 9/11 hijackers. On the most direct level, that plot involved 19 people working in tandem. Behind them were dozens of people around the globe who provided financial, technical, or logistical support, and who had been planning meticulously for years. Perhaps most famous of these behind-the-scenes supporters was Osama bin Laden. By all accounts, he did not conceive of the 9/11 attacks himself. But he possessed certain characteristics that were unique, and in some cases completely unteachable. He was the charismatic leader of a burgeoning movement, and he was able to earn notoriety from his opponents and lure like-minded people to his cause. But bin Laden also possessed exceptional financial resources and personal connections. These qualities not only allowed him to build al Qaeda into what it was pre-9/11, but it allowed him to inspire, support, and orchestrate the violent actions of those who shared his worldview.

None of this is to suggest that ordinary individuals have no role in shaping foreign policy—far from it. In fact, in a democracy, individuals have a responsibility to consider the relevant issues and to express their opinions on them. At the extreme, individuals certainly can cause great damage; Nidal Malik Hasan killed 13 people at Ft. Hood last year. Jones himself acquired a sort of temporary fame, and the media gave him a platform to spread his views. Abdulmutallab and Shahzad failed in their attacks, but their arrests drew media and political attention, and they served to remind Americans of a still-existing threat. Arguably, this visibility is what these individuals sought all along.

But visibility only goes so far, and eliciting a short-term response is not a sustainable strategy for policy change. Any untrained individual can cause a ruckus and attract the spotlight. To actually change policy, however, a ruckus alone is insufficient. Clear plans, abundant finances, devoted followers, media and political connections, well-run organizations, and simple luck are the ingredients necessary to turn individual action into any kind of effort to achieve real policy change. This is especially true in the realm of foreign policy, which historically has been more isolated from the whims of public opinion. It is still true that globalization and technology are empowering forces; the fact that money and ideas can spread cheaply and rapidly means that more people can become engaged in policy debates—for good or ill—than ever before. But these forces do not, and cannot, replace the much older prerogatives for effective grassroots policy influence: organization, money, and media. With these necessary tools, individuals have a much better chance to elicit the policy changes they hope to achieve. Whether such changes serve the common good, however, is another question entirely.

Foreign Policy Association, 23 September 2010

The Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) is a government department whose responsibilities include the UK’s scientific and university sectors. They support research and teaching as well as overseeing efforts to encourage people to take up scientific and research careers. Under the previous government, the department ran a campaign called Science: So What? So Everything (SSW) to encourage young people via websites, media reports and special events, to be inspired by the contributions of science to their lives.

SSW was not without its problems. The campaign included a website that was expensive and inefficient: BIS spent £1.85m on a website that compared poorly with science communication sites set up for far smaller sums. The site got little traffic for a campaign of this type and there were serious concerns about the quality of some of the research that BIS was promoting. In particular, a report on future jobs in science by the Fast Future consultancy was heavily promoted during the campaign despite failing to meet some basic standards.

The department and its SSW campaign have both come under fire, with various researchers criticising them in public and private. We were interested in how BIS responded internally to these criticisms, which sought to improve their activities. So we submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to find out.

Good quality research depends upon robust, critical appraisal. As BIS is a major player in the UK’s research work – and as the SSW campaign was intended to promote science, technology, engineering and mathematics – we hoped their own practices would reflect the standards that contribute to the UK’s deserved reputation for excellent research. We hoped, for example, that since the department plays a role in assessing the quality of research in UK universities the research it commissioned itself would be robust. Our findings are hardly encouraging. They suggest BIS did not respond appropriately to concerns about the SSW campaign and that their way of measuring success was questionable to say the least.

The report on future jobs in science was commissioned and promoted by BIS, under the former Business Secretary, Lord Mandelson, as part of the SSW campaign. This report was garlanded with supportive statements from the then science minister, Lord Drayson, and even the then Prime Minister, Gordon Brown. However, as soon as it was released, major concerns were raised by bloggers and academics about the methodology, the inappropriate use of Wikipedia and implausible claims about nanotechnology, amongst many other problems. These serious issues were largely missed by the mainstream media, beyond a blog on the Guardian's science website and an article in the Times Higher Education Supplement (THES) that criticised the report.

The Conservative Party – then in opposition – also failed to challenge the report effectively. It even issued a press release that added further errors. For example, it argued that a worldwide survey used for the report “determined that ‘Virtual Lawyer’ is the fantasy job which people in Africa, Peru and Pakistan think is ‘likely to be the best paid’.” But as the Fast Future report makes clear, this was based on responses from only one person in Peru and one in Pakistan. It would be rather tenuous to assume their compatriots share their views. It is unfortunate that the Conservative Party’s criticisms of such a flawed document were themselves so ill conceived. More worryingly, the press release went out with David Willetts’ name in the headline along with a lengthy quote. Willetts is now minister for universities and science.

When BIS evaluated the success of the future jobs report, it used media coverage as a gauge and all but dismissed its critics. Our FOIA request shows that the PR agency Kindred (which worked for BIS on the project) focussed on mainstream media coverage when evaluating the success of the campaign around the Future Jobs report. They noted that this report achieved “178 pieces of coverage across national, regional, consumer and online media…A combined OTS (opportunities to see) of 60,985,597…An AEV [Advertising Equivalent Value] of £2,248,866.” This is a poor measure of success in science communication. Public understanding of and engagement with science cannot usefully be measured by column inches in the press, without also considering the accuracy and efficacy of the project in question.

There were also crude attempts to assess the online impact of the Future Jobs report coverage of the SSW campaign. Kindred report that the story “generated a seven-fold increase in volume of traffic to the campaign website.” The increase raised the traffic to “7,733 website hits during the six days after the launch of the activity (compared to 1,167 websites hits for the same period before the activity launch)”. For a science communication campaign aimed at millions of young people and backed by a £1m-plus budget, this trumpeted increase is pathetic.

