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April 23, 2009
Zero nukes?
Barack Obama's recent trip to Europe and the Middle East was an important moment in his young presidency. Having spent much of his term so far focused on the deteriorating economy and other domestic concerns, Obama's trip to the G-20 summit in London, to a NATO meeting in France and Germany, to an EU meeting in Prague, and finally to Turkey and Iraq was the president's first intensive exposure to foreign policy. By most accounts, he met or exceeded expectations. Most notable, however, was Obama's public address in Prague, in which he declared the U.S. commitment to a “world without U.S. nuclear weapons.” Long after the world forgets about the rest of his European trip, it may be Obama's speech on nuclear weapons that endures.
At first glance, seeking a “world without nuclear weapons” may seem naïve, at best. Clearly, nuclear weapons are immensely destructive tools of state (or potentially, non-state) power. Having less of a destructive thing naturally would seem good. But nuclear weapons cannot simply be “wished” away. The fundamental principles underlying nuclear weapons are widely known, and the technology and expertise to develop nuclear technology has spread extensively over the past 60 years—such knowledge and technology cannot be “un-invented.” In addition, it is possible that nuclear weapons can provide a degree of strategic stability to the international system. Consider, for instance, the fact that no global conflict akin to the World Wars has taken place since nuclear weapons have been developed. Nuclear weapons may have raised the potential cost of war to such a degree that would-be aggressors thought twice about initiating hostilities. Although the Cold War was a period of intensive diplomatic and ideological struggle, the United States and the Soviet Union never engaged in a full-scale military conflict. If neither country had possessed nuclear weapons, the Cold War might have become much hotter.
If Obama's “zero nukes” posture was naïve to some, it was outright dangerous to others. For decades, the United States has negotiated arms reduction treaties with the Soviet Union and Russia. These treaties stipulated that both parties reduced their nuclear arsenals in a pre-determined, synchronized, and verifiable fashion. This was important for several reasons. As with any armament, the relative balance of forces between two rival states has a significant effect on the stability of their relationship. If two states are evenly matched, or if an imbalance in one category of armament is offset by an inverse imbalance in another category, neither state is likely to initiate hostilities with the other. But the consequences of an imbalance in nuclear forces are much greater than those of an imbalance in tanks or planes. If a country felt that the balance of nuclear forces had tilted in its favor, it might become more inclined to launch a first strike. For this reason, the United States and the Soviet Union always tried to reduce their arsenals in sync with each other, so that the relative nuclear balance was maintained even while the number of weapons was cut. As much as Obama may wish to rid the world of nuclear weapons, and as easily as he could cut the U.S. arsenal unilaterally, such an action would be ill advised. An uncoordinated and unilateral disarmament could radically destabilize the international system, and make the United States (and other countries) less safe.
Critics of Obama's Prague declaration, then, have a clear, logical argument. But that does not necessarily mean it is correct. Obama included a hefty dose of realism in his speech. He acknowledged that the objective of zero nuclear weapons “will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime.” He also matched his seemingly lofty goal with concrete steps to achieve it. Obama pledged to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy and to work with Russia on a new round of arms reduction negotiations. He also promised to push for Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the United States has signed but which a Republican-led Senate refused to ratify in 1999. Obama also advocated a treaty that would end the production of fissile material that could be used in nuclear weapons.
The steps Obama proposed were specific and pragmatic, but on their own, they were nothing new. In his first term as president, George Bush had agreed on disarmament objectives with then-Russian President Vladimir Putin. President Clinton signed the CTBT in the 1990s and the Senate debated the treaty extensively (and in a partisan manner) almost ten years ago. For years, disarmament experts have advocated a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) that would prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Beyond the apparent lack of novelty of Obama's proposals, it is unclear if they would make meaningful progress toward achieving his stated goal of a nuclear-free world. It is difficult to envision the United States and Russia reducing their arsenals to zero anytime soon, and a simple ban on nuclear testing would not eliminate the weapons that already exist. A verifiable FMCT would probably limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but like the CTBT, what would it do for the nuclear weapons that already exist?
These critiques may be valid, but they are equally shortsighted. The nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia are far larger than any other state's. Each country possess thousands of warheads, while the arsenals of the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea each number in the hundreds at the very most. For this reason, most of the major nuclear arms reduction treaties have been exclusively between the United States and Russia. But as these two countries reduce their arsenals, they may eventually count their warheads not in the thousands, but in the hundreds. At that point, they will have rough parity with the other nuclear states, and the arms reduction playing field will become more equitable. Instead of being bilateral affairs, arms reduction treaties could include more of the world's nuclear powers, if not all of them. This would make every nuclear warhead in existence eligible for a negotiated elimination.
Even U.S. action on multilateral treaties such as the CTBT and a potential FMCT could be very meaningful. For the past 40 years, the foundation of nuclear disarmament diplomacy has been the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT essentially splits the world into two camps: the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), which include the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China; and the Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS), which includes everyone else. The treaty formalizes an implicit bargain: if the NNWS pledge not to seek nuclear weapons, the NWS will work towards global disarmament. As Iran and North Korea have pursued nuclear weapons, the great emphasis has been on the nonproliferation provisions of the NPT. Often overlooked, however, are the pledges of the NWS to work toward the disarmament of their nuclear arsenals. If the NWS, including the United States in particular, are seen to be shirking their disarmament obligations under the NPT, the NNWS may become less inclined to cooperate on international nonproliferation efforts. Even worse, they may decide that the NPT represents a hypocritical bargain and abandon the regime altogether. This is all to suggest that U.S. participation in, and leadership of, multilateral nonproliferation diplomacy can have ripple effects beyond the literal power of the treaty itself. By sheer power of example, the United States can nudge the world in the direction of gradual disarmament.
In a general sense, Obama's speech should been seen as much as a political speech as a policy one. By clearly signaling his policy preferences, he removed a great deal of ambiguity about U.S. national intentions. That ambiguity can only be eliminated through the direct, specific policy actions that Obama outlined. Even then, the world may not be free of nuclear weapons, as Obama readily acknowledged. But just because a goal is unattainable does not mean it should not be pursued. Even if the world cannot rid itself of nuclear weapons, surely it would be a better place with fewer of them, especially if the reductions came about in a verifiable, deliberate, and multilateral manner. In this sense, the goal of global disarmament is similar to the goal of “energy independence.” It is exceedingly unlikely that the United States could reduce its energy imports to zero, but if the goal serves as motivation and inspiration to pursue clean energy technologies, conservation, and efficiency, then it is a worthy political tool applied to desirable policy ends. And that, if nothing else, is what Obama's Prague speech may come to represent, long into the future.
Foreign Policy Association, 23 April 2009
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:38 PM to Europe, | TrackBack (0)
