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June 29, 2005
Journeys and destinations
More details come to light regarding Turkey's pending EU accession talks:
Turkey will face the toughest test ever presented to a candidate for entry to the European Union and might have to settle for less than full membership, the European Commission said yesterday.
Setting out the Commission's proposals for negotiations with Ankara, Olli Rehn, enlargement Commissioner, said Turkey would face the "most rigorous" test of any EU candidate to date, while several of his colleagues called for a "privileged partnership" instead of membership.
"It certainly will be a long and difficult journey, but the journey is as important as the destination," Mr Rehn said, emphasising the reforms Turkey would need to carry out during the talks. [emphasis mine]
The FT goes on to note that Austria and Cyprus, in particular, are most likely to have issues with the Commission's proposals. Austria is said to want a more explicit reference to the "privileged partnership" option, and Cyprus' concerns are self-evident. Add to these concerns the EU's shaken confidence in the wake of the constitution's implosion, and Turkey's road to membership is certainly a rocky one.
Rehn is correct, however, in emphasizing the importance of the journey. EU membership, in and of itself, is only one benefit of accession (and some would argue it's not that much of a benefit). The process of meeting the EU's strict standards for free markets and liberal politics is perhaps an even greater benefit. That Turkey's accession will be the "most rigorous" is altogether fitting. Not only does the resistance to Turkish membership likely exceed that of all other aspiring member states, but Turkey itself has the longest way to go in meeting the EU's standards.
In the face of EU resistance, there are signs that Turkish patience is growing thin. But Erdogan, to his credit, is sticking to his guns:
The modern values and civilization process represented by the EU did not contradict the ideals of the republic, [Erdogan] said.
“Let no one doubt the fact that our objectives on democracy, justice, development and progress will be completed as soon as possible, no matter how fast or slow Turkey's accession process is. A strong Turkey is important for Europe and the world. The merging of different cultures under universal values, represented by Turkey's EU membership, will be a gain for the world,” he added.
One must hope that full membership eventually does come Turkey's way. But if and when it does, its value will be mostly symbolic. The true benefits to Turkey's politics, economics, and society will already have been realized.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:50 PM to Europe
June 28, 2005
Nothing new
I wasn't going to touch Bush's speech tonight, largely because it's being blogged ably, abundantly, and probably more originally elsewhere. But I just can't let this slide:
The troops here and across the world are fighting a global war on terror. This war reached our shores on September 11, 2001.
No. This war reaches our shores in the billions of dollars lost annually, the images of violence we see nightly, and the flag-drapped caskets we receive daily. The war begun on September 11 has absolutely and verifiably no connection with that currently being waged in Iraq -- Bush himself has admitted as much. Tying the two together is crass, manipulative, and irresponsible. Even today, three years after the drumbeat to war picked up pace, Bush continues to pick and choose among invasion rationales, trying to see which will stick. Regime change, al Qaeda, WMD -- each sound nice as a reason to invade, none are correct as represented by the administration. It hasn't been clearer than it is now: we went into Iraq to stay in Iraq.
To conflate September 11 and the invasion of Iraq is outright criminal. In doing so, Bush has condemned generations of Americans to a struggle that is not their own.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:06 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics
June 27, 2005
Contradiction corrected
This seems to represent an interesting bit of progress:
Israel and the US have reportedly agreed to defuse a row over Israel's arms sales to countries such as China.
The two are to sign a deal promising each will take the other's concerns into account when selling weapons, Israel's Haaretz newspaper says
As I've noted before, there has seemed to be a contradiction in Bush administration policy between its loyalty to Israel and its fear of China. With this new agreement, it seems that fear of China has won out. Haaretz provides some context:
The memorandum [outlining the arms agreement], which is to put an end an export crisis with the U.S., will state that the U.S. and Israel are "strategic partners" and that each country will be considerate of the other's concerns about military technology being transferred to other countries. The countries "arousing concern" will be specified separately.
The dispute erupted at the end of last year following Washington's demand that Israel not return to China spare parts of Harpy UAVs (drones). The Israeli-manufactured UAVs had been sold to China and were sent here for repairs. This conflict is one of the gravest ever to erupt between the two countries in recent years.
