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July 28, 2007
Terror questions
As Congress engaged in another round of contentious debate over the Iraq war—this time, complete with a successful overnight filibuster by Republicans—the country was reminded of the nagging, perpetual fear of terrorism. A spate of attempted and botched terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom renewed the sense that the threat of religious-inspired violence remains real. A new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was released that painted a discouraging picture of the Bush administration's anti-terrorism campaign. As the death toll mounts in Iraq, and the prospects for a change in strategy grow dimmer, many in Congress and elsewhere are questioning with increasing intensity the connection between the war in Iraq and the "war on terror." Together, these various threads beg serious questions about the current U.S. anti-terror strategy and how Congress might move to address its deficiencies.
In recent weeks, the United Kingdom experienced a rapid spate of terrorist-related incidents. On June 29, British police discovered and disarmed two rudimentary car bombs in central London. The next day, two men rammed a jeep filled with propane cylinders into the main terminal at Glasgow Airport in Scotland. Although neither incident resulted in civilian loss of life, and the Glasgow Airport attack only caused minor damage, they prompted the United Kingdom to raise its terror alert status to its highest level. Because the foreign policy of the United Kingdom is so closely aligned with that of the United States, a threat in one country can justifiably raise fears in the other. Perhaps with such fears in mind, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff admitted to feeling some discomfort: "[I have] kind of a gut feeling that we are in a period of increased vulnerability."
A few weeks later, the Bush administration released a declassified version of its latest NIE. The report, billed as the U.S. intelligence community's "most authoritative written judgment on national security issues," notes that nearly six years after the 9/11 attacks, the group has "protected or regenerated key elements of its [h]omeland attack capability, including a safe haven in [Pakistan], operational lieutenants, and its top leadership." These assessments provided a great deal of ammunition for Bush administration critics in Congress, who suggested that the president's "war on terror" has been less than successful. "It is a travesty that Osama bin Laden remains at large nearly six years after the 9/11 attacks, and that the Bush administration and most congressional Republicans remain stubbornly wedded to a flawed strategy in Iraq," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV).
The release of the NIE, incidentally, occurred in the midst of Congress' latest debate on the Iraq war. Some suspected that such timing was no accident, and that the Bush administration thought that such a bleak assessment of the "war on terror" would encourage legislators to support his steadfast strategy in Iraq. The NIE explicitly notes that the central al Qaeda organization would "seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), its most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack the [h]omeland." Indeed, the president himself has often sought to link the "war on terror" with the Iraq war. In May, he declared that, "the enemy in Vietnam had neither the intent nor the capability to strike our homeland [but] the enemy in Iraq does."
The administration's approach, however, is fraught with risk. In addition to Iraq's purported weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration's original case for invasion rested on that country's affiliations with al Qaeda. It is now known that any such affiliations were tentative at best, and that al Qaeda-inspired militancy in Iraq is largely a by-product of the U.S. occupation. AQI—the organization cited in the NIE and a group that rose to bloody prominence under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—only came into being after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and it swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden after its precursor organizations had already established an independent reputation for sectarian violence. In other words, AQI was not involved in the 9/11 attacks. And even if it seeks to attack the United States directly, the organization's priorities clearly lie in Iraq, where it has ready access to U.S. targets. Democrats in Congress were quick to emphasize this point. "It is not true, categorically not true, that there was al Qaeda in Iraq before we invaded," said Representative Jane Harman (D-CA), chair of the Homeland Security subcommittee on intelligence.
Despite the pointed language, the debate in Congress failed again to produce a definitive change in Iraq war strategy. But the latest reminder of the intersection between the Iraq war and the "war on terror" provides an opportunity to re-evaluate U.S. prosecution of the latter. The term itself –"war on terror"—has always been somewhat controversial. Even among the vast majority of policy makers that agree that terrorism is a serious threat, many question whether an approach that emphasizes a military response is the best strategy. Rhetorically, the term "war on terror" evokes unfavorable comparisons with the "war on poverty" or the "war on drugs," not to mention its grammatical irregularity. Given these inconsistencies, some have suggested a radical revision of U.S. anti-terror strategy. In an article in the Atlantic Monthly last year, James Fallows suggested a straightforward approach: simply declare victory in the "war on terror" and transition to a more measured, less inflammatory anti-terror strategy. He notes that although al Qaeda itself does not constitute an existential threat to the United States, a poor U.S. response to al Qaeda provocation does. The initial U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 evicted the ruling Taliban and deprived the central al Qaeda organization of its safe haven; it was clearly a success. But Fallows cites the U.S. war in Iraq and its galvanizing effect on Islamic militants around the world as an example of how a solely military response to terrorism can be counter-productive. Of course, as the latest NIE points out, al Qaeda has re-established some degree of shelter in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. But as Fallows noted optimistically last year, "[al Qaeda's] destiny is no longer in its own hands." Perhaps time remains for Congress to push for a different strategy that takes advantage of this reality.
