July 26, 2010
Clean start
Anyone concerned with the dangers posed by nuclear weapons (which, arguably, should be pretty much everyone) has had a busy and promising year so far. In the past six months, the United States and Russia have negotiated a new arms control treaty; a major summit was convened on securing loose nuclear material; the United States re-evaluated its nuclear doctrine; and the signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty met to renew their commitments under that bedrock regime. Each of these events, the importance of their timing, and President Obama's personal stake in them has been extensively chronicled in this space (see The Water's Edge April 2009, January 2010, and April 2010). But if the first half of 2010 was busy and flashy, it will be the subsequent months and years—when the promises of the past six months must be fulfilled—that will determine whether the flurry of activity was worthwhile. Senate ratification of the New START agreement is the first big test of Obama's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, and its outcome will be determined in the coming weeks. And as greater attention has focused on the treaty, the stakes for its ratification have become even greater.
The Obama administration originally wanted to negotiate a follow-on to the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by the end of last year, when the treaty expired. Failing that, Obama and Russian President Medvedev ultimately signed a follow-on agreement (nicknamed “New START”) in April. New START sets three principal restrictions on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, limiting each country to: 1) 1550 active nuclear warheads; 2) 800 total launchers, which include long-range missiles and bombers; and 3) 700 deployed launchers, which refers to delivery vehicles that are considered operational. This represents a 30 percent reduction in the number of deployed nuclear weapons that had been permitted under prior international agreements. Perhaps even more important than the reductions themselves are the extension and modernization of the provisions by which the United States and Russia monitor each other's nuclear arsenals. These provisions build trust, increase transparency, and limit the potential for unpleasant surprises.
To win ratification in the Senate, New START must secure a two-thirds majority. Despite the Democrats' majority in that chamber, acquiring the 67 votes needed for ratification is a tall order. In an election year, and amid an atmosphere of extreme partisanship, the challenge is even greater. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began holding hearings on New START ratification in June, and a vote by the full Senate on final ratification could take place before the end of this month. But as the pace of ratification has quickened, so too has the intensity and coordination of its opposition. Former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney—a Republican presidential candidate in 2008 and potential 2012 contender—published an op-ed that crystallized the emerging conservative argument against ratification. Romney argued that New START constrains the development of a missile defense system and noted the omission from the treaty text of various weapons types, such as rail-based and air-launched ballistic missiles. He also suggested that the treaty greatly favors Russia because it addresses only long-range, high-yield strategic nuclear weapons and not the shorter-ranged and smaller—but potentially more destabilizing—tactical variety; Russia is thought to rely more heavily on tactical weapons than the United States.
Although Romney surely intended the op-ed to burnish his foreign policy credentials in advance of another presidential run, it has served as something a rallying point for opposition to New START. Conservative activists and some Republican senators have taken up many of the points that Romney articulated. But on their merits, many of Romney's arguments fall short. The preamble of New START notes the relationship between offensive strategic arms (nuclear weapons) and defensive strategic arms (missile defenses). But the preamble is not legally binding, and it does not constrain efforts to construct missile defenses by either party. It further notes that currently deployed missile defenses do not undermine the viability of either U.S. or Russian nuclear weapons. This is a rather significant concession by Russia, which had long argued that plans for a U.S. missile defense system in Europe posed a threat to the viability of its nuclear forces, and not simply to Iran's nascent missile capability. As for the rail-based and air-launched ballistic missiles that Romney highlights, a plain reading of the treaty text would seem to cover such weapons—if they were still viable. Although both the United States and Russia have experimented with launching ballistic missiles by railcar and by airplane, neither method has proven to be particularly useful, and neither one represents any kind of serious threat.
To be fair, much of the Republican foreign policy establishment has downplayed or outright rejected many of Romney's arguments. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)—the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and something of a foreign policy mentor for Obama during his time in the Senate—called Romney's op-ed “hyperbolic” and full of “discredited objections.” Even Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), who is seen as an important source of potential opposition in the Senate, responded to Romney's arguments by calling New START “relatively benign.” Indeed, Romney's specific points of opposition were so roundly rejected by experts from across the political spectrum that they can almost be dismissed outright.
The underlying thrust of Romney's critique, however, is quite serious. It represents just the latest incarnation of a strain of U.S. foreign policy thinking that rejects “foreign entanglements” of all kinds. The term, as popularized in George Washington's farewell address, was intended as a warning for future Americans to avoid being pulled into conflicts that were not their own. But in some conservative quarters, that strain of thinking has evolved over the centuries into an aversion to any kind of international cooperation that could be interpreted as limiting not just U.S. freedom of action, but U.S. power and influence. Compelling arguments can be made that New START does exactly the opposite and actually enhances U.S power—the United States has such superiority in conventional weaponry that any global reduction of the role of nuclear weapons would, by definition, increase the relative power of the United States. But for many politicians, it is far too easy to associate a binding arms-control agreement with a weaker United States. This argument has a certain superficial traction (especially in the hyper-partisan environment of an election year), but it is not supported by reality, and its advocates do a disservice to responsible, popular policy discourse
One of Romney's specific critiques, however, is particularly valid. New START only addresses the active, strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. It does not address the thousands of nuclear weapons in reserve or the shorter-ranged, tactical weapons maintained by both countries. Many of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons pose no direct threat to the United States. They are either intended to deter an attack from China or are dedicated to air defense or naval purposes. Omitting them from New START does not upset the strategic balance between the United States and Russia. But it does leave out an entire class of nuclear weaponry, one that may be less secure than strategic weapons and potentially more amenable to actual use. The omission of tactical weapons does nothing to undermine a treaty that was never designed to include them. But this does not mean that they should go unaddressed. New START also does not include the arsenals of other nuclear powers, such as France and China. Although these countries have far fewer weapons than the United States or Russia, every nuclear weapon—in any country's arsenal—is a dangerous, potentially destabilizing tool.
This is where New START's greatest value may lie. Not only does it continue the tradition of transparency and verifiability between the United States and Russia, but it advances the overall cause of arms control diplomacy. If New START is ratified, it will reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and bring them closer in number to the more limited stockpiles of the world's other nuclear powers. When nuclear arsenals are measured in the hundreds and not the thousands, then every nuclear weapon in the world—and not just those of the United States and Russia—will become eligible for a negotiated reduction. The fate of this process likely will be determined in the coming days and weeks, in the chamber of the U.S. Senate.