Under the agreement, to be termed "Declaration of Understanding on Technology Exports," both countries will undertake to maintain transparency regarding weapons sales to countries considered worrisome. The U.S. will explicitly pledge not to ban defense deals on commercial grounds, thereby allaying Israeli defense establishment concerns that the Americans would try to hurt Israeli defense businesses and push them out of the international market."
So there appears to be plenty of soft, gentle language here to hide the fact that the Bush administration is pulling rank on the Israelis. And I have to admit, I'm surprised that they came down on Sharon decisively. Maintaining illogical and unsustainable policy contradictions has seemed to be par for the course for the Bush administration, so I have to give them credit for coming down on one side of the issue. Whether erring on the side of Chinese fear over Israeli loyalty was the right call isn't the issue; that the Bush administration actually made a tough choice is.
The Chinese, for their part, are a bit peeved:
Accusing the Bush administration of "carping" and "outside interference," China issued a sharp complaint Monday after Israel cancelled a controversial Israeli-Chinese arms deal under pressure from the United States.
The Israeli decision halted the sale of drone aircraft capable of seeking out radar installations. It was the result of a U.S. campaign to block China from obtaining advanced military technology that could be used against Taiwan and U.S. forces supporting the island in any confrontation.
Well, ok. One should remember that China really had no choice but to complain. I'm sure they'd like to give Israel their business in order to repair their radar-seeking drones, but in the big picture, they're just drones. This deal won't in any serious way crimp China's military modernization. Indeed, its relevance isn't on the Chinese side of the equation; it's on the U.S.-Israeli side. China can take care of itself.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:08 PM to Asia, Middle East, U. S. Politics
June 26, 2005
Known knowns
There was a time when the U.S. Defense Secretary was praised for his refreshing forthrightness. That time has long since passed, but even still, Donald Rumsfeld came through today with a somewhat surprising display of honesty:
Rumsfeld, addressing a question about whether U.S. troops levels are adequate to vanquish the increasingly violent resistance, said, "We're not going to win against the insurgency. The Iraqi people are going to win against the insurgency. That insurgency could go on for any number of years. Insurgencies tend to go on five, six, eight, 10, 12 years. [emphasis mine]
I don't know how long this particular insurgency will last. But the time frame so often bandied about with regard to the U.S. occupation has been of the 2-5 year variety. This is used to think about when U.S forces might leave Iraq, or when a stable government might take hold there, or even when the insurgency might sputter out. But now, Rumsfeld himself has broken the magic 10 year barrier.
It's refreshing, really. While I think the time frame he's introducing is still well short of reality, it is a step in a more honest direction.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:36 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics
June 25, 2005
Prophesying China, in print
Allow me to humbly point to my latest piece in the Providence Journal. For regular readers of Natural Selection, there's not much new here -- it's based in large part on ideas and language hashed out here. Regardless, check it out at the ProJo or in extended entry, if you're not into the whole registration thing.
Let me also give a special shout-out and thanks to Brian Bishop, William Touret, and everyone else at Rule Free Radio on WARL 1320 AM. Had a fine time chatting with you folks about all things "martial energy."
Daniel Widome: Beware of self-fulfilling prophecy -- U.S. should face China's rise rationally
I THINK I USED to like Robert Kaplan. Or, rather, I see value in some of his earlier works that blended travelogue, historical reflection, and political analysis. But in a recent piece in The Atlantic Monthly -- revealingly entitled "How We Would Fight China" -- Kaplan seems to have fallen victim to an all too common and particularly narrow point of view: the neo-conservative vilification of China. That he has only demonstrates how pervasive such a shortsighted perspective has become and how dangerous it is to U.S. interests.
Kaplan seems to have taken so whole-heartedly to the vilification of China that his Atlantic piece can be used as a prime example of it. He describes China's "martial energy" as "constitut[ing] the principal conventional threat to America's liberal imperium."
China's size, it's true, cannot be denied. But defining its "martial energy" as "the principal conventional threat" to U.S. interests? In today's world, that's a bold assertion.
Of course, Kaplan knows this. He tries to explain himself when he describes how China's antiquated but growing submarine fleet could threaten the U.S. Navy: "[O]ne can imagine that China could launch an embarrassing strike against us, or against one of our Asian allies." Sure, one could imagine that. One could just as easily imagine the opposite, too.
