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June 27, 2009
Subtle timing
In the past month, a quick succession of events has occurred that could significantly change the U.S. relationship with countries in the Middle East. Notable speeches by U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and important elections in Lebanon and Iran all occurred within a span of weeks. To a certain extent, the timing is coincidental, and the events largely unrelated. But they are connected, and the connection could have meaningful long-term consequences in the region.
During his election campaign, Barack Obama pledged to deliver a major speech on U.S. relations with the Islamic world from the capital of a Muslim country within the first 100 days of his administration. Although Obama's June 4 speech in Cairo missed his 100-day target (his April address to the Turkish parliament in Ankara apparently didn't count), it did not underwhelm in scope or ambition. Seeking a “new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect,” Obama stressed points of common interest between the United States and Islam. Although he reiterated his intention to pursue “violent extremism” and his view that the danger posed by al Qaeda is not an “opinion to be debated [but a] fact to be dealt with,” Obama also emphasized that the United States did not seek permanent military bases in Iraq or Afghanistan. He stressed the commonalty of themes such as democracy, women's rights, and economic development, and he sprinkled his speech with references to the Koran. The White House promoted the speech heavily and went to great lengths to ensure its translation and dissemination in languages and technologies widely used in the Muslim world. Reaction to Obama's speech was generally positive, with the main caveat that his conciliatory words needed to be translated into real action.
Just a few days after Obama's speech, on June 7, Lebanon held widely anticipated parliamentary elections. Long seen as a comparatively sophisticated and diverse corner of the Middle East, Lebanon has been wracked intermittently by civil war and outside intervention since the 1980s. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 led to a popular uprising that drove occupying Syrian forces from the country. In 2006, Israel waged a war against Hezbollah, a militant and political organization based in Lebanon that is popular among the country's Shia population and that receives significant support from Iran. Last year, a power-sharing crisis boiled over into open conflict between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government. The June 7 election was seen not only as an important opportunity for the Lebanese to cast their votes, but also as a proxy in a wider contest of popular opinion between Iran (which supported Hezbollah) and the United States (which preferred a coalition led by Rafik Hariri's son, Saad). Hariri's coalition won more seats than the Hezbollah-led coalition, representing at the very least a perceived setback for Iranian and Sryian influence in Lebanese politics.
Among the closest observers of Obama's speech in Cairo was Israel. Concern about the steadfastness of Obama's support for Israel predates even his election, and many Israelis wondered if Obama would sacrifice U.S. support for Israel in his address to the Muslim world. Obama made no such sacrifice, and he reiterated the United States' strong and “unbreakable” bond with Israel. He did, however, express his opposition to Israeli settlements in the West Bank. On June 14, Israel's newly elected prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, delivered his own notable speech, in which he endorsed the creation of a Palestinian state. This was the first public endorsement of its kind for Netanyahu, who had developed a hawkish reputation during his previous stint as prime minister and in his recent election campaign. Netanyahu's endorsement was far from complete, however. It was conditional on the demilitarization of the new Palestinian state and on the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, with Jerusalem as its capital. These conditions likely will not form the basis of an ultimate settlement. But the statement represented a notable shift in tone, if not necessarily in substance.
Potentially the most significant event in recent weeks is still ongoing. On June 12, Iranians went to the polls to elect a new president. In many ways, Iran lies at the heart of the U.S. relationship with the Middle East. Iran's nuclear program is of constant concern to the United States and its allies, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has spoken openly of his desire to destroy Israel. Iran supports militant groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and it exerts influence in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also possesses significant quantities of oil, and it borders the strategic Straits of Hormuz. Most importantly, Iran has a long history of resentment toward the United States. The 1979 Islamic revolution was partly fueled by anger at the United States' long support of the Shah, and the revolution has served as inspiration for militant Islamic movements around the world. On June 12, Ahmadinejad faced off against an array of opponents, the most significant being Mir Hossein Mousavi, a conservative former prime minister who experienced a tremendous surge of support among reform-minded Iranians. The official tabulation showed Ahmadinejad winning with 63 percent of the vote—a far more lop-sided outcome than had been expected, and one that seemed rigged by the authorities. Since then, Iran has experienced its largest wave of protests since 1979. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, has been resolute in resisting calls for a new election and in upholding Ahmadinejad's declared victory. The outcome of the election and the protests remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: this episode has unequivocally changed the nature of Iranian politics.
Individually, each of these events would have been significant and noteworthy. And to a certain degree, their clustering within a few weeks was the result of chance—the elections in Lebanon and Iran, in particular, were not scheduled to coincide with each other. But the scheduling of speeches is much more flexible than the scheduling of elections. Netanyahu, for example, likely scheduled his speech to follow Obama's. The prime minister had already received pressure from Obama on the question of settlements in the West Bank. It was important for him to address this pressure, and politically, it was useful for him to present a conciliatory front, if only as a negotiating tactic or to throw his rivals off-balance. Before he could do so, however, Netanyahu needed to see what Obama would say in his much-anticipated Cairo speech.
Indeed, it was Obama's speech in Cairo—the first in this sequence of events—that was most amenable to strategic timing. Obama seems well-aware of the symbolic value of his own election, not only in the United States but around the world. In part, this value rests upon the fact that he is not George W. Bush. But it also comes from his unique background, and to the role that his background can play in challenging negative misconceptions of the United States. Obama's campaign pledge to give a major address in a Muslim capital recognized this. Any U.S. president can address a Muslim audience. But only Obama could do so as a president with an international background, a childhood spent in a majority-Muslim country, and a middle name like “Hussein.” Obama likely knew the impact his speech could have in the Middle East, and he surely knew when Lebanon and Iran were holding their elections. Although the administration denies it, the timing of Obama's speech on the eve of these elections may have been very deliberate.
This doesn't mean that Obama's speech in Cairo was responsible for the victory of Hariri's coalition in Lebanon, or for the upheaval and uncertainty following Iran's election. But even if it had no direct effect, Obama's speech may have indirectly helped to preclude a more negative outcome, from the U.S. perspective. The Bush administration was very unpopular in the Middle East, and although Obama's election was a hopeful sign, there was little concrete evidence that his approach would be much different. His speech in Cairo reiterated to voters throughout the Middle East that his administration would a much more willing partner with receptive regimes. In other words, the promises made by reform-minded candidates in Lebanon and Iran would be much more realistic and achievable with President Obama in office. Elections and speeches, however, are only the first steps toward successful policies. Until the situation in Iran stabilizes, it is far too soon to judge Obama's timing.
Foreign Policy Association, 25 June 2009
Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:40 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
