« July 2009 | Main | September 2009 »
August 28, 2009
Alliance adjustment
As Japan nears its August 30 election, a political era may be nearing an end. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), under the leadership of Prime Minister Taro Aso, is deeply unpopular and trails badly in pre-election polls; its nearly uninterrupted 54-year reign seems to be in its final days. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), led by Yukio Hatoyama, stands poised to win a plurality in the lower house of Japan's Diet, giving it license to form a new government. That alone makes the election unique in modern Japanese political history. But its potential effect on Japan's foreign policy and its relations with the United States is equally unique, and a DPJ victory may lead to subtle but real changes in the Japan-United States alliance.
Japan has been a close ally of the United States since the end of Word War II. U.S. forces occupied the country until a formal treaty of surrender came into effect in 1952, and ever since, the United States has maintained a significant military presence in Japan. The transition from wartime enemy to peacetime ally largely was driven by the Cold War. Taking advantage of Japan's strategic position and the long-standing aversion to Communism among its ruling class, the United States found a useful and valuable ally to counter Soviet influence in the Pacific region. The long-term presence of U.S. military bases could partly be justified by Article 9 of Japan's post-war constitution, which formally prohibited an offensive military force and only permitted “self-defense” forces. Without the burden of maintaining an extensive military apparatus, Japan was able to focus its post-war economic development on export-driven growth. Its economic success since World War II can partly be attributed to its alliance with the United States.
The LDP initially came to power as a strong supporter of the U.S. alliance, and the strength and stability of the partnership has helped sustain its longevity in office. For decades, the success of the alliance with the United States—together with a growing economy and low unemployment—seemed to justify LDP rule. But as the party grew comfortable in its power and success, it increasingly fell victim to corruption and controversy. A series of scandals in the 1980s were navigated with savvy leadership changes, cabinet shuffles, and coalition building. Economic stagnation and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, however, posed real threats to the LDP, as the growth and stability that had justified its leadership and fractured its political opposition began to wane.
Instead of succumbing to an outside rival, the LDP elevated Junichiro Koizumi to the premiership in 2001. Koizumi led a reform-minded faction within the party that advocated, among other things, a more assertive foreign policy. He was close personally with President Bush, and he deployed Japanese troops to support U.S. occupation efforts in Iraq. He also deployed Japanese refueling ships to aid U.S. naval efforts in the war in Afghanistan. Although Japanese forces were tightly constrained in both missions, these missions generated a great deal of controversy in Japan. Koizumi was adamant in his support of these missions, however, and they were but a piece of his iconoclastic and relatively reformist agenda. He attempted to change the LDP from within, and by appealing to voters directly, he was able to lead the party to a significant electoral victory in 2005. But since Koizumi stepped down in 2006, a succession of short-lived and increasingly unpopular LDP prime ministers has followed. Taro Aso has become known for his erratic and detached behavior, and approval ratings for his cabinet hover around 20 percent.
All signs point to a DPJ victory on August 30. In part, this is due to difficult economic conditions and to the dwindling patience for LDP rule. One consequence of a DPJ victory would be the humbling burden of responsibility that faces any party that moves from perpetual opposition to first-time governing. This transition would be particularly acute for the DPJ, as the LDP's bold on power has been so strong and persistent in recent Japanese history. In a general sense, the DPJ has emphasized the need for a more “equal partnership” in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Indeed, during Koizumi's tenure in office, the DPJ expressed opposition to the naval refueling mission in Afghanistan. But as victory has become more plausible in recent months, the clarity that comes from permanent opposition has seemed become more muddled. Early in the campaign, Hatoyama was unclear about whether he would end or continue the refueling mission if the DPJ won a governing plurality in the Diet. Since then, he has clarified his party's position: he will not end the mission immediately, but he will not seek to renew the law that authorized the mission when it expires in January. This is less extreme than positions offered by the DPJ in the past, but it represents a clear departure from the policy of the LDP.
On many issues of policy, though, the LDP and the DPJ hold remarkably similar positions. The main battleground in the election is Japan's administrative structure and the political culture that has sustained it. Although Japan is nominally a multiparty democracy, the pervasiveness and perseverance of the LDP has seemed to suggest otherwise. The LDP has maintained its decades-long dominance with an interdependent web of relationships between big businesses, powerful bureaucracies, and dynastic politicians. This web has proven remarkably resilient, as money, influence, and careers circulate through it with ease. But this powerful system also obscures lines of political accountability and is prone to inefficiency and corruption. The DPJ pledges to reform this system, curtail the influence of bureaucrats, and promote a “politician-led” government in which the real policymakers are accountable to voters and not entrenched in ministries. For the DPJ, structural reforms are the prerequisites for real policy change and for a politics that “values people above concrete projects.”
In that sense, the victor in Japan's election will be unlikely to radically change the nature of the alliance with the United States. The two countries will remain strong allies with many of the same interests in East Asia and around the world. But if the DPJ wins, as appears likely, the Obama administration may find itself facing a slightly different tone emanating from the new government in Tokyo. The DPJ will be keen to prove its independence both from the LDP's time-honored ways but also, to some degree, from the perception of dependence on the United States. Already, policymakers in Japan feel some anxiety toward an Obama administration that has seemed to identify China as the key state in East Asia. This anxiety was heightened with Obama's choice for U.S. ambassador to Japan. Many had expected the appointment to go to Joseph Nye, a widely respected international relations scholar with extensive government experience and ample knowledge of Japan. Instead, Obama selected John Roos, a prominent fundraiser during his election campaign with little grounding in international diplomacy. None of this will dramatically change or upset the U.S.-Japan alliance. But if the DPJ is victorious on August 30, the new U.S. ambassador's job may suddenly become a bit more interesting.