The rest of Kaplan's piece follows in this vein, demonstrating an ever-expanding fascination with China and its popularly termed "rise." In just the past few weeks, both U.S. News and World Report and Time magazine have featured cover stories on China's rise. Indeed, the country's size and influence -- and the growth of each -- are ample. The copious ink spilled in covering them is perhaps not out of proportion with their importance.
Kaplan's piece, however, represents a darker and increasingly common side of this China fascination. In China's rise, to be sure, there is reason for wariness; but Kaplan's perspective goes well beyond wariness into the realm of unnecessary fear. Increasingly, it's a perspective that pervades the media consciousness.
Such vilification derives not only from China's rise but also from an equally large vacuum in neo-conservative self-perceptions. Certain ideologies define themselves more by what they're against than by what they're for. Although the "war on terror" has provided a legitimate and unifying foe for neo-conservatives to rally around, "terror" -- insofar as it can actually be defined as an enemy -- doesn't quite fill the shoes of a big, menacing state-based opponent. In other words, al-Qaida is no Soviet Union. But China -- oppressive, militaristic and expansive -- comes much closer.
The recent China vilification has its roots in scholarly works that hypothesized the capabilities of a potentially hostile China. Neo-conservative writers and ideologues joined the bandwagon in the late 1990s, replacing scholarly conditionality with breathless certainty, and China vilification has since snowballed to its current prevalence.
A common vilification argument rests on the classical great-power theory, which holds that rising powers inevitably come into conflict with existing ones. But history and theory should be used to illuminate the future, not to blind us to its unforeseen directions. China's rise, fundamentally, is unprecedented and uncertain. Such uncertainty is naturally disconcerting for those who instinctually demand certainty and the benefits it brings.
Predicting conflict with China doesn't just provide certainty in an otherwise uncertain situation. It also justifies a range of diplomatic and military policies that would otherwise be impossible to implement. More important, a hostile China represents a self-fulfilling, self-indulgent prophecy, which justifies a faulty ideology and perpetuates the political careers that rely on it.
It is perfectly fair to ask whether China's rise poses a threat to the United States. I think it very well might -- but it also might not. Again, that's the point: China's rise is a fundamentally uncertain phenomenon.
So much of the recent thinking on China seems to move beyond the frustrating uncertainty of reality and into the convenient certainty of fantasy. But though the United States should absolutely prepare for the possibility of a hostile China, such anticipatory policies must be based on rational judgment that prioritizes genuine U.S. interests -- not on breathless vilification that prioritizes political careers and ideological impetus.
I imagine the Chinese view this phenomenon and its pervasiveness with some amusement. Whether or not they seek conflict, they must surely be pleased at being unpredictable and confounding to U.S. policy makers and citizens alike. That China's "rise" is met by such a knee-jerk, fear-based reaction makes U.S. attitudes seem predictable and one-dimensional. The situation only empowers the Chinese; it gives them the freedom of movement that neo-conservatives love to ascribe to them.
So the prophecy becomes self-fulfilling: Irrational fear of China irrationally empowers China. And whom does that serve? Certainly not the United States.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:25 AM to Asia, Trans-geographical
June 22, 2005
Brothers again
Interesting little twist, following up from yesterday's post:
China called on Japan yesterday to respect the rights of Chinese fishermen, including those from Taiwan.
"The Chinese side is strongly dissatisfied with Japan's forcible expulsion of Taiwan fishermen from Chinese territory around the Diaoyu Islands," Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said yesterday at a regular briefing.
"For Japan to forcibly expel Taiwanese fishermen doing their work from that area is a violation of China's rights and sovereignty," Liu said. "We ask that Japan pays attention to the Chinese side's concerns and practically and prudently handles the related problems."
There's something kind of neat about this. Here you have a cluster of uninhabited islets, contested by China, Taiwan, and Japan. The Taiwanese send a frigate or two to escort some fishing boats as a demonstration of sovereignty. And then China speaks up on the side of the Taiwanese, some of whom, after all, consider themselves the rightful government of all of China. It seems that when it comes to territorial disputes with Japan, Chinese sovereignty -- no matter what side of the civil war you were on -- is still a strong unifying force.