Foreign Policy Association, 22 July 2010
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June 25, 2010
Allied voices
The United States has always depended on regional allies around the world to support its foreign policy agenda. But this is especially true today. Experiences with near-unilateralism in Iraq and elsewhere have shown that the United States cannot simply impose its agenda on its allies, and as a result, President Obama has made multilateralism a centerpiece of his foreign policy. But as the need for multilateralism increases, the voices of U.S. allies are becoming louder. For Turkey and Japan—two historically vital U.S. partners—their voices increasingly seem to clash with U.S. interests. But this impression is mistaken and is clouded by short-term thinking. In dealing with these two important allies, Obama would be well advised to take a longer-term view.
Turkey, in particular, has exerted its influence in highly visible ways in recent months. In May, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil announced a deal to reprocess Iranian nuclear fuel (for more, see The Water's Edge, May 2010). This deal was harshly criticized by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who claimed that the Iranians had taken advantage of Turkey and Brazil and that the deal would undermine efforts to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions. The UN Security Council ultimately approved new, tougher sanctions on Iran, over the dissenting votes of Turkey and Brazil.
A few weeks later, Israeli security forces killed nine Turkish civilians while attempting to stop an aid convoy from breaching Israeli's blockade of the Gaza Strip. The convoy originated in Turkey and was sponsored by a Turkish NGO. The global reaction to the Israeli action was understandably harsh, but it paled in comparison to the Turkish reaction. “Israel stands to lose its closest ally in the Middle East if it does not change its mentality,” Erdogan warned. Turkey and Israel do have a history of close relations, but under Erdogan's premiership, the relationship had cooled considerably. Erdogan has been particularly harsh in his criticism of Israeli behavior in Gaza, and the deaths of Turkish citizens only intensified Turkish attitudes. Although the Turkish government did not officially sanction the aid convoy, Erdogan certainly was sympathetic to its mission
Historically, Turkey's importance has been defined by its geography. During the Cold War, the United States perceived Turkey as on the fringes of more important regions—it was far from the flashpoints of Central Europe, too far north of Israel and the oil in the Middle East, and not quite amid the client state chess match in Africa. After the Soviet Union fell, the notion of Turkey as a “bridge”—between Europe and Asia, between Islam and democracy, between the West and the East—became more popular. But in the past 10 years, attitudes within Turkey have changed. Erdogan came to power in 2002 with a clear mandate and a strong parliamentary majority, riding the popularity of his mildly-Islamist AK Party. Progress toward joining the European Union—long a dream of Turkish secularists hoping to anchor Turkey firmly in the West—stalled, due primarily not to a lack of reform in Turkey but to intransigence and opposition in Europe. All the while, Turkey has experienced robust economic growth and increasing demand for its exports in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.
All of these factors have led to a remarkable increase in Turkey's influence in its region. If earlier observers (both Turkish and foreign) had thought of Turkey as a bridge between two worlds, or as a conduit through which others' ideas and influence could pass, Turkey now sees itself as a hub from which its own influence now radiates. Fueled by a sense of historical nationalism that is shared by Islamists and secularists alike, Turkey is now pursuing what it calls a “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy. The Iranian nuclear deal is an example of the open, conciliatory approach that this policy entails. Turkey's close relationship with Israel—unique in the Muslim world—also could be seen within the context of this policy. Israel's military action in Gaza in January 2009, however, precipitated a strong negative reaction from Turkey. Erdogan's visible opposition to Israel has made him something of a leader in the Arab street—which, of course, only improves the prospects of Turkish exports to the region. But recent events have shown that seeking greater influence is not always compatible with a “zero problems” foreign policy, especially in a region as volatile as the Middle East. Regardless of Erdogan's diplomatic skills, maintaining close relations with both Iran and Israel at the same time is unlikely to result in “zero problems.”
On the other side of the world, Japan also has found its interests increasingly coming into conflict with those of the United States. This tension recently manifested itself with the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. Last year, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—which had ruled Japan nearly uninterrupted for 55 years—was defeated in parliamentary elections by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), under the leadership of Hatoyama. This represented a monumental change in a political system that had grown ossified, stale, and increasingly beholden to an unaccountable and entrenched bureaucracy. Hatoyama primarily ran on a campaign that pledged to up-root this governing system and introduce a “politician-led” government; after years of economic and political stagnation, this was a popular platform, and the DPJ won handily.
But Hatoyama also ran on a subtle redefinition of Japan's alliance with the United States. While pledging that the U.S. alliance was of vital importance to Japan, Hatoyama stressed that the relationship should exist more on a more equal basis, implying that Japan would not blindly accede to U.S. wishes. This language proved especially popular in Okinawa, which is home to a disproportionate number of U.S. military bases. These bases have long been a source of tension, due to their persistent noise and commotion as well as to several episodes of off-duty U.S. soldiers assaulting Okinawan civilians. In 2006, the Bush administration negotiated a deal with the LDP government at the time to move a significant portion of the U.S. troops on Okinawa to Guam and to relocate one of the major bases on Okinawa to a more sparsely populated location on the island. The deal was intended to address civilian concerns on Okinawa, but because it did not entirely remove the U.S. bases, it was an incomplete solution at best. As part of his platform of redefining the U.S. alliance, Hatoyama pledged to renegotiate the deal to remove U.S. bases from Okinawa entirely.
In many ways, the U.S. response to Hatoyama's stance was predictable. It had negotiated a difficult deal in good faith with Hatoyama's predecessor, and the Defense Department had already begun to make long-term planning decisions based on that deal. Nevertheless, upon taking office, Hatoyama continued to insist to his domestic constituency that the deal would be renegotiated, while appearing to send different signals altogether to the United States. U.S. policymakers, from Obama downward, grew colder and more rigid toward Hatoyama's mixed messages, until the prime minister relented in May and agreed to implement the deal as negotiated in 2006. This unpopular decision broke one of Hatoyama's most prominent campaign pledges, and it led to his resignation earlier this month—giving Japan its fifth new leader in just four years.
