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May 18, 2006
Rising prices
In recent weeks, the nation has been wracked with rising gasoline prices and the ensuing consternation. For Congress and the president, the politics of high gasoline prices are relatively straightforward: high prices are bad, lower prices are better. But sometimes, political expediency outpaces realistic capability. Although it may be popular to advocate lower gasoline prices, it may be much harder for Congress to achieve that objective. Beyond the question of ability, however, lies a more serious question. Congressional action to lower gasoline prices may be hypocritical and, even worse, counterproductive.
There is no denying that gasoline prices have been on the rise nationwide. The average price for regular unleaded gasoline has climbed above $2.90/gallon, with prices much higher in several states. This is almost one dollar higher than the average price a year ago, and it is approaching the record high of $3.06/gallon set in the wake of Hurricane Katrina last September. Consternation over high gasoline prices is a semi-regular occurrence in the United States, and politicians and pundits alike have offered a slew of explanations for the rise in prices. Instability in Iraq, uncertainty in the U.S. relationship with Iran, increasing demand from India and China paired with static levels of supply, insufficient refining capacity, and price gouging by oil companies have all been suggested as reasons for the rising prices. In previous periods of high gasoline prices, the oil cartel OPEC has also been blamed. Regardless of the explanation, one thing is certain: the high price of gasoline is a foreign policy issue that directly affects Americans every day.
Accordingly, Congress has clamored to respond to the issue. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN) initially advocated a $100 rebate to taxpayers to offset the climbing gasoline prices. But this proposal quickly proved unpopular with consumers and legislators alike, even including Frist's fellow Republicans. Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX) referred to Frist's proposal as "a nonserious response to a serious problem." The rising gasoline prices seemed all the more unfair in the wake of the record profits reported by many major oil companies--the outgoing chairman of ExxonMobil, for example, recently received a $400 million retirement package. In response, Sen. Arlen Spector (R-PA) suggested a "windfall profits tax" on large oil companies that would be designed to discourage price gouging. "I believe that we have allowed too many companies to get together to reduce competition," Specter said. "They get together, reduce the supply of oil, and that drives up prices."
President Bush also offered his own plan to alleviate high gasoline prices. According to the administration, the plan would ensure that consumers are treated fairly, promote greater fuel efficiency, and invest in gasoline alternatives. Bush also called for revoking existing tax breaks to oil companies and for allowing the EPA to waive environmental restrictions that create fuel supply shortages. He suggested boosting the U.S. gasoline supply by deferring this summer's deposits into the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), a federally managed petroleum reserve designed to alleviate disruptions in oil supply: "By deferring deposits until the fall, we'll leave a little more oil on the market ... every little bit helps."
Each of the proposals suggested by Congress and the president operate under the assumption that the government is capable of affecting the price of gasoline. In one way--by adjusting the federal tax on gasoline--it can. But such tax only represents a portion of the overall cost of a gallon of gasoline, and the gasoline tax in the United States is already far lower than that in other developed countries. Many industry experts suggest that the factors affecting the price of gasoline are beyond governmental control. Questions of global petroleum supply and demand and political tensions with unpredictable, oil-rich regimes cannot be answered overnight by either the legislative or the executive branches of government. One industry expert suggested that delaying petroleum deposits to the SPR, as proposed by Bush, was akin to "not even rearranging a single deck chair on the Titanic."
Of course, the likelihood of policy-making impotence does not stop politicians from gathering behind a popular cause. But this allure of political popularity risks the ignorance of good policy. High gasoline prices could represent a natural market pressure on unsustainable social and economic habits in the United States. They could encourage carmakers and consumers alike to place a higher value on automobile fuel efficiency; discourage suburban sprawl and encourage the growth of more tightly woven communities; encourage investment in mass transit; generate less particulate pollution and slow the processes of global warming; encourage healthier lifestyle habits; and decrease U.S. dependence on unreliable or dangerous sources of petroleum.
If these themes sound familiar, they should--they have been discussed previously in this space. More importantly, President Bush himself spoke of energy independence in his most recent state of the union address, and legislators from both parties have advocated similar themes for many years. But very little of the recent posturing over gasoline prices seems to reflect any of these sentiments. For example, Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY) has previously called for improvements in federally mandated fuel economy standards for automobiles. But in the wake of the recent spike in gasoline prices, he has railed against big oil companies and has noted that "American consumers will need all the help they can get at the pump as we head into the summer driving season."
Many would suggest, however, that cheap gasoline and better fuel efficiency standards are contradictory policy goals. A few legislators who have been vocal advocates for energy independence, such as Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL), have stopped short of offering rash proposals to lower the price of gasoline: "The only thing as predictable as rising gas prices are the short-term political solutions that come along with them." But most have not, and none of them have attempted to reconcile the apparent contradiction between their calls for lower gasoline prices with their same calls for energy independence.
