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May 30, 2005
Winners and losers
While he may call for "reflection", there can be no doubt that Tony Blair is thrilled by the results of this weekend's French referendum. In their infinite wisdom or lack thereof (depending on your perspective) and with very high turnout, the French rejected the EU constitution, 56% to 44%. The Dutch are likely to follow the French lead in a few days time, and many Eurocrats are ringing some very dire bells. But Tony? As I've noted here before, a huge weight has now been lifted from his shoulders. His promised British referendum will likely not come to pass, and thus will likely never be defeated soundly, as many have predicted it would be. So don't be fooled by Blair's reticence -- he's a very happy camper.
But what of the EU? The Council will meet on June 16 to debate whether the constitution has a future. But you needn't wait that long, or even longer, to find out what will happen. In some form or another, pieces of the constitution will ultimately be adopted by the EU member states. The method will be one of intergovernmental treaties or agreements, without pesky referenda mucking up the works. What are the pieces most likely to be salvaged? Probably the position of an EU foreign minister, and possibly that of a permanent EU president. Less likely, but still very possible, are the extension of qualified majority voting to more issue domains, an expansion of Parliament's competencies, and reform of the Commission. These are all tricky subjects, but that the member states could agree to them en masse for incorporation into the constitution means a lot. Plus, there will be a lot of pressure to demonstrate some forward movement or progress in the wake of the French referendum. Might take some time, and it won't be easy, but some pieces will be salvaged. That aside, though, the constitution itself is a dead letter.
Frankly, though, I'm bemused by the uproar of surprise and faux shock at this result. The final tally almost precisely matched what polls had been indicating for months. As I have pointed out, we've already known the more important victor in this referendum for some months now. As a matter of fact, we've known the victor from the very day that Chirac announced that he would be putting the constitution before his people. That victor? The EU.
Make no mistake -- the EU is in for some rough weeks, months, and years ahead. But it's not going anywhere. The EU will not vanish overnight, nor will it vanish in several years' time. But the EU was living on borrowed time. The past 15 years have seen an unprecedented deepening of the EU's powers and a broadening of its borders. Popular engagement, where applicable, had been a fudged or close-run affair. For all the good it has done and for all the burucrats it has employed, the EU remains nothing more than a big theory. It needed to face a genuine, honest popular reckoning with reality before it could truly advance. This reckoning was long overdue, and the longer it was put off, the more risky it became. But such a reckoning came on Sunday.
Opponents of the EU and of the constitution seem to revel in its defeat, and so they should. They won a close-fought, honest debate of the issues. But their mere participation in the debate gives the EU a popular legitimacy that it could never bestow upon itself. The French -- and indeed, all Europeans -- have been engaged in a monumental debate over the nature of the EU and over how they themselves can hope to benefit from it. That is a legitimation of the EU, and thus a victory for the institution. The constitution's defeat is but a mere detail -- a serious and problematic one, sure, but far from life-threatening. Likewise, had the French approved the constitution, many Eurocrats would've felt a bullet dodged. But the EU itself would not necessarily have been any better off. The constitution is a flawed compromise document, as the EU itself is a flawed compromise institution. But flawed compromises are the essential lifeblood of any consociational polity -- look at the United States and the United Nations. That their founding documents are imperfect and unpopular among some has in no way diminished the fundamental and profound value of either institution. And so too with the EU.
I have no idea what the next few months and years hold for the EU. But to those who cheer in celebration or cry in defeat, I say only this: settle down. This vote was decided many months ago, and the EU -- as a mere theory in dire need of popular legitimation and a reality check -- was the victor.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:09 PM to Europe
May 27, 2005
Helping out
As he did before, Schroeder is trying to help his European brethren in Paris. This weekend is the big test -- it'll be interesting to see who claims victory on Monday.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:32 PM to Europe
May 26, 2005
Ineffectual ringmaster
The Bush administration offers its comments on Japan's recent rough stretch:
A senior U.S. State Department official on Thursday expressed concern about recent conflicts between Japan and China and South Korea and encouraged them to resolve their differences, saying their relations are ''essential to stability and prosperity in Asia.''
China and Japan ''have many common interests, and we encourage stable relations between them and engagement on a full range of issues,'' U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill said in a House of Representatives hearing.
Nothing wrong with that. Though as is often the case with ostensibly impartial diplomatic statements, the United States is clearly taking sides. Japan's been a very well-behaved U.S. ally of late, and the administration looks out for its own. Plus, China is the next big enemy, anyway (right?), so there's no use in just delaying the inevitable testiness.
But what of South Korea, which like Japan but unlike China remains a rather legitimate U.S. ally? The Koreans have certainly had their issues with Japan, as well. Assistant Secretary Hill didn't forget about them:
Despite the discord between Japan and South Korea, Hill was upbeat on future relations.
''My own belief is that our democratic allies have both the will and the ability to resolve their disputes,'' he said, noting that the United States has urged the two countries to mend their ties and ''not to allow their differences to escalate.''
Again, nothing wrong with that. But fixing up relations between the United States' "democratic allies" in East Asia will require more than just generic congressional testimony, especially in light of things like this:
South Korea demanded Thursday that Japan discipline its No.2 diplomat after reports of a comment that his government could not share intelligence on North Korea because Washington no longer trusted Seoul.
The remark, attributed to Deputy Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi of Japan and reportedly made to a group of South Korean lawmakers in Tokyo on May 11, was disclosed this week in Seoul. The incident has pushed South Korea's already troubled relations with Japan to a new low.
On Thursday the South Korean Foreign Ministry called in the Japanese ambassador, Toshiyuki Takano, and demanded an apology. The Seoul government warned that bilateral relations could be "seriously affected."
According to South Korean politicians who were present at the meeting, Yachi said: "Since the United States does not have sufficient trust in South Korea, Japan finds it a problem to share information it has received from Washington with South Korea." [emphasis mine]
Who knows if what Yachi said was technically accurate. Thing is, it doesn't matter. A Japanese diplomat implies a lack of U.S. trust in Korea, and the Koreans, in turn, warn that this will damage bilateral relations -- with Japan. Think about that. If and when you do, chances are you'll have given it greater consideration than any of the parties involved in this ridiculous but all-too-serious spat.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:39 PM to Asia
May 25, 2005
Open for business
As previously discussed here, the BTC pipeline has finally opened for business, to great fanfare:
The presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey pulled orange levers Wednesday to send the first flow of Caspian Sea crude into a $3.2 billion pipeline seen as key to reducing the West's reliance on Middle East oil.
