October 03, 2010
Individual action
Although foreign policy is typically crafted and wielded by states, it has become fashionable in recent years (if not recent decades) to suggest that non-state actors play just as important a role in international relations. The forces of technology and globalization are said to empower corporations, NGOs, terrorist organizations, and ordinary people to shape global events in new and more profound ways. Without question, the power of public debate can influence—and be used to influence—foreign policy (for more, see The Water's Edge, August 2010). This is especially true on the aggregate level, when an issue or idea can motivate large numbers of people to push in a certain direction and elicit a particular policy response. But recent events suggest that the ability of ordinary individuals, acting alone, to affect foreign policy is much less certain, and serve as a reminder that enthusiasm alone is not always enough.
In a climate of prospective “ground zero mosques,” clamor about President's Obama's religion, and escalating pre-election rhetoric, this month's anniversary of the 9/11 attacks evoked particularly passionate responses. In Florida, a rural pastor pledged to hold a “Burn a Koran Day” on September 11 to mark his belief that “Islam is of the Devil.” Pastor Terry Jones' congregation was small, and his beliefs were not reflective of mainstream Christianity. Under no circumstance should Jones' words or actions have had any influence beyond his own, small following. But they did. As September 11 approached, he attracted increasing media attention, which he seemed eager to use to propagate his own extreme views. Nearly all observers opposed Jones' planned Quran-burning. From Afghanistan, General David Petraeus said that his planned actions were already inciting violent opposition and presented a threat to U.S. troops. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called Jones to express his opposition personally. Ultimately, Jones canceled his event, claiming that he had already been successful in conveying his anti-Muslim views.
Jones used the media, however, for more than just that.. Deliberately or not, his planned Quran-burning inspired other radicals to turn their ideology into action. In Texas, Christian activists inspired by Jones held their own Quran-burning event. But as a Quran was about to be burned, a skateboarder named Jacob Isom grabbed the book and prevented its destruction, informing the would-be book burner, “Dude, you have no Quran!” Isom became a modest internet celebrity, and he represented an example of ordinary individuals not propagating hateful speech, but rather squelching it.
Some individuals seek to do more than simply spread an idea, or instead have a much different vision for how to do so. In recent years, several al Qaeda-inspired attacks on the United States have been carried out by individuals with more exuberance than training, acting on their own. Last year, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate explosives in his underwear on a flight to the United States, and earlier this year, Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square in New York. Neither attempt was successful, and although both individuals had plenty of enthusiasm, they lacked the skills and training (and perhaps luck) that would have been necessary for them to succeed.
Whether an individual hopes to carry out (or prevent) a hateful action, or whether they literally seek to harm other people, several things are clear. Ordinary individuals, acting on their own, find it very difficult to influence foreign policy in a direct way. Terry Jones and Jacob Isom are minor figures, with very limited followings, no coherent agenda, and limited means to realize on a larger scale whatever their agendas might be. Their words and actions can inspire or motivate others, or win the attention of powerful figures, but they need a vehicle to carry their agenda to a wider audience. Technology can assist in these efforts, of course, but the mainstream media was still necessary to give Jones' small-bore ideas the national and international attention they ultimately received. Naturally, Abdulmutallab's and Shahzad's attacks received media attention, and security-screening protocols were adjusted as a result. But the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy did not change. Had their attacks been successful and killed hundreds of people, it is not unreasonable to assume that U.S. policy could have shifted dramatically—it certainly did after 9/11.
These recent examples of individual efforts to affect foreign policy stand in contrast to other recent efforts that featured individuals who were better organized, funded, and trained. Compare Jones' efforts to those of the key players in the Park51 debate in New York, which arguably spurred the rash of would-be Quran burnings. The chief proponent of the Park51 center is Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, who has a long reputation as a conciliatory leader in New York and has the support of influential figures in the Muslim community, in the media, and from the State Department itself. Opposition to Park51 has been spurred (if not directly led) by political figures such as Sarah Palin and Newt Gingrich. Not only do these individuals command the loyalty of significant political constituencies, but they have years of experience in crafting public messages and leveraging media attention. Although the Park51 dispute is far from resolved, the key players on each side of the debate stand a much greater chance of affecting the course of U.S. foreign policy than either Terry Jones or Jacob Isom..
In a similar vein, although Abdulmutallab and Shahzad received modest inspiration and training from others, they carried out their attacks on their own, and in isolation. Their failure as individuals stands in stark contrast to the dramatic success (from their perspective) of the 9/11 hijackers. On the most direct level, that plot involved 19 people working in tandem. Behind them were dozens of people around the globe who provided financial, technical, or logistical support, and who had been planning meticulously for years. Perhaps most famous of these behind-the-scenes supporters was Osama bin Laden. By all accounts, he did not conceive of the 9/11 attacks himself. But he possessed certain characteristics that were unique, and in some cases completely unteachable. He was the charismatic leader of a burgeoning movement, and he was able to earn notoriety from his opponents and lure like-minded people to his cause. But bin Laden also possessed exceptional financial resources and personal connections. These qualities not only allowed him to build al Qaeda into what it was pre-9/11, but it allowed him to inspire, support, and orchestrate the violent actions of those who shared his worldview.
None of this is to suggest that ordinary individuals have no role in shaping foreign policy—far from it. In fact, in a democracy, individuals have a responsibility to consider the relevant issues and to express their opinions on them. At the extreme, individuals certainly can cause great damage; Nidal Malik Hasan killed 13 people at Ft. Hood last year. Jones himself acquired a sort of temporary fame, and the media gave him a platform to spread his views. Abdulmutallab and Shahzad failed in their attacks, but their arrests drew media and political attention, and they served to remind Americans of a still-existing threat. Arguably, this visibility is what these individuals sought all along.
But visibility only goes so far, and eliciting a short-term response is not a sustainable strategy for policy change. Any untrained individual can cause a ruckus and attract the spotlight. To actually change policy, however, a ruckus alone is insufficient. Clear plans, abundant finances, devoted followers, media and political connections, well-run organizations, and simple luck are the ingredients necessary to turn individual action into any kind of effort to achieve real policy change. This is especially true in the realm of foreign policy, which historically has been more isolated from the whims of public opinion. It is still true that globalization and technology are empowering forces; the fact that money and ideas can spread cheaply and rapidly means that more people can become engaged in policy debates—for good or ill—than ever before. But these forces do not, and cannot, replace the much older prerogatives for effective grassroots policy influence: organization, money, and media. With these necessary tools, individuals have a much better chance to elicit the policy changes they hope to achieve. Whether such changes serve the common good, however, is another question entirely.
Foreign Policy Association, 23 September 2010
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:39 PM to Trans-geographical | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