The big complication with this issue is that high gasoline prices are a very regressive means of modifying national behavior. In the medium- or long-term, higher prices may encourage more sustainable behavior. But in the short-term, they have a disproportionately greater effect on those of middle and lower incomes than on those who are richer. Many in the working class rely on cars for their livelihood. Even if they wanted to utilize mass transit or move into more densely populated neighborhoods closer to their workplaces, they could not do so, because these options simply are not available in many parts of the country. The more well-off, however, spend proportionately less of their income on transportation, so high gasoline prices for them are generally more of a bearable inconvenience than a serious threat to their livelihood.
Herein lies the true public policy challenge. If the president and Congress are serious about encouraging energy independence and sustainable development in this country, how can they affect a positive change in U.S. society without disproportionately hurting those who are least able to make such a transition? Or, conversely, are politicians more concerned with the "here and now" issue of high gasoline prices than they are with the more challenging, longer-term issues of energy independence? These questions are immensely challenging. They involve many different interests, many potential solutions, and few obvious answers, and they demand a long-term perspective. In other words, they are the foreign policy questions best suited for a deliberative body such as Congress. So far in the debate over high gasoline prices, however, short-term posturing seems to have proven more popular than an honest debate of the longer-term issues.
Foreign Policy Association, 18 May 2006
Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:52 PM to U. S. Politics
Important bases
The U.S. military is cleaning house. Existing bases are being retooled or eliminated, and new ones are popping up in some unexpected places. These are the overseas bases that are now vital to the U.S. military—and the new ones that will change its global footprint for years to come.
Andersen Air Force Base & Apra Harbor, Guam
The base: Andersen can handle aircraft ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles to long-range strategic bombers, and Apra Harbor can service everything from nuclear submarines to aircraft carriers. The naval base is also home to one of the three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons worldwide, which provides mobile, long-term storage of land-combat equipment and supplies near potential trouble spots.
Its importance: Located in the Pacific Ocean about 2,000 miles from Asia, Guam is close enough to the mainland to be vital in any conceivable conflict yet distant enough to preclude a surprise blow from an adversary. Andersen is one of the few locations with the necessary hanger facilities to protect the B-2’s sensitive, radar-evading skin, and strategic bombers regularly cycle through the base to project power toward mainland Asia. The best part: unlike other large bases in the region, Guam is U.S. territory.
Balad Air Base/Camp Anaconda, Iraq
The base: Most prominent of the “enduring bases” being constructed in Iraq, Balad is located just north of Baghdad. It is one of the busiest airfields in the country, accommodating both Air Force fighters as well as transport aircraft. Camp Anaconda, adjacent to the air base, serves as a main base and logistics center for U.S. troops serving throughout central Iraq.
Its importance: Balad’s facilities and location make it more than just an ideal base from which to fight insurgents in Iraq. It is also perfectly positioned to project U.S. power throughout the Middle East, and it will likely do so for many years to come. Although this convenience might serve wider U.S. interests, it doesn’t sit too well with Balad’s Iraqi neighbors—U.S. soldiers have nicknamed Camp Anaconda “Mortaritaville” after a common greeting they receive.
Bezmer Air Base, Bulgaria
The base: Bezmer reflects a broader trend toward lighter, more austere bases in Eastern Europe and away from the larger military complexes in Western and Central Europe. To keep a low profile in the host countries, the Pentagon is reluctant to even refer to Bezmer and its Eastern European equivalents as “bases,” and it stresses that the host countries retain full control of their facilities.
Its importance: Compared to U.S. bases in “old” Europe, Bezmer and its Eastern European equivalents are cheaper to operate and closer to potential hot spots in the Middle East and Central Asia. In times of conflict, the military will use these facilities to “surge” men and materiel toward the front lines. The hope is that former-Soviet bloc host countries will be more amenable to U.S. bases than other hosts in “old” Europe and be less likely to block their use in a time of conflict.
Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory
The base: Located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia served as a base for B-52s during the 1991 and 2003 wars with Iraq and during post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan. Its isolated anchorage is also home to both Army and Marine seaborne prepositioning squadrons for land-combat equipment and supplies.
Its importance: Isolation—and British sovereignty—make Diego Garcia a far more secure base for U.S. forces than any mainland base in Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia. Specialized shelters to protect the sensitive stealth equipment of visiting B-2s have recently been installed, and strategic bombers regularly rotate through the base. The atoll is also an important part of the U.S. Space Surveillance Network of telescopes, radars, and listening stations.
