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October 22, 2009
Euro vision
The U.S. president frequently finds himself at the center of global attention. This month was no different, as speculation mounted over Barack Obama's new strategy in Afghanistan and surprise erupted over the president's unexpected Nobel Peace Prize. Beneath these stories, however, was an event that helps to explain them and will likely have significant implications for Obama's foreign policy in the coming years. Ireland voted, for a second time, on the Treaty of Lisbon. This time it passed, paving the way for a reformed European Union that will have increased clout on the world stage.
The origins of the European Union (EU) date back to the 1950s, when France, West Germany, and the Benelux countries formed the European Coal and Steel Community to centralize control of these strategic industries in member states. The effort was in direct response to the ravages of the Second World War, and it was felt that greater European integration would limit the excesses of radical nationalism and encourage peace. In the decades that followed, the institution that is now known as the EU broadened by taking in new member states and deepened by assuming greater responsibility. This seemingly inexorable trend culminated earlier this decade with the European Constitution, which would have replaced multiple, existing treaties with a single document that bound the EU more tightly together. After great effort was expended in the creation of such a comprehensive document and passed without referendum by most EU states, the voters of France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitution in 2005, pushing EU policymakers back to the drawing board.
Despite the rejection of the Constitution, many of the institutional problems that it had hoped to address remained serious challenges for the Union. As the EU expanded to include more than 20 member states, the demand for unanimity and absolute equality in decision-making became cumbersome. The Union also suffered from a “democratic deficit” in which voters felt distant and detached from EU decision-making bodies, including the popularly elected European Parliament. After several years of reflection, the member states negotiated a modified and stripped-down collection of institutional reforms known as the Lisbon Treaty. As with the Constitution (and any other EU treaty), the Lisbon Treaty required ratification by all member states. But each state had different methods of ratification. Ireland was the only member that required a referendum to approve the Lisbon Treaty, but in a vote in June 2008, Irish voters rejected it, causing great consternation across Europe. This month, Ireland held another vote on the Lisbon Treaty, and this time, Irish voters approved it, paving the way for the Treaty's near-certain adoption.
Along with a host of modifications to the EU's institutions and decision-making structures, the Lisbon Treaty would make significant changes to how the Union conducts its foreign policy. As a body in international politics, the EU has always been a unique and singular creature. Due to its common market and the combined size and wealth of its member states, the EU possesses clear economic weight. It frequently negotiates with one voice on matters of international trade, and it has its own representation at global bodies such as the G20. But the EU also consists of 27 independent countries, each of which jealously guards its foreign policy prerogatives. This is particularly true in the case of security and defense policy. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the EU was sharply split on the decision, with the United Kingdom and Poland supporting the action and France, Germany, and others strongly opposed. There have been efforts to create a more coherent EU foreign policy, primarily in the form of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but the results have been limited by the institutional realities of the Union. These realities have existed for decades, frustrating Europe's allies. Henry Kissinger famously asked, “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?”
Right now, the answer to that question could include, at a minimum, any of three people. The highest authority of the EU is the European Council, consisting of the heads of government of the various member states. The presidency of the Council rotates among member states every six months, and during a member's presidency, its prime minister or president can present the public face of the EU. The European Commission is the executive arm of the EU, implementing and enforcing EU policies and regulations. It, too, has a president—completely unrelated to the Council presidency—that carries the weight of international recognition. (There is also a member of the Commission explicitly charged with managing External Affairs, but put that aside for a moment). In addition, the CFSP is managed by its own High Representative, who may be best positioned to represent the EU in an international setting. In short, it is difficult for the world to know who to “call” in Europe, or indeed how many people it needs conference in.
The Lisbon Treaty tries valiantly to answer Kissinger's question. It would replace the rotating, state-based EU presidency with an individual President of the European Council, elected to a two-and-a-half year term. The treaty would also combine the positions of High Representative for the CFSP and the Commissioner for External Affairs into a single EU “foreign minister,” and it would empower that position with a new External Action Service, which would essentially be an EU diplomatic corps. Member states could assign specific tasks to the new High Representative, and he or she will be able to implement commonly agreed actions. Both the Council President and the new High Representative would be selected through something called Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), which means that no single country could veto an appointment to either position. The Lisbon Treaty also clarifies the existing, complicated legal standing of the EU. Once in place, the Treaty would empower the Union with a single legal personality, making it less cumbersome for the Union to sign treaties and international agreements.
These changes are explicitly structural in nature. The EU will be granted no new foreign policy-making powers, and indeed, those foreign policies that it can implement will more strictly defined on an intergovernmental (as opposed to a supranational) basis. Essentially, the Lisbon Treaty will simply allow the EU to operate more efficiently on the world stage. That alone, however, will constitute a marked change in EU foreign policy, and this change could have important effects on Obama's foreign policy. As Obama considers the next steps in his Afghanistan strategy, one of the most important questions is whether he will order more U.S. troops to that country. Upon taking office, there was some hope that Obama would be able to convince European allies to send more soldiers and resources to Afghanistan. Such hopes have largely diminished, and in any event, the request would have been made through NATO channels. But centralizing the EU's limited foreign policy authority also centralizes its nascent security abilities. The prospect of an EU-led mission in Afghanistan is remote, especially while the security situation there remains so unstable. But it is conceivable that an EU stabilization or humanitarian mission could be useful in Afghanistan in the future, and having a single number to “call” in Europe would prove very helpful if Obama needed to coordinate that.
The treaty's reforms also might serve to amplify the EU's greatest foreign policy strength, which has always been in the realm of “soft power.” The Union has long used the prospect of membership as a carrot to induce neighboring states to reform their political, economic, and legal systems, and in doing so, it has served as force for stability in post-Cold War Europe. Its unique model of regional integration also serves as an example for similar intergovernmental bodies in South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Taken as a whole, the EU is the largest provider of global development funds on the world stage. Obama's recent Nobel Peace Prize was, in many ways, a reflection of the European preference for “soft power.” The award itself represents an intangible honor of immense reputational power but of limited practical import. And the justification for awarding it to Obama was, in part, his preference for the techniques of “soft power.” The citation for the prize lauded Obama's creation of a “new climate in international politics” and his capture of the “world's attention.” To be sure, the Peace Prize was granted in Norway, which is not an EU member. But pro-Obama sentiments appear to be widespread in Europe, and an empowered EU may prove to be a more useful partner for a U.S. president who speaks a language that Europeans understand and appreciate.
Despite Ireland's (second) vote, the Lisbon Treaty is not yet a reality. The sole remaining roadblock is the Czech Republic, where the parliament has approved the treaty but the strongly opposed president has deferred from signing it. The pressure on President Vaclav Klaus is intense, however, and it is unlikely that he will scuttle the treaty on his own. Once he signs the Lisbon Treaty, it will go into effect shortly thereafter, and the Council President and the High Representative can be selected. Until then, supporters of a more efficient EU—as well as a U.S. president eager for a coherent partner across the Atlantic—will need to wait a bit longer.
Foreign Policy Association, 22 October 2009
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:44 PM to Europe, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