By year's end, the 1,100-mile pipeline is to ship up to 1 million barrels a day to Turkey's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.
President Bush, whose administration is seeking to diversify energy sources, said in a letter read at the ceremony by Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman that the pipeline "opens a new era in the Caspian Basin's development."
There's a fair variety of coverage about this opening, including a snippy piece in the Independent and a nostalgic, Azeri-focused take in the Times. Of greatest interest to me, however, is a fine piece in the Christian Science Monitor focusing on what the BTC pipeline means for Turkey:
For Turkey, which has few energy supplies of its own, the pipeline is the initial step in its effort to become a major energy player, not as a producer but as a transit point. In an era when countries are increasingly looking to diversify their energy sources, Turkey hopes to establish itself as a kind of energy supermarket, betting that controlling oil routes will turn out to be as strategically valuable as producing the stuff.
"Geographically, Turkey is endowed with advantages, so we would like to use those advantages to give Turkey a role as a supplier of energy resources," says a senior Turkish foreign ministry official involved in energy issues. "It gives Turkey relevance." [emphasis mine]
I've long been fascinated by Turkey's unique geopolitical position, and the BTC pipeline is a classic example of Turkey utilizing that position to its advantage. That Turkey benefits from the BTC pipeline as an energy transit point is no surprise. Nor, for that matter, is the obvious Turkish desire to have seen the pipeline project through to its completion, and on the specific BTC routing. But I doubt Turkey alone could have swung the route to its advantage. No, it called upon its stalwart ally in the United States to twist some arms and provide some capital. And why? Because Turkey is the indispensable country, for so many others, in so many ways. Remember that the BTC project stretches back years. In its earlier phases, before any ground had been broken, Saddam Hussein still ruled Iraq. To keep him in his box -- the desired Iraq strategy during the 1990s -- Turkey was vital. No one had any way of knowing that the United States would seek and execute a pretext to occupy Iraq, nor could anyone know that Turkey would be under the strong but democratic rule of a mildly Islamist Prime Minister, nor could anyone know that the party led by that Prime Minister would deny U.S. troops access to Turkey as a staging ground for invasion. The only constant was Turkey's prime geopolitical position and, despite invasion rebuffs, its alliance with the United States. My point is that the two are inextricably linked, and Turkey consequently has much greater influence than any other country its size ordinarily should. And as times and priorities change, so does the nature and orientation of Turkey's influence. As the CSM concludes:
"It was originally a US strategic thing, to get around Iran and Russia," says Gareth Winrow, an energy and foreign policy expert at Istanbul Bilgi University. "Now there is the EU wanting to diversify its resources and build new pipelines.
"These things are coming together - US interests, EU interests, and Turkish interests, and it's something Turkish officials know they can play on."
Another benefit of the BTC pipeline to Turkey, of course, is the reduced specter of dangerous tanker traffic in the Bosporus. That congested waterway is already much too polluted, and the prospect of vastly greater petroleum traffic within meters of Istanbul pleased no one. So while the BTC pipeline may entrench an unpleasant Azeri government, and while oil companies may be profiting exorbitantly, and while locals may have been displaced in the pipeline's construction, and while the whole project just perpetuates an unhealthy petrochemical obsession, it saves the Bosporus from greater pollution. Say what you will in opposition to BTC, but I think millions of Istanbulis are at least somewhat grateful for it.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:41 PM to Asia, Europe, Middle East
May 24, 2005
Connecting the dots
Our old friend Kong Quan at the PRC Foreign Ministry had something to say about Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi's slap in the face:
On the evening of May 23, in response to questions from the press, Spokesperson Kong Quan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the Chinese Government attaches great importance to Sino-Japanese relations and has made unremitting efforts to the improvement and development of the relations, which is well demonstrated by Vice Premier Wu Yi's visit to Japan. It is regrettable that, during her visit in Japan, the Japanese leader repeatedly made remarks on the visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which is inconducive to the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations. The Chinese side strongly feels unsatisfied with it and sincerely hopes that both sides will work together to implement the five-point proposition put forward by President Hu Jintao, so that the Sino-Japanese relations could develop on a sound and stable track. [emphasis mine]
I must say, I'm surprised by Mr. Kong's forthrightness. He may not have spelled things out piece by piece, but tying Vice Premier Wu's snub to Koizumi's recent (and apparently unappreciated) comments on Yasukuni is pretty much spot on, I'd say.
Koizumi, for his part, got a little uppity:
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on Tuesday brushed aside China's claim that Japanese leaders' position on the war-related Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo led to the sudden cancellation of a meeting between himself and Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi.
"Not only the Chinese side has its say -- both sides have something to say," Koizumi told reporters at his office, referring to remarks by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman in Beijing that the Yasukuni issue prompted Wu to cancel the Monday meeting.
"I said I would meet. I'm not the one who canceled it," Koizumi said. "Don't you think the Chinese side is the one sticking to this issue?"
[...]
Koizumi indicated Tuesday that the Chinese claim will have no effect on his visits to the Shinto shrine as he reiterated about future visits, "I will make an appropriate decision." [emphasis mine]
Well that's a good way to de-escalate things, don't you think? I'm beginning to think that China and Japan actually prefer to be snippy with each other.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:43 AM to Asia
May 23, 2005
Sudden duty
This is pretty cold:
Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi abruptly canceled a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on Monday and returned to China a day ahead of her original schedule, prompting a sharp rebuke from top Japanese officials.
Tokyo was told Wu had shortened her stay in Japan due to an order from Beijing to return home for a ''sudden duty,'' Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda said. [emphasis mine]
Apparently, that "sudden duty" was to "screw the Japanese."
Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:20 PM to Asia
May 22, 2005
One week left
Pretty good overview piece in the Washington Post on next weekend's constitutional referendum in France.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:58 PM to Europe
May 21, 2005
More Yasukuni
Returning to a favorite topic here at Natural Selection, Koizumi clarified the distinction between his professional responsibilities and his personal interests:
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said Friday that when he visits the notorious Yasukuni Shrine he does so as a private individual and not in his capacity as premier, Kyodo News reported.
"I pay a visit as a person and not as duty of the prime minister," Koizumi was quoted as saying at a House of Councillors Budget Committee session.
"Junichiro Koizumi, who is prime minister, is paying a visit as an individual," he reiterated. [emphasis mine]
As I've discussed here before, Yasukuni in many ways is the crux of Japan's unsettled historical and diplomatic position in East Asia. The point Koizumi is making here is certainly legitimate, but it also misses the point in a monumental and quintessentially Japanese way. Koizumi's personal interests simply don't matter in this case, just as the personal interests of any head of government become secondary to professional considerations upon taking office.