So perhaps this is the solution to China-Taiwan tensions: vilify Japan. It's one of the few things that pretty much all of East Asia can agree on these days, after all. But what of Japan itself? Wouldn't it be bad if all the states of East Asia were able to put aside their differences at the exclusion of one of their own? Nah. Unlike China and everyone else in East Asia, the Japanese haven't been sufficiently repentful anyway. They pretty much deserve all the unconstructive condemnation they can get.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:47 PM to Asia
June 21, 2005
Right idea, wrong location
So a Chinese naval ship entered the waters around a group of disputed islands, thus upsetting Japan:
"This area belongs to us historically, geographically and legally," [a leader on the ship] told reporters before boarding along with a cross-party group of 15 MPs.
"We must defend our sovereignty and protect our fishing rights." [emphasis mine]
Unsurprising, really, until you realize the Chinese ship in question was, more specifically, Taiwanese. Anyone else see the irony here? Taiwan is surely justified in its desire to defend its soverignty. But I have to say, I don't think Japan is its biggest concern in that regard.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:15 PM to Asia
June 20, 2005
Saddam's favorites
This just makes too much sense:
Saddam Hussein likes Doritos, washes his hands compulsively and thinks fondly of the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan, according to American soldiers who guarded him and tell their story in the July issue of GQ magazine.
The jailed former Iraqi leader described how Reagan, who was president during the time of Iraq's 1980-88 war with Iran, sold him planes and helicopters. "Reagan and me, good,'" Saddam said, according to the article by Lisa DePaulo in the July issue that goes on sale June 28.
"He said, 'I wish things were like when Ronald Reagan was still president,'" said one of the soldiers who guarded him. [emphasis mine]
I'm sure he does.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:16 PM to Middle East
June 18, 2005
Reporting from the past
The Mainichi Shimbun has gotten its hands on dispatches from George Weller, an American journalist who was among the first to enter Nagasaki during the U.S. occupation. The dispatches were filed but never published -- U.S. occupation censors blocked them out of fear of how unsanitized reporting of a nuclear wasteland might affect popular perceptions of atomic weapons. From his very first dispatch:
The atomic bomb may be classified as a weapon capable of being used indiscriminately, but its use in Nagasaki was selective and proper and as merciful as such a gigantic force could be expected to be.
Interesting as that is, the rapid evolution of Weller's views as reflected in his dispatches is what is more intriguing. Check them out.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:40 PM to Asia
June 17, 2005
Membership card
Talk about looking out for your friends:
The US on Thursday declared its position in the debate over expansion of the United Nations Security Council by backing Japan and one or two other states for permanent membership, while effectively excluding Germany and Brazil.
The administration's formal announcement followed months of speculation amid a high-stakes diplomatic poker game that had been dominated so far by a united proposal set out by the “Group of Four” Germany, India, Brazil and Japan. [emphasis mine]
Big words from the State Department. But of course, they have the luxury of knowing that their proposal is a dead letter: China will never let Japan on the Council.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:25 AM to Trans-geographical
June 16, 2005
Turkey and the constitution
While ostensibly separate issues, the EU constitution and Turkish accession to the EU have always been inextricably linked. In the recent French referendum, many in the non camp made no secret of their opposition to Turkish membership in the EU, to their opposition to Chirac's support of the same, and to their subsequent vote against the European charter. For Turkey's part, accession talks are set to begin later this year. But will a confidence-shaken EU be eager to set a firm date for such talks? With the constitution dead, will Eurocrats fear whether their existing institutions can accommodate any more members?
The linkages between the two issues, while real, have always been implicit. Turkish accession is not mentioned in the EU constitution, and it has been pursued by successive Turkish governments since long before the constitutional process began. At this week's meeting of the European Council -- the first since the French and Dutch referendums, and thus a rather important meeting -- Chirac used his country's referendum to cast a very ominous shadow on Turkish accession:
President Jacques Chirac of France, speaking as the European Union opened a summit meeting here in an atmosphere of crisis, also threw doubt on the future of European enlargement. Following the constitution’s rejection in France and the Netherlands, he said, the 25-member EU might not be able to cope with more members.
‘‘In this new situation,’’ Chirac asked, ‘‘can the Union continue to expand without the institutions capable of making this expanded Union function efficiently?’’ [emphasis mine]
While several countries are waiting in the membership wings, Chirac clearly is referring to Turkey. As a supporter of Turkish accession, such language from Chirac should be very worrisome to Turkish ears. Perhaps he was genuinely rattled by the non vote. Or perhaps he is just biding his time until the European waters calm a bit. Either way, Chirac's statement marks a shift, and it's probably not far from the Council's own consensus view.