The nature of the U.S. alliance with Japan is similar in some respects to its alliance with Turkey. As with Turkey, Japan's unique geography suited U.S. interests during the Cold War. It served almost as seal on Soviet ambitions in the Pacific, and it was strategically located to contain North Korea and support U.S. troops in South Korea. In recent decades, it has served U.S. interests as a useful check on the growing influence of China. Economically, the U.S. and Japan are very tightly linked. Through their alliance, the U.S. has effectively underwritten Japan's defense, allowing Japan to become the world's second-largest economy and a major exporter to the United States. In recent years, however, unease with a relationship has grown, on both sides. Many U.S. officials feel that Japan should carry a greater burden in international affairs and that Washington no longer needs to subsidize Japan's defense. In Japan, some conservative elements view the U.S.-written constitution that forbids offensive military forces as insulting and outdated. Witnessing the growth of China firsthand, some Japanese wonder if the country would be better served by re-orienting its foreign policy accordingly, away from the United States.
In the case of both Turkey and Japan, the interests of the United States are increasingly (and more vocally) coming into conflict with those of its ally. In part, this is due to the relative decline of U.S. influence and to the rise of other global and regional powers. But it is also due to a decades-long tradition of short-term thinking about how the U.S. manages its international alliances. If these are alliances worth maintaining, they must be premised on a set of shared principles and long-term objectives that benefit both partners. Once these principles are established, the U.S. should avoid the temptation of geopolitical myopia. If Turkey shows its independence from the U.S. on issues like Iran's nuclear program or Israel's behavior in Gaza, its credibility among its Muslim neighbors increases. If Japan can redefine its alliance with the U.S. on its own terms, stability may return to its tumultuous politics, allowing it to address serious economic and demographic challenges. The U.S. benefits under both scenarios, as its long-term interests neatly coincide with those of its ally.
Turkey and Japan may have short-term goals that seem to be at odds with U.S. objectives, and in the fast-moving world of diplomacy, this apparent gap may appear significant and worrisome. But each country exists within its own political, economic, and social universe, over which the United States cannot—and should not—hope to exert complete control. As long as the U.S. trusts the fundamental long-term objectives of its allies, it should be more understanding of their short-term policy fluctuations and simply take their louder and discordant voices in stride.
Foreign Policy Association, 25 June 2010
Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:54 PM to Asia, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
June 01, 2010
Global upstarts
Recent months have been busy ones in the world of nuclear diplomacy. Many of the most important events already have been covered in this space. But this month, signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) gathered in New York to review progress toward the treaty's twin goals of disarmament and nonproliferation. In many ways, this train of nuclear diplomacy has saved its best stop for last, as the NPT represents the foundation of the global nonproliferation regime and review conferences happen only once every five years. But nuclear diplomacy doesn't always proceed according to plan. Amid the backdrop of the NPT review conference emerged two starkly different approaches to dealing with Iran, one of the NPT's most prominent outlaws. One approach came from the usual power brokers on the UN Security Council. But another came from a pair of over-achieving emerging powers and took many observers by surprise. Whether one approach holds more promise than the other is open to debate. But what is certainly clear is that the pivot points of international relations—and not just nuclear diplomacy—are subtly beginning to shift.
Events surrounding Iran's nuclear aspirations have become somewhat predictable in recent years. Despite repeated assertions that it does not seek nuclear weapons, Iran has flouted NPT requirements and maintained secret nuclear facilities that have been off-limits to international inspectors. But unlike fellow scofflaw North Korea, Iran has technically remained a party to the NPT. Although it does not currently possess nuclear weapons, and its claims for not desiring them may be legitimate, it seems clear that at the very least Iran seeks to master the nuclear fuel cycle. This would give Iran “breakout” capacity—it wouldn't have nuclear weapons, but it would have the ability to build them on short notice.
The response of Iran's neighbors both near and far has followed a similar pattern. Given the aggressive statements of Iran's leaders and the country's long-standing support of Hezbollah and Hamas, Israel views the potential of Iranian nuclear weapons as an existential threat. It is consistently at the vanguard of those advocating a strong response to Iran's NPT transgressions. But Israel's unacknowledged nuclear arsenal lies at the core of Iran's public defense of its own nuclear program: How can Israel, a non-NPT state, be allowed to possess nuclear weapons while Iran, which has remained within the NPT, cannot simply pursue nuclear technology? This argument carries a great deal of weight within the region, but others weigh just as heavily. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, for example, share Iran's view about the hypocrisy of Israel's nuclear arsenal. But they view Shia Iran as a challenger to their own Sunni pre-eminence in the Middle East and in the Muslim world. Despite protestations about Israeli nuclear hypocrisy, there is no country in the Middle East that would welcome a nuclear-armed Iran.
Further afield, the UN Security Council has been a key forum for airing claims about Iranian noncompliance and for levying sanctions. The five permanent members plus Germany (known as the “P 5+1”) have represented the principal negotiating team. Although U.S. policy may seem to have changed dramatically when Barack Obama succeeded George Bush, both presidents have followed a relatively consistent course that refuses to condone Iranian nuclear weapons and pushes for escalating sanctions in the face of increasing Iranian noncompliance, while stopping short (so far) of direct military action.
In the past, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have made their own overtures (as a group) toward Iran, but especially since Obama's election, they have generally followed U.S. policy. China and Russia, on the other hand, have consistently been the greatest hurdles for tougher sanctions on Iran. Russia has provided assistance to Iran's nuclear program in the past and continues to equip Iran's armed forces, and China is a major importer of Iranian oil. Beyond their immediate concerns (or lack thereof) with Iran's nuclear program, both China and Russia view a Western-dominated world order with trepidation. Resistance to tougher sanctions on Iran has been an important way for China and Russia to flex their independent muscles.
But in recent weeks, amid the ongoing NPT review conference, some new players have entered the Iranian nuclear game. With great fanfare, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced a breakthrough deal with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Under the terms of the deal, Iran would ship some of its low enriched uranium to Turkey, which would hold the material until it could be reprocessed to a level of enrichment suitable for civilian use but not for weaponization. The reprocessed uranium then would be returned to Iran for civilian use.
