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July 28, 2005
Rhetorical shift
There's been a lot of reporting recently on the Bush administration's recent shift from referring to a "global war on terror" to a more amorphous "global struggle against violent extremism." There's good reason to be skeptical of this shift; it could be politically easier for the administration, or it could be a subtle attempt to shift blame for failures in Iraq, or it could be a way to define the conflict more broadly.
Putting all that aside, I have to give credit where credit is due -- and it's due here. First off, referring so explicitly to a "war" was a very dangerous thing to do, especially when such a "war" had, by definition, no clear benchmarks for victory or defeat. Perpetual war, for very good reason, has been the fear of civil libertarians for generations. Second, it's tough to wage war on an adjective, or an emotion, or for that matter something that possesses no clear definition. In short, the phrase "global war on terror" was flawed on nearly every count, and beyond that, it was quite possibly dangerous. It was only a tad better than Bush's original, rash construction of a "crusade against evil-doers."
This new title -- "global struggle against violent extremism" -- is a clear improvement. For one thing, the word "struggle" instinctively encompasses a much wider, more diffuse conflict, one in which the military represents but one component. And "violent extremism," while admittedly not much more concrete than "terror," at least portrays the foe in a much more accurate light. It's tough to be for "violence," and "extremism" implies that the converse -- mainstream, peaceful Islam -- is the norm. This new term might not roll off the tongue like the old one, but it's a clear improvement nonetheless.
Many will argue, rightly, that talk is cheap: the real test will be whether the new terminology is met with new policies. But in diplomacy, style very often is substance. Simply dropping the word "war" will go a long way in making the case that the United States really doesn't want to subjugate the Muslim world, and "violent extremism" is an altogether more accurate term than "terror." It won't happen overnight, and it likely won't affect the views of those who know the political machinations behind such a rhetorical shift (rumor has it that it was a Karen Hughes original), but the change in language could very possibly have a pervasive effect on friend and foe alike. It implies in more realistic terms the challenge that faces the United States, and it more clearly suggests the desired objectives in meeting such a challenge. Over time, this shift in rhetoric could produce a shift in tone and in the very parameters of the terrorism debate. This, I think, is much required and would be altogether healthier for society.
While I'd very much like to see this rhetorical shift further matched by a policy one, don't dismiss it quite yet as mere politics. At least initially, I have to agree with the administration on this one.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:49 PM to U. S. Politics
July 27, 2005
Good on ya
In somewhat of a surprising move (to me, at least), Australia has decided to sign ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Co-operation. As such, the Aussies will be invited to the inaugural East Asian Summit in Malaysia this December:
Alexander Downer, the Australian foreign minister, yesterday hailed the country's accession to the peace pact and its invitation to the summit as “an enormous step forward for Australia in terms of our engagement with east Asia”.
The summit could play a “very important part in building an east Asia community”, Mr Downer said. Australia had previously resisted signing the regional treaty, citing the potential conflict with its cold war-era mutual defence pact with the US, which obliges the two countries to come to each others' aid in the event of a threat.
But the prospect of exclusion from a nascent economic block finally prompted Australia's capitulation, though political analysts said John Howard, the Australian prime minister, first received a green light from Washington, which it still considers the primary guarantor of Australia's security.
“He really does believe there should be a good relationship with Asia but it's a question of what price he is willing to pay,” Harold Crouch, a political scientist of Australian National University, said yesterday.
As I've noted before, Australia's John Howard has been courting Asia of late. In many ways, this cuts against the common perception of him as a PM who values Australia's alliance with the United States at the expense of relations with its more proximate neighbors in Asia. But as I've also noted, this perception is not entirely accurate. There is a great deal of evidence to support the assertion that Howard really doesn't view relations with the United States and Asia as a zero-sum game. This, as it happens, is the correct perspective.
Still, the big news with Australia's decision to sign the amity treaty is that it violates previously stated Australian policy. In effect, the treaty binds signatories to the peaceful resolution of interstate disputes. While hard to argue with the virtue of that premise, Australia found reason to squabble and delay its signing. That reason? Pre-emption. Demonstrating the highest of loyalty to the United States (or, one could argue, to Bush), Howard never quite renounced the right of Australia to launch unprovoked military action. Prompted by the Bali bombings in 2002 and encouraged by the maze of violent, uncertain, and extremist Islam in Indonesia and the Philippines, Howard reserved the right to take out terrorist targets that he deemed a threat to Australian citizens. There is certainly a fair and valid argument to be made for this, and my hunch was that Howard would stick with it.