What will the EU do? I don't think they can back away completely from the prospect of Turkish accession -- that hurdle has already been jumped, last year, amid much debate. But interminable delaying or postponing of the accession process has always been an explicit option for the EU. Indeed, it was a vital option whose incorporation was necessary to win the initial, broad European consensus for the setting of a start date for accession talks. It now looks like delay will be the name of the game.
As for the Turks, this is not what they have in mind. They have been waiting in the EU membership wings for decades, and under Erdogan, Turkey has made great strides in recent years in terms of reforming its justice system and in cleaning up human rights issues. The reward for such successes, many Turks feel, should be genuine movement toward EU accession. More delay and more debate, from the Turkish perspective, does not count as "genuine movement."
What does this all mean? To some extent, not all that much. Both the EU and Turkey have made too many commitments, too recently, toward accession that backing out now would be very difficult. But significant delay in the accession process will have a real effect on Turkish public opinion. Would accession really seem so important if the reforms most requested by the EU are met not by action but by delay? For the EU, there is a discomforting (and somewhat irrational) alignment between opposition to the constitution and opposition to Turkish accession. As one sentiment gains greater currency, so too will the other.
For both the EU and Turkey, then, time is working against Turkish accession. I don't think any hard deadlines must be set, nor do I think that the accession process will die if not completed by a certain date. But interminable delay would only serve opponents of Turkish accession, and given the current status of the EU constitution, delay certainly seems to be in the cards. Make no mistake: the clock for Turkish accession has been ticking much faster since the French and Dutch referendums.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:44 PM to Europe
Futility
So I see that a bipartisan group of congressmen is pushing the administration for a plan to withdraw U.S. trrops from Iraq by October 2006. While noble, I wonder if the congressmen realize how truly futile their efforts are. Aside from the fact that the last thing the Bush administration would allow would be submission to a motley group of congressmen (Dennis Kucinich included), a more fundamental truth is in play here: the United States will never leave Iraq.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:27 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics
Imbalanced scale
Remember that sale of F-16s to Pakistan a couple months ago? U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Christina Rocca sure does:
Rocca has said that Washington’s decision to sell F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad sends a clear signal of its determination to stand by Pakistan’s legitimate defence needs. Testifying before the U.S. House International Relations Sub-committee on Asia, Ms Rocca ruled out a possibility that the sale would upset the current regional military balance or lead to an arms race and added that "it only shows our commitment to help Pakistan in its long haul." [emphasis mine]
Not upsetting the current regional military balance, huh? That may or may not be technically accurate, but it sure doesn't jive with what the Bush administration was saying a couple months ago:
The United States has unveiled plans to help India become a "major world power in the 21st century" even as it announced moves to beef up the military of New Delhi's nuclear rival, Pakistan.
Under the plans, Washington offered to step up a strategic dialogue with India to boost missile defense and other security initiatives as well as high-tech cooperation and expanded economic and energy cooperation. [emphasis mine]
So while the sale of F-16s to Pakistan might not have upset the regional military balance, that's just incidental. The Bush administration really does want to upset the regional military balance -- only on the other [Indian] end of the scale. That adds up really well, doesn't it?
Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:20 PM to Asia
June 15, 2005
Prophesying China
I think I used to like Robert Kaplan. Or rather, I see value in some of his earlier work. But the more I learn about him and some of his other work, the more my impression fades. Especially since 11 September 2001, he seems to have gone off the realist deep end. Nothing proves this more than his recent piece in the Atlantic (which I realize I've discovered rather late in the game). Conveniently, his piece is provided in its entirety -- free from the Atlantic's seawall -- here:
For some time now no navy or air force has posed a threat to the United States. Our only competition has been armies, whether conventional forces or guerrilla insurgencies. This will soon change. The Chinese navy is poised to push out into the Pacific -- and when it does, it will very quickly encounter a U.S. Navy and Air Force unwilling to budge from the coastal shelf of the Asian mainland. It's not hard to imagine the result: a replay of the decades-long Cold War, with a center of gravity not in the heart of Europe but, rather, among Pacific atolls that were last in the news when the Marines stormed them in World War II. In the coming decades China will play an asymmetric back-and-forth game with us in the Pacific, taking advantage not only of its vast coastline but also of its rear base -- stretching far back into Central Asia -- from which it may eventually be able to lob missiles accurately at moving ships in the Pacific.