For the United States and its allies, this proposal would remove from Iran some of the material that it could use to develop nuclear weapons. For Iran, the proposal would allow it access to the nuclear material it claims it needs for civilian purposes. The deal is reminiscent of a proposal that fell apart last October that would have had Iran ship some of its low enriched uranium to Russia and France for reprocessing for civilian nuclear use. The quantity to be shipped out of Iran under the Brazilian/Turkish proposal is the same as in the deal of a few months ago. Iran's total stock of uranium, however, has increased significantly since then. Whereas the October deal would have deprived Iran of sufficient uranium to produce a bomb, the Brazilian/Turkish deal would leave Iran with enough material to do just that.
Naturally, the United States and its allies on the Security Council were skeptical of the Brazilian/Turkish proposal. Not only did it seem like a weaker rehashing of their own earlier deal, it seemed to undermine the growing momentum for a new round of tougher sanctions against Iran. As it happens, both Brazil and Turkey currently hold rotating seats on the Security Council. But any effort to undermine the perception of unanimity among the international community—regardless of Security Council votes—could be seen as a boon to the Iranian regime's efforts to stymie Western restrictions on its nuclear program. Indeed, shortly after the Brazilian/Turkish deal was announced, the United States announced a broad agreement (including Russia and China) on a new round of sanctions against Iran. The Security Council could vote on the sanctions in the next month.
Regardless of whether the Brazilian/Turkish deal will trump a new round of sanctions, one thing is particularly noteworthy about this month's spate of diplomacy: Where did Brazil and Turkey come from, and why do they care about the Iranian nuclear program?
The answer is a bit clearer with Turkey, as an immediate neighbor of Iran. Since taking office, Erdogan has earnestly pursued a “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy. The country has long held a unique strategic position, but a strong government and a growing economy have given Turkey greater clout in the region, and it has attempted to use this clout to resolve regional issues. Relations with Greece, Syria, and Armenia are all remarkably strong, and although Turkey's relations with Israel have become a bit tenser, this is a natural consequence of being more sensitive to regional concerns. Brazil, for its part, is finally realizing its longstanding potential as a global power. Under the successful and dynamic leadership of Lula, Brazil has leveraged its significant economic weight more aggressively on the world stage. Although its appearance in the forum of nuclear diplomacy took some by surprise, what is perhaps more surprising is that it has taken Brazil so long to make its presence felt. It is the ninth largest economy in the world, and many feel it is time it started acting as such.
As with many international relations challenges, Iran's nuclear program is can be viewed through multiple lenses. Regionally, it poses a security risk to Israel, while simultaneously drawing attention to that country's own clandestine nuclear program. It also threatens to escalate the centuries-old duel between Persians and Arabs for pre-eminence in the Muslim world. Globally, Iran's nuclear program presents a major challenge to the nonproliferation regime embodied by the NPT. If nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are worthy goals (and Obama certainly thinks they are), then Iran's nuclear program must not be allowed to remain opaque and unaccountable. Iran's program represents a profound threat not only to the NPT, but also to the notion that international regimes can define and enforce global norms and address multilateral problems.
But aside from the direct security challenges that Iran's nuclear program presents to its neighbors and the indirect challenges it poses to the effectiveness of global regimes, it also has served to illuminate the shifting balance of power among states in the international system. For the past decade, at least, the issue has served a vehicle for Russia and China to exert their growing and evolving influence on world affairs, primarily due to their permanent membership on the Security Council and to their growing economic clout. But more recently, global upstarts like Brazil and Turkey have inserted themselves into the process. Their motivations are multiple, and are surely self-serving, in part. Regardless of its merits, the Brazilian/Turkish proposal is a serious one, and it demonstrates the emerging “democratization” of the global balance of power. Whether or not this is a good thing is as yet unclear, and so too are the potential winners and losers from a world in which emerging powers exert greater influence. What is clear, however, is that the balance is inexorably shifting, and both the current and emerging powers must quickly learn to operate in this new reality.
Foreign Policy Association, 28 May 2010
Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:08 AM to Americas, Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
April 26, 2010
Nuclear blast
Over the span of just a few weeks, Obama has leveraged the issue of nuclear weapons in an unprecedented manner. Partly by design and partly by chance, he has staked a tremendous amount of time and capital on his goal of achieving a nuclear-free world. Although he has made concrete achievements in recent weeks, Obama's nuclear spring is reflective of a deeper symbolic trend in his foreign policy—a trend that may be even more important that the agreements and treaties that have been signed.
It has long been clear that the first few months of 2010 would be busy ones for the field of nuclear nonproliferation (for more, see The Water's Edge, January 2010). What was perhaps more difficult to predict was the remarkable timing of certain key events. First came the announcement of a follow-on START agreement between the United States and Russia. The new START agreement sets three principal limits on both U.S. and Russian nuclear forces: 1) 1550 active nuclear warheads; 2) 800 total launchers, which include long-range missiles and bombers; and 3) 700 deployed launchers, which means delivery vehicles considered operational. This represents a 30 percent reduction in the number of deployed nuclear weapons permitted under prior international agreements. Nevertheless, criticism has emerged. Some suggest the reductions are too modest and may not even require cuts beyond what already had been planned. Others note the ridiculousness of counting a bomber as one nuclear weapon, while some say that the treaty may limit U.S. efforts to deploy a missile defense system. Regardless of their accuracy or merit, these critiques are important--the new treaty must be ratified by the Senate before it can take effect. This will require 67 votes, and it is by no means certain that Obama can corral enough Republican support to meet this target. But despite the ratification challenges that lie ahead, the treaty unambiguously does one important thing: it implements a monitoring system that is binding upon both countries, and it reestablishes a basis of trust between the United States and Russia.
Between the announcement of the new START treaty and its signing in Prague came the release of the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which lays out the overall nuclear strategy of the United States. This was only the third NPR conducted since the end of the Cold War and will likely be Obama's only such review. The NPR stated that the “fundamental” role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal was to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies, and it placed significant emphasis on the growing threat of nuclear proliferation to state and non-state actors alike. It foreswore a nuclear retaliation in response to a chemical or biological attack on the United States. And although it did not pledge a “no first use” policy, it did state that the United States would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any country that is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and is in compliance with its provisions. This language artfully makes an exception for a country like Iran. But enshrining the NPT in U.S. nuclear policy sends a powerful symbolic message to the world that international regimes—and compliance with them—still mean something.
