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September 28, 2007
Hyperbolic insight
As the first primaries of the 2008 presidential election rapidly approach, the campaign rhetoric has heated up. Desperate to consolidate their leads or topple the front-runners, the presidential candidates have become increasingly comfortable with hyperbole, exaggeration, and obfuscation. Although these tricks may seem like easy ways to win media attention and campaign dollars, they aren't always the best ways to articulate a governing agenda. They do serve a purpose, however, although not necessarily to the candidate's benefit.
To be sure, the candidates have been issuing political hyperbole for some time. At a Republican debate in May, Republican candidate Mitt Romney, the former governor of Massachusetts, was asked about his views on the terrorist detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. “Some people have said we ought to close Guantanamo. My view is we ought to double Guantanamo,” said Romney. As a political statement, this won Romney points from Republican voters who value the perception of “toughness” against terrorists. Indeed, it's mildly surprising that none of Romney's Republican competitors tried to raise his claim and offer to triple or quadruple the size of Guantanamo. As a policy statement, however, Romney's statement was nonsensical, akin to claiming a desire to double the size of the U.S. prison population, without any consideration of guilt, innocence, or due process.
The former Massachusetts governor is not alone. Congressman Tom Tancredo (R-CO), also competing for the Republican nomination, has noted, “if it is up to me, we are going to explain that an attack on this homeland … would be followed by an attack on the holy sites in Mecca and Medina.” Such a statement is clearly outrageous, and to their credit, many of Tancredo's fellow Republican candidates repudiated his comments. Indeed, his comments set off a peculiar exchange with the State Department, which described his statements as “absolutely crazy.” Instead of taking offense at the castigation, however, Tancredo seemed to revel in it: “Boy, when they [the State Department] start complaining about things I say, I feel a lot better about the things I say, I'll tell you right now.” This response demonstrated a larger point: Tancredo's statement was intended to differentiate his candidacy for a domestic audience, not necessarily to advocate his policy for an international one. Recklessness, evidently, is a small price to pay for attention.
Democratic candidates are not immune to the temptation for hyperbole, either. Bill Richardson, the governor of New Mexico, has insisted that all U.S. troops should leave Iraq and that an all-Muslim UN force be inserted deployed in their place. Calling for a withdrawal from Iraq has long-since become mainstream among Democrats. Although experts may quibble about the details of a withdrawal, the fundamental policy premise is sensible. But insisting on the deployment of a UN force—much less an all-Muslim one—is something beyond the abilities of a U.S. president. Despite its international heft, the United States cannot simply compel the United Nations to do something on its own. Beyond that, it is highly questionable that the UN could muster a sufficient force from only its Muslim member states. Just as the United States cannot compel the UN to deploy peacekeepers, the UN cannot compel unwilling member states to contribute soldiers. As an ultimate policy objective, Richardson's ideas might make sense. But in a domestic political campaign, vital context and nuance fall by the wayside, and the public is left misinformed.
Former senator John Edwards shares Richardson's desire to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq. A major piece of his plan, and one that he cites frequently, is an “immediate withdrawal of 40,000-50,000 combat troops.” This may sound great to Democratic primary voters who oppose the war in Iraq and seek a quick end to it. But the position is also strikingly arbitrary. Why, for example, would Edwards withdraw 40,000-50,000 troops and not 30,000, or 60,000? Indeed, assuming that it would take at least several weeks (if not months) to “immediately” withdraw 40,000-50,000 troops, why does he not call instead for an “immediate” withdrawal of all U.S. troops? Edwards does not offer explanations for these legitimate policy questions, but then again, he doesn't have to. His statements are, first and foremost, political in nature. If he had any reason to believe that further details would boost his standing in the polls or help his fundraising efforts, Edwards would surely jump at the chance to provide them.
Such comments, designed for domestic consumption, can clearly make an impact overseas (for more, see Election Watch, August 2007). Election Watch, August 2007). Because Guantanamo Bay is as divisive an issue abroad as it is in the United States, Romney's full-throated support of its detention facilities shape the world's view of him. Tancredo's indelicate thoughts on deterring terrorism earned condemnation from the speaker of Pakistan's National Assembly, among others. On the issue of Iraq, foreign leaders are fully aware that it will be very difficult for Democrats to begin a significant withdrawal of U.S. forces as long as President Bush remains in office. They further know that any critique emanating from governors or former legislators—such as Richardson and Edwards—carries less weight than that coming from current senators.
Even if it must be discounted as electoral posturing, and although it may have unintended or damaging effects abroad, this season's political hyperbole does serve a certain purpose: It offers an insight into a candidate's underlying worldview and their substantive rigor. Voters may not be able to trust that Romney would actually “double Guantanamo,” but they can confidently infer that he would pursue aggressive policies against suspected terrorists and support the expanded powers of the executive branch. Democrats know that as a mere candidate, Edwards cannot “immediately” withdraw 40,000-50,000 troops from Iraq. But if his campaign pronouncements lack detail or consistency, his policies as president may be similarly plagued. The same principle is applicable elsewhere. If a campaign experiences a great deal of staff turnover, voters could infer that the candidate is a poor manager. If he or she is a listless public speaker, they may well have difficulty mustering popular support for important policies. The reverse can also be true. If a candidate shies away from excessive political hyperbole, one could infer that they value sound governance over winning-at-any-cost. Alternatively, voters could suspect that the candidate lacks the stomach for a political fight.