In dealing with criticisms, BIS and Kindred focussed on managing negative publicity rather than on correcting mistakes or meaningful engagement with critics. For example, when the nanotechnology blogger James Hayton criticised the Fast Future report, an e-mail exchange supplied in response to our FOIA request argued that “James’ blog isn’t particularly well known…Not that this means his criticisms aren’t well-founded, but I doubt appeasement will be a worthwhile strategy.” The emails are so heavily redacted, it is impossible to know whether the email was from a civil servant or a BIS contractor. In deciding whether to respond to Hayton's blog, these e-mail exchanges gave considerably more attention to whether Hayton’s criticisms would appear on the Guardian science blog and how to distance BIS from any criticism than was given to the accuracy and significance of his points: “Given the reach of the Guardian blog, we believe that it is a worthwhile exercise for Rohit [Talwar, the author of the future jobs report] to provide some form of response”. The e-mail exchange states that “while tacitly looking over Rohit’s response, it needs to come from him (rather than Kindred, and certainly not BIS)”.

Responses to mainstream media criticism of BIS’s practice were no better. In response to the Times Higher Education Supplement article, BIS are quoted emphasising the “speculative” nature of the research behind the future jobs report. It is left to Talwar to claim that the approach taken is “accepted best practice in horizon scanning”. The importance of the THES was downplayed, with one email exchange citing a single tweet stating that “Jonathan Mendel [quoted in the THES article criticising the future jobs report] is a prat” as evidence that there was little interest in the story. Substantive criticisms from the THES article and elsewhere were not addressed in the documents supplied to us.

When preparing a statement on the response to the future jobs report for the then science minister, Lord Drayson, a draft saying that the “vast majority” of coverage of the campaign was positive was revised to marginalise criticism further: simply stating that the campaign “has generated a great deal of positive coverage”. Failures by BIS to uphold basic standards raise concerns about how they engage with the professions within their remit and are frankly embarrassing for those of us who work within and are keen to promote the UK’s excellent research sector.

While BIS failed to redact Hayton's name from the documents released to us and left at least one other individual easily identifiable, they redacted so much from the e-mail exchanges that it is not always clear which organisation is saying what. Given that the government is now arguing that “transparency across all departments a necessary and important part of making government more accountable” it is unfortunate that this FOIA response was excessively and clumsily redacted. We appreciate it can be important to protect the identities of individuals, but there is a real public interest in knowing whether particular statements were made by government departments or by contracted organisations. Not only have BIS been involved in commissioning and promoting substandard research, their current data-handling practices are making it harder for researchers to assess the problems with BIS’s practice.

Despite these redactions, what stood out in the documents BIS released to us was how government, PR agencies and mainstream media worked as a closed and vicious circle. The Government commissioned and promoted bad research; PR agencies promoted this to the media and the media overwhelmingly reported the government line. The project was then deemed a success because of the positive media coverage. Critical engagement with research and appropriate analysis of the tools, goals and achievements of research communication were very much marginalised and the Conservative Party’s press release only added to the misinterpretations it should have been challenging. Recent government announcements, such as changes to housing benefit, also seem worryingly under-researched in how they are presented by the government and reported by the press. Given the damaging nature of such vicious circles, there is a real need for those of us outside of these circles to find ways to criticise and challenge bad policies and practice in order to improve them.

Despite concerns about David Willetts’ role in the Conservative criticisms of SSW, we hope the new government will engage better with researchers. This means being open to a genuine dialogue and listening to constructive criticism. However, although pre-election Conservative and Liberal Democrat rhetoric emphasised evidence-based policy, we are yet to see any convincing signs that this government will engage well with those who have genuine concerns about its policies. Consider the manner in which Nick Clegg has challenged Institute for Fiscal Studies work to argue that the government’s policies are progressive (http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/aug/25/nick-clegg-budget-report-partial). We have real concerns about whether the government has even done the necessary research to know if its policies are progressive or not. Promises of engagement and evidenced-based policy seem to have become less of a priority than ensuring that mantras of cuts, austerity and reform remain in the headlines.

Postscript
The recent announcements by the Secretary of State for DBIS, Vince Cable, and subsequent criticism raise concerns that this government is not setting an example at ministerial level with respect to the appropriate evaluation of evidence.
Some of the angriest responses to Dr Cable this week were over his misleading interpretation of data from RCUK on the quality of research produced in the UK science sector for which he has yet to clarify despite a robust correction from RCUK. Given the ease with which certain politicians can misinterpret research and win uncritical media coverage for these misinterpretations we are concerned that Dr Cable may have established an inaccurate headline figure that will be used in subsequent debates on science funding in the media. Evan Harris (ex-MP, and former Liberal Democrat science spokesperson) has called on his former colleague to correct this figure:

Lest that figure of 45% should stick in the mind of the public, as it is presently stuck in the craw of the scientific community, what's needed first is a proper acknowledgement from the business secretary of the true assessment of the quality of British science. It is important for Mr Cable to put the record straight.

While it is important for Dr Cable to correct his mistake, this should not be the end of the matter. The government appears to have ignored the arguments of the previous parliament's Sci & Tech committee report on science funding, chaired by a Liberal Democrat and featuring Evan Harris. This report was highly critical of planned £600m cuts by the previous government and argued strongly - and from a wide evidence base - that even in difficult economic terms it is highly unwise to cut basic research. As Harris argued after Cable's speech there are concerns that:

To believe it is possible to get more good science from less funding is the political equivalent of a belief in cold fusion: an aspiration not supported by logic or reproducibility...there is very little room to identify wastage...The real question is one for the government to address. Is there any evidence from anywhere that can be cited showing any changes to current funding allocations could reliably generate "more" from less? Even then it is not clear what the "more" is.

