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August 29, 2008
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In a month in which the Beijing Olympics, the impending party conventions, and vice presidential speculation should have been the main political news, an overseas war rudely interrupted. The conflict between Russia and Georgia, ostensibly over the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, has reignited Cold War-era suspicions of an assertive, nuclear-armed Russia. These suspicions are greatest in places like Georgia, Ukraine, and the other countries once dominated by the Soviet Union. But they are also having an effect on the U.S. presidential race. Although the Russia-Georgia conflict has not unearthed any new insights into the campaigns of Barack Obama or John McCain, it has solidified the existing and substantial distinctions in their foreign policy thinking.
This conflagration is just the latest chapter in a long history of conflict in the Caucasus region. Located at a confluence of religions, ethnicities, and trade routes, Georgia and its neighbors are wedged between the perennial powers of Turkey (and before that, the Ottoman Empire), Iran (Persia), and Russia (the Soviet Union). Since achieving independence amid the fall of the Soviet Union nearly 20 years ago, Georgia has experienced a variety of secessionist movements, most notably in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although animosity between South Ossetians and Georgians is genuine, the situation has hardly been helped by Russia. In an attempt to maintain sway in its former territories and along its present-day periphery, Russia supported these secessionist movements by providing passports to South Ossetians and Abkhazians and by deploying its own “peacekeepers” in the area. Tensions have been building all year, and in early August, Georgian troops moved to capture the capital of South Ossetia. Russia responded, not only evicting Georgian forces from South Ossetia, but also from Abkhazia and from parts of Georgia itself.
The onset of the conflict caught Obama at the beginning of a weeklong vacation in Hawaii. Although his holiday prevented Obama from engaging the subject on the campaign trail, he did issue a statement that called on Georgia and Russia to show restraint and to “avoid an escalation to full scale war.” These relatively even-handed remarks were strengthened a few days later, after Russian forces had moved beyond South Ossetia, where the conflict had begun, into Abkhazia and Georgia proper: “No matter how this conflict started, Russia has escalated it well beyond the dispute over South Ossetia and invaded another country.” Most notably, he reiterated his desire to pursue NATO membership negotiations with Georgia. Obama has since sharpened his criticism of Russia for refusing to abide by cease-fire terms and for suggesting that it would formally recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
McCain, for his part, was not on vacation when the conflict began, and he seemed quite content to address the issue in unambiguous terms. His initial statement was far harsher toward Russia than Obama's, and it did not acknowledge any Georgian culpability in igniting the conflict: “Russia should immediately and unconditionally cease its military operations and withdraw all forces from sovereign Georgian territory.” He also called for NATO to “review measures [it] can take to contribute to stabilizing this very dangerous situation.” McCain later claimed that “Russian aggression against Georgia is both a matter of urgent moral and strategic importance to the United States of America,” and that “the fate of Georgia should be of grave concern to Americans and all people who welcomed the end of a divided of Europe.”
Neither Georgia nor Russia is blameless for this war. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili acted recklessly in attacking his far larger neighbor; he may have assumed that the United States or NATO to come to his country's aid. Since taking office in 2003, Saakashvili has eagerly sought NATO membership for his country in an attempt to tie it more closely to the West. Given the history of Russian dominance in the Caucasus and its provocative actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (not to mention in Chechnya in the 1990s), it is only logical that Saakashvili sought such security assurances. Russia, however, had deliberately provoked Georgia by offering Russian citizenship to South Ossetians and Abkhazians and by placing “peacekeepers” in both regions. It reacted disproportionately when it invaded Georgia proper, blockaded its ports, and strongly hinted at its desire to depose Saakashvili.