But he hasn't. This proves a couple things. First, it further demonstrates that Howard is not the stark zero-sum theorist -- one who sides with the United States at the expense of Asia -- that many make him out to be. Australia can remain a staunch U.S. ally and still nurture relations with its Asian neighbors. Second, it proves that Howard views the upcoming East Asia Summit as vital to Australian interests. Don't misunderstand this: by signing the amity treaty, Howard is definitely limiting Australia's strategic and tactical flexibility. This, in turn, could make Australia appreciably less useful to the United States as an ally, or rather as its "deputy" in Asia. So while Australia's alliance with the United States is in no real danger (especially given Howard's recent commitment of more Aussie troops to Afghanistan), and while the FT piece hints that Australia got a U.S. green light to sign the amity treaty, Howard's decision was by no means a foregone conclusion.
So Howard changes existing Australian policy, threatening to annoy the United States in the process, in order to get a seat at the East Asian table. This is a wholly pragmatic decision. Not only must Australia give due emphasis to relations with its Asian neighbors, but signing the amity agreement -- especially after initially refusing to do so -- represents an important show of compromise and pragmatism on Australia's part. This, in turn, will give Australia greater leverage at the summit itself, which by all accounts could mark the start of something big. Already, states as far away as Pakistan and Russia are clamoring to be invited to the inaugural summit. I'll reserve judgment as to whether such enthusiasm is justified, but obviously, the neighborhood thinks it will be a big deal. That Australia does as well only proves that it, too, is part of that same Asian neighborhood. Good for Howard to not only recognize that, but to act on it.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:46 PM to Australia/NZ
July 24, 2005
Relevant question
There is another piece in the NYT today about the increasing effectiveness and continuing mystery that is the Iraqi insurgency. Looking at the recent trend of attacks against Arab diplomats and Iraqi Shia, the piece shrewdly identifies a new insurgent strategy: isolate the Iraqi government from its immediate neighbors and increase levels of sectarian tension. Insurgents have also targeted moderate Sunnis who had been involved in the constitutional process, which conveniently serves both goals.
It's a fine piece, and I recommend you check it out. But I have to say that in terms of its content as well as its mere presence, the piece is not all that surprising. That in itself is the remarkable thing. Over the past 2+ years, we've been fed a steady diet of evidence, communiqués, and reportage that highlight two things: the effectiveness of the Iraqi insurgency and its compositional mystery. And while serving both goals, each new media tidbit has generally advanced one and not the other. We are increasingly aware of the insurgents' strategic effectiveness, to the point that we take it for granted. As for the insurgency's composition, however, we're almost as much in the dark now as we were months and years ago.
This dual trend is a sad testament to the status quo in Iraq. As the insurgency becomes bloodier, the mystery in which it is shrouded grows only more opaque. The composition of the insurgency remains a deeply fascinating question, but perhaps now, its importance can be overstated. Would knowledge of its organization and composition really reverse the trend of violence? Maybe, and I think certainly, had the question been asked and answered much earlier. But now, I fear the question may be increasingly an academic one.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:54 AM to Middle East
July 21, 2005
Obligatory boilerplate
Some obligatory boilerplate reaction to the Pentagon's report on China's military capabilities:
China yesterday expressed "strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition" to a Pentagon report on its military power, describing the dossier as an attempt to spread "the China threat" theory.
[...]
According to [Vice-Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi], China's increased defence spending has mainly been used to improve living conditions for soldiers and officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).
The PLA also upgraded some weapons in order to "deal with the complicated international situation, safeguard national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity," he said. This is the right of China as a sovereign country, and other nations do not have the right to intervene," Yang added.
Classic -- the Chinese do not disappoint. And the White House knows its role, too:
"We're committed to peace and stability in the region, but that should not be viewed as us viewing China as a threat," White House spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters.
"We're looking to move forward in a constructive and cooperative way with China, and we certainly have a very open and candid discussion with China on many issues," added the spokesman.