Foreign Policy Association, 27 August 2009
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:01 AM to Asia, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
August 19, 2009
Reign's end
As Japan nears its August 30 election, a mixture of political weariness and anticipation fills the air. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), under the leadership of Prime Minister Taro Aso, is deeply unpopular and trails badly in pre-election polls; its nearly-uninterrupted 54-year reign seems to be in its final days. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), led by Yukio Hatoyama, stands poised to win a plurality in the lower house of Japan’s Diet, giving it license to form a new government. A combination of bleak economic conditions and even bleaker political mismanagement has led to this seemingly foregone conclusion. But change doesn’t come easily in Japan. Even if the LDP is ousted on August 30, the political structures and culture that have sustained its lengthy reign will not disappear overnight.
Although tiny glimmers of good news began to appear just this week, Japan has been hit very hard by the global economic downtown. Its economy shrank by more than eight percent in the past year, and its rapidly aging population makes long-term recovery and growth particularly challenging prospects. Unsurprisingly, the focus of the election is domestic and economic policy. The party manifestos of the LDP and the DPJ are similarly tinged by economic populism, and although they differ on some specifics, both parties broadly pledge to grow household income, increase employment, and cut taxes.
What’s remarkable, however, is the relative lack of ideological differentiation between the LDP and the DPJ. This is not by accident. Indeed, ideology is not even the main battleground in the election. It is instead primarily a fight over Japan’s administrative structure and the political culture that has sustained it. Although Japan is nominally a multi-party democracy, the sheer pervasiveness and perseverance of the LDP has seemed to suggest otherwise. Aside from a few months in 1993, the LDP has governed Japan uninterrupted since 1955. It secured power in the immediate post-war period through a combination of strong support for the Cold War alliance with the United States and a clear emphasis on export-driven growth.
Since then, the LDP has maintained its dominance with an interdependent web of relationships between big businesses, powerful bureaucracies, and dynastic politicians. This web has proven remarkably resilient, as money, influence, and careers circulate through it with ease. But this powerful system also obscures the lines of political accountability. Political change comes not from open competition among rival parties, but from opaque bureaucratic decree and from factional maneuverings within the LDP. Power – both wielding it and keeping it – has become the driving motivation for the party. This situation is prone to corruption and inefficiency, and it often deprives Japanese voters of a meaningful political choice.
For decades, the combination of a growing economy, low unemployment, and a steady alliance with the United States seemed to justify LDP rule. But as the party grew comfortable in its power and success, it increasingly fell victim to corruption and controversy. A series of scandals in the 1980s were navigated with savvy leadership changes, cabinet shuffles, and coalition building. Economic stagnation and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, however, posed real threats to the LDP, as the growth and stability that had justified its leadership and fractured its political opposition began to wane.
Instead of succumbing to an outside rival, the LDP elevated Junichiro Koizumi to the premiership in 2001. Koizumi led a reform-minded faction within the party that advocated a more assertive foreign policy and the privatization of large state-operated enterprises. Koizumi waged an internal campaign to purge the LDP of his opponents, and he appealed to voters directly to help him in the effort. In 2005, Koizumi led the party to one of its largest-ever electoral victories. But since Koizumi stepped down in 2006, a succession of short-lived and increasingly unpopular LDP prime ministers have followed. Taro Aso has become known for his erratic and detached behavior, and approval ratings for his cabinet hover around 20 percent.
Poised for victory, the DPJ has not advocated radical policies; overthrowing the dominant political party and proving its own, untested ability to govern are challenges enough. The change it does promote, however, cuts to the heart of the LDP’s hold on power. The DPJ pledges to curtail the influence of bureaucrats and promote a “politician-led” government in which the real policymakers are accountable to voters, not entrenched in ministries. Budgeting authority and the responsibility for policy planning and execution will be centralized in the cabinet, while more funds will be placed under local governments’ control. Politicians will be placed deeper within ministries to enforce discipline and ensure accountability among bureaucrats. For the DPJ, these reforms are the prerequisites for real policy change and for a politics that “values people above concrete projects.”
The DPJ certainly has identified the major structural features that have sustained the LDP’s longevity and impeded accountable policymaking. And if the polls are a reliable guide, many Japanese agree with the diagnosis. But even if the DPJ wins a historic victory on August 30, it is unclear how its reforms will fare. The entrenched bureaucracy that the DPJ has marked as its enemy is entrenched for a reason. As an entity, it sees itself as indispensible, in part because it is. Together with LDP politicians and business leaders, the bureaucracy has created and sustained an administrative system in which it is an essential component. The bureaucracy defends its prerogatives well, and it has outlasted scores of crusading politicians. A change in governing party alone may not be enough to dislodge its influence.
Perhaps the greatest threat to the DPJ’s agenda is that of co-optation. The challenges facing Japan are urgent and real. In the current economic climate, the desire for policy change may outweigh the need for structural reform. The resilient system that has fueled the LDP’s longevity may survive by adapting to serve new times and new political masters, and the impulse for reform may gradually wane. If the DPJ is victorious on August 30, it may find it easier to compromise with the current system than to force it to change.
The Asia Foundation, 19 August 2009
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:42 PM to Asia | TrackBack (0)