We would agree that this is an important question for the Government to answer: 'more for less' in research terms would be nice; however, one would not want to base major policy decisions on unevidenced, under-researched and barely plausible claims. Is there any good reason for the Government to think that more research for less is either
plausible or likely?

Despite the Liberal Democrat Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, offering a commitment to science before the election and more recently extolling the virtues of long term thinking with respect to funding the government must be judged by its actions not its words. Thus far the failure of ministers to correct glaring mistakes and to engage with important previous reports is far from reassuring. It could be disastrous if this style of government were to persist.

In recent weeks, passions have become inflamed over plans to build an Islamic community center and mosque a few blocks from the World Trade Center site in New York. Park51 is the brainchild of Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, a religious leader with a long tradition as a moderate, conciliatory figure. A passionate group of supporters for the project has emerged, arguing that it will embody the constitutional right to freedom of religion and help preserve New York's culture of tolerance and diversity. But opposition to Park51 has been even more vocal. In many media depictions and reports, the center has been labeled “the Ground Zero mosque,” and it has been seen as insensitive or even offensive to the memory of the 9/11 attacks.

The recent uproar over Park51 is, in some respects, very peculiar. The project has received support from a local community board committee and from New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg. Abdul Rauf has been praised by Jewish leaders and the FBI, and he has even written a book entitled, “What's Right with Islam is What's Right with America.” But many of the project's opponents have amplified their views, and they have come to dominate the national conversation. Some, like Newt Gingrich, equate the project with a Nazi sign being posted near the Holocaust Museum or a Japanese “site” next to Pearl Harbor, and suggest that a synagogue should be built in Saudi Arabia before a “mosque” is built in Lower Manhattan. Others take a more moderate view that Park51 should simply be moved further away from the Ground Zero site or outside of Lower Manhattan.

The arguments against Park51 clearly have taken hold. A recent poll by the Economist found that 58 percent of Americans thought that an Islamic cultural center should not be built near the World Trade Center site, and 33 percent did not even think that Muslims had a constitutional right to build such a facility. Opposition to Park51 has spread beyond New York and has grown into wider, more public anti-Muslim sentiment. In Connecticut, Tennessee, and California, existing and planned mosques have become targets for vitriolic protests.

Park51's opponents imply—deliberately or otherwise—that Islam writ large is waging a war against the United States and the West. Ironically, this is the same notion that extremists such as Osama bin Laden seek to perpetuate. Their ideology rests upon the notion that the West, and the United States in particular, is fundamentally hostile to Islam, and that Islam must strike back violently. Without this extremist interpretation of a cultural and religious war, the logic of al Qaeda's violent agenda dissipates. But the intense, public opposition to Park51 and to mosques around the country only gives credence to al Qaeda's point of view. Even the more mild opponents of Park51—those who simply think that the center should be built elsewhere—may unwittingly be giving comfort to adherents of religious warfare. Declaring entire neighborhoods off-limits to places of worship could isolate, ostracize, or even radicalize religious minorities.

To be sure, the debate over Park51 is not one-sided. The fact that a debate is taking place, and that prominent figures like Bloomberg and even President Obama have expressed support for Park51, sets the United States apart from many other countries in which such open expression would be discouraged or even repressed. But in functional terms, such nuance may not matter. To succeed over the long-term, the U.S. effort to combat Islamic extremism must rely primarily on the power of ideas. Extremist ideologies must be exposed as corrupt and hopeless, and the notion of an existential struggle between Islam and the West must be undermined. In a certain sense, it almost doesn't matter if Park51 is built or not. The passion and anger that have fueled the Park51 debate will give ammunition to extremist propagandists for years to come. And that will make U.S. efforts to counter such propaganda more difficult, more costly, and more time-consuming.

Meanwhile, the issue of Iran's nuclear program has entered the public forum in a different and more direct kind way. In the September 2010 edition of The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg writes about Israel's growing concern with Iran's nuclear ambitions. Gaining extensive access to Israeli political and military leaders, Goldberg concludes that there is a better than 50 percent chance that Israel will attack Iranian nuclear facilities by July 2011. Within days of the publication of Goldberg's article, The New Yorker featured an article by Jon Lee Anderson, for which he interviewed Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. As he is prone to do, Ahmadinejad spoke at great length about the hypocrisy of U.S. policy toward Iran and about Iran's right to nuclear technology. But the context of the interview, as reported by Anderson, sent a very different message: significantly, Ahmandinejad agreed to be interviewed by Anderson—a Western journalist—in Tehran.

Goldberg's and Anderson's articles each offer valuable glimpses into the minds of national policymakers. In a sense, the governments of Israel and Iran have entered the realm of public debate in a very deliberate kind of way. Both journalists are fully aware that their sources may have used them to advance a precisely constructed—and not necessarily honest—public message. But even if that was the case, the messages that Israel and Iran hoped to put forward still help to illuminate the motivations of each side. This is diplomacy-as-poker. Each player, or country, is endowed with a certain set of resources and a particular range of options for how to employ those resources. But the path from potential policy to actual policy is marked by bluffs and truths, with each move designed to manipulate, recruit, or deceive the other players.

In Goldberg's case, his sources may have advanced the idea that Israel was likely to attack Iran for any number of purposes. It could increase the pressure on the Obama administration to take a tougher line with the Iranian regime, or it could serve to remind Iran of Israel's resolve. It also could serve a domestic purpose, to reassure Israelis that their government is proactively engaged with the issue. But deliberate or not, Goldberg's sources seemed nearly unanimous on one point in particular: Israel views an Iranian nuclear weapon as more than just an abstract existential threat, but as something on equal terms with the Holocaust—as a clear echo of a specific historical episode. That key Iranian leaders have explicitly denied the very existence of the Holocaust makes this strain of the debate even more poignant. In the eyes of Israeli policymakers, Ahmadinejad's denial of the Holocaust is more than just the ranting of a leader playing to a domestic constituency. It reinforces their perceived connection between an actual calamity and a potential one.