His own visits aside, Koizumi also touched obliquely on the actual nature of Yasukuni:
On Friday, Koizumi reiterated that his visits to the Shinto shrine in Tokyo were to pay respect to those who died and to vow that Japan would never again wage war.
"The criticism that this glorifies war is not right," Koizumi said.
Well, maybe, but that doesn't matter. Taken together, Koizumi is basically dodging the whole Yasukuni issue. He is more cognizant of the Yasukuni controversy than perhaps anyone else. Yet he innocently defends his right to visit the shrine as he pleases, and he glances away the suggestions that Yasukuni itself is a problematic place. I think I can say with a fair degree of certainty that Koizumi's statements are far from the "concrete actions" that China has requested from Japan.
Despite this, Koizumi lamely claimed that his visits to Koizumi should have nothing to do with Japan's Security Council bid:
"My visits to Yasukuni Shrine and Japan's bid for permanent membership are separate issues and have no links," Koizumi told reporters
No matter how true such a statement should be, I'm fairly certain that Koizumi's barking up the wrong tree here. While I've criticized China for its recent, unimaginative, and historically-handicapped diplomacy vis a vis Japan, Koizumi himself is far from blameless for the current tensions.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:44 PM to Asia
May 20, 2005
Big talk, foregone conclusion
So this is interesting:
European leaders raised the stakes in the battle for the new constitution on Friday when Jean-Claude Juncker, the prime minister of Luxembourg and the current European Union president, said the EU would not proceed with the new treaty if French voters rejected it in the referendum on May 29.
Officials in Brussels have suggested that if France were to reject the treaty, as opinion polls suggest, it could be renegotiated and put to a second referendum, but Juncker appears to have ruled this out.
Separately, EU foreign ministers are due to meet in Brussels on Sunday as the nations that pay most into the EU's coffers are seeking to scale back future contributions.
"If France votes no in a referendum on the European constitutional treaty, the European Union will lose 20 years. Treaties have never been renegotiated," Juncker said in an interview published Friday in the Belgian newspaper De Standaard. [emphasis mine]
Big talk from Juncker, but my guess is that it's just that: talk. The EU intelligentsia are rightfully scared by the prospects of a French rejection, and they're racking their brains about what would come from such a once-unthinkable scenario. But such speculation derives from a shortsighted conception of the French referendum and misses its wider significance. That France has even put the constitution to a vote -- a core EU country allowing its citizens to pass judgment on the most important EU document in 50 years -- already represents a victory for the EU. This is true regardless of the poll’s eventual outcome.
The EU has long been plagued by a “democratic deficit.” It has often seemed more relevant to bureaucrats in Brussels than to the average Europeans it is supposed to benefit. Over 20 years ago, the EU created a parliament to address, in part, this very same deficit. But despite its growth in authority over the years, the parliament’s power is limited, and the deficit remains. Its cause and effect are one and the same: the EU remains an abstract theory to many because its recent growth has not been matched by effective popular engagement. The French referendum is a big step toward fixing that dangerous shortfall.
Moreover, while acceptance of the constitution would presuppose support for the EU as a theory, rejection would by no means imply the opposite. Whereas many French view the constitution as too economically liberal, many Britons view it as not nearly liberal enough. While the constitution would give the EU a president and a foreign minister, it also reaffirms that the institution is subsidiary to member states. A French acceptance would not necessarily be good for the EU, and a rejection would not necessarily be bad. The two possible outcomes merely represent different realities deriving from the same theory.
The French referendum, then, has already proven to be a victory for the EU. It was a victory from the day France selected the referendum model of ratification, it is today as the constitutional debate rages in France and across Europe, and it will be on May 29, when the EU will face a genuine popular reckoning. The reality resulting from the poll’s fallout -- from either an acceptance or a rejection -- is entirely unpredictable, and that makes it scary.
But democracy, after all, is a little scary. Winston Churchill (no slouch of a European himself) called it the worst form of government except for all others. Europeans, and the French in particular, know this. But if it is to thrive into the future, the imperfect reality of democracy must test the perfect theory of the EU. For all the good it has done and for all the bureaucrats it has employed, the EU remains just that: a theory. So far, it is a theory that has passed every test with reality it has faced, and it likely will pass its next one on May 29. If the French accept the constitution, the test will pass without much consternation. If they reject the constitution, however, the reality faced by the EU will be one more bracing and genuine than it has ever known.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:43 PM to Europe
May 19, 2005
Live and let live
I've long been confounded by Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. He elicits unusually intense, polarized feelings among supporters and detractors alike, and these feelings are shared by many of the media outlets covering Venezuela. As a result it's tough to find sober, even-handed assessments of Chavez and his policies
In my view, one of the more reliable of the anti-Chavez media outlets is the Economist. Occasional cheekiness aside, the Economist has always provided a reliable, honest, well-written glimpse into the world of the center-right. Most of their Chavez reportage, while lacking a certain foaming intensity, has been rather predictably negative. I was a bit surprised, then, when I read the following assessment of U.S. policy toward Chavez:
So what should be done about Mr Chávez? The short answer is not much. The first point to understand about Venezuela's president, a former army officer, is that, like Mr Castro, he thrives on being Washington's bogeyman. For much of the past few years, American policy towards Venezuela has been run by junior officials who have appeared to flirt with regime change. In 2002, the United States failed to condemn, and may have connived in, a short-lived coup against Mr Chávez. That not only sent the wrong message in a region where democracy still needs to be nourished. It played into Mr Chávez's hands, giving him an excuse for repression.
This strikes me as a remarkably sober and altogether logical assessment, and it confirms my faith in the Economist. Chavez is undoubtedly popular among many Venezualan communities, and I don't think he needs an imperialist bogeyman in order to stay in power. But U.S. meddling, or even the impression thereof, only plays into Chavez's demagogic instincts. Ignoring Chavez might deprive him of some of the spotlight that he so craves, leaving him with less of an excuse for his military expenditures and autocratic inclinations.
It would be impossible for the United States to completely ignore Chavez, of course. Not only is he practically a neighbor, but he's one whose oil is vital for the U.S. economy. So by all means, the U.S. government and U.S. firms should continue to conduct fair and equitable business with Venezuela. As for Chavez? Just let him be. Maybe he'll act up in an attempt to garner attention. But without the United States as a clear provocateur, the subsequent international response would justifiably be more broad-based and multilateral.