Following quickly on the heels of the new START agreement and the release of the NPR was the Nuclear Security Summit, convened by Obama in Washington DC. This gathering sought to draw attention to the dangers posed by unsecured nuclear materials and to set an agenda for dealing with them. Notably, in addition to the typical communiqués that emerge from any international summit, several concrete steps actually were achieved. Ukraine, Canada, and Chile agreed to divest themselves of their stocks of highly enriched uranium, which is particularly vulnerable from a proliferation standpoint. But the summit achieved more that just these concrete steps. It drew leaders from 47 countries, making it the largest U.S.-hosted international gathering since the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945. The power of that historic show of commitment may be hard to quantify, and it will mean nothing if nuclear proliferation continues apace. But it has immense value in terms of highlighting the urgency and importance of the issue.
Each of these events has been in the planning stages for months. That they all reached their climactic final stages within a two-week span is due partly to coincidence, but also partly to a deft recognition of potential opportunity. Of all of the events, the one most fixed in the calendar was the Nuclear Security Summit. Obama had spoken of convening a summit to address nuclear security issues since before his inauguration, and Spring 2010 had long been the most likely timeframe for such a gathering. The other events, however, have been victims of repeated and unanticipated delays. Since the START treaty expired last year, negotiators had been working feverishly to complete a follow-on agreement. Indeed, Obama would have preferred to have reached an agreement before START expired, and failing that, an agreement sooner would have been better than one later. Likewise, the completion of the NPR has been delayed for several months due to internal disputes within the Obama administration. But in the case of the NPR (and, to a slightly lesser degree, the START follow-on treaty), there was no doubt about its eventual completion; it was just a matter of when.
As each initiative faced greater delay, the potential of coordinating their ultimate culmination probably occurred only suddenly. But once it did, the effect of fortuitous timing was a great boon, and it was not felt by Obama alone. Based on public accounts, it seems that the START follow-on agreement was the event over which the Obama administration had the least control. But that isn't to say that the calendar didn't weigh heavily on the minds of the participants. Knowing the nuclear security summit was fast approaching, and knowing that he would be in attendance himself, Russian President Dimitry Medvedev probably faced pressure to reach a START agreement before traveling to Washington. Being perceived as a historic statesman is just as important to Medvedev and his domestic constituencies as it is to Obama's and his.
The fortuitous timing is not over yet. Next month, signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will gather in New York to review progress toward the treaty's goals and to consider any needed changes. The NPT is the bedrock of the global nonproliferation regime, but it has found itself under increasing strain in recent years from the proliferation challenges presented by Iran and North Korea. The NPT Review Conference, above all else that has happened in recent weeks, is the event most locked into the calendar. Review conferences happen every five years at the United Nations, and this conference will draw representatives from an even wider range of countries than Obama's nuclear security summit. The last review conference, in 2005, convened in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the ensuing widespread mistrust of U.S. intentions. Next month's conference thus offers a unique opportunity to advance the NPT's nonproliferation and disarmament goals. That it will take place amidst a U.S. presidential administration that has so explicitly committed itself to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament is yet another coincidence of timing.
What is not entirely coincidental, however, has been how Obama has arrayed the roadmap of events this spring. Operating with the knowledge that certain anchors of timing would be immovable (the NPT Review Conference), he arranged to schedule that which he could (the Nuclear Security Summit) in such a manner as to build momentum for the following event. For those events over which he had only limited control (the signing of the START follow-on treaty and the completion of the NPR), the synergies of timing only helped; the urgency of scheduled conferences spurred resolution of the new START treaty, and within certain limits, the release of the NPR was able to be coordinated with external events.
If nothing else, the events of the past few weeks have demonstrated Obama's sense of timing, his stamina, and—to no small degree—his luck. But they are also reflective of something else. Although nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament have been key goals of this administration, so too has been changing the tone of the previous administration and realizing a shift in global perception of the United States. Regardless of the specific achievements over the past few weeks, the world has seen the United States take a leading role on an issue of global importance. Crucially, the leadership exhibited has not been perceived as overbearing or unilateral. At its core has been a recognition of the importance of international treaties, regimes, and understandings. This is a powerful change in tone that differs dramatically from what has come before, and it is central to Obama's conception of the United States' role in the world. Whether this comparatively new approach will achieve every U.S. policy objective remains to be seen. But the results so far are promising.
Foreign Policy Association, 23 April 2010
Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:36 PM to Europe, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
April 21, 2010
The Art of Diplomacy
A common critique of Barack Obama's foreign policy is that it consistently takes a back seat to domestic affairs. Just this month, Obama canceled a trip to Indonesia and Australia to stay in Washington DC to shepherd health care legislation through Congress. This may have been an extraordinary situation, but it only reinforced the notion that foreign policy just isn't a priority for this president. If correct, the consequences could be profound. If they suspected that the U.S. president had his attention elsewhere, other countries could feel empowered to extract concessions from the United States, or even to treat the U.S. agenda with outright disrespect. Recent weeks have witnessed several potential examples of this behavior. But instead of demonstrating Obama's indifference to foreign policy, these episodes actually are indicative of his willingness to push policy in difficult but needed directions.
The U.S. relationship with Israel is simultaneously one of the country's most important and one of its most troubled. From the Israeli perspective, Obama entered office under a degree of suspicion. Republican presidents traditionally have been seen as more amenable to the Israeli security concerns, and Obama's professed desire to reach out to the Muslim world struck many Israeli observers as naïve at best and as dangerous at worst. Obama has yet to visit Israel as president, so the recent visit by Vice President Joe Biden assumed a great deal of symbolic value. But in the midst of Biden's visit, and shortly after the resumption of indirect talks between Israel and the Palestinians had been announced, Israel's Interior Minister revealed plans to construct 1600 new housing units in East Jerusalem, which has been under Israeli control since the 1967 war. An unquestionably inflammatory move, the announcement undermined the tenuous trust between Israelis, Palestinians, and the U.S. officials who hoped to bring them back to the negotiating table. The timing of the announcement was too pointed to be coincidental. The most plausible explanation was that the announcement was timed if not to embarrass Biden (and Obama, by extension), then at least to demonstrate Israeli independence.