Anderson, for his part, reports very explicitly that Ahmadinejad and his handlers were trying to use him as a vehicle to deliver a particular message. Although Ahmadinejad spoke in familiar, hyperbolic terms, his media officials hinted very strongly that his interview should focus on the prospects for peace between Iran and the United States. Regardless of whether Anderson's article satisfied Ahmadinejad's handlers, it is notable that they wanted to use him to deliver this particular message. Given the outlet, it seems logical that Ahmadinejad wanted to communicate without the filter of diplomacy or politics, directly to Americans (or at least to New Yorker readers). But one point on which Ahmadinjad's officials seemed quite clear was that the nuclear issue should be disentangled from Israel. As reported by Anderson, it appeared that Iranian officials were open to negotiations with the United States but were much less conciliatory toward Israel. This may be part of an Iranian effort to drive a wedge between Israel and the United States, or it may represent a legitimate opening to resolve the nuclear issue. Either way, it contrasts strongly with Israel's own view (as reported by Goldberg) that Iran's nuclear program is aimed squarely in its direction.

Neither the Park51 controversy nor Iran's nuclear program will be resolved by these latest public debates alone. The U.S. campaign to combat Islamic extremism has many components and will not conclude anytime soon, and the governments of Israel, the United States, and Iran guard their true intentions with the utmost secrecy. But this recent activity in public forums is not merely academic. These open debates can be seen and heard (and are) by a much wider audience than intended. And as public debate can be an unpredictable, unruly thing, it is all too easy for passions to overrule reason, or for deliberately crafted messages to be misinterpreted or manipulated. None of this is to suggest that the debate should be stifled. Instead, it is simply incumbent upon everyone engaged in these public debates to realize that their voices carry, and that their effects may be unpredictable. More than mere glimpses into how the games of foreign policy are played, the public debates about Park51 and the Iranian nuclear program could have a direct and profound effect on their very outcomes.

Foreign Policy Association, 27 August 2010

The Government justified these changes in part through emphasising that "there are some families receiving £104,000 a year in housing benefit". However, they have been criticised for failing to consider the evidence relating to such statements:

The rates Osborne used show that prior to yesterday's reforms, anyone granted housing benefit on a five bedroom house in Kensington and Chelsea, one of London's most upmarket boroughs, would have got £2,000 a week.

"It is what the rate would be," said a spokeswoman for the Department for Work and Pensions [DWP]. "We don't have any figures on how many people are claiming that rate."

However, she added that a search of the Daily Mail and the Sun newspaper websites would throw up stories of people being paid the same if not more.

To follow up on this, I submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to the Treasury (George Osborne is Britain's Chancellor) asking how many households were known to claim over £104,000/year or £2,000 per week in housing benefit. I was told that the Treasury "does not hold the information that [I] requested". It was suggested that I contact the DWP; however, it was the DWP which referred a journalist to the tabloid press when asked for figures. This suggests that the Government did not have a strong grasp of (and perhaps had not even looked up) the statistics used to promote a key policy.

After these changes were announced, the Evening Standard reported that "Westminster council said it may have to house poor families outside central London." I therefore asked Westminster some questions under the Freedom of Information Act.

A first thing to note is that only 2 households in Westminster (out of 28,000 claiming LHA) were claiming £2,000/week of this benefit; 81 households were claiming £1,000/week or more. Westminster is one of the more expensive places in the UK to live. While other parts of the country may have more high-level claimants, these figures do suggest that rather few people may be claiming at the 'headline' levels which Osborne used when trying to justify his planned changes.

Worried by the Standard story, I also asked Westminster for any documents relating to the possibility that the Government's proposed housing benefit reforms will lead claimants to leave the borough or which discuss encouraging and/or assisting housing benefits claimants to leave the borough. However, Westminster informed me that "no such documents exist". Councillor Phillipa Roe (Westminster's cabinet for housing) told me that

Council policy is that all households are very welcome to find accommodation in the centre of London if they can find these within the housing benefit caps.
The intention has not been to force claimants from the borough but to support the reduction of the national housing benefit bill and restrain a system which was driving up and distorting private sector rents.
I was therefore commenting on what may occur in some cases as a result of the new caps. The local authority will be providing whatever support is possible to mitigate against this, but both tenants and private sector landlords will have to adjust their sights according to the new rates.
Until the detailed legislation is developed and accompanying regulations, it is however not possible to say exactly now many households will be affected.

These responses to my enquiries suggest that we may be facing some policy- and media-related problems. A benefit on which many of the most vulnerable members of our society depend is being cut. While particular statistics are used to promote policy changes, the Government does not appear to have researched these figures as well as one might have hoped. Some media representations of these policy changes have also been problematic: often (with honourable exceptions) adding to the spinning of these policy plans rather than effectively questioning the ideas and beliefs which may or may not underlie them. Osborne's use of statistics here appears to have been a rather unfortunate case of policy-based evidence; what is equally unfortunate is that many media outlets have uncritically reported this policy-based evidence or even managed to add to the confusion and to the (understandable) alarm which many feel about these changes. Assuming that these tactics will continue to be used, it is increasingly important to find ways to critically engage with Government ab/uses of research and statistics.

