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April 26, 2007
Iraq pushback
In the past few months, the Congressional debate over the Iraq war has come into much greater focus. In January, Democrats in the House and Senate—freshly installed as the majority party in each chamber—generated a raft of proposals to rein in President Bush’s conduct of the Iraq war (for more, see Capitol Watch, January 2007)). Now, after weeks of steadily amplifying rhetoric, words will soon be translated into political action. Congress has staked its position, and the president his, but the resulting confrontation is unlikely to dramatically change the situation in Iraq.
In March, the House approved a $109 billion supplemental spending bill to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The vote—largely along partisan lines—was 218-212. Unlike previous supplementals, however, this bill placed conditions on the president’s use of the appropriated funds. It required that U.S. troops meet certain readiness standards before deploying to Iraq, and it set benchmarks for the Iraqi government to meet as conditions for continued U.S. support. If such benchmarks are not met, U.S. troops could begin withdrawing from Iraq as early as July 1. Even if conditions improved in Iraq, U.S. forces would need to begin leaving in March 2008, with most combat forces out of the country by August 31, 2008. Anticipating a close vote, Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) successfully motivated her caucus prior to the roll call: “The American people do not support the war without end and neither should this Congress.”
The very next week, the Senate approved a companion $122 billion supplemental spending bill. It, too, passed the chamber with a largely partisan vote (51-47). The Senate bill required the president to begin withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq within four months and set a goal of ending combat operations by March 31, 2008. Although this non-binding “goal” for complete withdrawal differed in both force and date from the House bill’s “deadline,” the Senate vote was in some ways a greater jolt to the administration. The Senate has always been considered the more deliberative chamber of Congress, where the perpetual threat of a filibuster makes controversial bills more difficult to pass than in the House. The Senate has also traditionally held greater sway in the realm of foreign policy. Most importantly, as a follow-up to the House’s action, the Senate vote marked the first time that the full Congress had rebuked the president’s Iraq war policy with binding legislation. “The Senate and the House have held together and done what we’ve done,” Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-NV) said. “It’s now in [the president’s] corner to do what he wants to do.”
The House and Senate have just reconciled their respective bills, and the resulting compromise—which keeps the House’s readiness standards for U.S. troops but adopts the Senate’s non-binding date for complete withdrawal—will be sent to the president in the coming days. In doing so, Congress will speak in a rare, unified, and assertive manner. The war of words already has ascended to match this new level of earnestness. President Bush has made clear his intent to veto any bill containing timetables or deadlines. “When we've got a troop in harm's way, we expect that troop to be fully funded," he said. “We expect there to be no strings on our commanders.” Among the candidates in the 2008 presidential race (who are increasingly assuming the mantle as their respective parties’ most visible spokespersons), opinions largely fell along partisan lines, with some notable wrinkles. “[Nobody] wants to play chicken with our troops,” Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL) said, causing a minor stir that was quickly seized upon by one of his Democratic rivals. “This is not a game of chicken,” sniped former senator John Edwards. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) didn’t want to miss the chance to score political points, either. “I hope Democrats in Congress will heed the advice of … Senator Obama, and immediately pass a new bill to provide support to our troops,” he politely opined.
Beneath the electoral posturing, the war of words primarily is about responsibility. The argument is governed by two facts: The war in Iraq requires funding that only Congress can provide, but Congress cannot muster the super-majorities needed to override a presidential veto. So if the president vetoes the supplemental spending bill passed by Congress, will he be responsible for cutting off funding to troops in Iraq? Or will Congress be culpable for not passing a “clean” bill, free of restrictions or deadlines on combat operations? The president and his allies argue that the troops in Iraq are in urgent need of additional funding for weapons, body armor, and materiel. Democrats in Congress, on the other hand, dismiss this stance as overly dramatic and misleading, suggesting that troops in Iraq are not in danger of going hungry or unarmed.
To a certain extent, both sides of the argument have been exaggerated and abstracted. According to instructions recently issued to military commanders by Army Comptroller Nelson Ford, the Pentagon is taking “prudent [accounting] measures” to ensure that it has enough money to fund the Iraq war through June. In other words, troops in Iraq will not be cut off. And regardless of the political outcome, manipulating appropriations is inherently a blunt, imprecise, and imperfect way to affect the details of war policy. This is clear in the Constitution, which effectively grants Congress an “on/off switch” for war but reserves the “dimmer switch” for the president.
Nonetheless, the tactical implications of these rhetorical fireworks are very relevant and entirely clear. There is, in fact, a game of chicken afoot, and one side—the legislature or the executive—will have to blink. For institutional reasons, Congress is likely to compromise first, for the simple reason that the legislature must contend with the agendas of 535 ambitious individuals while the executive must only deal with the agenda of one. So when the president receives the final bill from Congress, he almost certainly will fulfill his promise to veto it.
Even then, Congress still will have several ways to constrain the president’s war policy. One likely option would have Congress pass a funding bill without restrictions or deadlines, but with a limited duration. Once the funding expired (after, say, three months), the president would need to request additional money from Congress, which could then pass another funding bill of limited duration, and so on. As each funding deadline passes, the political pressure on the president will ratchet ever higher, conceivably forcing a change in war policy or winning a veto-proof majority in Congress.
For those opposed to the war, however, such a tactic is not without risk. The original House and Senate bills passed by very slim margins, and even those majorities contained legislators whose support was only grudging. Even those who oppose the Iraq war and are inclined to manipulate appropriations to change its course may not be comfortable with the prospect of keeping the president on such a short leash. This much is clear: Whatever its course of action, Congress’ margin for error is much slimmer than the president’s.
In the end, none of this may matter. The House-Senate compromise bill that will be sent to the president in the coming days sets a 2008 withdrawal date from Iraq. Given the president’s likely veto and Congress’ likely response, any movement of this target withdrawal date—either in legislation or in principle—will be toward the future, thus inching into the term of the next president. That may be the first real opportunity to change Iraq policy (for more, see Capitol Watch, August 2006).
But even then, the path of Iraq war policy remains uncertain. The leading Democratic candidates for president—all of whom use anti-war rhetoric and advocate aggressive plans for redeployment from Iraq—leave allowances for residual forces in the country. Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) has noted that, “we have remaining vital national security interests in Iraq … I think we [will] have a remaining military as well as political mission.” And for the leading Republican candidates, any kind of pro-withdrawal stance would be politically untenable, regardless of the popular support for such a position.
The passage of binding legislation on the Iraq war by both the Senate and the House is a remarkable achievement, one that would have been unthinkable even a few months ago. But however the rhetorical war plays out, the overall political and institutional climate continues to bode poorly for a significant change in war policy in the near future.
Foreign Policy Association, 26 April 2007
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:44 AM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