Clearly, sifting through political hyperbole can resemble fortune telling. It is, after all, no more or less trustworthy than anything else a politician might say. But the hyperbole does represent a window—albeit a distorted one—into the candidate's underlying worldview and their substantive rigor. The hyperbole will, by definition, exaggerate or mischaracterize these underlying truths. But however obscured they may be, hints of such truths remain present in every breathless pronouncement or faux display of earnestness a candidate makes. And as extreme as their hyperbole may seem, candidates are almost always better judged by their own words than by those of their competitors. For that reason alone, voters nationwide would be well advised to stay patient. The rising volumes of rhetoric emanating from Iowa and New Hampshire aren't just hot air.
Foreign Policy Association, 27 September 2007
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:11 AM to U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
September 03, 2007
Bleak comparison
Parallels between the war in Iraq and the war in Vietnam practically draw themselves. Many have long since noted the most obvious similarities: In each conflict, the United States struggled to defeat an unconventional enemy, using unorthodox tactics, in an unforgiving environment.
Recently, President Bush drew his own parallel: “Then as now, people argued the real problem was America’s presence and that if we would just withdraw, the killing would end.” Of course, any comparison between the wars in Vietnam and Iraq is bound to be nearly as controversial as the conflicts themselves. But beyond the hyperbole, relevant comparisons are there to be made. And as the momentum to exit Iraq gathers steam, the lessons from Vietnam can be particularly illuminating.
During the U.S. war in Vietnam, roughly from 1965 to 1973, troop levels varied greatly, climbing to a peak of over 500,000 in early 1969. The withdrawal of combat troops, however, actually began in earnest that very same year, as President Nixon tried to implement his “Vietnamization” policy of shifting the burden of the fight to the South Vietnamese. Troop levels dropped gradually over the coming years, as South Vietnam shouldered a greater combat burden and as negotiations with North Vietnam progressed in fits and starts. Withdrawal of combat troops from Vietnam was completed in 1972 (although “advisers” remained behind), and the Paris Peace Accords — which formally ended U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War — were signed in early 1973. From the U.S. perspective, these accords provided an expedient cover for the military withdrawal, or a “peace with honor,” as Nixon described it. Of course, neither the United States nor its South Vietnamese allies saw much of either. The Paris accords ultimately fell apart, and South Vietnam fell to the North in 1975.
By contrast, U.S. troop levels in Iraq have remained fairly consistent through the war — 100,000-200,000 since the invasion, in 2003. This has remained true both through Bush’s own strategy of “Vietnamization” (when the emphasis was on training Iraqis to assume security responsibilities from the United States) as well as his latest “surge” strategy (emphasizing the security of Baghdad with U.S. troops).
Moving forward, the comparison with Vietnam falls apart even more. The various Iraqi resistance groups lack a formal state sponsor with which the U.S. could negotiate a withdrawal; despite its clear influence, Iran cannot play the role of North Vietnam today. A regional diplomatic dialogue may emerge alongside the withdrawal process, and the U.S. will surely try to coordinate its departure with the Iraqi government. But the eventual U.S. withdrawal will probably not be accompanied by the same kind of political or diplomatic cover that the Paris Accords offered in Vietnam. As unsuccessful as the Paris Accords were, though, it isn’t clear that such cover is really that valuable.
Despite these differences, one important lesson can be gleaned: Withdrawal does not occur for withdrawal’s sake alone. The U.S. departure from Vietnam did not occur in isolation, and the eventual U.S. withdrawal from Iraq won’t, either. In each case, the military departure will be part of a broader political and military strategy with goals beyond the simple extrication of U.S. forces. Given its global standing, the United States does not have the luxury of simply leaving devastated, chaotic countries in its military’s wake. Rather, any military withdrawal from Iraq will be but one component of a broader strategy designed to ensure stability and security in that country. This is not to say that such a strategy will be successful; it certainly wasn’t so in Vietnam, and the prospects are dim for anything better in Iraq. But it does suggest that the withdrawal from Iraq will not be quick, and it will not be easy. This is a reality that will confront Democrats and Republicans alike.
Another interesting parallel between Vietnam and Iraq does present itself. Throughout the prolonged, gradual withdrawal from Vietnam, the United States continued to suffer casualties. It also remained very engaged in combat operations, specifically in the form of the aerial bombardment of North Vietnam. From the perspective of many on both sides of the conflict, then, the U.S. withdrawal process was somewhat illusory — the troops may have been leaving, but the war was still on. The same will probably be true in Iraq. The United States has invested so much in its military infrastructure in Iraq that a complete, 100 percent withdrawal remains unlikely for the foreseeable future. And even as the troops begin to leave, their air cover will remain in place, based from carriers in the Persian Gulf and from other bases throughout the region.
Compared with Vietnam, the bombers over Iraq may be faster and their bombs smarter. But as in Southeast Asia, it’s unlikely that the Iraq war will end when the last U.S. soldier leaves the battlefield.
Providence Journal, 4 September 2007
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:43 PM to Asia, Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