In any naval encounter China will have distinct advantages over the United States, even if it lags in technological military prowess. It has the benefit, for one thing, of sheer proximity. Its military is an avid student of the competition, and a fast learner. It has growing increments of "soft" power that demonstrate a particular gift for adaptation. While stateless terrorists fill security vacuums, the Chinese fill economic ones. All over the globe, in such disparate places as the troubled Pacific Island states of Oceania, the Panama Canal zone, and out-of-the-way African nations, the Chinese are becoming masters of indirect influence -- by establishing business communities and diplomatic outposts, by negotiating construction and trade agreements. Pulsing with consumer and martial energy, and boasting a peasantry that, unlike others in history, is overwhelmingly literate, China constitutes the principal conventional threat to America's liberal imperium.
He's laying it on a bit think, isn't he? I should mention that his piece is entitled, "How We Would Fight China." So from the outset, Kaplan has shown his hand. By title alone, it's clear he's adopted an over-played and under-sourced metaphor of China-as-the-new-Soviet-Union. It's also clear that he's going to offer his expert military opinion of how the U.S. should counter the insidious Chinese threat. But instead, he offers up this:
There are many ways in which the Chinese could use their less advanced military to achieve a sort of political-strategic parity with us. According to one former submarine commander and naval strategist I talked to, the Chinese have been poring over every detail of our recent wars in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, and they fully understand just how much our military power depends on naval projection -- that is, on the ability of a carrier battle group to get within proximity of, say, Iraq, and fire a missile at a target deep inside the country. To adapt, the Chinese are putting their fiber-optic systems underground and moving defense capabilities deep into western China, out of naval missile range -- all the while developing an offensive strategy based on missiles designed to be capable of striking that supreme icon of American wealth and power, the aircraft carrier. The effect of a single Chinese cruise missile's hitting a U.S. carrier, even if it did not sink the ship, would be politically and psychologically catastrophic, akin to al-Qaeda's attacks on the Twin Towers. China is focusing on missiles and submarines as a way to humiliate us in specific encounters. Their long-range-missile program should deeply concern U.S. policymakers.
With an advanced missile program the Chinese could fire hundreds of missiles at Taiwan before we could get to the island to defend it. Such a capability, combined with a new fleet of submarines (soon to be a greater undersea force than ours, in size if not in quality), might well be enough for the Chinese to coerce other countries into denying port access to U.S. ships. Most of China's seventy current submarines are past-their-prime diesels of Russian design; but these vessels could be used to create mobile minefields in the South China, East China, and Yellow Seas, where, as the Wall Street Journal reporter David Lague has written, "uneven depths, high levels of background noise, strong currents and shifting thermal layers" would make detecting the submarines very difficult. Add to this the seventeen new stealthy diesel submarines and three nuclear ones that the Chinese navy will deploy by the end of the decade, and one can imagine that China could launch an embarrassing strike against us, or against one of our Asian allies. Then there is the whole field of ambiguous coercion -- for example, a series of non-attributable cyberattacks on Taiwan's electrical-power grids, designed to gradually demoralize the population. This isn't science fiction; the Chinese have invested significantly in cyberwarfare training and technology. Just because the Chinese are not themselves democratic doesn't mean they are not expert in manipulating the psychology of a democratic electorate.
Sure, it's not science fiction. But it also isn't original. The notion that the threat posed by China's military would be an unconventional one is not new. More specifically, literature abounded in the 1990s that the Chinese navy might deploy submarines and missile forces in creative and asymmetrical ways to unbalance U.S. carrier battle groups. To be sure, in 15-25 years, the mainline Chinese military might pose a legitimate challenge to the U.S. military -- but not now. Let there be no mistake: while a U.S. military conflict with China in the near-term would not be bloodless, it would be a cake-walk. Folks of Kaplan's vein know this intellectually, but they can't betray it, for reasons I'll discuss in a bit. Hence, the fear-mongering, not of the China that is, but of the China that might be. So not only is Kaplan guilty of irresponsible fear-mongering, but he is monumentally unoriginal in doing so.
