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September 29, 2006
There to stay
As the midterm elections rapidly approach, the calls for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq have grown louder and more consistent. In some cases, they have even come in a bipartisan flavor. Such sentiment is only natural. The bloodshed in Iraq is increasing at a gruesome rate, and the U.S. mission there has haphazardly meandered into something seemingly intended to save the country from its own internal divisions.
Some suggest that the very presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is responsible for the violence and instability there. Others counter by suggesting that U.S. forces are the only thing standing in the way of genocide. Both arguments have merit, but they both miss the point. The debate over the length of the U.S. occupation of Iraq was settled before the initial attack was even launched in 2003. Its resolution lies squarely with the very rationales for the invasion itself.
From September 2001 to March 2003, the Bush administration offered a slew of reasons to invade Iraq -- WMDs, regime change, links to al Qaeda and more. But the logic behind each rationale seemed tenuous and forced, and the constantly shifting emphasis diluted the strength of each one. Most damning, however, was the post-invasion evidence that the administration may have exaggerated its arguments to get the war it wanted. If the ostensible reasons to invade were exaggerated, then, a key question remains: Why did the Bush administration really want to invade Iraq?
This is best answered by imagining a traditional Russian nesting doll, in which each visible invasion rationale can be peeled away to reveal another, less presentable one. The most exterior argument, and the one that could bear not only public scrutiny but also that of the United Nations, was Iraqi possession of illicit WMDs. Insufficiently proven to justify invasion on its own (in part because Iraq did not possess any WMDs at the time), this exterior layer of rationalization must be peeled away to reveal more nested pro-invasion arguments.
One such argument was based on regime change. This rationale could be used publicly, but not at the United Nations, for Saddam Hussein -- like every other dictator in the world -- violated no U.N. Security Council resolution just by being an odious leader. In a similar vein, if the administration originally intended to promote democracy in Iraq, its initial post-invasion plans would have included more than a simple reliance on Ahmed Chalabi. Even at its best moments, the Bush administration could prove nothing more than weak and circumstantial links between Iraq and al Qaeda. It had absolutely no convincing argument linking Hussein to 9/11.
Peeling away these various layers of rationalization ultimately reveals the nub of the pro-invasion argument: pure geopolitics. This argument, unlike the others, could not be made publicly to justify a war of choice. It was based on a long-held belief by many in the Bush administration that the United States must remain in a position of global supremacy, and that force should be used to deter or defeat any potential challenges to such supremacy. That this belief coincided neatly with the country's post-9/11 paranoia and with neoconservative dreams of democratizing the world was, to put it mildly, exquisitely convenient.
Invading Iraq put U.S. power in a vitally important part of the world, positioned neatly over abundant energy reserves and between Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Iraq was a perfect place to plant the U.S. flag; everything else was ancillary to this central cause. Practically speaking, this geopolitical argument translates into permanent basing rights. Although U.S. troop levels may well fluctuate in the coming months and years, the Pentagon has constructed at least four so-called "enduring bases" in Iraq. These facilities -- fortified and cordoned off from their Iraqi neighbors and served by such staples of U.S. culture as Burger King and Subway -- are designed to house U.S. forces for an extended period of time. Perhaps this is why Iraqis have never received a definitive indication that U.S. forces will ever completely leave their country.
The debate over withdrawal timetables is thus almost ludicrous. Fundamentally, the United States invaded Iraq to stay in Iraq; upon arrival, the Bush administration never had any intention of leaving. U.S. forces will remain, based at Hussein's former military bases, ready to deter challenges to U.S. supremacy and to project power in a chronically unstable corner of the globe.
This brings us to today, where the debate over invasion rationales can illuminate the one over occupation dilemmas. The United States must refute its root cause for invasion and disavow any intention of permanent or "enduring" bases in Iraq. Various administration officials have muttered words loosely to this effect before, but never to an Iraqi audience and never while addressing the apparent contradiction of the "enduring" military facilities that have been established. To be effective, a genuine disavowal must be backed by genuine intent. Such a disavowal would not solve Iraq's problems overnight -- the current violence and instability are far too deeply rooted for that. But it would be an important first step. It would place any timetable for eventual withdrawal firmly in Iraqis' collective hands, truly contingent upon their own political and security development. Withdrawal would become something desired by the United States, not something deferred.