Obama is also facing greater resistance on another complex issue. Last year, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia expired. Negotiators from both countries had been working feverishly to produce a follow-on treaty before START expired, and failing that, they resumed negotiations early this year. Many of the key parameters of a follow-on treaty had been decided, and it was hoped that a formal treaty would not take long to finalize (for more, see The Water's Edge, January 2010). But no treaty has emerged. In large part, this is due to challenges that have been inherent in the process since the beginning. Although both sides have reached a rough understanding on the number of warheads and delivery vehicles a new treaty would permit, Russian concerns about verification procedures persist. Russia also appears increasingly insistent on linking U.S. missile defense plans in Europe with the START follow-on treaty. In February, Romania announced that it had agreed to serve as a base for the U.S. missile defense system in Europe. This would have bothered Russia under any scenario, but the Romanian announcement came before U.S. officials could privately inform their Russian counterparts. This miscue in timing may have spurred Russia's intransigence and its willingness to delay a key component of Obama's nonproliferation agenda.
Are Israel and Russia disrespecting Obama or taking advantage of his supposed distraction from foreign policy? Or do recent reactions to U.S. policies say something deeper about Obama's priorities? The Israeli announcement of housing construction succeeded in raising the ire of the Obama administration. Biden said the announcement ran “counter to the constructive discussions” he had been having in Israel, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called the timing of the announcement “insulting.” Although the episode certainly seemed to be a deliberate affront to U.S. efforts to restart the peace process, the underlying reality complicates that picture. Netanyahu leads a coalition government with several far-right parties that unequivocally oppose the peace process, and the Interior Minister happens to lead one of those parties. It is likely that the announcement was made during Biden's visit without Netanyahu's knowledge, and instead of being designed to embarrass the Obama administration, it may have been targeted at Netanyahu's. Nevertheless, Netanyahu left Washington this week after meetings with Obama that failed to produce even the standard joint statement, leaving U.S.-Israel relations in no better shape than they were upon the Israeli Prime Minister's arrival.
The delay in finalizing a START follow-on treaty was, in a certain sense, inevitable. Arms control treaties are uniquely sensitive and time consuming, and this is especially true for Russia, which sees its nuclear arsenal as central to its post-Cold War influence and prestige. The timing of the Romanian missile defense announcement was clearly botched, but it could not have been a great surprise to Russia. Last year, Obama announced a complete reconfiguration of U.S. missile defense plans in which greater emphasis would be placed on smaller interceptor missiles that would pose less of a threat to Russia's arsenal (for more, see The Water's Edge, September 2009). That the new scheme retained plans for European bases was widely reported and acknowledged. And if the new missile defense plan was an important piece of Obama's national security strategy, his emphasis on nuclear nonproliferation is an essential strategic keystone. Obama has championed nonproliferation issues since long before his presidency, and the coming months will witness several important milestones along the path toward achieving his stated goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. In April, Obama will host a special international summit designed to curb the spread of nuclear materials, and in May, the UN will host the review conference for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which are held every five years. Obama is pushing hard for a START follow-on treaty to build momentum for the events that follow, and it is only natural that such pressure would yield some pushback from Russia. And if reports this week of a final agreement are correct, then Obama's efforts finally will have paid off.
The world of diplomacy is often marked by an excessive and artificial display of politeness. But when sensitive political or security issues are at stake, international actors never hesitate to disregard propriety in the name of their own self-interest. A U.S. president who seems pre-occupied with domestic policy may appear to be a ripe target to be needled, prodded, or otherwise pushed around. But one can only be pushed around when they have forced their way into issues that could easily be left alone. The tensions that have been building in the U.S.-Israel relationship are not a consequence of Obama's withdrawal from it, but rather of his deeper engagement in it. He has pushed Netanyahu hard to freeze settlement construction in the West Bank and to reopen direct negotiations with the Palestinians. And although a START follow-on treaty was inevitable, Obama's focus on nuclear nonproliferation issues and his decision to reconfigure U.S. missile defense plans were by no means a foregone conclusion. These were deliberate policies that he adopted, of which one of the consequences was a tougher, more drawn-out series of negotiations with Russia. Israel and Russia have not disrespected Obama or taken advantage of his domestic political circumstances. Rather, Obama has staked out contentious policies that have placed him in exposed positions. In other words, he's just as engaged as he should be.
Foreign Policy Association, 26 March 2010
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:18 PM to Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
March 12, 2010
Afghan action
One of the early ways that the Obama administration set itself apart from its predecessor (and there were many) was in its re-conceptualization of the war in Afghanistan. Recognizing that the challenges presented by that conflict couldn't be neatly confined within political borders, the administration began to present them as part of a wider “AfPak” problem, which included Pakistan as much as it did Afghanistan. Although the term is more bureaucratic shorthand than anything else, the sentiment behind it is valid. The multiple economic and security challenges in the region are interconnected, and it is only logical that any solution would need to be interconnected, as well. Recent events in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have proven this, but they also suggest that the interconnectedness of the conflict is more complex than the “AfPak” term may imply. They also suggest that the definition of “success” will be as complicated as the definition of the problem.
In Afghanistan itself, U.S. and allied forces — together with their Afghan counterparts — launched a major offensive to clear the town of Marja, in the Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan. Billed as the largest effort of its kind since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Marja offensive seeks to clear a region that has been an important Taliban sanctuary and a hub for drug production and trafficking. The effort is notable for more than just its magnitude. U.S. commanders have tried to emphasize that Afghan government forces have been given a lead role in the operation. Although the bulk of the fighting has been borne by U.S. and British soldiers, it is true that a significant number of Afghan troops have been involved in the operation.
The Marja offensive is also notable for what it is not. Although sharp fighting was reported early in the operation, the most significant challenge—openly acknowledged by U.S. commanders—will come after the fighting has ended. Since 2006, the Taliban has been increasingly successful in undermining government legitimacy across wide swaths of Afghanistan. Fighters are drawn from the local population and are difficult for U.S. forces to target without more troops on the ground. As Taliban forces are attacked, they disappear among the population, only to re-emerge when U.S. forces depart — as they inevitably do. The Taliban have instituted “shadow” governments in parts of the country that allied forces could not secure and that the regime of President Hamid Karzai could not control. In Marja, the objective is to restore that control and regain government legitimacy. Once the region is cleared of Taliban fighters, U.S. and allied forces will hold and secure the area as the Afghan government attempts to provide police, services, and development assistance. “We've got a government in a box, ready to roll in,” said General Stanley McChrystal, commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The challenge will lie in making the “government in a box” take root.