"We do have concerns about the size and pace of China's military modernization, and it's important for us to pay close attention to it."
Nothing surprising here, either. It's theater, really. These immediate responses and reactions -- and indeed, the general gist of the Pentagon's report -- could have been reasonably predicted in advance. Yet despite the foregone nature of the Chinese anger and the U.S. backpedaling, they are steps that had to be taken. With the predictable (and most public) responses out of the way, we can now move on to the more genuine reactions to the Pentagon's report. These will come from official and independent sources alike, on both sides of the Pacific, and it will be interesting to see where how they play out.
One other item of note: Headlines around the world announced either the release of the Pentagon's report or China's angry reaction to it with pretty good degrees of reliability. Yet while headlines announcing McClellan's conciliatory message featured quite prominently in Chinese media outlets, I could find no such headlines in U.S. outlets. Consider what I've discussed here previously, and think about that for a second. Can this selective headlining really be passed off as coincidental? Whose interests does this reflect? Who exactly does it serve?
What was that Yang was saying about the "China threat" theory?
Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:07 PM to Asia
July 20, 2005
PRC power
The Pentagon has issued its long-awaited report on China's military capabilities. Its conclusion: China is building up its military. No surprise there.
I haven't looked at the report too closely yet, but I'm sure there is much in it that will serve as natural fodder for China vilifiers and fear-mongerers. Still, it seems that the Pentagon was attempting to strike a realistic tone in releasing the report:
At the Pentagon on Wednesday, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, said that although China's military might is growing he sees no reason to think that Beijing is interested in starting a war.
"You judge military threat in two ways: one, capacity and two, intent. There's lots of countries in the world that have the capacity to wage war," Pace said. "Very few have the intent to do so. Clearly, we have a complex but good relationship with China, so there's absolutely no reason for us to believe there's any intent on their part."
Can't really argue with that reasoning. No matter how it's used, I'm certain that the Pentagon's report makes for very interesting reading. If anything in particular catches my eye, I'll mention it here.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:23 PM to Asia
CNOOC'd out
I haven't said much about CNOOC's bid for Unocal so far, in part due to my intense frustration over the bipartisan irrationality exhibited around it on cable news, in congressional hearings, and among the pop punditry. Indeed, it's a sad day when the Cato Institute represents the voice of reason in their congressional testimony:
My comments will be confined to the fear that such a transaction would harm national security by making the United States more dependent upon foreign oil or, relatedly, that the proposed transaction threatens to provide China with an "oil weapon." I believe those fears are ill founded. In short:
-Energy independence provides no economic protection against supply disruptions abroad and no guarantee that supplies will be secure in the future. America's vulnerability to oil supply disruptions is primarily related to how much oil we consume, not where the oil we consume happens to originate.
-America need not worry about access to international oil supplies. Embargoes or supply diversions cannot keep oil out of U.S. ports and there are plenty of sellers in world oil markets. Only a naval blockade could prevent American from buying all the oil it needs from international oil markets.
-Unocal's reserves are not large enough to provide CNOOC with significant market power in the global oil economy.
-Because China is a net oil importer, it has every incentive to maximize production and none to curtail production. Accordingly, American and Chinese interests in the oil market coincide.
And in much pithier Cato-speak:
When I first read that the China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) had offered to buy Unocal for about $7 a share more than Chevron offered, my initial reaction was that this is none of my business. Foreign and U.S. investors who own shares in Unocal have a right to sell their shares to anyone they please
Well, it looks like it might all be rather moot now:
Chevron sweetened its offer for Unocal late yesterday in an 11th-hour move to thwart a rival offer from Cnooc, a government backed Chinese oil company, executives close to the negotiations said.
Unocal's board voted to accept Chevron's increased offer worth $17 billion, or $63 a share in cash and stock, and rejected a still higher all-cash offer from Cnooc worth $67 a share as too politically risky, the executives said.
The Times notes that CNOOC could still make a counter-offer before Unocal's shareholders meet on August 10, and I honestly can't guess whether they will. Likewise, I'm not too concerned about whether Chevron or CNOOC ends up with Unocal. If we believe in the market, than we must trust that it will settle itself out. If we believe in fear mongering -- and these days, with regard to China, it seems that all too many do -- than we root for Chevron.
