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February 23, 2006
Re-energizing the debate
In terms of ceremony, a president's state of the union address can serve as a compelling vehicle to launch the political year. In policy terms, however, the constitutionally mandated address often has been rich in rhetoric but weak in substance. That President Bush's address on January 31 placed a great emphasis on energy policy is clear. Whether the substance of the speech matched its ceremony, however, is not.
From the House dais, Bush proclaimed, “we have a serious problem: America is addicted to oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world. The best way to break this addiction is through technology.” Under the label of the “Advanced Energy Initiative,” he announced a 22 percent increase in clean-energy research, which would emphasize zero-emission coal plants, solar and wind technology, and nuclear energy. The initiative would also encourage greater research on battery technology, hydrogen, and various types of ethanol for automobile use. Bush stated his ultimate goal was to replace more than 75 percent of U.S. oil imports from the Middle East by 2025.
As a generic political goal, “energy independence” is not new. It has been used as a rallying cry during election seasons since the oil shocks of the 1970s, primarily because it is an easy concept to like. Reducing dependence on foreign sources of energy, particularly of the hydrocarbon variety, could fundamentally restructure U.S. relations with many autocratic Arab regimes. If the United States relied less on their petroleum products, it would have less reason to support odious regimes that nurtured virulent anti-Western sentiment and be less vulnerable to political shocks in oil-rich states. Furthermore, if a policy of “energy independence” entailed a shift from hydrocarbon energy sources toward cleaner and more renewable sources, the environmental benefits could be significant. The perception of dwindling oil supplies, greater energy demand from China and India, rising gasoline prices, and a global scarcity of refining capacity makes “energy independence” especially attractive in today's political and economic climate.
For many, however, Bush's emphasis on “energy independence” was curious. The president's professional background includes stints in the petroleum industry, yet he spoke of reducing U.S. oil imports. Some observers questioned his pledge to replace 75 percent of U.S. oil imports from the Middle East. Because only a fifth of U.S. oil imports come from that region, alternative fuels could account for the equivalent of only 15 percent of total oil imports under Bush's proposal. Others pointed out that oil is a fungible commodity; even if the United States bought less from the Middle East, other countries would pick up the slack, and the political and economic conditions there would remain unchanged.
Perhaps the most curious aspect about Bush's emphasis on energy policy was that Congress passed a major energy bill just last summer. Bush had pushed for such a bill since early in his administration, and its passage represented a clear victory for him. Much like the state of the union address, the Republican-sponsored energy bill stressed certain themes of “energy independence.” It provided tax credits for owners of hybrid vehicles, subsidies for providers of renewable energy sources, and tax breaks for those making energy conservation improvements to their homes. But Democratic opponents argued that such initiatives were outweighed by the subsidies provided for fossil fuels, nuclear power, and coal. Such criticism did not stop the bill, however. The House passed it with a vote of 275-156, the Senate did so with a vote of 74-26, and Bush signed the energy bill into law on August 8, 2005.
In the wake of such of such a comprehensive energy bill, then, why did the president feel compelled to emphasize many of the same themes in his state of the union address? One answer, offered mainly by Democrats, is that Bush's emphasis was less than heartfelt, too limited in scope, and reflective of a desire for political insulation from future oil shocks. The administration's proposed budget, revealed since the state of the union address, calls for a $381 million increase in spending on renewable energy technologies. But this figure is 22 percent less than the commitments laid out in last year's energy bill, according to Democratic staff members of the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee. Senator Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), the ranking Democrat on the committee, suggested that, "this budget is taking us backwards in important programs in energy efficiency, clean coal, oil and gas, electricity reliability, and distributed energy, just to name a few.”
Another answer holds quite the opposite. The President may be so committed to his energy policy that the need to strengthen it so soon after the passage of the 2005 bill overrode other political concerns. The administration notes that last year's act “is strengthening America's electrical infrastructure, reducing the country's dependence on foreign sources of energy, increasing conservation, and expanding the use of clean renewable energy.” In the past, the Bush administration has continued to pursue legislative agendas long after other administrations would have declared victory and moved on. The administration's multiple (and successful) attempts to secure tax cuts from Congress are an example of such perseverance. “Energy independence” could simply be the latest issue to generate such administration dedication.
