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March 27, 2009
Nuclear empathy
In his first months as president, Barack Obama's focus necessarily has been on the rapidly deteriorating economic situation. But while he grapples with unexpected and fast-moving domestic issues, certain timeless international challenges remain, Iran foremost among them. Although the danger posed by Iran's nuclear intentions is real and prone to unexpected developments, the fundamental parameters of the situation have remained the same for several years. Obama, then, faces a choice. He could base his policy on the unchanging, long-term fundamentals of the situation, or he could respond to the rapidly changing, short-term shifts in assessments and expectations. Obama has already hinted at which tack he prefers, but may find himself constrained by forces beyond his control.
George Bush famously included Iran in his “axis of evil” in 2002, and although the country's nuclear ambitions preceded that date, international interest in its nuclear program certainly increased afterward. Iran's long history of antagonism and resentment toward the United States—from the CIA's meddling in its internal politics in the 1950s, to the Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis in the 1970s, to the country's support of anti-U.S. and anti-Israel terrorist groups from the 1980s to today—mean that its nuclear intentions are certainly to be of great concern to any U.S. president. That Iranian leaders have regularly referred to the United States as “the Great Satan” and spoken hypothetically about the destruction of Israel has not done much to alleviate fears.
Intelligence about the real progress of the Iranian nuclear program, however, is far less certain. Iran clearly has a nuclear program, but it has consistently declared its ambitions to be peaceful in nature and fully within its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 2007, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) declared that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. But the Obama administration has made clear that it suspects Iran is still pursuing nuclear weapons. During his confirmation hearings, CIA Director Leon Panetta said that he had “no question that they are seeking [weapons] capability.” Obama himself has spoken of Iran's “development of a nuclear weapon.” Last month, an inspection report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that Iran has acquired a sufficient amount of low-enriched uranium to produce a single, crude bomb. Understandably, this caused a great deal of anxiety, especially among those who have always been skeptical of Iranian intentions. But shocking headlines overwhelmed the nuance of the report. To produce a bomb, Iran would need to process its low-enriched uranium to make highly enriched uranium—something that would take several years and require the eviction of the IAEA inspectors already in place in Iran.
During the election campaign, Obama differentiated himself from his Democratic and Republican rivals by promoting a more open and transparent engagement of potential U.S. rivals. So far, he has largely kept that promise. This month, on the occasion of the Iranian New Year, he recorded a video message that was meant to directly address the Iranian people. In the message, Obama emphasized common traits that Americans and Iranians shared, in an empathetic tone very similar to many of his own campaign themes: “You will be celebrating your New Year in much the same way that we Americans mark our holidays—by gathering with friends and family, exchanging gifts and stories, and looking to the future with a renewed sense of hope.” He also spoke clearly about the approach he planned to pursue, noting that his “administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community.” Perhaps most notably, he expressed the U.S. desire for “the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations.” This was a remarkable gesture of respect because U.S. presidents traditionally have not formally or publicly acknowledged the Islamic government of Iran or referred to the country by its formal name.
Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, responded to Obama's message in relatively short order. As might be expected, he did not embrace the president's gesture wholeheartedly. “They chant the slogan of change but no change is seen in practice,” Khamenei noted, perhaps mocking Obama's famous campaign theme. He cited specific changes that have yet to be made: “Has your hostility towards the Iranian nation changed? … Have you unblocked Iran's assets [frozen in US banks]? Have you lifted the oppressive sanctions? Have you stopped insulting us and making accusations against our great nation and its leaders? Have you stopped your unconditional support for Israel?” Such rhetoric, however, does not mean Obama's gesture was fruitless. Iran's leaders have their own domestic political concerns; although the United States is popular among many younger Iranians, the conservative, hard-line constituency is still vitally important to the reigning political and clerical establishment. Indeed, Khamenei did not entirely rebuff Obama's message. He noted that Iran has “no prior experience of the new president of the American republic and of the government, and therefore we shall make our judgment based on his actions.” In other words, Iran would respond to U.S. actions, and not just its words. This is an entirely reasonable response, and it is in the nature of diplomacy that “words” almost always precede meaningful “actions.” Obama's message, then, might not have been made in vain.
The United States, however, is not the only country with a serious interest in Iran's nuclear program. Literally and figuratively, Israel is far closer to the core issues surrounding Iran's nuclear program than the United States. It is the only Middle Eastern country that possesses a nuclear arsenal, and although it is clearly intended as a deterrent against attacks, Israel's Muslim neighbors view it in a far more offensive light. Iran's leaders have long spoken explicitly about their desire to destroy Israel, and the country actively supports anti-Israel militant groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. Whereas the United States may see a nuclear-armed Iran as a nuisance, Israel sees it as an existential threat. The respective thresholds of action for the United States and Israel, therefore, are very different. The Iranian nuclear program may well reach a point at which Israel sees preventative military action as necessary, while the United States perceives more room for diplomacy and sanctions. The conflicting interpretations of the latest IAEA report highlight the risks here: no one can say with any certainty how close Iran is to acquiring a nuclear weapon. And where some might see the potential for diplomacy and negotiation in such uncertainty, others (in Israel, in particular) see a mortal threat.
Obama, then, faces no easy choices. In Iran, he is presented with a country with a long history of antagonism toward the United States that might be close to acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Or, because the intelligence is often so ambiguous, it might not be so close. On top of that, his closest ally in the region threatens to upend his diplomatic initiatives due to very different perceptions of the same threat. He cannot disregard Israeli concerns, but at the same time, there is no scenario under which a preventative military strike against Iran would have a clearly positive outcome. Obama's tack, so far, appears sound. It is a tentative, flexible, but definitive break with the aggressive rhetoric of George Bush. He applied his potent skills of empathy by speaking directly to the Iranian people in a way that may be interpreted as more sincere than the words of his predecessor; if it has not yielded immediate results, it quite possibly has laid the groundwork for future progress. Obama would be well advised to expand his application of empathy beyond the Iranian people and toward the Iranian leadership. Consider their situation: Iran is surrounded by nuclear powers locally (Israel, Pakistan), regionally (India, Russia), and internationally (U.S. forces based in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf). It is a country with a long and proud history that has regularly been squeezed and exploited by outside powers. Essentially, the Iranian regime is insecure. But they are also smart. They witnessed what happened when a U.S. adversary did not possess nuclear weapons (the invasion of Iraq) and what happened when a U.S. adversary did possess such weapons (the acquiescence to the North Korean nuclear program).
If Obama applied his unique skills of empathy in this manner, what might he find? Clearly, fewer nuclear weapons are better than more. But he must define U.S. objectives in a rational manner. Does he seek to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons? Or does he seek to prevent Iran from acquiring the capacity to develop nuclear weapons? These are very different policy thresholds, and each demands a very different technical, diplomatic, and military approach. Obama, then, must not only apply his ample skills of empathy in dealing with Iran's leaders, but also a clear-headed assessment of what the U.S. interest really is, and how best to achieve it. In this sense, Iran is no different than any other foreign policy challenge. But of course, the stakes are much higher, and Obama's margin for error is that much slimmer.
Foreign Policy Association, 26 March 2009
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:40 AM to Middle East, | TrackBack (0)
