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April 26, 2010
Nuclear blast
Over the span of just a few weeks, Obama has leveraged the issue of nuclear weapons in an unprecedented manner. Partly by design and partly by chance, he has staked a tremendous amount of time and capital on his goal of achieving a nuclear-free world. Although he has made concrete achievements in recent weeks, Obama's nuclear spring is reflective of a deeper symbolic trend in his foreign policy—a trend that may be even more important that the agreements and treaties that have been signed.
It has long been clear that the first few months of 2010 would be busy ones for the field of nuclear nonproliferation (for more, see The Water's Edge, January 2010). What was perhaps more difficult to predict was the remarkable timing of certain key events. First came the announcement of a follow-on START agreement between the United States and Russia. The new START agreement sets three principal limits on both U.S. and Russian nuclear forces: 1) 1550 active nuclear warheads; 2) 800 total launchers, which include long-range missiles and bombers; and 3) 700 deployed launchers, which means delivery vehicles considered operational. This represents a 30 percent reduction in the number of deployed nuclear weapons permitted under prior international agreements. Nevertheless, criticism has emerged. Some suggest the reductions are too modest and may not even require cuts beyond what already had been planned. Others note the ridiculousness of counting a bomber as one nuclear weapon, while some say that the treaty may limit U.S. efforts to deploy a missile defense system. Regardless of their accuracy or merit, these critiques are important--the new treaty must be ratified by the Senate before it can take effect. This will require 67 votes, and it is by no means certain that Obama can corral enough Republican support to meet this target. But despite the ratification challenges that lie ahead, the treaty unambiguously does one important thing: it implements a monitoring system that is binding upon both countries, and it reestablishes a basis of trust between the United States and Russia.
Between the announcement of the new START treaty and its signing in Prague came the release of the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which lays out the overall nuclear strategy of the United States. This was only the third NPR conducted since the end of the Cold War and will likely be Obama's only such review. The NPR stated that the “fundamental” role of the U.S. nuclear arsenal was to deter nuclear attack on the United States and its allies, and it placed significant emphasis on the growing threat of nuclear proliferation to state and non-state actors alike. It foreswore a nuclear retaliation in response to a chemical or biological attack on the United States. And although it did not pledge a “no first use” policy, it did state that the United States would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any country that is party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and is in compliance with its provisions. This language artfully makes an exception for a country like Iran. But enshrining the NPT in U.S. nuclear policy sends a powerful symbolic message to the world that international regimes—and compliance with them—still mean something.
Following quickly on the heels of the new START agreement and the release of the NPR was the Nuclear Security Summit, convened by Obama in Washington DC. This gathering sought to draw attention to the dangers posed by unsecured nuclear materials and to set an agenda for dealing with them. Notably, in addition to the typical communiqués that emerge from any international summit, several concrete steps actually were achieved. Ukraine, Canada, and Chile agreed to divest themselves of their stocks of highly enriched uranium, which is particularly vulnerable from a proliferation standpoint. But the summit achieved more that just these concrete steps. It drew leaders from 47 countries, making it the largest U.S.-hosted international gathering since the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945. The power of that historic show of commitment may be hard to quantify, and it will mean nothing if nuclear proliferation continues apace. But it has immense value in terms of highlighting the urgency and importance of the issue.
Each of these events has been in the planning stages for months. That they all reached their climactic final stages within a two-week span is due partly to coincidence, but also partly to a deft recognition of potential opportunity. Of all of the events, the one most fixed in the calendar was the Nuclear Security Summit. Obama had spoken of convening a summit to address nuclear security issues since before his inauguration, and Spring 2010 had long been the most likely timeframe for such a gathering. The other events, however, have been victims of repeated and unanticipated delays. Since the START treaty expired last year, negotiators had been working feverishly to complete a follow-on agreement. Indeed, Obama would have preferred to have reached an agreement before START expired, and failing that, an agreement sooner would have been better than one later. Likewise, the completion of the NPR has been delayed for several months due to internal disputes within the Obama administration. But in the case of the NPR (and, to a slightly lesser degree, the START follow-on treaty), there was no doubt about its eventual completion; it was just a matter of when.
As each initiative faced greater delay, the potential of coordinating their ultimate culmination probably occurred only suddenly. But once it did, the effect of fortuitous timing was a great boon, and it was not felt by Obama alone. Based on public accounts, it seems that the START follow-on agreement was the event over which the Obama administration had the least control. But that isn't to say that the calendar didn't weigh heavily on the minds of the participants. Knowing the nuclear security summit was fast approaching, and knowing that he would be in attendance himself, Russian President Dimitry Medvedev probably faced pressure to reach a START agreement before traveling to Washington. Being perceived as a historic statesman is just as important to Medvedev and his domestic constituencies as it is to Obama's and his.
The fortuitous timing is not over yet. Next month, signatories to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will gather in New York to review progress toward the treaty's goals and to consider any needed changes. The NPT is the bedrock of the global nonproliferation regime, but it has found itself under increasing strain in recent years from the proliferation challenges presented by Iran and North Korea. The NPT Review Conference, above all else that has happened in recent weeks, is the event most locked into the calendar. Review conferences happen every five years at the United Nations, and this conference will draw representatives from an even wider range of countries than Obama's nuclear security summit. The last review conference, in 2005, convened in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the ensuing widespread mistrust of U.S. intentions. Next month's conference thus offers a unique opportunity to advance the NPT's nonproliferation and disarmament goals. That it will take place amidst a U.S. presidential administration that has so explicitly committed itself to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament is yet another coincidence of timing.
What is not entirely coincidental, however, has been how Obama has arrayed the roadmap of events this spring. Operating with the knowledge that certain anchors of timing would be immovable (the NPT Review Conference), he arranged to schedule that which he could (the Nuclear Security Summit) in such a manner as to build momentum for the following event. For those events over which he had only limited control (the signing of the START follow-on treaty and the completion of the NPR), the synergies of timing only helped; the urgency of scheduled conferences spurred resolution of the new START treaty, and within certain limits, the release of the NPR was able to be coordinated with external events.
If nothing else, the events of the past few weeks have demonstrated Obama's sense of timing, his stamina, and—to no small degree—his luck. But they are also reflective of something else. Although nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament have been key goals of this administration, so too has been changing the tone of the previous administration and realizing a shift in global perception of the United States. Regardless of the specific achievements over the past few weeks, the world has seen the United States take a leading role on an issue of global importance. Crucially, the leadership exhibited has not been perceived as overbearing or unilateral. At its core has been a recognition of the importance of international treaties, regimes, and understandings. This is a powerful change in tone that differs dramatically from what has come before, and it is central to Obama's conception of the United States' role in the world. Whether this comparatively new approach will achieve every U.S. policy objective remains to be seen. But the results so far are promising.
Foreign Policy Association, 23 April 2010
Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:36 PM to Europe,
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Comments
I want to know what Darrell will change with that??
Posted by: insurable insurance at December 2, 2010 03:00 AM