But a non-interventionist U.S. policy in Latin America? Never gonna happen.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:10 PM to Americas
May 18, 2005
On screen and in space
Well, this is certainly a good idea:
The Air Force, saying it must secure space to protect the nation from attack, is seeking President Bush's approval of a national-security directive that could move the United States closer to fielding offensive and defensive space weapons, according to White House and Air Force officials.
Fortunately, the Air Force is letting loose with their razor-sharp logic and GPS-guided precision to defend the move:
Air Force officials said yesterday that the directive, which is still in draft form, did not call for militarizing space. "The focus of the process is not putting weapons in space," said Maj. Karen Finn, an Air Force spokeswoman, who said that the White House, not the Air Force, makes national policy. "The focus is having free access in space." [emphasis mine}
But lest there be any doubt:
"Space superiority is not our birthright, but it is our destiny," [Gen. Lance Lord, who leads the Air Force Space Command] told an Air Force conference in September. "Space superiority is our day-to-day mission. Space supremacy is our vision for the future."
Ok then. At least the Air Force has a knack for timing. Gotta watch out for all them Sith out there among the stars, lest they become vengeful and clad in black.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:17 PM to Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics
May 17, 2005
Muddled righteousness
It seems that Christopher Hitchens and I have different takes on James Bennet's Iraq piece from this weekend's New York Times:
A doozy classic led the "Week in Review" section on Sunday. Portentously headed "The Mystery of the Insurgency," the article rubbed its eyes at the sheer lunacy and sadism of the Iraqi car bombers and random murderers. At a time when new mass graves are being filled, and old ones are still being dug up, writer James Bennet practically pleaded with the authors of both to come up with an intelligible (or defensible?) reason for his paper to go on calling them "insurgents."
[...]
In my ears, "insurgent" is a bit like "rebel" or even "revolutionary." There's nothing axiomatically pejorative about it, and some passages of history have made it a term of honor. At a minimum, though, it must mean "rising up." These fascists and hirelings are not rising up, they are stamping back down. It's time for respectable outlets to drop the word, to call things by their right names (Baathist or Bin Ladenist or jihadist would all do in this case), and to stop inventing mysteries where none exist.
Hitchens is so breathless he almost forgets to be incomprehensible. But in true form, he pulls through in the end. Well done, chap.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:02 PM to Middle East
May 16, 2005
Missed points, and opportunities
For all its royal wit, the Economist can sure be daft:
Should either or both of these events [Iran and/or North Korea going nuclear] come to pass, note please that it is the world and not just America that will have to rise to the challenge. A lot of Mr Bush's critics will not see it that way. They will take satisfaction in his failure to achieve an aim he put at the forefront of his foreign policy in 2002—and they will argue that the example America made of Saddam Hussein turns out to have fed rather than curbed the nuclear appetite of Iran and North Korea. But that argument is magnificently beside the point. The point now is that both Iran and North Korea are unpredictable regimes whose possession of nuclear weapons would be dangerous in its own right and might also persuade other countries in their neighbourhoods to go nuclear as well. [emphasis mine]
Well, yeah. But the point is also that the Bush administration's behavior thus far has probably had a lot to do with the Iran and North Korea situations getting so out of hand. Instead of reminding readers that Bush may have been prescient in defining an "axis of evil," the Economist could have pointed out that the president's prophesy was in no small part self-fulfilling. And history helps inform the present, and the future. Should the delivery of a half-clever, historically-mixed metaphor three years ago suggest a diplomatic confidence in him for the next three years? The Europeans and others should not feel obliged to address the Iran and North Korea issues because Bush shamed them into doing so. They need to address these nuclear issues, in part, because Bush has so exacerbated them. Going forward, Bush deserves no deference and admiration for his handling of the two countries. Rather, he must demonstrate humility, focus, and patience if he hopes to get the job done, in concert with others.
Indeed, the Economist goes on to make the case that dealing with Iran and North Korea requires a multilateral approach, and that's all well and good. But somebody has to keep their cheeky editors honest. Pithiness can dig almost any argument out of logical quicksand -- almost.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:18 PM to U. S. Politics
May 15, 2005
Boarding by row
There's been much talk recently in D.C. circles about "UN reform" and the personalities required to make such reform a reality. But do you ever wonder what the Bush administration actually thinks about UN reform, confirmation politics aside?
The United States has warned four nations campaigning jointly for permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council that it will not support their cause unless they agree not to ask for the veto power that the five current permanent Council members hold, senior diplomats and administration officials said.
The four nations - Brazil, India, Germany and Japan - are unhappy about that position. "The Security Council is not like an aircraft, with first class, business and economy seats," said Ryozo Kato, Japan's ambassador to the United States.
This isn't necessarily surprising, nor is it necessarily demoralizing. But it's good to see a substantive discussion of the issues of UN reform rather than of the personalities required to implement it. This discussion, as it happens, it a rather interesting one. While the aspiring four countries may be facing opposition, the mere lure of a Security Council seats has forced them into unique cooperation. Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan are not states that typically share many high-level interests. But their coordination in pursuing Security Council seats is remarkable. Check out the piece to get more.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:58 PM to Trans-geographical
No precedent
Fine piece in today's New York Times about the Iraqi insurgency:
The insurgents in Iraq are showing little interest in winning hearts and minds among the majority of Iraqis, in building international legitimacy, or in articulating a governing program or even a unified ideology or cause beyond expelling the Americans. They have put forward no single charismatic leader, developed no alternative government or political wing, displayed no intention of amassing territory to govern now.
Rather than employing the classic rebel tactic of provoking the foreign forces to use clumsy and excessive force and kill civilians, they are cutting out the middleman and killing civilians indiscriminately themselves, in addition to more predictable targets like officials of the new government. Bombings have escalated in the last two weeks, and on Thursday a bomb went off in heavy traffic in Baghdad, killing 21 people.
This surge in the killing of civilians reflects how mysterious the long-term strategy remains - and how the rebels' seeming indifference to the past patterns of insurgency is not necessarily good news for anyone.
A friend currently serving Iraq confirms that a big reason the insurgents have gone after civilians and Iraqi recruits is the ease by which they can. While sophisticated and coordinated in their own way, the insurgents are wary of directly attacking against U.S. forces. And the lack of apparent strategy could very easily be explained by the varied composition of the insurgency itself. But it could not have persisted as long as it has by simply being a disorganized and uncoordinated assemblage of fighters. So what to make of the insurgency?