Yet another answer is wholly political. Bush has faced approval ratings below 50 percent for some months now, creating a climate inhospitable to bold and risky presidential initiatives. The president's state of the union address accordingly “played it safe” with a variety of micro-initiatives that were difficult to oppose and too small to generate much concern. In addition to his “Advanced Energy Initiative,” the President's address also promoted a “Strong America Leading the World” initiative, an “American Competitiveness Initiative,” and an “Affordable and Accessible Health Care” initiative. Much like his energy proposals, these initiatives are difficult to oppose on principle alone, and thus were painless topics for presidential emphasis.
But when any such proposal meets Congress, principle only goes so far. It will be up to the legislature to nurture or kill Bush's new energy initiative, and much will depend on how aggressively the administration promotes it. The similarities between the state of the union initiative and last year's energy bill may help its prospects, under the logic that Congress could easily adopt proposals so similar to those already passed only a few months ago. But the initiative's similarity to the 2005 energy bill may also harm its prospects. The passage of last year's bill was the result of a long, contentious process. Many legislators and interests remain steadfastly opposed to the 2005 energy bill even today and are willing to fight any attempts to strengthen its provisions.
On the surface, Congress faces a dichotomous choice. Does it advance an energy agenda it has already (and acrimoniously) approved, or does it do nothing and leave the nation's energy policy untouched for another decade or more? The choice appears stark, but it need not be. If Congress wishes to continue this year's trend of asserting itself toward the executive, it could pursue different, creative, or otherwise unresolved paths toward the goal of “energy independence.” Drilling in Alaska's National Wildlife Refuge and modifying federal fuel economy standards are two contentious issues that have yet to be resolved. On the demand side of the energy equation, efforts to promote conservation have not yet been fully explored, nor have free-market approaches to promote renewable energy such as carbon trading or carbon taxes.
So there exists room for legislative creativity on the topic of “energy independence.” Genuine “energy independence” may be an unrealistic goal in today's global market, but reducing U.S. dependence on foreign energy sources is not. However sincere his sentiment, the mere fact that Bush emphasized the issue in his state of the union address indicates a willingness to keep “energy independence” in the public square. Congress should not shy away from his challenge.
Foreign Policy Association, 23 February 2006
Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:53 PM to U. S. Politics
February 20, 2006
Commander-in-Mischief
Executive power seems to be the hot political topic these days, and with good reason. The NSA’s unwarranted domestic surveillance and last year’s fight over Senator John McCain’s anti-torture amendment demonstrate the Bush administration’s desire for ever-greater executive prerogatives.
On one level, this sets up a political debate, with an array of partisan arguments both defending and attacking the administration’s power grab. But it’s also a constitutional debate, one whose ramifications could reach far beyond today’s political landscape. This is why one of the administration’s arguments, in particular, constitutes a dangerous misrepresentation of fact.
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has claimed that the administration “believe[s] the President has the inherent authority under the Constitution, as Commander-in-Chief, to engage in [the unwarranted domestic surveillance].” One must be careful, however. All too often, the simple utterance of “Constitution” or “constitutional” is accepted as an argument in and of itself.
The “commander-in-chief” clause of the Constitution can be found in Article II, Section 2: “The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States.” Note Gonzales’ truncation of the complete clause; he didn’t omit the latter part just for expediency’s sake. Rather, the administration knows that significant differences of perception exist between the truncated and the complete clauses.
The truncated clause, shortened simply to “commander-in-chief” and so far favored by the administration, has a succinct, authoritative ring to it. The term conjures images of martial leadership and resolve, and of the powers needed by an executive in times of war.
The complete clause complicates matters. The term “commander-in-chief” doesn’t sound martial by accident -- it is martial. George Bush is the “commander-in-chief” of the U.S. armed forces; he is the president of the United States. The terms are not interchangeable; military officers lead armies and navies, not civilian states.
Referring to the president as the “commander-in-chief” of the United States is akin to referring to a governor as the “general” of his state, or to a ship’s captain as its “mayor.” The difference is far more than semantic. It speaks to the extent and nature of the authority the executive seeks. To conflate the terms, especially in a time of conflict, is reckless and deceptive.
The administration’s selective truncation of the Constitution is not limited to its unwarranted domestic surveillance program. Shortly after Bush signed McCain’s anti-torture amendment, the administration quietly released an accompanying “signing statement,” which noted that they would interpret the amendment “in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the president … as commander-in-chief.” The power of a truncated “commander-in-chief” clause, it appears, is widely applicable.