The point isn't that Chevron is somehow more deserving of Unocal than CNOOC, or vice versa. Rather, it's that the irrational vilification of China has reached near-paranoid heights. The frightening thing is that such vilification has viable constituencies nearly everywhere you look; Democrats and Republicans alike find the fear mongering in their political interests. It's a shuddering thought that the defender of common sense in this case is Cato.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:55 PM to Asia, U. S. Politics
July 19, 2005
More fun with state media
When you see a piece entitled "Chinese military gets transparent shopping list" on Xinhua's website, it's natural to be somewhat confounded. Chinese state media, the PLA, and transparency are not three things commonly associated with one another. But who knows, maybe Xinhua's finally coming around:
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) yesterday claimed to have saved 1.8 billion yuan (US$218 million) in the past three and a half years as increased transparency granted outsiders a rare glimpse of the workings of the Chinese military. [emphasis mine]
That sounds juicy. I'd love to have a "rare glimpse of the workings of the Chinese military." And you know what? I can think of a few others that might enjoy that, as well. Let's read on:
PLA General Logistics Department sources said the army had spent more than 12 billion yuan (US$1.46 billion) on basic supplies last year, a 64 per cent increase over 2003.
Ok, that's a start -- some mundane figures to whet the palette. I bet the good stuff's just around the corner:
According to General Logistics Department regulations, all PLA material procurement information, except that involving military and commercial secrets, must be made public. [emphasis mine]
Oh well, I guess that's to be expected. Not only would a glimpse inside the PLA's procurement policies aid our understanding of China's military capabilities, but it would cast light on the lucrative intersection of PLA officers and their commercial ventures. Such areas, I would imagine, would probably fall under the categories of "military and commercial secrets." While somewhat of a let down, it's at least reassuring to know that Xinhua is maintaining its reputation as state mouthpiece par excellence.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:47 AM to Asia
July 18, 2005
Radicalization
Interesting piece in the Boston Globe this weekend, highlighting two separate studies that each found that most of the "foreign fighters" in Iraq are not longstanding terrorists but rather were radicalized by the U.S. occupation:
[I]nterrogations of nearly 300 Saudis captured while trying to sneak into Iraq and case studies of more than three dozen others who blew themselves up in suicide attacks show that most were heeding the calls from clerics and activists to drive infidels out of Arab land, according to a study by Saudi investigator Nawaf Obaid, a US-trained analyst who was commissioned by the Saudi government and given access to Saudi officials and intelligence.
A separate Israeli analysis of 154 foreign fighters compiled by a leading terrorism researcher found that despite the presence of some senior Al Qaeda operatives who are organizing the volunteers, "the vast majority of [non-Iraqi] Arabs killed in Iraq have never taken part in any terrorist activity prior to their arrival in Iraq." [emphasis mine]
This isn't particularly surprising, nor does it in any way simplify our understanding of the complex composition of the insurgency itself. But it is always useful to collect data and to confirm hypotheses. The trick, of course, is whether the policy will change to reflect such confirmations. I doubt it, and so does Peter Bergen, rather succinctly:
"To say we must fight them in Baghdad so we don't have to fight them in Boston implies there is a finite number of people, and if you pen them up in Iraq you can kill them all," said Bergen. "The truth is we increased the pool by what we did in Iraq."
Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:01 PM to Middle East
July 15, 2005
Trash talking
Some Chinese sword-rattling to take us into the weekend:
"If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition on to the target zone on China's territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons," the official, Major General Zhu Chenghu, said at an official briefing Thursday.
Simply because Zhu said this doesn't make it official Chinese policy. But his comments are certainly sufficient to raise some eyebrows, especially when one reads on:
"War logic" dictates that a weaker power needs to use maximum efforts to defeat a stronger rival, he said, speaking in fluent English. "We have no capability to fight a conventional war against the United States," Zhu said. "We can't win this kind of war." [emphasis mine]
Zhu is correct here. Hysterical claims of military modernization to the contrary, China cannot defeat the United States in a conventional military conflict, at least not for the next 10-15 years. Even in no-holds-barred nuclear exchange, the United States would have the upper hand simply due to the qualitative and quantitative advantage of its nuclear arsenal (though admittedly, the "upper-hand" in such a scenario would be rather pyrrhic).