The common denominator, clearly, is the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq. Whether an insurgent is an ex-Baathist, and Iraqi nationalist, or a foreign jihadist, they would not have taken up arms if the United States had not invaded Iraq. Attacking civilians and Iraqi recruits, then, might logically be an attempt to sow distrust of U.S. authority. But as the NYT piece points out, Iraq is now nominally sovereign, governed by elected leaders -- the argument that the Iraqi government consists of U.S. stooges has grown increasingly difficult to prove. And no matter what the circumstances, attacking civilians does not go far in gaining the insurgency additional popular support.
But this assumes rational behavior on the part of the insurgency, or at least rational behavior as defined by historical precedent. Perhaps, in its own way, chaos is seen as a sufficient end in itself by the insurgency. It could reduce confidence in the Iraqi government and increase resentment of the U.S. occupation. That such chaos doesn't necessarily represent a cohesive message or a governing philosophy might be irrelevant. While the various components of the insurgency may have different ends in mind, they may be putting off such differences and settling on common means for the time being.
I had earlier suggested that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would not necessarily quell the insurgency. I may have been too simplistic in that assessment. A U.S. withdrawal, instead of representing a victory for the insurgency, might actually just fracture it. The nationalists among them would probably consider their goals met and the ex-Baathists might see their violent struggle evolve into a more directly political one. But would the jihadists and foreign fighters just give up and/or go home? I couldn't see that happening. As long as a semblance of representative government persists in Iraq, it will -- in some small way -- represent a success for U.S. policy and liberal political values. While the number of Iraqis who would fight just to oppose such values would be much less than the number who would fight foreign occupation, there would still be some who would. In an environment of such instability, it would be very easy for such disaffected Iraqis to continue their struggle through violent means.
Political values aside, it is inconceivable that any Iraqi government in the near future would take an actively anti-U.S. stance. That alone would be sufficient rationale for unrest and bloodshed, albeit at perhaps reduced levels than it is at present. Think Saudi Arabia -- the pro-U.S. government there certainly generates its fair share of violent opposition. But if the NYT piece proves nothing else, it's that history doesn't serve as a reliable guide to understanding the Iraqi insurgency. Predicting its strategy, then, is next to impossible, and the ultimate outcome of the insurgency is anyone's guess. Perhaps more disturbingly, it's becoming increasingly apparent that the United States is the reactive component in the Iraqi equation. We are not setting the agenda, we are responding to events as they develop, and we don't know enough to throw the insurgency off balance. All in all, not a very hopeful scene.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:16 AM to Middle East
May 14, 2005
China's charm
The IHT ran a piece today entitled, "Beijing charms its neighbors." Given China's recent behavior to the contrary, I wondered what this could possibly be referring to. Turns out, it's this:
China's increased economic power and these changing perceptions have prompted countries along China's periphery to readjust their relations with Beijing. As China's influence continues to grow, many of these countries look to Beijing for regional leadership or, at a minimum, take into account China's interests and concerns in their decision-making.
China's new proactive regional posture is reflected in virtually all policy spheres - political, multilateral, economical and military. Politically, bilateral relations with its neighbors have never been better; many formerly antagonistic relationships (Russia, India, Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia) are now thriving.
Multilaterally, China's engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Central Asia reveals a key element in Beijing's enhanced regional profile - an increased appreciation of "soft power." Chinese media, music, food and popular culture are spreading as never before, while Chinese tourists are fanning out across the region.
Fair points, I agree. But I'm just not used to seeing such a positive appraisal of China's role in East Asian politics, especially not within the past few months. The piece goes on to suggest that while China's "charm offensive" does not necessarily threaten U.S. interests in the region, the positive feelings so assiduously being nurtured by China are strikingly universal. If for no other reason, China's burgeoning domestic market makes this assertion a reality -- China's (exporting) neighbors want a piece of the economic pie.
But much as East Asia may be united in its positive outlook toward China, it's also united by something much more negative and much less contemporary. Japan, appearing to wane in influence relative to China's meteoric rise, once occupied the better part of the region under rather brutal circumstances. The Chinese, for their part, have recently manipulated such historical resentment for domestic and international political gain. While to some this may appear a striking example of crass, unimaginative diplomacy, it may actually be rather astute, given the regional context. What better way to demonstrate regional leadership than by beating up on a universally resented historical foe? In terms of Japan-China relations, stirring up such tension does no good for China. But weighed against the unspoken camaraderie won in the process with its other Asian neighbors, maybe China knew what it was doing all along.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:42 PM to Asia
May 13, 2005
Howard's way
Last week's Economist had a good (if amazingly positive) survey of Australia. If you skipped over it, I recommend you go back and check it out. Of particular note was the rather glowing piece on John Howard's foreign policy:
On two successive days in October 2003, Australia's two houses of Parliament met in joint session to hear first President George Bush and then President Hu Jintao of China. Though many Australians, and not just of the left, found it hard to decide whether it was the warmonger or the tyrant whose presence they found more objectionable, the visits proved one point: Australia has become a country of disproportionate consequence in world affairs. It has achieved the unlikely feat of close friendships with both the world's most powerful state and its most populous one, friendships that are being turned into hard cash. Last year Australia signed a free-trade agreement with America; in April it opened negotiations on one with China. These days, Alexander Downer, Australia's effective if prickly foreign minister, can plausibly say that “there is no need to trade off America against Asia”: Australia has managed to have both.
I'd add to the Economist's example of well-timed Aussie diplomacy the recent visits of Indonesian President Yudhoyono and Malaysian PM Badawi to Canberra in the span of a single week. Clearly, Australia is in a unique position in world affairs, if for no other reason than the fate that placed a Western culture on the edge of Eastern civilization. But despite Howard's avid support of the Iraq war (which I continue to find inexcusable), I've developed a new-found respect for his foreign policy direction.
As I've noted here before and as the Economist reiterates, a great tension in Australian foreign policy is between Asia and America, or rather, to which of the two Australia displays a greater affinity. Howard is commonly criticized for tilting too closely to the United States at the expense of Asia, having agreed with the assertion that Australia has acted as a "deputy sheriff" for the United States in its neck of the words. That was surely an unfortunate mistake on Howard's part, as not even the closest of U.S. allies wants to be identified as a "deputy" anything. But Iraq aside, what else has prompted this moniker?
These storm-clouds aside, one unsung success of the Howard years has been its willingness to take up the burden of the South Pacific, a collection of dysfunctional island nations that no one else wants to grapple with. The first instance was the Australian-led intervention in East Timor, in 1999: but that involved two dozen countries and was blessed with a full-scale UN Security Council resolution. More recently, Australia has found itself drawn into much smaller-scale operations with a big civilian component in the Solomon Islands, in Papua New Guinea and even in Nauru: all countries that became independent only in the late 1960s or 1970s, and have signally failed to prosper. Elsina Wainwright, an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute who has written on Australia's “near abroad”, sees September 11th as instrumental: it helped to focus minds on the dangers of failing states.