Just as U.S. and Afghan forces were beginning to clear Marja, news emerged of the capture of a major Taliban leader in Pakistan. U.S. and Pakistani intelligence agents arrested Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's military commander and the deputy to the movement's founder, in Karachi. He is the highest-ranking Taliban official yet arrested by U.S. or Pakistani forces, and he potentially could provide a wealth of intelligence about Taliban operations. His arrest also could place significant limitations on the capacity of the Taliban leadership, which might prove to be an important advantage as the Marja campaign unfolds. Several days after news of Baradar's arrest emerged, it was reported that two of the Taliban's “shadow governors” had also been arrested, also in Pakistan. Just as with Baradar's arrest, the capture of the shadow governors could provide a wealth of information and significantly hinder Taliban operations. At the very least, it provides a morale boost for U.S. and Afghan soldiers fighting in Marja.
Perhaps the most important fact about the recent Taliban arrests, however, is that they took place in Pakistan. In Baradar's case, the arrest occurred hundreds of miles from the Afghan border, giving immediate credence to the entire “AfPak” construction. The arrests could not have taken place without the cooperation of Pakistan's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which sponsored the Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan in the 1990s. The ISI's support for the Taliban was deep-seated and complex, but it was rooted Pakistan's desire to have a stable western border. If that was possible, Pakistan could focus its defenses eastward, toward its main rival India. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan upended this policy, forcing Pakistan into a very conflicted position. The tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have served as a base for Taliban fighters, but Pakistan has done little to eliminate their safe haven, despite facing its own growing threat from a Pakistani variant of the Taliban. The recent arrests may indicate a change of mood among the Pakistani leadership, particularly in the ISI. If they have become convinced that the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban are pieces of a larger threat to the region, and if they see their own security threatened by a resurgent Taliban movement in Afghanistan, Pakistani authorities may be more willing to crack down on Taliban fighters in their midst.
Taken together, the operation in Marja and the arrests in Pakistan could signal an important shift of momentum in the Afghan war, away from a resurgent Taliban and toward U.S. and Afghan government forces. This would be a significant fulfillment of Obama's Afghanistan strategy, pieces of which have been developed and revealed over the past year. Richard Holbrooke, the person credited by many as the source for the “AfPak” term, was appointed by Obama as his special representative in the region early in his presidency. Months of diplomacy by him, Stanley McChrystal, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and General David Petraeus (commander of the U.S. Central Command) may have helped convince Pakistan to cooperate more fully in fighting the Afghan Taliban. Last December, Obama announced the deployment of 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan to bolster McChrystal's new counter-insurgency strategy. The Marja operation is an important test of that strategy, which requires more soldiers to defend the civilian population from Taliban influence and to give the Afghan government a chance to reassert control.
Even if recent events do signal a change in momentum, it isn't clear that this would be sufficient to defeat the Taliban in the long-run. As novel as McChrystal's population-centric counter-insurgency may appear — especially in comparison to earlier U.S. tactics in Afghanistan — it really is nothing new. The “clear, hold, build” strategy is a classic approach to dealing with a robust insurgency and a weak central government. It is premised on the fact that an insurgency's greatest source of strength is its popularity among the civilian population. If that loyalty can be transferred to the preferred governmental authorities—if their “hearts and minds” can be won, in other words—the insurgency can be deprived of its lifeblood. The problem is that while this strategy is eminently logical on paper, it is not foolproof in practice. It is true that each insurgency is unique, and there is no indication that the Taliban holds the genuine loyalty of many Afghans; whatever popular support the Taliban has comes from intimidation and ethnic Pashtun solidarity. But the tactics employed by McChrystal do not differ from those used unsuccessfully in countless other counterinsurgency operations through history. He is further burdened by the inherent corruption and ineffectiveness of the Karzai regime, which has yet to acquit itself well. U.S. and allied forces will undoubtedly be able to “clear” and “hold” Marja, but if the Afghan government cannot “build,” their effort will be for naught.
None of this may matter. The goals of Obama's Afghan strategy, as presented last December, are strikingly clear: deny al-Qaeda a safe haven; reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the Afghan government; and strengthen Afghanistan's security forces and government. Notably absent from those goals is any mention of “defeating” the Taliban. This is probably borne both of necessity and good judgment. Politically, it would have been difficult for Obama to send McChrystal the 80,000 additional soldiers he requested, and it is questionable whether even that number would have been sufficient to destroy the Taliban. Strategically, the notion of conclusively “defeating” an insurgency is as old as the “clear, hold, build” strategy itself; barring enormous investment of resources and a nearly limitless appetite for destruction, central governments have poor track record of crushing insurgencies (for more, see The Water's Edge, May 2009). It is to Obama's credit that his Afghanistan policy matches capability with ambition so closely. But to succeed, expectations must be equally realistic. The Taliban will not be defeated. With more troops, better tactics, and closer cooperation from Pakistan, the most that the United States and the Afghan government ultimately can hope for is some kind of negotiated settlement with the Taliban. Given the tumult of Afghan history, such an outcome would not be half bad.
Foreign Policy Association, 5 March 2010
Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:38 PM to Asia, Middle East, Trans-geographical | TrackBack (0)
January 29, 2010
Nonproliferation priorities
In the year since Barack Obama's inauguration, observers of all stripes have attempted to measure his progress in office against his promise as a candidate. Invariably, a mixed impression emerges. On several prominent issues, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, Obama has largely kept to the policy pledges he made as a candidate, satisfying some and frustrating others who had hoped (or presumed) that his positions would be more malleable. On other issues, such as the closure of the Guantanamo Bay military prison, Obama clearly has failed to meet his promises. Some issues, however, did not generate much attention during Obama's election campaign but nonetheless represent an important piece of his foreign policy agenda. One such issue, highlighted in this week's state of the union speech, is nuclear nonproliferation. Although Obama placed great emphasis on the issue in his first year as president, the coming year offers several important opportunities to turn his rhetoric into action.