More importantly, such a disavowal could raise the level of trust between the United States and the international community. Just as Americans questioned the administration's invasion rationales, so too did the world, and so too do Iraqis today. Coming to grips with the real reasons behind the invasion could pay long-term dividends. That little bit of honesty would help not only Iraq, but also the United States' own sagging international reputation.
Alas, no disavowal will ever come. The Bush administration will never renounce permanent bases in Iraq, for doing so would undermine its root rationale for invasion. One could expect no better from the other party, either. Thus far, congressional Democrats have been reluctant to question the Pentagon's construction of the "enduring" bases in Iraq, for doing so might leave them vulnerable to the charge that they do not support safe, comfortable facilities for the U.S. troops there. More important, the geopolitical appeal of ready-made bases in Iraq is hard to resist. It is simply a bipartisan truism that Iraq is a perfect location from which to project U.S. power.
This is where the debate over the U.S. presence in Iraq ultimately returns, back to the decision to invade and to the fundamental nature of political and military power. It just so happens that when you're the one wielding the power, it doesn't seem so bad after all.
San Francisco Chronicle, 29 September 2006
Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:45 AM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
September 28, 2006
Congressional rush
As the November mid-term elections rapidly approach, Congress finds itself rushing against the clock. Out of concern for the campaigning requirements of its members, it has set October 6 as its target adjournment date for the year. This means that the legislature has given itself only a scant few weeks between its August recess and its October adjournment to take care of several pieces of outstanding business. At a September 15 press conference, President Bush identified two such issues he felt that Congress must address before it recessed: military commissions for the detainees at Guantanamo Bay and new rules for the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program. It is surely possible that the time constraints Congress has placed on itself will motivate legislators to reach resolution either or both of these contentious issues. But it is more likely that such pressure will prove counterproductive, resulting in neither useful public policy nor a positive image of the United States abroad.
The first issue identified by Bush—military commissions at Guantanamo Bay—has long been a contentious one. But it has taken on a new urgency since the Bush administration’s previous plan to try the detainees was invalidated by the Supreme Court in its June decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) (for background, see June’s Capitol Watch). President Bush jump-started the current debate by acknowledging the existence of secret CIA-run detention facilities in which prominent terrorist suspects were detained and interrogated. He also announced that fourteen such suspects—including suspected 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and co-collaborator Ramzi Binalshibh—had been transferred from their secret prisons to Guantanamo Bay, where they would be tried under the new procedures that Bush hoped to push through Congress.
Because many had thought that such prominent terrorist suspects would remain beyond the reach of any judicial process, such a transfer was a remarkable move. The administration’s proposal for new military commissions at Guantanamo would have allowed prosecutors to use classified information at the detainees’ tribunals, but would have forbidden the detainees access to—or even knowledge of—such evidence. Bush’s proposal also would have redefined U.S. obligations under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which forbids “outrages upon personal dignity” in the treatment of detainees. He sought clarification of these obligations so that CIA agents would be able to continue their interrogations of suspected terrorists: “This program has been one of the most vital tools in our efforts to protect this country … [w]e need this legislation to save it.” Some have even suggested that Bush also sought such legislation to retroactively legitimize the earlier torture of detainees. Mary Ellen O'Connell, a professor of international law at Notre Dame and critic of the Bush administration's detention policies, notes that "they want retroactive immunity … have you known of any other time in our history when we have tried to immunize public officials against crimes after they have committed the crimes?"
But the administration quickly discovered that the secret transfer of prominent terrorist suspects did not buy them much goodwill in Congress. Sens. John Warner (R-VA), John McCain (R-AZ), and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) formed a core of opposition that blocked the president’s program in the Senate. Their position was supported by several military officials and by Colin Powell, Bush’s own former secretary of state. Each of the maverick senators had their own reason for opposing Bush’s proposal. Warner has close and longstanding connections with uniformed military leaders, many of whom privately opposed Bush’s proposal; Graham has a great deal of experience in the military legal system and is a judge in the Air Force Reserve; McCain spent six years a prisoner of war in Vietnam, during which time he experienced torture first-hand. Regarding Bush’s proposal, McCain noted that, “weakening the Geneva protections is not only unnecessary, but would set an example to other countries, with less respect for basic human rights, that they could issue their own legislative ‘reinterpretations.’”
The second issue identified by Bush—the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program—has also been contentious for some time (for background, see July’s Capitol Watch). But like the military commissions at Guantanamo, this issue has recently taken on greater urgency. In August, a federal district judge in Michigan ruled that the wiretapping program violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) as well as the First and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution. “It was never the intent of the framers to give the president such unfettered control, particularly where his actions blatantly disregard the parameters clearly enumerated in the Bill of Rights,” wrote Judge Anna Diggs Taylor in her decision.