The Solomons, a collection of 1,000 islands wracked by civil war and political and economic breakdown, marked a key departure for Australia. Little more than two years ago, the Australian government was still insisting that it could not “presume to fix the problems of the South Pacific countries”. But as the situation in the islands, a three-hour flight from Brisbane, continued to deteriorate, the government performed a complete U-turn. In July 2003, it established and led a multilateral, but overwhelmingly Australian, regional-assistance mission. The Australians are now training the Solomons' own police, and have brought in a team of civil servants to help rebuild the country's economy so that it will eventually be able to function on its own.
But what really spooks Australian planners is Papua New Guinea. It is far bigger than the Solomons (5.8m people rather than 500,000), very much closer, and was an Australian colony until 1975. It has an appalling AIDS problem, a history of attempted secession and abortive coups, and an economy that has stagnated since independence. In the hope of forestalling its collapse, Australia has long thrown money at it: now it is throwing people.
In an exercise modelled on the Solomons intervention, but without the military component, Australia in December 2003 launched its “enhanced co-operation programme” for Papua New Guinea, sending Australian police officers and civil servants to work there. Something similar, but on a much smaller scale, is happening in Nauru. The jury is still out on the new doctrine of “co-operative intervention”, but at least the Australians are trying.
If Australia would not have taken the lead in East Timor, the Solomons, and Papua New Guinea, who would have? The United States certainly has the means, but would it have had the inclination? Especially in the case of its mission in East Timor -- when Australia atoned for its historical sin of condoning Indonesia's original invasion and seriously chilled relations with its populous, Muslim, northern neighbor in the process -- Australia demonstrated the bold behavior not often associated with deputies. There are certainly valid critiques to be made of Australia's recent interventions in the South Pacific. But above all, it took the initiative and set the agenda, and under circumstances that by no means guaranteed success.
The survey also discusses Howard's artful diplomacy vis a vis China. Economically, Australia provides an ample supply of raw materials to meet China's even greater demand for them. The two countries find themselves currently negotiating a free-trade agreement, which is remarkable, as the Economist notes, because Australia already has such an agreement with the United States. The likely tipping point in Australia's delicate balance between China and the United States, of course, is Taiwan, which so often seems to be a disruptive factor in Pacific politics. I cannot envision a situation whereby Australia would break on China's side if the Taiwan situation ever came to blows. Does this represent a fault in Howard's balancing? Hardly. While it's important to maintain positive relationships and to nurture constructive diplomacy, a foreign policy that condones military invasion is not worthy of the name -- principle must always have a place in any responsible state's foreign policy. It's just a shame Howard didn't have that in mind when Bush came calling about Iraq.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:31 PM to Australia/NZ
May 12, 2005
Worthy adversary
I've been meaning to refer to this very good piece in the Washington Post from earlier this week:
According to Hurley and others who recounted the fighting that followed, Lima Company's Marines searched each house they passed. They turned up weapons cache after weapons cache: bombs made to be dropped from airplanes, a bicycle with a seat made of explosives and an antenna for remote-control triggering, a vest rigged with explosives, a car rigged with bombs, mortar tubes, rocket launchers with new backpacks full of rockets, artillery shells.
The costly equipment, as well as body armor later recovered from the bodies of dead insurgents, suggested that the fighters were foreigners, the military said. Though the level of foreigners' involvement in the insurgency has been disputed for nearly two years, Muslim men have come to Iraq from neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia and from as far away as Chechnya and Indonesia to fight the United States and its allies.
The Marines also found Soviet-designed PKM machine guns and belts of armor-piercing ammunition. In contrast, Lima Company was armed with M-16 assault rifles and carried nothing comparable -- nothing that could penetrate walls and floors and still pack enough force to kill.
I have long been intrigued by nature and origin of the Iraqi insurgency. While the WaPo piece does touch on that -- hinting that foreign fighters now represent the most challenging elements of the insurgency -- I'm convinced that the insurgency's composition remains complex. U.S. policy options, consequently, are limited. The fact that recent attacks have predominantly targeted Iraqi military officials and recruits -- by no means a new insurgent strategy -- suggest that a simple U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would not quell the insurgency on its own (not that such a withdrawal would ever happen). Despite the remarkably successful elections in January, organs and representations of the Iraqi government remain the prime targets of the insurgency, with civilians appearing to be a close second. Why? Was the delay in forming a government to blame? Do foreign fighters resent the newly formed government as much as disenfranchised Sunnis or short-changed Shia and Kurds? Or are Iraqi recruits and civilians simply easier to kill than U.S. soldiers?
I don't know the answer, obviously, but I have no doubt that the targeting decisions are deliberate and rational in their own macabre way. Underestimating the insurgency has been a common mistake -- it has not been lacking in strategic sophistication, despite its complex composition. What strikes me most about the WaPo piece, aside from its hints about the insurgency’s composition, is the stunning detail in which it outlines the insurgents' sophistication in the tactical realm. Just as their targeting decisions are deliberate and strategic, the insurgents’ means in carrying out such attacks are frighteningly sophisticated. They are well-equipped, highly-motivated, and tightly-organized. This is nothing new, of course. But it is important to be reminded that in over 2 years of post-invasion occupation, the United States has not conclusively pacified Iraq. Indeed, the trend lines of progress or failure must constantly be scrutinized. Just because Iraqis have voted does not mean that the insurgency is diminished. The goalposts for success in Iraq are constantly moving and maddeningly uncertain, and the insurgents know this. Indeed, it is they who are moving the posts, forcing the United States to react as desired.
As a wise character once opined about a different enemy in a different war, the insurgents -- whoever they may be, whatever their objectives – surely are a "worthy fucking adversary." This doesn’t mean they can’t be beat. It just means that doing so won’t be easy.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:44 PM to Middle East
May 11, 2005
Political alerts
I was convinced a while ago that changing the terror alert level was tied to presidential politics. Now, via Kevin Drum and Eschaton, I see that former DHS chief Tom Ridge concurs:
Ridge, who resigned Feb. 1, said Tuesday that he often disagreed with administration officials who wanted to elevate the threat level to orange, or "high" risk of terrorist attack, but was overruled.
His comments at a Washington forum describe spirited debates over terrorist intelligence and provide rare insight into the inner workings of the nation's homeland security apparatus.