Even if Congress does not take up this challenge, it appears that others might. In the wake of the terrorist incidents in the United Kingdom, a number of foreign-born, Muslim physicians were arrested. One of the two men who rammed a vehicle into the Glasgow Airport terminal was Iraqi. Given such evidence, one could imagine how authorities might jump at the opportunity to link terrorism in Western countries with the war in Iraq—the need to fight them "there," before they attack us "here." As former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld remarked in 2005, "U.S. forces are in Iraq to … fight the terrorists there, so we don't have to fight them here in the United States." Instead of taking a similar approach, the newly installed British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, adopted a notably measured tone in addressing the incidents and the resulting arrests. He was more likely to define culprits as "criminals" rather than "terrorists," and he refrained from identifying them explicitly as "Muslim" or "Islamic." The rhetorical distinctions are subtle, but revealing. In using such language, Brown was attempting to deny the culprits the prestige of being soldiers in a war, and to decouple the religion from the crime.
Some in the United States are pushing for a new strategy more loudly than others. Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards has made a point of refuting the "war on terror" rhetoric, calling it "a slogan designed only for politics, not a strategy to make America safe." But the president is unlikely to change his rhetoric or his strategy before he leaves office, and if Congress cannot pass legislation to govern a conflict as discrete and unpopular as the war in Iraq, it is not likely to be able to do the same with a conflict as nebulous and important as the "war on terror" or its equivalent. The emerging British example under Brown may offer a glimmer of hope for a different approach to anti-terror strategy, but don't expect a change anytime soon.
Foriegn Policy Association, 26 July 2007
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:05 AM to Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
July 19, 2007
Election correction: Turkey and the EU
On Sunday, Turks will go to the polls to elect a new parliament. This earlier-than-expected election will be the latest chapter in the decades-long debate over secularism and democracy that has defined modern Turkey, as well as the culmination of months of political tension. In April, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development (AK) Party nominated Abdullah Gul, Turkey's foreign minister, to be the country's next president. But the nomination was stymied in parliament--the body charged with electing the country's largely ceremonial president--over concerns about Gul's religiosity and the AK Party's mildly Islamist roots. Even more ominously, the Turkish military registered its disapproval by suggesting that Gul's election would be part of a "growing threat" to the secular republic. Instead of nominating a less controversial figure that could have broken the political impasse, Erdogan decided instead to try and renew his popular mandate by calling for Sunday's early elections.
But the factors at play in this weekend's election extend beyond Turkey's borders. For decades, Turkey's tortured courtship of the European Union proceeded at a snail's pace. But after the AK Party won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and Erdogan became prime minister the following year, Turkey made remarkable progress in implementing the liberal reforms needed for eventual EU membership. In recent years, however, the vision of Turkish accession to the EU has grown dimmer, and the prospects for the continuation of much-needed reform in Turkey have dimmed with it. A victory for the AK Party on Sunday will leave the path to reform open. But, ultimately, the success of Turkey's reform movement rests not just with Erdogan, but with the EU itself.
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Turkey's road to EU membership began in 1959, when it applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community, a predecessor of the EU. The next four decades were marked by ambiguity, setbacks, and half-victories in Turkey's quest. In recent years, however, significant progress toward accession has been made. The EU agreed to begin formal membership negotiations in 2004, and launched such talks the next year.
The greatest catalyst for progress, however, was the election of Erdogan and the AK Party. Historically, governing majorities in the Turkish parliament have relied upon fragile coalitions that were unable to implement bold policy changes. The AK Party, however, won an uncompromised majority in parliament, riding to victory on a uniquely Turkish combination of religiously inspired social conservatism, staunch adherence to the secular principles of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (the founder of modern Turkey), and fierce devotion to the goal of EU accession. Erdogan, in other words, had both the ability and the desire to work toward EU membership, and he did so with gusto. He has moved to distance the Turkish military from the political process and to expand political and social rights both for Turks and the country's minority Kurds, and he has overseen robust economic growth.
From the perspective of many Europeans, however, Turkish membership in the EU has always been unpopular. Concerns have typically centered on economic factors (how could developed EU countries deal with a flood of unskilled Turkish labor?) and cultural ones (does Muslim Turkey really belong in Christian Europe?). In recent years, as Turkish accession has become a more realistic prospect, such sentiment has increasingly seeped into formal EU policy. The French rejection of the EU constitution in 2005 was fueled largely--and somewhat misleadingly--by fears of eventual Turkish membership. Since then, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy have each ridden to election victories on platforms that prominently opposed full Turkish accession, favoring instead vague alternatives such as "privileged partnership." The accession of Cyprus in 2004--after that country's rejection of a comprehensive settlement with its Turkish-dominated and isolated northern half--introduced a strong anti-Turkish voice into the EU. Late last year, continued mutual intransigence over the divided island compelled the EU to suspend negotiations on eight of the 35 "chapters" needed to complete Turkey's accession process.