Prior to Judge Taylor’s decision, Sen. Arlen Spector (R-PA) had announced that he had struck a deal with the administration regarding the program. One provision of Spector’s bill would have allowed the president to submit the wiretapping program—in its entirety—to the FISA court to rule on its constitutionality, giving the administration free reign to continue the program without needing to seek individual warrants for each wiretap. Elsewhere in the Senate, a group of Republicans who last year had helped delay renewal of the Patriot Act—Sens. Larry Craig (R-ID), John Sununu (R-NH), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK)—advocated their own set of measures for any potential compromise on the NSA program. First, they wanted to remove the aforementioned provision from Specter’s bill. Second, they wanted to remove language that referred to the president's inherent “constitutional authority” to pursue national security programs. And third, they wanted to ensure that warrantless surveillance could not be conducted on a U.S. citizen. Their proposal would also have required a court-issued warrant for wiretapping beyond 45 days, unless the attorney general certified to Congress that such a warrant could not be obtained but that the surveillance was necessary for national security.
In the House, Rep. Heather Wilson (R-NM) originally proposed a bill that would have given legal status to the wiretapping program only after a terrorist attack on the United States. She later revised her proposal to allow warrantless wiretapping if an attack was believed to be imminent and if Congress was notified of such a threat. The notification would have to be submitted within five days of the president's authorization of the surveillance, name the entity or entities responsible for the threat, state the reason for believing the attack is imminent, and describe the foreign intelligence expected to be obtained through the surveillance and the means of the surveillance. “Excesses are best prevented when intelligence activities are operated within a framework that controls government power by using checks and balances among the three branches of government,” Wilson noted.
Eager to adjourn and return to the campaign trail, Senators and Congressmen will continue to work feverishly on these and other contentious issues. In their haste, the fine print of any potential compromise may receive scant attention. On the issue of military commissions at Guantanamo, it appears as if the Bush administration may be willing to compromise on its demand to keep prosecution evidence from defendants in the commissions themselves. In return, Congress may retroactively exempt CIA interrogators from potential prosecution for violating U.S. and international law forbidding torture. There remains some uncertainty, however, on the precise definition of “unlawful combatant,” which has been the term used to describe the Guantanamo detainees. The Senate version of a potential compromise defines them as those persons “engaged in hostilities against the United States;” a House version defines “unlawful combatants” as those persons “engaged in hostilities or who [have] purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States." On the issue of the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program, Specter’s bill and Wilson’s revised bill would seem to meet the president’s demands. It also appears that the administration may be willing to compromise on the demands put forward by Craig, Sununu, and Murkowski. But it remains unclear as to whether Congressional Democrats would allow either bill to reach the president’s desk for his signature.
To be sure, a fair and reasoned compromise on either issue would be a desirable outcome. But the time constraints that Congress has placed upon itself are purely artificial; in their haste, legislators may well pass inferior bills. The reason for the constraint itself may also serve to hamper the legislative process. Senators and congressmen are eager to return to the campaign trail and to demonstrate to their constituents that they deserve to be sent back to Washington DC. Such pressure to produce electorate-friendly legislation could easily result in poorly reasoned public policy.
It is on a broader, more international level that such legislative haste may prove the most damaging. Around the world, the U.S. Congress is seen as debating the merits of torture and of liberal jurisprudence. The tragedy, however, is that such a perception is precisely accurate. It has been widely noted that the United States is a country bound not by ethnicity, religion, or race, but rather by ideals. When the supposed temple of such ideals—the U.S. Congress—debates the issues it has been, in such a rushed and hasty manner, it raises serious questions about the moral legitimacy of the United States on the global stage. That, ultimately, may be the most lasting result of the current Congressional rush.
Foreign Policy Association, 28 September 2006
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:06 AM to U. S. Politics
September 12, 2006
Small diameter solutions
The latest conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has elicited plenty of comparisons with the U.S. war in Iraq. In each case, a technologically superior foreign state fought a less-advanced, indigenous, non-state foe. And in each case, the latter appeared to win, largely by practicing the tenets of "asymmetric warfare." Such a situation has raised one resounding question: Is a technologically advanced military an effective tool to fight terrorists?