As the conflict progressed, Russia's overreaction and aggressiveness became more obvious and Georgia's recklessness and presumptuousness receded into the background. Thus McCain's early, hawkish statements toward Russia seemed more prescient than Obama's even-handed approach. Indeed, McCain has taken an aggressive stance toward Russia throughout the presidential campaign. He has called for Russia to be kicked out of the G8 group of industrialized nations, and he is fond of describing his first meeting with Russia's current prime minister: “I looked into Mr. [Vladimir] Putin's eyes and I saw three things — a K and a G and a B.” At times, McCain's enthusiasm seemed to get the better of him. He declared at a campaign rally that he personally told Saakashvili that he spoke for every American in proclaiming, “we are all Georgians.” And without a trace of irony, he insisted that, “in the 21st century, nations don't invade other nations.”
Though he seemed to lack McCain's prescience about Russia's motivations and behavior, Obama became harsher towards Russia as the conflict unfolded. Broadly speaking, the reactions of McCain and Obama to the conflict confirm their emerging foreign policy identities. McCain is aggressive, assertive, and forceful in identifying clear adversaries and in speaking or acting against them. For him, the threats to U.S. security are always clear and discrete: Iraq, al Qaeda, Russia, etc. Obama is more deliberate, consultative, and cooperative in working to diffuse threats with a minimum of bluster or excessive rhetoric. In Obama's worldview, not all adversaries will be clearly defined. Correctly identifying the threat may be just as important (if not more so) than actually combating it. Even though the conflict in Georgia was far from straightforward, with plenty of culpability to go around, it could be handily portrayed as a big, scary, authoritarian Russia invading a small, brave, democratic Georgia. This is an easy construction to understand, with a clear “good guy” and “bad guy.” Such an issue is tailor-made for McCain's worldview.
Although this worldview may have its advantages, its blunt assertiveness can overshadow the important historical subtleties at the root of Russia's current behavior. After the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia became a weaker, more insecure country. But instead of disbanding or reorganizing itself, NATO—the alliance explicitly created to fight the Cold War and counter the Soviet threat—actually expanded, accepting as members countries in Eastern Europe that had once been under Soviet domination. As NATO moved closer to its border, and as the alliance flexed its muscles over Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, Russia's sense of its own insecurity grew deeper. But at the time, it was too weak to force a change in Western behavior, and many U.S. and NATO policy makers took Russia for granted.
Russia's immediate neighbors, however, did not. The countries of Eastern Europe understandably sought NATO membership, and more recently, so too did Ukraine and Georgia. For Russia, the encroachment of a “victorious” NATO toward its own borders represented not just a security threat, but an affront and an insult. If they had won the Cold War, why did NATO need to grow? Why did it even need to continue to exist? President Bush's unilateral behavior, such as his abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the invasion of Iraq, and the recognition of Kosovo, added insult to injury. But unlike in the 1990s, Russia's political power was consolidated under Vladimir Putin and its economic power was bolstered by a huge resource boom. Russia's invasion of Georgia had little to do with South Ossetia or Abkhazia. It was more about reasserting a long-dormant dominance over its impudent neighbors and reigniting a sense of national pride after nearly 20 years of perceived victimhood, disrespect, and insecurity.
In this context, it is Obama's more deliberative worldview that strikes upon an ironic kind of logic. For all of its real benefits, NATO's rapid expansion in the 1990s was a key contributor to Russia's sense of victimhood. Although the alliance has not yet begun formal membership negotiations with Georgia, the fact that its candidacy has been seriously considered—and strongly backed by the United States—has not gone unnoticed by Russia. But by launching its invasion, Russia has proven beyond any doubt that it poses a threat to Georgia. Its actions constitute the best case yet for Georgian membership in NATO. And Obama, counter-intuitively, seems to realize this. His response to the conflict lacked the aggressive bluster of McCain's, and he seemed to appreciate the complexities inherent in the conflict. Yet he simultaneously embraced the one policy—NATO expansion—perhaps most responsible for Russia's false sense of insecurity. But conditions change, and the policy makers that realize it are the ones that succeed.
Foreign Policy Association, 28 August 2008
Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:11 AM to Europe, U. S. Politics
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