The Chinese general slips off into the deep end, however, with this:
"If the Americans are determined to interfere, then we will be determined to respond," he said. "We Chinese will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all the cities east of Xian. Of course the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of cities will be destroyed by the Chinese." [emphasis mine]
First off, I doubt the Chinese would really be prepared for "the destruction of all the cities east of Xian." Second, the Chinese would be flatly incapable of destroying "hundreds of [U.S.] cities." There is much uncertainty surrounding the Chinese nuclear arsenal. Most estimates credit China with at most several hundred warheads but with only around 20 land-based missiles -- kept unfuelled and unarmed -- that could reach the continental United States. Furthermore, most experts believe the Chinese have only one (or maybe two) submarines capable of launching intercontinental missiles. Such valuable yet fragile submarines rarely stray far from Chinese waters, from which their missiles cannot reach the United States. China is working on an improved missile design, for land- and sea-based use, but their deployment date is still some years away.
The Chinese military knows its weaknesses. So what is Zhu doing? Already, we're seeing some reaction. The official Chinese position is that Zhu's comments were, "just his personal views;" the United States calls them "irresponsible;" the Taiwanese say they reveal the mainland's "hideous face of terror."
I believe that Zhu's comments, as off the cuff as they may seem, are really a very deliberate political maneuver. The Chinese leadership knows that it very likely could not conquer Taiwan; it knows that it would be impossible to do so if the United States became involved on Taiwan's side, which it likely would. The threat to nuke the United States, much like the recently passed anti-secession law, is just another step in the game of chicken over Taiwan. With each step, the Chinese leadership hopes to instill just a little more hesitation on the part of U.S. policy-makers and to buy more time to upgrade its military capabilities. If conflict ever came to the Taiwan Straits, China hopes that such incrementally increased trepidation would postpone U.S. entry into the conflict just long enough to make such entry pointless.
But Zhu's comments also serve a broader strategic function, beyond the confines of the Taiwan Strait. He is a nearly perfectly positioned messenger: he has the credibility of a high-ranking military officer but not the expectations of sobriety or political correctness that would burden a more senior official. His statements, then, cannot be taken as official policy, but they cannot be entirely discounted either. As such, they will create quite a stir among the more hawkish or conservative media outlets and punditry: "A Chinese general threatening to nuke the United States? Why, of course China is a threat!"
Such comments only feed the vilification machine that has picked up speed in recent years. And in case you forget, let's run-down who benefits from this: the media, first, for whom the idea of another superpower bogeyman makes great copy, and political ideologues of all stripes, second, who require a threatening enemy to justify their narrow ideologies, outdated policies, and stale careers. But who benefits the most from China vilification? None other than the Chinese themselves, for whom such irrational fear only strengthens. It casts China in a cloud of fearsome opacity, giving their leaders a freedom of movement that would be denied them if they were treated as genuine, reciprocal, political partners. In short, the Chinese like to be mysterious, and they like to keep their competitors guessing. Zhu's comments do just that; fear-mongerers rejoice.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:11 PM to Asia
July 12, 2005
Pro-China
Interesting update on the Yasukuni front:
Dozens of pro-China lawmakers in the governing Liberal Democratic Party launched a study group Tuesday out of concern over Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's controversial visits to the war-related Yasukuni Shrine. [emphasis mine]
I like how Kyodo describes as "pro-China" any movement seemingly at odds with Yasukuni and its establishment support. And who knows, maybe these lawmakers really are "pro-China" -- just like U.S. legislators who opposed the Iraq war were "pro-Saddam." It really is an unforgivable sin to oppose the establishment so blatantly.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:40 PM to Asia
July 10, 2005
Why they hate us
I was listening to an interview with Benjamin Netanyahu this afternoon on WBUR (sorry, can't find a link to the interview itself). Apparently, he was in London on Thursday. The timing -- horrific terrorist bombings and a hard-line Likudnik, in the same city, on the same day -- has resulted in the Israeli Finance Minister making the media rounds.
In any event, Netanyahu expounded on the seemingly age-old question regarding Islamic terrorism: do they hate us because of who we are (let's call it the "existential" argument) or because of what we do (the "practical" argument)? It's a popular question to toss around, in part because its terms are relatively straightforward, and in part because it's a rather important question. Basically, it boils down to this: do Islamic extremists attack Western targets because they hate freedom/democracy/human rights or because of hundreds of years of Western mistreatment of Muslims?
