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August 30, 2006
Past imperfect
As expected, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the controversial Yasukuni war shrine this month. It was Koizumi's sixth visit to the shrine and most likely his last, as he is due to step down as prime minister in September. But it was also his first ever visit on August 15, the anniversary of Japan's surrender in the Pacific War. As such, it represented a particularly brazen act of symbolism.
The resulting protests from Japan's regional neighbors, however, differed little in tone or content from the condemnations of Koizumi's earlier visits. "Koizumi's shrine visits a 'poison' for Sino-Japanese relations," said a headline on the website of China's state-run Xinhua; "South Korea denounces Koizumi's shrine visit" said one in The Korea Times of South Korea; North Korea's KCNA news agency stated bluntly that the visit "clearly prove[s] that Japan is a cancer-like entity in preserving regional peace as it is seized by such revanchism and fever to revive militarism." The reason for this is as perverse as it is straightforward: However much they may heighten regional tensions--in fact, because they heighten regional tensions--Koizumi's repeated visits to Yasukuni actually serve the interests of every power in East Asia.
The Yasukuni Shrine was created by the Emperor Meiji in 1869 to honor Japan's war dead. Among those currently comemorated at Yasukuni are 14 convicted war criminals that were executed or imprisoned following the Pacific War. China, Korea, and other countries that were occupied by Japan during the war accordingly interpret Koizumi's visits as tacit yet official approval of Japan's actions during that period. Indeed, Yasukuni is emblematic of Japan's much larger problem of reconciling its collective memory of the Pacific War with its actual behavior. The shrine is not responsible for Japan's difficulties in grappling with its own history (and such difficulties would still torment the country in the shrine's absence), but Yasukuni provides a physical manifestation of the problem. It serves as a rallying point for the vocal nationalist minority that reveres fantastical conceptions of Japan's militarist glory. This right-wing sentiment provides the necessary context for Koizumi's visits and provokes resentment--across the region--to all things Japan. And the regional fury, in turn, fuels the harsher side of Japanese nationalism: The cycle perpetuates itself.
This mutually reinforcing suspicion spurs distrust between Japan and its neighbors. Strangely, however, it also serves each country's interests. China, where anti-Japanese sentiment is naturally abundant, is the clearest example. Official displays of outrage help legitimize the ruling Communist Party, whose legacy rests on its resistance to Japanese invaders in the 1930s and 1940s. But other countries follow a similar pattern. Hatred of Japan is one of the few things that unite North and South Korea in mutual nationalist fury. Both countries resent Japan's claim on the Dokdo Islands--or the Takeshima Islands, to the Japanese. Japan annexed the islands--along with the rest of Korea--in the early twentieth century, but it refused to relinquish its claim on them after it was expelled from Korea after the Pacific War. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has indicated that he will not hold a summit with any Japanese prime minister that visits Yasukuni. Singapore, like much of the rest of East Asia, was also occupied by Japan during the Pacific War. In the wake of Koizumi's latest visit to Yasukuni, its foreign ministry released a statement noting that the visits "are not helpful to the larger common interest of building closer relations and cooperation in East Asia, including Southeast Asia."
Righteous indignation obviates the need for these countries to craft a meaningful policy toward Japan. Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing is fond of demanding "concrete actions" from Japan in the spirit of "taking history as a mirror and looking forward to the future." He has been less forthcoming, however, in describing exactly what that means. And why should he? Authoritarian governments are always interested maintaining their power above all else, and a great way to do that is to rant demagogically about some perceived enemy. For China especially, Japan represents the perfect foe, with a long history of mutual enmity and distrust between the two countries that began long before the Pacific War.
But China's instinctive aggravation with Yasukuni serves more than just a domestic political purpose. It's also a simple way to cripple regional diplomacy. For all the talk of China's "rise" and Japan's "graying," the two countries are indisputably the most important powers in East Asia--and, although it is neither as safe nor productive as cooperation, China prefers competition. Whenever Koizumi visits Yasukuni, China reverts to a predictable litany of complaints grounded in a war it fought (and won) decades ago. Most unproductively--and with uncanny predictability--it uses the visits as excuses to cancel diplomatic summits and other bilateral exchanges. Since Koizumi first visited Yasukuni in 2001, the leaders of China and Japan have not held a formal summit meeting, and China has refused to endorse such a meeting for as long as the visits to Yasukuni continue.
Still, Japan has every reason to absorb the moral condemnation from across East Asia. Koizumi, for his part, also uses his Yasukuni visits to advance his own foreign policy agenda in his own country. Since taking office, he has attempted to nudge Japan into becoming a fuller and more responsible member of the international community. Koizumi has advocated revisions to Japan's constitution that would allow the Self-Defense Forces to engage in a wider variety of peacekeeping operations, and he has strongly pushed for a permanent Japanese seat on the U.N. Security Council, in the face of China's consistent and instinctive opposition.
Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni are, in part, attempts to bolster domestic support for this comparatively muscular vision. They stir domestic debate about Japan's global role and focus attention on his foreign policy vision. (They also give a voice to Japan's angry nationalist minority, making Koizumi's own foreign policy goals seem moderate in comparison.) In essence, Koizumi's visits shift the debate about Japan's international role rightward, positioning his own vision as the increasingly reasonable option.
Of course, none of this is very healthy for Japan or its neighbors. Given his country's difficulty in grappling with its own history, Koizumi's game is cynical and irresponsible, and it stokes long-divisive sentiments in Japanese society. Koizumi adds insult to injury by seeming to revel in the controversy his Yasukuni visits generate. He recently told reporters that he "still [doesn't] understand why China and South Korea criticize my visits to Yasukuni." Meanwhile, with a dollop of creativity and initiative, China could use Koizumi's visits as prompts to address the bilateral issues that are relevant today, such as its lingering territorial disputes with Japan or drilling rights in the East China Sea. But, as long as its leaders can get away with attacking Japan for 60-year-old sins, they have no need to find creative solutions for tough bilateral problems.
As long as Japan grants even a hint of official recognition to the war criminals commemorated at the shrine, it will be impossible for the Japanese to come to grips with what their country did in the Pacific War. And, as long as Japan's neighbors fixate on Yasukuni as a means to prevent Japan from taking on a larger, more responsible role in international affairs, regional politics will stagnate. Of course, even though this month's visit to Yasukuni was Koizumi's last as prime minister, his successors will likely continue the practice anyway. Shinzo Abe, currently Koizumi's chief cabinet secretary and the frontrunner to replace him as prime minister, has already visited Yasukuni himself and has gone on record in asserting his right to do so. (A recent poll by Nihon Keizai Shimbun showed that, while 39 percent of Japanese would oppose visits to Yasukuni by future prime ministers, 43 percent would support them.) This means that the powers of East Asia will continue to blindly fight yesterday's war. And they will enjoy every minute of it.