Heffernan bemoans the fact that, she believes

Deconstructing science is a fool’s game. In the ’90s, literary critics used to try. They’d argue that science is a system of metaphors, complete with a style and an ideology, rather than the royal road to the truth. They were laughed at as cultural relativists, posers high on Gaul­oises and nut jobs who didn’t believe in gravity. Masha Krasnova-Shabaeva

Science writers play rough. They like hoaxes, humiliations and Oxbridge-style showdowns that let them use words like “claptrap” and “gibberish.” There’s a reason people don’t call themselves deconstructionists and pick fights with science anymore. The old battle is won: books called “The Science of X” fly off shelves, while “The Culture of” books are remaindered.

Heffernan's complains that the prominent science blogging network Science Blogs

has become preoccupied with trivia, name-calling and saber rattling. Maybe that’s why the ScienceBlogs ship started to sink...Clearly I’ve been out of some loop for too long, but does everyone take for granted now that science sites are where graduate students, researchers, doctors and the “skeptical community” go not to interpret data or review experiments but to chip off one-liners, promote their books and jeer at smokers, fat people and churchgoers? And can anyone who still enjoys this class-inflected bloodsport tell me why it has to happen under the banner of science?

Hammering away at an ideology, substituting stridency for contemplation, pummeling its enemies in absentia: ScienceBlogs has become Fox News for the religion-baiting, peak-oil crowd. Though Myers and other science bloggers boast that they can be jerky in the service of anti-charlatanism, that’s not what’s bothersome about them. What’s bothersome is that the site is misleading. It’s not science by scientists, not even remotely; it’s science blogging by science bloggers. And science blogging, apparently, is a form of redundant and effortfully incendiary rhetoric that draws bad-faith moral authority from the word “science” and from occasional invocations of “peer-reviewed” thises and thats.

I do have several concerns about Heffernan's piece. Firstly, I am not sure what her criticisms have to do with Derrida and/or deconstruction. She clearly objects to the tone, ethics and/or mores of a lot that takes place on ScienceBlogs - which is fine - but I do not see any need to invoke a 'Derridean cloak' in order to make such criticisms. While there is a lot of debate about what deconstruction may or may not be - Derrida argued that "All sentences of the type "deconstruction is X" or "deconstruction is not X" a priori miss the point, which is to say that they are at least false" - but I do fail to see what is Derridean or deconstructive about Heffernan's piece.

Secondly, it is unfortunate that - while Heffernan starts by discussing work on the culture of science - her own research into ScienceBlogs and science blogging more broadly seems so weak. Heffernan only quotes a handful of examples from ScienceBlogs (two of which are arguably quoted out of context). While complaining about the lack of discussion of science of ScienceBlogs, she fails to note that a lot of the science blogging on ScienceBlogs and more broadly does focus very much on scientific issues. It is unfortunate that Heffernan focussed on such a narrow range of material.

Heffernan subsequently noted that she regrets recommending the Watt's Up With That blog in the NYT piece, stating that

I’m a stranger to the debates on science blogs, so I frankly didn’t recognize the weatherspeak on the blog as “denialist”; I didn’t even know about denialism. I’m don’t endorse the views on the Watts blog, and I’m extremely sorry the recommendation seemed ideological.

I would argue that using the tools of the social sciences and humanities to research science is extremely important - I have a conflict of interest here, as I am doing some work around science blogging and would love to develop a couple of other projects on science and science communication if anyone is nice enough to fund me! However, such approaches rely on putting work into researching the topic: to write well about the culture of science (or science blogging) one needs to do some research into what is taking place in these fields. A 'Derridean cloak' is not an excuse to avoid doing basic research or learning about ones subject - instead, deconstructive approaches may open up highly productive ways of doing engaging with this.

Thirdly, Heffernan constructs a number of problematic divisions in the social and cultural terrains she is writing about. She introduces the piece with a discussion of a "science-culture battle" and argues that "battle is won: books called “The Science of X” fly off shelves, while “The Culture of” books are remaindered." Perhaps due to my own social and cultural position - part of the attraction of Geography is it's interdisciplinary nature - I don't see this as a straightforward battle with 'science' and 'culture' sides. This is not a zero-sum game and I am delighted if colleagues writing on topics such as climate change or hydrology are able to gain large audiences. I am also pleased, of course, when work on culture and society attracts large audiences - and sometimes it does, as in the case of geographers such as David Harvey - but I don't see any kind of battle here. It is important for those of us working in the humanities and social sciences to engage with science and scientists, but I don't see how metaphors of battle are helpful in building productive relationships here. Also - while people sometimes disagree with one another and sometimes do so in strong terms - discussion of 'battle' seems to both exaggerate what conflict there is and to pass over the many productive relationships that do exist.

Heffernan criticises ScienceBlogs as

not science by scientists, not even remotely; it’s science blogging by science bloggers

On the face of it, I would have expected to be rather more positive about Heffernan's article. She recommends the study of the culture and language of science - something which I would see as invaluable - and gestures towards theoretical approaches that I am sympathetic towards. However, the article is theoretically weak (I still fail to see a Derridean element to it), empirically poor (it displays inadequate knowledge about the ScienceBlogs and science blogging on which it focuses) and itself constructs problematic divisions and metaphors which would seem ripe for deconstruction and critique.

While Heffernan discusses relationships between scientists and other researchers in terms of a battle, I would argue that it is important to draw on and to develop effective and productive ways of working with and disagreeing with one another. Pieces such as Heffernan's are unhelpful for those of us doing social and cultural research: they give a poor impression of what we do (or try to do) and make it much too easy to dismiss a whole range of work as 'postmodernism'. Rather than re-entering or restarting perceived science-culture battles, poststucturalist approaches might be more useful insofar as they can pull apart some of the taken-for-granted beliefs which underly such 'battles' and open up new types of relationships.

Heffernan announced the NYT piece with a tweet saying that "Science blogs are very strange". Social research can help us to understand the diverse ways in which scientists, science bloggers, journalists and even geographers are strange - and thus, perhaps, to find new and creative ways to work with and around our strangeness.