Personally, I'm more inclined to believe that bin Laden's gripe has more to do with specific U.S. actions. But more than that, I'm struck by the absolute nature of all the discussion of this question. If any pundit or scholar out there has taken a position on this question that doesn't fit within one of the two extremes, I haven't heard it. It's all too easy to boil down the motivation of one's enemies to the basest simplicities. But unlike in the hard sciences, the simplest solution isn't always the right one.
I won't go into this too deeply, in large part because this subject deserves more time than I currently have. But fundamentally, I think extremist discontent is rooted in both the existential and the practical, and that any attempt to separate the two is flawed in conception. First, the existential. Just because bin Laden, Zarqawi, et al are "evil-doers" doesn't necessarily make them liars. They are politicians just as much as any prime minister or president, though they are, of course, slightly less accountable to their constituents. So we should take their public utterances in much the same way: don't believe them ver batim, but don't discount them unless given reason to do so. Reading through bin Laden's public statements is a fascinating exercise; a pretty good compilation of them is here. In all of his statements, bin Laden issues the standard anti-West boilerplate. But in one in particular, bin Laden states specifically what he wants Americans to do -- and it sounds pretty existential:
What are we calling you to, and what do we want from you?
The first thing that we are calling you to is Islam.
[...]
The second thing we call you to, is to stop your oppression, lies, immorality and debauchery that has spread among you.
If we are to believe bin Laden is sincere in this case -- and again, we should have no more or less reason to do so than with any of Bush's or Blair's statements -- then it certainly appears that he hates the West for it is and what it represents. "Oppression, lies, immorality, and debauchery," if you will.
But in the very same statement, bin Laden makes a very strong case for the practical hatred of the West:
We also advise you to stop supporting Israel, and to end your support of the Indians in Kashmir, the Russians against the Chechens and to also cease supporting the Manila Government against the Muslims in Southern Philippines.
We also advise you to pack your luggage and get out of our lands. We desire for your goodness, guidance, and righteousness, so do not force us to send you back as cargo in coffins.
Sure sounds like a gripe against what the West actually does, don't you think?
So what to make of this? My supposition is that the most public of the "evil-doers" -- bin Laden, Zarqawi, and others -- genuinely do hate the West for what it is and for what it represents. For them, their demands can never be reasonably met, their opinions never changed. Those folks, I'm afraid, will go down fighting, no matter what policies Western states may implement.
But as I noted earlier, bin Laden is above all a politician. He needs a constituency. Most Muslims, I would like to believe, have more important things to worry about than Western decadence. Even if they don't necessarily like it, distaste is a long way from militant opposition. This vast majority of Muslims is exercised, however, by a constantly reinforced perception that the West in general, and the United States in particular, is propagating crimes against Muslims and Muslim-majority states. Perhaps worse than the crimes themselves, many sense a great deal of hypocrisy and insincerity on the part of Western governments -- their words do not come close to matching their actions. This is where scenes of Israeli soldiers in the occupied territories and of U.S. soldiers in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Afghanistan come into play. No one likes to see their kind oppressed. It is from this pool of resentment and disenfranchisement that the "evil-doer" ideologues -- the existential believers, like bin Laden -- can plant their seeds, recruit their soldiers, and otherwise take solace.
Notice I mention Saudi Arabia. The basing of U.S. soldiers in the land of Mecca and Medina was one of bin Laden's original grievances. And say what you will about Bush, but he did pull U.S. troops out of Saudi (sure, he moved them to Iraq, but who's counting). A common argument among proponents of the existential case is that 11 September predated the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan -- how can al Qaeda complaints about those occupations be taken as legitimate grievances? That's where Saudi Arabia comes in. The general gripe is the U.S. occupation of Muslim lands. In the 1990s, that was Saudi Arabia. Today, it's Iraq and Afghanistan. The difference, while significant, is also amazingly negligible.
So while the existential believers -- those that truly hate the West -- can never be talked down from violence, the vast sea of practical believers -- those who hate specific actions of the West -- can be dealt with in creative ways. Namely, by treating their concerns and aspirations with respect, and refraining from invading their countries unless absolutely necessary. To be sure, the solution is much less glib and much more complicated than that. And even if the West changes its actions dramatically, alleviating many of the Muslim world's practical grievances, we will still be faced with the hard core of existential believers -- those who hate the West no matter what it does.