Still, I can't claim that Kaplan's piece is entirely without value. Indeed, why else would I be quoting so extensively from it? China's rise, as it is popularly termed, is a genuinely fascinating phenomenon. Its size and influence -- and the growth of each -- are ample, and the copious ink spilled in covering them is perhaps not out of proportion with their actual importance. Likewise, I don't think anyone can say with any degree of certainty how close China's rise will match historical precedent or theoretical predictions. History and theory, as always, should be used to illuminate the future, not to blind us to its unforeseen directions.
So despite China's logical short-term quest for stability, will its rise inevitably bring it into conflict with the United States? I think such a scenario is very possible -- but not very likely. Certainly, it is no more or less likely than a cataclysmic readjustment of China's domestic politics. And that's the whole point -- China's rise is fundamentally uncertain. Such uncertainty is naturally disconcerting for many folks, especially for those who have an instinctual demand for certainty and for how such certainty can directly benefit them. Predicting conflict with China justifies a wide range of diplomatic and military policies that would otherwise be impossible to implement. More importantly, a hostile China represents a self-fulfilling, self-indulgent prophesy that justifies faulty ideology and perpetuates the political careers that rely on it.
How so? It's simple, really. First, academic pieces appear in scholarly military literature about the possibilities of a conflict with China in the medium-term. Then, half-wit conservative operatives jump on the bandwagon. They add some time-tested, confrontational rhetoric, mix in some dire predictions, and cap it all off with prescriptions for a confrontational China policy and for increased military spending to keep up with the Chinese menace. By this point, more and more pieces appear about China's burgeoning economy and about the United States' imbalance of trade with that country. These voices, these pieces, these pundits, all this noise -- it becomes a poisoned stew, one which contains just enough truth to avoid being laughed off the front page, but one that nonetheless seeps into the mass consciousness of not only the average voter, but also of current and future policy makers. These people will actually be the ones in positions to solve or aggravate problems. Ultimately, though, such a climate of fear justifies an unjustifiable ideology, employs otherwise unemployable political and foreign policy operatives, and aggrieves an otherwise unaggrieved rising foreign power. Already, the contradictions inherent in such an ideology have become apparent.
Am I suggesting that China's rise is indisputably in the U.S. interest, or that such a rise will be smooth sailing from a U.S. perspective? Hardly -- I haven't done so before, and I'm not doing so now. The truth is, I don't know what role China will play in the world over the next 10-30 years, and neither does anyone else. I am fairly certain, however, that classical theories of great power politics will only be partially applicable in the case of China -- the 21st century is simply too far removed from the concert of Europe, the balance of power, and the Cold War of the past two hundred years. Blame this on technology, "globalization," or on post-modern politics -- I'm sure the uncertainty stems from all of these reasons, and from many more. And the United States should certainly brace itself for such uncertainty. But such anticipatory policies must be based on sound, rational judgement that prioritize genuine U.S. and international interests, not on half-baked, breathless fear-mongering that prioritizes political careers and bureaucratic impetus.
Kaplan, I fear, has become caught up in this China fetishization and fear-mongering, and that troubles me. I'd like to believe that he's a sharp fellow -- he's certainly written some fine pieces in his time. But unfortunately, the China fear-mongering apparatus is already well-entrenched, and it is expanding. I imagine the Chinese must view this with a certain degree of amusement. Whether they seek conflict or not, they surely must be pleased that they are unpredictable and confounding to U.S. policy-makers and citizens alike. Such a situation only empowers China; it gives them the freedom of diplomatic movement that U.S. fear-mongerers love to ascribe to them. And so, the prophesy becomes self-fulfilling. Irrational fear of China irrationally empowers China. And who does that serve? Certainly not the United States.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:07 PM to Asia
June 14, 2005
Same old story
More trouble at Yasukuni, again centered around the Chinese. This time, however, the ruckus concerns Chinese of the island variety:
A group of indigenous Taiwanese gave up an attempt Tuesday to stage a rally at Yasukuni Shrine because they didn't want to clash with rightists.
They had hoped to protest Yasukuni's enshrinement of their relatives who died fighting for Japan in the war.
About 50 descendents or relatives led by indigenous legislator Kao Chin Su-mei arrived near the shrine in central Tokyo in the morning on two buses. They decided to scrub the protest after police told them the shrine was surrounded by 100 rightwingers, Kao Chin said.
My initial thought, having read those paragraphs, was that the police were somehow acting in a shady manner to scare the Taiwanese away from Yasukuni. But sure enough, as the piece later reports, there were genuine "rightwingers" waiting for the Taiwanese at the shrine. The piece also drops this little tidbit concerning Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni:
The government said the prime minister's visits to the shrine are not official events and public money has not been spent on them.