These links aren't clickable, for an MT-related reason I can't figure out at the moment. I know this is messy - I will look to see if I can get this to appear properly later on.

http://gentlemanschoice.blogspot.com/2010/07/im-nonplussed-by-your-high-dudgeon.html
http://phronesisaical.blogspot.com/2010/08/bits-and-pieces-blogging-edition.html
http://climateprogress.org/2010/08/01/wattsupwiththat-anthony-watts-steven-goddard/
http://ongenetics.blogspot.com/2010/08/defending-science-blogs.html
http://scripting.com/stories/2010/07/31/theNytIsAtItsBestWhen.html
http://ksjtracker.mit.edu/2010/07/31/ny-times-science-bloggers-charged-with-bigotry-and-class-war-claptrap/
http://scienceblogs.com/mikethemadbiologist/2010/07/the_astonishing_arrogance_of_v.php
http://evolvingthoughts.net/2010/07/31/linkraiser/
http://www.genomicron.evolverzone.com/2010/07/im-not-a-science-blogger/
http://neuroanthropology.net/2010/07/31/virginia-heffernan-vs-scienceblogs/
http://scienceblogs.com/erv/2010/07/sciblogs_virginia_heffernans_l.php
http://scienceblogs.com/principles/2010/07/the_heffernan_conundrum.php
http://www.wordyard.com/2010/07/30/heffernan-vs-the-scibloggers-when-community-becomes-commodity/
http://blog.coturnix.org/2010/07/30/is-this-something-that-nytime-editors-proudly-allowed-to-get-published/
http://scienceblogs.com/thoughtfulanimal/2010/07/science_on_scienceblogs.php
http://brianswitek.com/2010/08/back-in-the-saddle/
http://www.neuronculture.com/http:/www.neuronculture.com/archives/for-virginia-hefferman-readers-some-contexst-on-the-scienceblogs-pepsi-fizz
http://neurodojo.blogspot.com/2010/07/dear-virginia.html
http://itsnotalecture.blogspot.com/2010/07/breaking-bloggers-can-be-aholes.html

The Obama administration originally wanted to negotiate a follow-on to the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by the end of last year, when the treaty expired. Failing that, Obama and Russian President Medvedev ultimately signed a follow-on agreement (nicknamed “New START”) in April. New START sets three principal restrictions on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, limiting each country to: 1) 1550 active nuclear warheads; 2) 800 total launchers, which include long-range missiles and bombers; and 3) 700 deployed launchers, which refers to delivery vehicles that are considered operational. This represents a 30 percent reduction in the number of deployed nuclear weapons that had been permitted under prior international agreements. Perhaps even more important than the reductions themselves are the extension and modernization of the provisions by which the United States and Russia monitor each other's nuclear arsenals. These provisions build trust, increase transparency, and limit the potential for unpleasant surprises.

To win ratification in the Senate, New START must secure a two-thirds majority. Despite the Democrats' majority in that chamber, acquiring the 67 votes needed for ratification is a tall order. In an election year, and amid an atmosphere of extreme partisanship, the challenge is even greater. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began holding hearings on New START ratification in June, and a vote by the full Senate on final ratification could take place before the end of this month. But as the pace of ratification has quickened, so too has the intensity and coordination of its opposition. Former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney—a Republican presidential candidate in 2008 and potential 2012 contender—published an op-ed that crystallized the emerging conservative argument against ratification. Romney argued that New START constrains the development of a missile defense system and noted the omission from the treaty text of various weapons types, such as rail-based and air-launched ballistic missiles. He also suggested that the treaty greatly favors Russia because it addresses only long-range, high-yield strategic nuclear weapons and not the shorter-ranged and smaller—but potentially more destabilizing—tactical variety; Russia is thought to rely more heavily on tactical weapons than the United States.

Although Romney surely intended the op-ed to burnish his foreign policy credentials in advance of another presidential run, it has served as something a rallying point for opposition to New START. Conservative activists and some Republican senators have taken up many of the points that Romney articulated. But on their merits, many of Romney's arguments fall short. The preamble of New START notes the relationship between offensive strategic arms (nuclear weapons) and defensive strategic arms (missile defenses). But the preamble is not legally binding, and it does not constrain efforts to construct missile defenses by either party. It further notes that currently deployed missile defenses do not undermine the viability of either U.S. or Russian nuclear weapons. This is a rather significant concession by Russia, which had long argued that plans for a U.S. missile defense system in Europe posed a threat to the viability of its nuclear forces, and not simply to Iran's nascent missile capability. As for the rail-based and air-launched ballistic missiles that Romney highlights, a plain reading of the treaty text would seem to cover such weapons—if they were still viable. Although both the United States and Russia have experimented with launching ballistic missiles by railcar and by airplane, neither method has proven to be particularly useful, and neither one represents any kind of serious threat.

To be fair, much of the Republican foreign policy establishment has downplayed or outright rejected many of Romney's arguments. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)—the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and something of a foreign policy mentor for Obama during his time in the Senate—called Romney's op-ed “hyperbolic” and full of “discredited objections.” Even Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), who is seen as an important source of potential opposition in the Senate, responded to Romney's arguments by calling New START “relatively benign.” Indeed, Romney's specific points of opposition were so roundly rejected by experts from across the political spectrum that they can almost be dismissed outright.