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba
The base: Originally intended as coaling station for the U.S. Navy, Guantánamo Bay (or “Gitmo”) remains an important logistical base for Navy units operating in the Caribbean. It also serves as a hub for counter-drug and migrant interdiction operations.
Its importance: Gitmo’s greatest strategic asset is its hazy legal status—it is U.S.-controlled, but it is not U.S. territory. Although it’s not the only place through which “enemy combatants” (neither POWs nor convicted criminals) could be processed, it is readily accessible from the U.S. mainland, and its staff and facilities have experience in detention operations from their time as host to Haitian and Cuban refugees. As a result, Gitmo is one of the most well-known and reviled U.S. bases worldwide. The Bush administration has repeatedly rejected high-profile calls to shut down the base.
Manas Air Base, Kirgizstan
The base: Manas was established at Bishkek’s international airport in the months following 9/11 as a hub for multinational operations in Afghanistan. It has since grown into a substantial base in the heart of Central Asia, playing host to combat aircraft, their supporting personnel, and associated facilities.
Its importance: In addition to its proximity to Afghanistan, Manas is located near the immense energy reserves of the Caspian Basin, as well as the Russian and Chinese frontiers. Kirgizstan has not threatened to follow Uzbekistan’s example and expel U.S. forces, which suggests that Manas could become a linchpin of the enduring U.S. presence in Central Asia. Recognizing its value, Kirgizstan is talking about raising the rent from $2 million to $207 million per year.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:43 PM to Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics
May 02, 2006
On the revolt of the ex-generals
The latest wave of criticism to target Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has come from a cadre of distinguished, retired generals. It differs significantly, however, from previous attacks on the secretary of defense. More than simply calling for Rumsfeld's resignation, it raises a fundamental question about U.S. military policy: Has the concept of civilian control of the military gone awry?
The recent criticism is most distinguishable by its sources. Calls for Rumsfeld's resignation have come from at least six generals, including Marine Lt. General Greg Newbold (ret.), director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2000 to 2002; Maj. General John Batiste (ret.), who led the Army's 1st Infantry Division in Iraq in 2004 and 2005; and Marine Gen. Anthony Zinni (ret.), former chief of the U.S. Central Command.
The substance and source of this criticism has created a unique alliance of sorts. For Democrats, liberals and everyone else instinctively opposed to the Iraq war, the notion of military officers criticizing the Bush administration is a priceless commodity. The political left in the United States has long been tagged -- rightly or wrongly -- with an intense aversion to all things military. For them to criticize President Bush is nothing remarkable; it is entirely expected.
But when military officers with distinguished service histories and combat records join their chorus, people take notice.
Beyond the specifics of Rumsfeld's management of the Iraq war, however, this alliance of liberals and generals risks confusion and misinterpretation. The principle of civilian control of the military is enshrined in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, and the president exercises this authority directly and through subordinates such as the secretary of defense. By so eagerly claiming the generals' criticisms as their own, however, the political left could appear to be challenging this constitutional principle. That alone would contradict the political left's own intellectual and antiwar roots. In terms of who should control the U.S. Armed Forces, then, does military expertise trump civilian accountability?
The answer may not be as simple as it appears. On the basis of fact alone, the criticisms leveled by the retired generals appear sound. The situation in Iraq remains violent and unsettled -- conditions that can be traced to decisions made before the war and shortly after the invasion. Rumsfeld's pre-Sept. 11 goals to reform the military into a leaner, more technologically advanced fighting force may have been sound in theory and even in certain cases of practice, such as the initial invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. But his ideological and political rigidity has cost time, treasure, and lives in post-invasion Iraq.
The attraction of the so-called ''generals' revolt'' for the political left is thus readily apparent. But this attraction must be treated with caution, for it risks adopting a shortsighted view of history. During the Korean War, Gen. Douglas MacArthur brazenly challenged President Truman's authority when he publicly advocated the use of nuclear weapons on China. In 1951, Truman fired the immensely popular general, and he suffered politically in doing so. But history has judged Truman's decision to be the correct one. By risking his short-term popularity, Truman reasserted a fundamental constitutional principle at the very outset of the Cold War and the nuclear age.
The current situation requires not just a reassessment of the short-term strategy in Iraq. It also demands a far-sighted vision for how civilian leadership of the military will function in the future. The questions raised may be academic in nature, but they are immensely important. Much as Truman did in the 1950s, the United States today finds itself in the early years of what may well be a long, dangerous and endemic military conflict. Fundamentally, the principle of accountability must reign supreme. Military officers -- as tempered with experience and caution as they may be -- are not directly accountable to citizens at large. Civilians -- as arrogant, wrong-headed and eager to fight as they may be -- necessarily are.
San Francisco Chronicle, 2 May 2006
Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:40 AM to U. S. Politics