In many cases it is. Failed states can be co-opted by terrorists and provide a sanctuary for their operations, and rogue states can deliberately and strategically support their goals. Ousting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan unquestionably hurt al Qaeda's operations, and some suggest that Iran's support for Hezbollah can only be stopped by military action against that country.
Military force, however, is an inherently messy and imprecise instrument, especially when fighting non-state actors, such as terrorists. Without clear battle lines and a universal respect for the laws of war, it is sometimes impossible for a bomb or missile to take out an individual terrorist target without killing nearby non-combatants or destroying non-military facilities. The effects of such "collateral damage" often outweigh the strategic benefit of a destroyed terrorist target. Increasingly, modern militaries are finding themselves ill suited to fighting these kinds of asymmetric wars.
Keenly aware of this truth, the Pentagon is retooling its arsenal to cope with the new kind of war practiced in Lebanon and Iraq. This summer, the Small Diameter Bomb debuted in U.S service; it should see its first combat use before the end of the year. This bomb will have an advanced GPS guidance system, theoretically enabling it to hit within 3 meters of a designated target from as much as 60 miles away, in all weather conditions. Its uniqueness, however, can be found in its name. The Small Diameter Bomb will be a small bomb -- less than 6 feet long, less than 8 inches in diameter, and weighing less than 300 pounds. By contrast, versions of the Joint Direct Attack Munition -- the primary GPS-guided bomb currently in the U.S. arsenal -- range in length from 10 feet to more than 12 feet and in weight from 1,000 lbs. to 2,000 lbs.
The Small Diameter Bomb's diminutive size gives it two great advantages. First, aircraft can carry more of them, and thus attack more targets per mission. The new F-22 fighter can carry two 1,000-pound Joint Direct Attack Munitions or, alternatively, eight Small Diameter Bombs. The B-2 bomber will be able to carry more than 200 of the little bombs. Second, the Small Diameter Bombs will limit collateral damage. If the target is a house, a car or even an individual terrorist, a small bomb will work just as well as a bigger bomb. With GPS guidance, generals no longer need a big blast to compensate for a near miss.
The Pentagon is poised to go even further. It is researching what it calls focused lethality munitions, which could be fitted to small bombs in the future. These munitions are encased in a composite material that, unlike steel, will not fragment into thousands of pieces of shrapnel upon detonation. This means that the effect of a bomb's explosion is far more focused around the point of impact -- ideally, nothing but the intended target itself is destroyed. To increase the bomb's effect on its intended target alone, the Pentagon is also experimenting with Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME), which uses tungsten powder in the explosive to act as a kind of shrapnel at close ranges. Because the shrapnel itself is only a powder, however, it cannot travel nearly as far as the steel fragments resulting from traditional bomb blasts.
If the Small Diameter Bomb and its associated research products live up to their billing, the U.S. military will be able to strike more precisely at terrorist targets with far less collateral damage. Their GPS guidance systems are supposed to be even more precise than those currently in service and their warheads far more efficient. Warplanes will be able to carry a great number of the little bombs, allowing them to strike more targets per sortie. The Small Diameter Bomb could quickly become the indispensable counter-terrorist weapon.
The problem is that the Pentagon rarely lives up to its promises. The inert tungsten powder that would be used in DIME-filled bombs has caused exceedingly high rates of cancer in lab rats. Whether through the explosion itself or through cancer several months later, collateral damage is still collateral damage. And how often in Lebanon and Iraq did a supposedly "smart bomb" -- guided by GPS systems similar to those that will guide the Small Diameter Bombs -- cause tremendous civilian casualties? However technologically precise a guidance system may be, it is still programmed by a human. And if a human tells a bomb to hit an apartment complex, it will do just that.
But programs such as the Small Diameter Bomb present a more fundamental problem. They risk creating the impression that a tactical and technological approach can solve a strategic and moral challenge. If Small Diameter Bombs and focused lethality munitions fulfill their potential, they will undoubtedly prove to be very useful on the battlefield. But no amount of technology can guarantee zero collateral damage in a military action. Rightly or wrongly, the image of a single dead child -- killed by a U.S. or Israeli bomb -- is more than enough to outweigh the strategic benefit of a single dead terrorist.
Technology alone cannot solve the challenges of asymmetric warfare; only a shift in counterterrorism strategy can do that. Recent events, however, seem to demonstrate that such a shift may be a long time in coming.
San Francisco Chronicle, 12 September 2006
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:23 AM to Trans-geographical