As a U.S. senator before his presidential run, Obama's formal exposure to foreign policy was limited. But he did sit on the Foreign Relations Committee, and in that capacity he worked closely with Senator Dick Lugar (R-IN). One of Lugar's most notable accomplishments as senator was on the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, created in the early 1990s to provide assistance and expertise to states of the former Soviet Union to dismantle and safeguard their nuclear weapons materials. This program was remarkably successful and has been expanded several times over the past 20 years. Obama attached himself to Lugar soon after taking office and traveled with him to Russia and Ukraine to inspect ongoing CTR activities. The two senators eventually sponsored and helped pass an expansion of the program to cover conventional weapons and to help allies detect and interdict weapons of mass destruction. As a freshman senator, CTR was not an obvious issue to champion, and seeking Lugar as a mentor was not necessarily a politically smart choice. In other words, there were no votes to be gained through nuclear nonproliferation. Obama's active interest in the issue, then, could be interpreted as sincere.
Obama did not make nuclear nonproliferation a centerpiece of his election campaign, but in his first year in office, it became much more prominent. During one of his first major international trips as president, Obama delivered a major address on nuclear nonproliferation. In Prague in April 2009, Obama called for more than just enhanced efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. He stated his intention to seek the eventual abolition of such weapons altogether. Although the notion of a “world without nuclear weapons” may have seemed fanciful, Obama addressed it in realistic terms, and the speech served as confirmation that Obama intended to prioritize the issue (for more, see The Water's Edge, April 2009). Later in the year, at the opening of the UN General Assembly in September, Obama chaired a session of the Security Council that adopted a resolution calling for tighter controls on nuclear materials. And one of the principal justifications beyond Obama's Nobel Peace Prize was his commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.
If Obama clearly stated his commitment to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament during his first year in office, the opportunities to begin realizing that commitment will come in his second year. Domestically, the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is a semi-regular assessment by the Pentagon of the country's nuclear forces, strategy, and readiness. New NPRs have been conducted at the beginning of each new presidential administration since the end of the Cold War, with the last one completed under President Bush in 2002. Originally intended for release late last year, the completion of Obama's new NPR has been pushed back until March at the earliest. Reports indicate that the delay is due to tensions between the Pentagon and White House over the future role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy, and to what extent the missions of deterrence, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism will be balanced. Although Obama has stated his belief that the U.S. arsenal plays an important deterrent role, Pentagon officials believe that his desired de-emphasis of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense strategy goes too far. Tensions also have emerged over how the U.S. nuclear stockpile is remained. Obama has been steadfast in his opposition to the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW), a new class of nuclear weapon designed to be more reliable than existing stock. His opposition is premised on the notion that the United States cannot be an honest broker for nuclear nonproliferation if it is building new nuclear weapons itself. But legitimate concerns exist about the reliability of existing U.S. nuclear weapons, many of which are decades old and cannot be tested. If the U.S. nuclear arsenal is to remain a trusted deterrent—as all sides say they want—reliability is key. If the RRW will not be produced, how the NPR addresses stockpile maintenance, modernization, and reliability becomes even more important, and even more contentious.
Internationally, Obama will also be facing important tests of his nuclear policy. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which governed reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia since 1994, expired in December 2009. Under the terms of START, the maximum allowable number of nuclear warheads for each country is 2200 and the maximum allowable number of launch vehicles is 1600. In July 2009, Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev issued a joint memorandum of understanding that outlined what a START successor treaty should look like. It would reduce each country's strategic nuclear arsenal to between 1500 and 1675 warheads and limit their strategic delivery vehicles to between 500 and 1100. The Obama administration had hoped to negotiate a follow-on treaty before START expired in December, but failing that, both countries agreed to continue observing the terms of the treaty until a new treaty can be finalized. But the longer the delay until a new treaty can be finalized, the more uncertain future nuclear reductions become. Accounts suggest that the main sticking points concern the terms for the verification of future reductions. Whatever form it takes, the START follow-on treaty will require Senate ratification—a challenging prospect given the current political climate. Already, several senators are threatening to link their support for a START follow-on treaty with the outcome of Obama's NPR.
Although Obama faces challenges in implementing his nuclear positions both domestically and in a bilateral setting, perhaps the most important event in the coming year will be in the multilateral realm. In May, the United States will host a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Held every five years, NPT Review Conferences bring together every country that is party to the NPT to consider changes or amendments to the original treaty, dating from 1970. Given Obama's vocal support, the prospects for strengthening the treaty look stronger than they did five years ago. But the outcome of the conference is by no means certain, due to the fact that the NPT largely depends upon faith in a bargain that has been unevenly enforced. The NPT divides the world into Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) that are permitted to have nuclear weapons, and Non Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) that are not. The bargain between NWS and NNWS rests upon two pillars. The NNWS agree not to pursue nuclear weapons, thus countering the proliferation of such devices. In exchange, they have the right to peacefully pursue nuclear technology. They also secured pledges from the NWS to work toward the eventual disarmament of their nuclear arsenals. Given the thousands of nuclear warheads that remain throughout the world, the disarmament pillar of the NPT is its most tenuous—a fact that has never escaped the NNWS. Obama's call for nuclear disarmament is the most explicit statement of its kind from a U.S. president, and already, it has gone a long way toward making this year's review conference a smooth one. But operationalizing this good will and strengthening the NPT will depend heavily on the final nature of Obama's NPR and on the outcome of negotiations on the START successor treaty.
The Nuclear Posture Review, the START successor treaty, and the NPT Review Conference are only the most prominent markers of nonproliferation policy this year—and all will likely be concluded before June. In addition, Obama hopes to win Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to advance a new treaty to prohibit the production of weapons-grade nuclear materials. Surely, he will not accomplish all of these things in one year, and Obama himself has explicitly noted the long-term nature of his goal of a “world without nuclear weapons.” But real accomplishments will be needed if a skeptical world is to be convinced that Obama's lofty rhetoric of the past has a legitimate future.
Foreign Policy Association, 29 January 2010
Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:15 PM to Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