Terrorism, as commonly conceived, cannot be "defeated," as historically inherited and understood from the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay. And the reason that the "evil-doers" hate us is both for who we are and for what we do. The "war on terror," as it were, must be pursued with the fullest appreciation of this duality. In some cases, that will require a dramatic reassessment of what the West has long taken for granted. In others, it will require no change whatsoever and simply more of the steadfastness with which Bush is constantly exhorting us. It's a tricky one, there's no doubt.
One final point. Not only do proponents of the existential and the practical arguments only seem to appreciate their own viewpoint at the complete expense of the other, but the fundamental sentiments they betray is revealing. Those who argue that Islamic extremists hate the West for what it does paint a puzzle that has a solution: the West must simply change its policies. Simplistic, yes, but with the hope for a legitimate and easily defined solution. Those who argue that Islamic extremists hate the West for what it is imply no clear way out: the West isn't going to convert to Islam en masse. The only solution, in their eyes, is simply the total annihilation of Islamic extremism. As we have seen over the past 4 years, that is an exceedingly difficult chore. And thus, the existential argument is an exceedingly hopeless one.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:45 PM to Trans-geographical
July 07, 2005
Textbook troubles
Looks like East Asia's not alone in its textbook troubles"
Angered by what it described as the "serious issue" of the existence of schoolbooks in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) which contain material implying claims on Greek territory, Athens yesterday called on the neighboring country to put an end to its "dangerous propaganda."
Well, to be honest, "FYROM" isn't exactly a national title that inspires much pride. It's not even a title -- it's an acronym. So maybe the Greeks should just let a little "dangerous propaganda" slide and focus on more important things, like preparing for a shadow invasion from Turkey.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:47 PM to Europe
Separate issues
It looks like the Aussies are being called back to another front in the "war on terror:"
The Afghan government had asked Australia, a close US ally, to send troops and the cabinet would most likely make a decision next week, Howard told a commercial radio station Thursday.
"There's been a standing request from the government of Afghanistan over quite a period of time to a lot of countries including Australia to send troops," he said.
"Now we are going to look at it. I don't want to pre-empt what cabinet might decide. But we are going to look at it and if we do take a decision it will be announced next week."
I would argue that a given military commitment to Afghanistan would do much more to mitigate violent Islamic extremism than a similar commitment to Iraq. Though the occupation of Iraq has caused a blossoming of Islamic terrorism in that country, Afghanistan was always the hub of al Qaeda's operations. Even today, it remains nothing more than a fragile success, still hosting and falling victim to Taliban and al Qaeda perturbations. Of course, this is all complicated by the fact that Iraq -- as a hub and training center for mujahideen, both local and foreign -- has become the new Afghanistan. Both places are a mess, but on principle, Afghanistan represents the struggle against Islamic terrorism in a purer and more effective sense.
Howard strives to make the distinction between Iraq and Afghanistan, especially with regard to possible troop deployments:
Australia already has about 900 troops with the US-led coalition in Iraq, and Howard indicated that any decision on Afghanistan would not affect this commitment.
"The two issues are quite separate and if we were to decide on Afghanistan it would be taken in isolation to our commitment to Iraq, and that commitment will remain until the job is finished," he said. [emphasis mine]
I suppose that's better than rejecting the Afghan request out of hand, but it misses a great opportunity to send a symbolic and practical message that Iraq represents a colossal miscalculation in the West's post-9/11 response. Interestingly, and refreshingly, Labor is making the same distinction that Howard is ("the two issues are quite separate") but from a much more logical basis:
"At the moment Australia is caught in the Iraq quagmire," [Labor leader Kim] Beazley said. "Australia needs to get out of Iraq so that we can begin to prepare for involvement in Afghanistan to tackle terrorism."
Indeed, Iraq and Afghanistan are quite separate issues. Howard thinks they are separate because they represent different battlefields in the same war, while Beazley thinks they're separate because Iraq and Afghanistan represent different wars altogether. In this instance, I think Beazley's closer to the truth.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:16 PM to Australia/NZ, Middle East
