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March 29, 2005
Official reconstruction
The FT reports that the National Intelligence Council is whipping up a secret list of 25 countries in which instability may lead to U.S. intervention. Carlos Pascual, the head of the recently formed Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and the source for this news, offers some background:
Mr Pascual told a conference last week on reconstructing and stabilising war-torn states that the NIC would identify countries of “greatest instability and risk” to clarify priorities and allocate resources. The watch-list was classified, according to a spokesperson. However, another official gave the example of Nepal, saying it was the subject of a study on fragile states by USAid, the government aid agency. USAid declined to comment.
I have a couple things to say about this. First, I don't particularly have a problem with the NIC collecting information and planning for contingencies. While breathless talk of a U.S. "hit-list" certainly sounds exciting in this season of preventative wars, one of the most important jobs of the intelligence community is to plan for contingencies that may never come to pass. That way, when seemingly unlikely events develop, policymakers will at least have some data and thinking on which to base their responses.
Second, and perhaps the more notable piece of the FT story, is the nature of the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. Surely motivated by the unspinnable and undeniable difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq to ignore campaign rhetoric in opposition to "nation-building," the administration was compelled to create the Office last year. This was a smart, if belated, decision. As some have rightly noted, the United States needs a trained and able civilian capacity to deal with post-conflict reconstruction, especially if this country -- intentionally or otherwise -- plans to create future demand for such reconstructive capacity. It was also probably wise to place this office in the State Department, which has a recent track record of getting things right, at least with regards to Iraq. But its small budget -- $17 million this year and $124 million in FY2006 -- belies the Office's true significance in the Bush administration's panoply of foreign policy bureaucracies. Further hatcheting by a Republican congress doesn't help much, either. Is its creation too late to have an effect in Iraq, and if not, will its paltry budget and congressional and executive opposition allow it much freedom of action? And if the Office missed the boat on Iraq, to which "unstable" country will its work be called next?
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:02 PM to U. S. Politics
