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March 27, 2005

Running guns (and planes)

The U.S. decision to supply F-16s to Pakistan was rightly big news late last week. U.S. policy toward that country is rife with contradictions. Pakistan is a "major non-NATO ally," yet much of its population is radically Muslim and militantly anti-United States; it was vital in the invasion of Afghanistan and remains so in the ongoing "war on terror," yet it is an arch-proliferator of WMD; it fits within Bush's mission to spread democracy and smite tyranny, yet it's ruled by an unelected military leader. And as Jai has noted, while F-16s would be overkill for al-Qaeda hunting, they're perfect for nuke-carrying. India's displeasure, then, is perfectly understandable.

The Bush administration appears to have been prepared for this. Just as the transfer of fighters to Pakistan is announced, the State Department unveils plans to make India a "major world power." At the very least, it's quaint and amusing that the U.S. government has granted itself such kingmaking authority. But the details?

We understand fully the implications, including military implications, of [helping India become a major world power]. This includes political moves, like the President will invite Prime Minister Singh -- is inviting Prime Minister Singh to visit him in July here in the United States. The President would also like to travel to South Asia later this year or early next year and those presidential meetings, in turn, will be consolidating an enhanced dialogue on three tracks.

First, strategic dialogue. The strategic dialogue will include global issues, the kinds of issues you would discuss with a world power. Regional security issues, things like the tsunami situation or Nepal. And India's defense requirements, high-tech cooperation, expanding the current High Technology Cooperation Group and manufacturing licenses, even working towards U.S.-India defense co-production.

Thus, it would follow that the U.S. will respond positively to the current Indian request for information on its bid to sell -- or its bid for people who are willing to sell India its next generation of multi-role combat aircraft and the U.S. will work with U.S. companies that seek to participate in the competition for this sale.

That's not just F-16s. It could be F-18s. But beyond that, the U.S. is ready to discuss even more fundamental issues of defense transformation with India, including transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early warning and missile defense. Some of these items may not be as glamorous as combat aircraft, but I think for those of you who follow defense issues you'll appreciate the significance. [emphasis mine]

Basically, what we have here is the Bush administration buying off and balancing bitter foes with weaponry. There is certainly a precedent for this -- ever wonder why Egypt gets so much from the United States? In that case, however, the circumstances are much clearer. The United States had long supported Israel, so increased aid to Egypt sent a particular message. More importantly, the United States had brokered a peace process between the two countries, culminating at Camp David in 1978, in which proportional military assistance to Israel and Egypt represented a deliberate component of a broader, more strategic process. In the case of India and Pakistan, however, the U.S. strategy appears to be lacking. Inasmuch as there is a India-Pakistan peace process, the United States is not its sole broker, and its leverage is consequently lacking. Any attempt to modulate the situation through arms transfer is necessarily risky and incomplete, given the lack of broader, strategic framework for peace.

In lieu of an effective strategy, then, the Bush administration is playing geopolitics (nothing new there) with weapons transfers, a situation made ironic by the staunch U.S. opposition to Europe for trying to do the same. Pakistan, which probably doesn't deserve additional nuclear delivery vehicles but is an invaluable U.S. ally, gets weapons. India, a vibrant if imperfect democracy that represents the only legitimate target of such delivery vehicles, gets its own weapons (maybe even F-18s, if it's lucky!) as a sop. And what does the United States, the region, or the world get for all these weapons transfers? Peace, or at least a legitimate hope, practical road map, or reliable framework thereof? Nope.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:20 PM to Asia,