Ridge said he wanted to "debunk the myth" that his agency was responsible for repeatedly raising the alert under a color-coded system he unveiled in 2002.
"More often than not we were the least inclined to raise it," Ridge told reporters. "Sometimes we disagreed with the intelligence assessment. Sometimes we thought even if the intelligence was good, you don't necessarily put the country on (alert). ... There were times when some people were really aggressive about raising it, and we said, 'For that?'" [emphasis mine]
This is intriguing for a couple reasons. First, as Kevin notes, Ridge himself denied this politicization of terror alerts on the Daily Show last week. To break the stoic bonds of Bush administration loyalty in this manner seems rather brazen, and thus makes me wonder if there's more to Ridge's comments than meets the eye. Second, and perhaps partly addressing the first, Ridge really seems to be protecting himself here. His comments suggest that he's shuffling the bulk of the blame upward or outward. It's a very natural human and bureaucratic reaction, sure, but why come forward with it now?
I'm also curious about the "some people" Ridge refers to having pushed to raise the alert level. As the piece later notes:
The level is raised if a majority on the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council favors it and President Bush concurs. Among those on the council with Ridge were Attorney General John Ashcroft, FBI chief Robert Mueller, CIA director George Tenet, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell.
Now, I think there's some sloppy reporting here, because the "Homeland Security Advisory Council" that was created by executive order, resides in DHS, and whose members are appointed by the President does not seem to count Cabinet secretaries (even the newly-former secretaries cited in the article) among its ranks. So I remain a little hazy about the actual procedure behind raising and lowering the alert level. Reagardless, I could guess which people influence the decision, and I could guess with even greater certainty their political leanings. In his recent statement, Ridge seems to be passing the buck along to those "some people" rather explicitly. You would think, at some point, that buck would have to end up on Bush's desk. But don't hold your breath.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:52 AM to U. S. Politics
May 10, 2005
Fighter femmes
I see that the Pakistani Air Force will soon have some female pilots in its ranks. This has to be seen as a positive, if tentative, step. The real question is whether they'll be allowed to fly any of the fancy F-16s recently rangled from the United States. Perhaps, in the off-chance that the female pilots are allowed to fly the F-16s, the whole deal over the fighters will have been worthwhile. Or perhaps not.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:07 PM to Asia
May 09, 2005
Show off
It's really remarkable how many foreign leaders Putin was able to gather in Moscow for the VE commemorations yesterday. It was a rather bizarre scene. The image of troops and tanks parading through Red Square is just straight out of the Cold War, and it really is a rather heavy-handed way for Russia to show the world that it still matters. That is, of course, if marching and goose-stepping count for international influence these days. At least they didn't make the foreign leaders review the festivities from atop Lenin's tomb, as was the custom for Politburo members in the good old days. That would just have been too rich.
But as a sign of how impressive Putin's RSVP list was, just look at some of the wide shots of the commemorations. You'll notice that positions usually reserved for staff or functionaries, in the wings or in the back rows, were populated by the likes of Berlusconi, Koizumi, and Schroeder. Oh, that's right -- they lost.
Incidentally, this happens to be my 100th post in the Watsonblogs community. Hopefully some of them had more of a point than this one.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:03 PM to Europe
May 08, 2005
Unnecessary bluntness
It looks like Bush is really living on the edge with his visit to Riga, and it's probably not an edge that Vladimir Putin much cares for:
Asked if Russia poses a threat to its smaller neighbors, Bush said, ''I certainly hope not.'' But he added that Latvia has little to fear if his hopes turn out to be false. ''We will stand with Latvia if a larger country tries to intimidate the people,'' he said. [emphasis mine]
Nothing subtle to that. Nothing subtle to this, either:
Second-guessing Franklin D. Roosevelt, President Bush said Saturday the United States played a role in Europe's painful division after World War II — a decision that helped cause "one of the greatest wrongs of history" when the Soviet Union imposed its harsh rule across Central and Eastern Europe.
Mr. Bush said the lessons of the past will not be forgotten as the United States tries to spread freedom in the Middle East.
"We will not repeat the mistakes of other generations, appeasing or excusing tyranny, and sacrificing freedom in the vain pursuit of stability," the president said. "We have learned our lesson; no one's liberty is expendable. In the long run, our security and true stability depend on the freedom of others."
I suppose I should be heartened that I live in a country where the President is free to criticize his lionized predecessors. And FDR certainly could've done better at Yalta. But Bush is being a tad heavy-handed here, don't you think? Putting aside for the moment the fact that the United States is currently "excusing tyranny ... in pursuit of stability" all over the world, I think FDR was keenly aware that the Soviets were an imperfect but absolutely vital ally at the time. This isn't to excuse any mistakes he may have made at Yalta. Rather, it's to make the vital but oft-forgotten point that diplomacy is not a game of absolutes. Imperfect trade-offs sometimes have to be given to imperfect partners to achieve imperfect results. Last time I checked, "imperfect" is still a whole lot better than "bad."
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:25 AM to Europe
May 07, 2005
Neverending war
As the 60th anniversary of V-E Day approaches, we're reminded that the haunting ghosts of World Wars II are not confined to East Asia. Steve Gilliard points out that Bush's stopover in the Baltics prior to attending the V-E commemorations in Moscow is loaded with all kinds of historical baggage. In essence, what the Americans and Russians perceive as a victory over Nazism the Balts perceive as the beginnings of Soviet occupation. Both points of view, of course, are completely correct, and that makes the issue so messy. Should the Russians be praised for rolling back Hitler's hordes or condemned for shackling the Baltic states for decades thereafter? Should the Balts be honored for resisting the Soviet (re)invaders or castigated for enthusiastically aiding and abetting Nazi handiwork?
I'm not as concerned with Steve's final conclusion, that Bush's itinerary is driven by domestic, interest group politics. It's not that I doubt it -- as a matter of fact, he's probably on to something. Rather, I'm more generally struck by history's ability to reach beyond the grave, even in the most unexpected places and ways. The Japanese, for their part, are deservedly notorious for their maddening historical ambiguity. But in Europe, Germany has been portrayed as a paragon of contrition. I continue to be amazed that to this day, expressions of Nazi symbology and sympathy are criminalized in Germany -- can illiberal means truly serve liberal ends? Either way, Germany today finds itself much less constrained and criticized than Japan does. It still has its issues with historical reconciliation, but Germany's genuine contrition has won it a subtle yet perceptibly greater level of historical rehabilitation than Japan.