If this tactic of constitutional truncation sounds familiar, it should. It has been widely used in the debate over gun control, whereby opponents cite the Second Amendment (“… the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed”) while omitting the preceding words (“A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state …”). The administration’s tactics, then, are by no means original. In a democracy perhaps more so than anywhere else, verbal imagery is a potent tool in any politician’s arsenal.
So far, the debate over increasing executive prerogatives has been fought primarily between the executive and the legislative branches of government. Inevitably, it will end up in the hands of the judiciary, which conveniently has already said a few things about the “commander-in-chief” clause. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), the Supreme Court ruled that President Truman could not seize U.S. steel mills during the Korean War. In the ruling opinion, Justice Hugo Black wrote, “Even though ‘theater of war’ be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power … [t]his is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its military authorities.”
Although the circumstances then were obviously different than they are now, Black stressed the inherent limits of a president’s “commander-in-chief” powers. When such limits create gaps in the nation’s ability to wage wars, they can only be filled with legislative -- not executive -- authority.
By resting so much of its argument over executive prerogatives on a truncated and misleading interpretation of the Constitution’s “commander-in-chief” clause, the Bush administration is betraying its true intentions. Until the judiciary becomes more involved in this debate, the burden of responsibility rests solely with the executive. Such loose, selective interpretation of the Constitution does not speak highly of its motives.
Providence Journal, 17 February 2006
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:21 PM to U. S. Politics
February 17, 2006
Yasukuni, Yomiuri, & Asahi
Fine summary of all things Yasukuni in the latest issue of the Economist. Nothing new or groundbraking, but this bit caught my attention:
... [O]pposition to a rising mood of nationalism is coming from an unlikely source from within the conservative establishment itself: the Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's -- indeed the world's -- biggest-circulation newspaper. Under Tsuneo Watanabe, the group's 79-year-old chairman and an éminence grise within the political establishment, the Yomiuri came to be the flag-waver for a more assertive Japan, one that argued for a revision of the pacifist constitution foisted on Japan by General Douglas MacArthur in 1947, and that bristled at any foreign criticism of the Yasukuni shrine.
Recently, however, Mr Watanabe has ordered the Yomiuri Shimbun to change its tune. Yasukuni, he now says, is the source of all Japan's problems with its neighbours; the Yomiuri and its more liberal rival, the Asahi Shimbun, have joined forces to push for a state alternative to the shrine, where the war dead can be honoured with less controversy. The LDP, however, has turned this idea down.
In particular, Mr Watanabe reserves his bile for Mr Koizumi—partly, perhaps, out of personal pique that the prime minister does not hang on his every word, as predecessors did. Equating Tojo with Hitler, Mr Watanabe told the New York Times last week that “Mr Koizumi worships at a shrine that glorifies militarism. This person Koizumi doesn't know history or philosophy, doesn't study, doesn't have any culture. That's why he says stupid things, like, ‘what's wrong about worshipping at Yasukuni?' Or, ‘China and Korea are the only countries that criticise Yasukuni.' This stems from his ignorance.” The Yomiuri is now running a series of articles examining Japan's wartime record, and promises to come up with a “verdict” by August. It is unlikely, though, to lay the past to rest. [emphasis mine]
The notion that two of Japan's largest and most establishment-linked newspapers would attack Koizumi so aggressively over Yasukuni strikes me as peculiar. I'm inclined to agree with the Economist's correspondent here in that this is more of a spat among old-school Japanese elite, and that Watanabe is upset at Koizumi's success in challenging the conservative LDP way of doing things.
The idea of a state-sponsored alternative to Yasukuni is not new, however, nor is it a likely solution. National monuments cannot simply be replaced by government fiat and be expected to win widespread acceptance overnight. If the Bush administration created a new version of the Washington Monument and told everyone that it was just as good as the original, would tourists buy it?
No, the most interesting bit of the Economist's fine summary is this bit about the revolt of Japanese big media. While Watanabe's motives may be based more on personal insult than on genuine conviction, I think any effort to challange authority or to question conventional wisdom in Japan is a good thing. Oddly, it is such qualities that endear Koizumi to so many. If Watanabe really is repelled by Koizumi's threat to the old LDP order in Japan, he has an ironically Koizumi-esque way of showing it.