But it did not explain why Koizumi signs the shrine's guest book using his official title.
Fine point, and a contradictory one, too. Unfortunately, it's also completely irrelevant. Koizumi is never going to stop visiting Yasukuni, especially if the Chinese want him to. I've said it before and I'll say it again: the solution to the current tensions in East Asia cannot be solved at Yasukuni alone. The shrine's symbolism has long since trumped its actual importance, consequently giving Yasukuni an entirely new brand of straight-jacket relevance. While it will remain a hot potato in East Asian politics, no conceivable action by Koizumi with regard to Yasukuni will be enough to satisfy the Chinese, Koreans, Taiwanese, and others. And that, precisely, is why the Chinese and others love to keep hanging the shrine over Japan's head.
While history cannot be completely ignored, and while Japan's collective memory can be disturbingly aloof, it's high time for East Asian politics to move beyond the Pacific War.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:31 PM to Asia
June 10, 2005
Better
A couple days ago, the Greeks were on guard for Turkish military mischief in the wake of the French and Dutch referendums. Now, this:
Greece committed itself yesterday to helping Turkey fulfill one of the criteria it must meet before joining the EU — by agreeing to start training Turkish judges in European law before year’s end.
Justice Minister Anastassis Papaligouras and his Turkish counterpart Cemil Cisek signed an agreement in Athens yesterday by which Greek legal experts from the National College of Judges will pass on their knowledge of the implementation of EU law to Turkish justices. Cisek’s visit to Greece was the first by a Turkish justice minister in over 30 years, Papaligouras said.
Can't argue with that, and I'm willing to bet that judicial training will be of far greater benefit to Greeks and Turks alike than will military excercises.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:51 AM to Europe
June 07, 2005
Fun with headlines
From CNN: "OAS members balk at U.S. intervention plan."
From the Washington Post: "Bush Calls for Democracy in Western World."
I'm pretty sure both pieces are referring to the same event. In this particular case, I think it's safe to count Hugo Chavez as a CNN reader.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:32 AM to Americas, Trans-geographical
Excuse for trouble
Ok, so first the French and then the Dutch reject the EU constitution. This has shaken things up in Europe, of course, and no one's really sure what will happen next. But where the hell does this come from?
Greece’s military is keeping a close eye on traditional rival Turkey after French and Dutch referendums on the EU Constitution raised questions over future EU enlargement, Defense Minister Spilios Spiliotopoulos said.
“Of course we are checking the behavior of Turkey in the Aegean Sea, and we will continue to do that,” Spiliotopoulos said yesterday while attending a one-day military exercise.
“Turkey’s response appears to have been neutral,” Spiliotopoulos told The Associated Press. He added that Greece was “closely monitoring” Aegean air space after voters in France and the Netherlands rejected the EU Constitution in separate referendums this week
Greece-Turkey relations have long been a pet fascination of mine, so such petty language among these nominal NATO allies isn't all that surprising. And it's true that a key motivation for the non/nee camps was opposition to Turkish membership in the EU (ignoring for the moment the fact that the constitution has nothing to do with Turkish membership and that such membership -- if it ever comes -- won't become reality for some time). But Spiliotopoulos here seems to be suggesting an expectation of increased Turkish military activity as a result of the French and Dutch votes. That, I have no hesitation in proclaiming, is simply ludicrous.
Sure, Erdogan has recently (and justifiably) stiffened in response to EU intransigence and hesitance regarding entry talks. Thin theories of ulterior motives by staunch Kemalist political opponents aside, there can be no doubting Erdogan's sincerity in pursuing EU membership. At the very least, he sees the process of seeking membership as having a beneficial effect on Turkey, be it the gradual improvement of minority rights in Turkey or the whittling away of the military's political influence.
If I were to think as a Greek politician, I suppose I might suspect Erdogan of wanting to rattle his sword in the wake of the French and Dutch referendums as a sign that Turkey isn't willing to put up with interminable delays in its membership quest -- a "don't forget about us/don't push us around"-type of display. But please. In this case, age-old animosities are getting in the way of reality. This scene does go to show, however, that Greece -- as a current EU member -- has the means and the will to make Turkey's accession as tough as it wants to make it.