The issue with Balts, moreover, shows that even the "enemies" of World War II inhabit an ambiguous historical space. Who can honestly say that the Soviets represented any kind of good greater than that of Germany? This moral conflict was present at the time, but the fundamental distinction, of course, was that the Soviets were on our side. But today, 60 years after the Nazi surrender, must we still choose sides?
Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:38 PM to Europe
May 06, 2005
Real exit strategy
Like many other countries before it (but very much unlike the United States in the future), it seems that Japan plans to withdraw its troops from Iraq. I can't say I'm terribly surprised by this. Koizumi already demonstrated his loyalty to the United States by contributing troops in the first place, which was no easy thing for him to do. And now that a popularly-elected government has been formed, the rationale for U.S. allies to keep their forces in Iraq is becoming weaker by the day. I don't think it's a coincidence that the Diet-imposed mandate for SDF operations in Iraq expires on December 14. Formal Iraqi elections, based on a fresh constitution, are due on December 15.
Another question: what will the Aussie soldiers who are protecting the SDF troops do once the Japanese leave?
Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:25 PM to Asia, Middle East
May 05, 2005
Chalabi the cat
Good Lord, it's amazing how Ahmad Chalabi always manages to land on his feet. First he helped bamboozle the gullible into invading Iraq. When the country wasn't delivered to him on a silver platter, he got uppity and started passing along U.S. intelligence to his old clerical pals in Iran. His other pals in the U.S. Defense Department didn't much like that, plus they realized they could no longer deny that his pre-war intelligence on Iraqi WMD had been shady if not flat-out wrong. So they cut off his allowance, busted up his house, and had him charged with counterfeiting and his nephew with murder. While the legal charges were later dropped, one might assume that Chalabi had been put in his place.
But like the slippery, resourceful feline he is, Chalabi now finds himself Deputy Prime Minister in the Iraqi cabinet. Sure, it's not the top job, but I'd call it a remarkable comeback nonetheless. And Condi, of all people, was among the first to congratulate him. The irony here is that it was the DOD that was always the chummiest with Chalabi, while State was dispensing some pesky, rational skepticism. No matter -- it's not like Chalabi is in a position to cause any more trouble, right?
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:09 PM to Middle East
May 04, 2005
Hands tied
I saw this story yesterday, about a leaked Joint Chiefs report that notes that ongoing U.S. military action in Iraq and Afghanistan is having a detrimental effect on the military's capacity to respond to threats elsewhere. This seems to me to be a self-evident assertion -- how is the United States able to practice effective coercive diplomacy if the bulk of its army is on occupation duty (or refitting from such duty) in Iraq? Coming from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, however, lends it a certain damning quality. Will the report, or its leakage, affect policy in Iraq and Afghanistan? Surely not; U.S. policy in those countries is too pre-determined, and the stakes are too high, for a radical shift or force allocation adjustment to other potential threats. But it just goes to show that the repercussions of the Iraq war extend far beyond the Middle East.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:35 PM to U. S. Politics
May 03, 2005
Protester profile
There's a very good piece in the IHT about the kinds of Chinese who formed the backbone of the recent anti-Japan protests. Working class types, you would suppose? Nope -- middle class, urban professionals predominantly:
[Li Bin, the chief executive of a health-club chain] says his generation feels pride about China's status in the world. But he thinks the Japanese still look down on Chinese, much as they did 60 years ago. "The Japan issue is deep in our bones," he says.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:43 PM to Asia
May 02, 2005
Koizumi in Europe
Good account of Koizumi's meetings in Luxembourg with EU leaders, including interesting bits about the jockeying over the EU arms embargo on China as well as on the EU's apparent support for Japan's Security Council bid.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:19 PM to Asia, Europe
May 01, 2005
French stakes
In last week's Economist (which I've just gotten around to reading), Charlemagne explores the hypothetical futures following an increasingly likely French rejection of the EU constitution:
In Brussels, the gloomy talk is of a “period of stagnation”, after a French no. That is the most plausible outcome, and few EU citizens would notice the difference. But there is a worse possibility: that the EU might begin to break down. National governments, many of them in serious economic difficulty, might be tempted to seize on the unpopularity of the EU and ignore inconvenient edicts from Brussels. This process is well established for the euro. Germany and France have persistently breached the rules on budget deficits; deficits in Greece, Italy and Portugal are all soaring. This unraveling of EU discipline over the euro might spread to other areas.
True believers might bemoan this trend, but they may have only themselves to blame. Eurosceptics have long predicted that deeper integration based on shallow popular support would spark a backlash. And not just Eurosceptics. A year before the constitutional convention met, Frits Bolkestein, then a European commissioner, commented that “it would be a risky business to work towards a federal Europe, since there is a good chance of failure and Europe might then end up on the road to disintegration as a kind of reaction.” Perhaps the French should have listened to Mr Bolkestein, after all. [emphasis mine]
I agree with this assessment. Not only is Germany's future riding on the French referendum, as I previously supposed, but so is that of the entire EU. Yet despite the undeniable benefits the the EU has brought to Europe, and despite its great potential for the future, I can't help but think that this is an entirely appropriate situation to be in. The EU's democratic deficit has to be reckoned with at some point, and one could argue that the earlier that hurdle is crossed, the better, and the easier it is to be dealt with. The constitution is certainly an imperfect document, as proven by the strong opposition it generates among Eurosceptics and Eurofederalists alike. If the French reject it, the reality then faced by the EU will be one more genuine than it has ever known.
Are these stakes sufficient to advocate for French acceptance? I'm not sure. It would be tragic if the EU disintegrated ingloriously. But as the Economist notes, this dire scenario is but one possible result of a French rejection, and a particularly extreme and implausible one at that. Too many countries and too many people have sacrificed too much to allow the EU to disappear quietly into the light. Oddly, one of the prime pieces of evidence in arguing the EU's democratic deficit -- the vast, seemingly unaccountable Euro-bureaucracy that has taken root in Brussels -- might serve to brake the institution's fall following a French rejection. A rejection, then, might be the splash of water that the EU needs if it is to persist and grow in the twenty-first century.
So, again, should EU-fans (-sceptics and -federalists alike) root counterintuitively for a French rejection? Probably not, if for no other reason than that it would create some very strange bed-fellows with little additional prospect for a French acceptance. No, the lines between supporters and opponents of the constitution are clearly drawn, and as it should be, French citizens themselves will make the final determination of their country's future. It's their call, and any outside advocacy on either side is just noise that risks offending the sovereignty of the French people and their institutions of democracy. All of this certainly makes for exciting political drama and an exciting couple of weeks coming up. But a little contingency planning on the side -- for either outcome -- sure doesn't hurt.