The underlying thrust of Romney's critique, however, is quite serious. It represents just the latest incarnation of a strain of U.S. foreign policy thinking that rejects “foreign entanglements” of all kinds. The term, as popularized in George Washington's farewell address, was intended as a warning for future Americans to avoid being pulled into conflicts that were not their own. But in some conservative quarters, that strain of thinking has evolved over the centuries into an aversion to any kind of international cooperation that could be interpreted as limiting not just U.S. freedom of action, but U.S. power and influence. Compelling arguments can be made that New START does exactly the opposite and actually enhances U.S power—the United States has such superiority in conventional weaponry that any global reduction of the role of nuclear weapons would, by definition, increase the relative power of the United States. But for many politicians, it is far too easy to associate a binding arms-control agreement with a weaker United States. This argument has a certain superficial traction (especially in the hyper-partisan environment of an election year), but it is not supported by reality, and its advocates do a disservice to responsible, popular policy discourse

One of Romney's specific critiques, however, is particularly valid. New START only addresses the active, strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. It does not address the thousands of nuclear weapons in reserve or the shorter-ranged, tactical weapons maintained by both countries. Many of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons pose no direct threat to the United States. They are either intended to deter an attack from China or are dedicated to air defense or naval purposes. Omitting them from New START does not upset the strategic balance between the United States and Russia. But it does leave out an entire class of nuclear weaponry, one that may be less secure than strategic weapons and potentially more amenable to actual use. The omission of tactical weapons does nothing to undermine a treaty that was never designed to include them. But this does not mean that they should go unaddressed. New START also does not include the arsenals of other nuclear powers, such as France and China. Although these countries have far fewer weapons than the United States or Russia, every nuclear weapon—in any country's arsenal—is a dangerous, potentially destabilizing tool.

This is where New START's greatest value may lie. Not only does it continue the tradition of transparency and verifiability between the United States and Russia, but it advances the overall cause of arms control diplomacy. If New START is ratified, it will reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and bring them closer in number to the more limited stockpiles of the world's other nuclear powers. When nuclear arsenals are measured in the hundreds and not the thousands, then every nuclear weapon in the world—and not just those of the United States and Russia—will become eligible for a negotiated reduction. The fate of this process likely will be determined in the coming days and weeks, in the chamber of the U.S. Senate.

Foreign Policy Association, 22 July 2010

Writing a paper on the topic has been interesting in part because of the degree of self-reflection in this community. As noted in the interview, bloggers have very much engaged with ideas around - for example - whether blogging is distinct from the mainstream media. It was also a nice surprise to get home from presenting the paper and talking about related topics in the pub to find that the paper had been tweeted (a worryingly good and very brief summary of the key points - I may have to start drafting papers in 140 character chunks); I have also now signed up for a Twitter account, in part in order to follow such debates.

I now find myself writing a blog post about Alice's blog post about Hauke and my research on science blogging; I will tweet the link to this post after publishing. Much new media discussion can seem like a kind of echo chamber and this type of reflection on reflection on reflection might appear to be an example of that issue. However, what makes the type of science blogging Hauke and I have been researching especially interesting is the focus on activism: the virtual realities of new media are used (with some notable successes) to impact upon our social and political realities. It has been interesting to see how ideas around science blogging (from many more interesting discussants than myself) have been reverberating around in virtual spaces. What will also be important, though, is the wider impact that these ideas are having and will have in future.

Turkey, in particular, has exerted its influence in highly visible ways in recent months. In May, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil announced a deal to reprocess Iranian nuclear fuel (for more, see The Water's Edge, May 2010). This deal was harshly criticized by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who claimed that the Iranians had taken advantage of Turkey and Brazil and that the deal would undermine efforts to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions. The UN Security Council ultimately approved new, tougher sanctions on Iran, over the dissenting votes of Turkey and Brazil.

A few weeks later, Israeli security forces killed nine Turkish civilians while attempting to stop an aid convoy from breaching Israeli's blockade of the Gaza Strip. The convoy originated in Turkey and was sponsored by a Turkish NGO. The global reaction to the Israeli action was understandably harsh, but it paled in comparison to the Turkish reaction. “Israel stands to lose its closest ally in the Middle East if it does not change its mentality,” Erdogan warned. Turkey and Israel do have a history of close relations, but under Erdogan's premiership, the relationship had cooled considerably. Erdogan has been particularly harsh in his criticism of Israeli behavior in Gaza, and the deaths of Turkish citizens only intensified Turkish attitudes. Although the Turkish government did not officially sanction the aid convoy, Erdogan certainly was sympathetic to its mission

Historically, Turkey's importance has been defined by its geography. During the Cold War, the United States perceived Turkey as on the fringes of more important regions—it was far from the flashpoints of Central Europe, too far north of Israel and the oil in the Middle East, and not quite amid the client state chess match in Africa. After the Soviet Union fell, the notion of Turkey as a “bridge”—between Europe and Asia, between Islam and democracy, between the West and the East—became more popular. But in the past 10 years, attitudes within Turkey have changed. Erdogan came to power in 2002 with a clear mandate and a strong parliamentary majority, riding the popularity of his mildly-Islamist AK Party. Progress toward joining the European Union—long a dream of Turkish secularists hoping to anchor Turkey firmly in the West—stalled, due primarily not to a lack of reform in Turkey but to intransigence and opposition in Europe. All the while, Turkey has experienced robust economic growth and increasing demand for its exports in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

All of these factors have led to a remarkable increase in Turkey's influence in its region. If earlier observers (both Turkish and foreign) had thought of Turkey as a bridge between two worlds, or as a conduit through which others' ideas and influence could pass, Turkey now sees itself as a hub from which its own influence now radiates. Fueled by a sense of historical nationalism that is shared by Islamists and secularists alike, Turkey is now pursuing what it calls a “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy. The Iranian nuclear deal is an example of the open, conciliatory approach that this policy entails. Turkey's close relationship with Israel—unique in the Muslim world—also could be seen within the context of this policy. Israel's military action in Gaza in January 2009, however, precipitated a strong negative reaction from Turkey. Erdogan's visible opposition to Israel has made him something of a leader in the Arab street—which, of course, only improves the prospects of Turkish exports to the region. But recent events have shown that seeking greater influence is not always compatible with a “zero problems” foreign policy, especially in a region as volatile as the Middle East. Regardless of Erdogan's diplomatic skills, maintaining close relations with both Iran and Israel at the same time is unlikely to result in “zero problems.”