As with all symbiotic relationships, the health of one party is dependent on the health of the other--when one gets sick, the other usually follows suit. EU membership has long been a popular goal for Turks; many see it as the ultimate realization of Ataturk's dream of a modern, secular Turkey. But as European politicians eagerly campaign for votes at Turkey's expense, and as ancient rivalries seem to arbitrarily derail accession talks, Turks have begun to wonder whether EU membership is worth the hassle. Increasingly, they seem to think not. In a recent poll, only one in three Turks said that they definitely want their country to join the EU--about half the figure in similar polls only a few years ago. And as EU membership plummets in popularity, so too does the rationale for many of the tough political and social reforms required for accession, especially those that work toward unfinished goals such as cutting public corruption and expanding freedom of expression. Erdogan, for his part, remains resolute. He pledged late last year that the "reform process will continue with the same decisiveness," regardless of what the EU says or does. But it is clear that Erdogan's patience is also wearing thin.
The most pernicious result of the EU's vacillation is that the forces opposed to Erdogan have found it easier to array against him. The Turkish military, which has long fancied itself as the ultimate guardian of the secular state, has always been wary of the AK Party's Islamist roots, and it resents Erdogan's efforts to remove it from the political process. Turkish nationalists have also long been skeptical of Erdogan's religiosity, in addition to his relatively measured approach in dealing with Kurdish issues and his devotion to EU membership in general. Mainstream secular political parties, which represent the bulk of Erdogan's parliamentary opposition, are eager to capitalize on any failures they can attribute to Erdogan, even if they share his goal of EU membership.
Ironically, as these varied forces align against Erdogan, they also align against their own best interests. Urban, secular Turks--those who would find themselves most at home in Europe--protest Erdogan's religiosity, giving cover to the military's ominous and blatantly anti-democratic rhetoric in the process. Rural, socially conservative Turks--those who might gain the most from expanded trade and investment with Europe and who might best identify with the AK Party's roots--support nationalist political elements that would realign Turkey's domestic and foreign policies for the worse. If Erdogan's opponents succeed in derailing his reforms, they would return Turkey to a darker period of its own history--military-dominated politics, vitriolic nationalism, or ineffectual coalition governments.
To be sure, Erdogan's opponents would seek his defeat regardless of the EU's attitude toward Turkish accession. But deficiencies of political will, strategic foresight, and structural capacity have made the EU and its leaders complicit in the potential failure of Erdogan's reforms. Merkel and Sarkozy's predecessors faced similar degrees of domestic opposition to Turkish membership, yet they still remained steadfast in their own support for accession. But despite their strength of will, Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac were unable (or unwilling) to articulate to their constituents the geopolitical and cultural imperative of Turkish accession, not just for Turkey, but for the EU itself.
Most importantly, the EU is structurally handicapped as a foreign policy actor, perpetually forced to contend with the divergent international agendas of its 27 member states. In other words, speed and clarity are not its strong suits. Where it can succeed on the international stage, however, is through its power of example. Over the past 15 years, the allure of EU membership encouraged and strengthened liberal reform in the former communist states of Eastern Europe, and these countries were ultimately rewarded with accession. A similar effect continues to extend east and south along the EU's periphery, but it requires the legitimate prospect of accession to achieve the same liberalizing results. Turkey could become the ultimate validation of this kind of indirect "foreign policy by example." It could also become its ultimate failure.
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Fortunately for Turkey, the AK Party is likely to retain its parliamentary majority in Sunday's elections, although perhaps by a reduced margin. If it does, it will be due to Erdogan's distinctly Turkish brand of politics. His deft blending of social conservatism, institutional secularism, and political liberalism make him uniquely suited to enact the reforms that will secure EU membership and strengthen Turkish democracy. It is unclear if Erdogan will re-nominate Gul for the presidency, and if he does, how the military would respond--much depends on the ultimate size of the AK Party's majority. But a resounding victory by the AK Party would provide a needed boost for the prospects of genuine reform in Turkey. This, in turn, could nudge the EU in a more encouraging direction, ultimately leading to greater progress toward Turkish accession.
Such a course correction is sorely needed. The EU has unnecessarily and myopically gone out of its way to make things worse for Turkey's political and social reform, and at the worst possible time. In addition to its struggles with EU accession, Turkey finds itself surrounded and bedeviled by a multitude of challenges. The war in Iraq, the re-emergence of Kurdish militarism, an increasingly assertive Russia, and the omnipresent threat of genuine Islamic extremism will continue to place ever-greater strains on Turkey. In such a turbulent environment, Erdogan's electoral victory alone cannot ensure the long-term success of his liberal reforms. This makes the EU's continued (and promised) support for his efforts--and ultimately, for membership--that much more important.
The New Republic, 20 July 2007
Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:22 PM to Europe, Middle East | TrackBack (0)