On the other side of the world, Japan also has found its interests increasingly coming into conflict with those of the United States. This tension recently manifested itself with the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. Last year, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—which had ruled Japan nearly uninterrupted for 55 years—was defeated in parliamentary elections by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), under the leadership of Hatoyama. This represented a monumental change in a political system that had grown ossified, stale, and increasingly beholden to an unaccountable and entrenched bureaucracy. Hatoyama primarily ran on a campaign that pledged to up-root this governing system and introduce a “politician-led” government; after years of economic and political stagnation, this was a popular platform, and the DPJ won handily.

But Hatoyama also ran on a subtle redefinition of Japan's alliance with the United States. While pledging that the U.S. alliance was of vital importance to Japan, Hatoyama stressed that the relationship should exist more on a more equal basis, implying that Japan would not blindly accede to U.S. wishes. This language proved especially popular in Okinawa, which is home to a disproportionate number of U.S. military bases. These bases have long been a source of tension, due to their persistent noise and commotion as well as to several episodes of off-duty U.S. soldiers assaulting Okinawan civilians. In 2006, the Bush administration negotiated a deal with the LDP government at the time to move a significant portion of the U.S. troops on Okinawa to Guam and to relocate one of the major bases on Okinawa to a more sparsely populated location on the island. The deal was intended to address civilian concerns on Okinawa, but because it did not entirely remove the U.S. bases, it was an incomplete solution at best. As part of his platform of redefining the U.S. alliance, Hatoyama pledged to renegotiate the deal to remove U.S. bases from Okinawa entirely.

In many ways, the U.S. response to Hatoyama's stance was predictable. It had negotiated a difficult deal in good faith with Hatoyama's predecessor, and the Defense Department had already begun to make long-term planning decisions based on that deal. Nevertheless, upon taking office, Hatoyama continued to insist to his domestic constituency that the deal would be renegotiated, while appearing to send different signals altogether to the United States. U.S. policymakers, from Obama downward, grew colder and more rigid toward Hatoyama's mixed messages, until the prime minister relented in May and agreed to implement the deal as negotiated in 2006. This unpopular decision broke one of Hatoyama's most prominent campaign pledges, and it led to his resignation earlier this month—giving Japan its fifth new leader in just four years.

The nature of the U.S. alliance with Japan is similar in some respects to its alliance with Turkey. As with Turkey, Japan's unique geography suited U.S. interests during the Cold War. It served almost as seal on Soviet ambitions in the Pacific, and it was strategically located to contain North Korea and support U.S. troops in South Korea. In recent decades, it has served U.S. interests as a useful check on the growing influence of China. Economically, the U.S. and Japan are very tightly linked. Through their alliance, the U.S. has effectively underwritten Japan's defense, allowing Japan to become the world's second-largest economy and a major exporter to the United States. In recent years, however, unease with a relationship has grown, on both sides. Many U.S. officials feel that Japan should carry a greater burden in international affairs and that Washington no longer needs to subsidize Japan's defense. In Japan, some conservative elements view the U.S.-written constitution that forbids offensive military forces as insulting and outdated. Witnessing the growth of China firsthand, some Japanese wonder if the country would be better served by re-orienting its foreign policy accordingly, away from the United States.

In the case of both Turkey and Japan, the interests of the United States are increasingly (and more vocally) coming into conflict with those of its ally. In part, this is due to the relative decline of U.S. influence and to the rise of other global and regional powers. But it is also due to a decades-long tradition of short-term thinking about how the U.S. manages its international alliances. If these are alliances worth maintaining, they must be premised on a set of shared principles and long-term objectives that benefit both partners. Once these principles are established, the U.S. should avoid the temptation of geopolitical myopia. If Turkey shows its independence from the U.S. on issues like Iran's nuclear program or Israel's behavior in Gaza, its credibility among its Muslim neighbors increases. If Japan can redefine its alliance with the U.S. on its own terms, stability may return to its tumultuous politics, allowing it to address serious economic and demographic challenges. The U.S. benefits under both scenarios, as its long-term interests neatly coincide with those of its ally.

Turkey and Japan may have short-term goals that seem to be at odds with U.S. objectives, and in the fast-moving world of diplomacy, this apparent gap may appear significant and worrisome. But each country exists within its own political, economic, and social universe, over which the United States cannot—and should not—hope to exert complete control. As long as the U.S. trusts the fundamental long-term objectives of its allies, it should be more understanding of their short-term policy fluctuations and simply take their louder and discordant voices in stride.

Foreign Policy Association, 25 June 2010

In more interesting news, we're putting together our project itinerary, ie that time/space schema of which stations we'll visit, on which days, and in what order. Thanks to the help of several local radio professionals and radio NGO workers, who circulated our application for three-day production workshops to small community stations throughout the country, we have a substantial list of candidates. Interested radios were asked to describe their programming and how it relates to and serves their communities, and these answers bely the incredible diversity of grassroots, independent radio programming in Kenya. Some are more general service-type radios: they have music, news, local news, etc. Others focus more closely on one subject or area of need: one radio is entirely female-run, and reports on womens' issues; one is a sort of meteorology-cum-media center, and their sole concern is weather reporting for local farmers. Obviously, these quirks and variations will make our project just THAT much more interesting, as we hope to learn social, political, economic (and perhaps agricultural) lessons from our radio hosts as we work with them on recording and editing techniques.