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July 26, 2010
Clean start
Anyone concerned with the dangers posed by nuclear weapons (which, arguably, should be pretty much everyone) has had a busy and promising year so far. In the past six months, the United States and Russia have negotiated a new arms control treaty; a major summit was convened on securing loose nuclear material; the United States re-evaluated its nuclear doctrine; and the signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty met to renew their commitments under that bedrock regime. Each of these events, the importance of their timing, and President Obama's personal stake in them has been extensively chronicled in this space (see The Water's Edge April 2009, January 2010, and April 2010). But if the first half of 2010 was busy and flashy, it will be the subsequent months and years—when the promises of the past six months must be fulfilled—that will determine whether the flurry of activity was worthwhile. Senate ratification of the New START agreement is the first big test of Obama's commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, and its outcome will be determined in the coming weeks. And as greater attention has focused on the treaty, the stakes for its ratification have become even greater.
The Obama administration originally wanted to negotiate a follow-on to the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by the end of last year, when the treaty expired. Failing that, Obama and Russian President Medvedev ultimately signed a follow-on agreement (nicknamed “New START”) in April. New START sets three principal restrictions on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, limiting each country to: 1) 1550 active nuclear warheads; 2) 800 total launchers, which include long-range missiles and bombers; and 3) 700 deployed launchers, which refers to delivery vehicles that are considered operational. This represents a 30 percent reduction in the number of deployed nuclear weapons that had been permitted under prior international agreements. Perhaps even more important than the reductions themselves are the extension and modernization of the provisions by which the United States and Russia monitor each other's nuclear arsenals. These provisions build trust, increase transparency, and limit the potential for unpleasant surprises.
To win ratification in the Senate, New START must secure a two-thirds majority. Despite the Democrats' majority in that chamber, acquiring the 67 votes needed for ratification is a tall order. In an election year, and amid an atmosphere of extreme partisanship, the challenge is even greater. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began holding hearings on New START ratification in June, and a vote by the full Senate on final ratification could take place before the end of this month. But as the pace of ratification has quickened, so too has the intensity and coordination of its opposition. Former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney—a Republican presidential candidate in 2008 and potential 2012 contender—published an op-ed that crystallized the emerging conservative argument against ratification. Romney argued that New START constrains the development of a missile defense system and noted the omission from the treaty text of various weapons types, such as rail-based and air-launched ballistic missiles. He also suggested that the treaty greatly favors Russia because it addresses only long-range, high-yield strategic nuclear weapons and not the shorter-ranged and smaller—but potentially more destabilizing—tactical variety; Russia is thought to rely more heavily on tactical weapons than the United States.
Although Romney surely intended the op-ed to burnish his foreign policy credentials in advance of another presidential run, it has served as something a rallying point for opposition to New START. Conservative activists and some Republican senators have taken up many of the points that Romney articulated. But on their merits, many of Romney's arguments fall short. The preamble of New START notes the relationship between offensive strategic arms (nuclear weapons) and defensive strategic arms (missile defenses). But the preamble is not legally binding, and it does not constrain efforts to construct missile defenses by either party. It further notes that currently deployed missile defenses do not undermine the viability of either U.S. or Russian nuclear weapons. This is a rather significant concession by Russia, which had long argued that plans for a U.S. missile defense system in Europe posed a threat to the viability of its nuclear forces, and not simply to Iran's nascent missile capability. As for the rail-based and air-launched ballistic missiles that Romney highlights, a plain reading of the treaty text would seem to cover such weapons—if they were still viable. Although both the United States and Russia have experimented with launching ballistic missiles by railcar and by airplane, neither method has proven to be particularly useful, and neither one represents any kind of serious threat.
To be fair, much of the Republican foreign policy establishment has downplayed or outright rejected many of Romney's arguments. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)—the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and something of a foreign policy mentor for Obama during his time in the Senate—called Romney's op-ed “hyperbolic” and full of “discredited objections.” Even Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), who is seen as an important source of potential opposition in the Senate, responded to Romney's arguments by calling New START “relatively benign.” Indeed, Romney's specific points of opposition were so roundly rejected by experts from across the political spectrum that they can almost be dismissed outright.
The underlying thrust of Romney's critique, however, is quite serious. It represents just the latest incarnation of a strain of U.S. foreign policy thinking that rejects “foreign entanglements” of all kinds. The term, as popularized in George Washington's farewell address, was intended as a warning for future Americans to avoid being pulled into conflicts that were not their own. But in some conservative quarters, that strain of thinking has evolved over the centuries into an aversion to any kind of international cooperation that could be interpreted as limiting not just U.S. freedom of action, but U.S. power and influence. Compelling arguments can be made that New START does exactly the opposite and actually enhances U.S power—the United States has such superiority in conventional weaponry that any global reduction of the role of nuclear weapons would, by definition, increase the relative power of the United States. But for many politicians, it is far too easy to associate a binding arms-control agreement with a weaker United States. This argument has a certain superficial traction (especially in the hyper-partisan environment of an election year), but it is not supported by reality, and its advocates do a disservice to responsible, popular policy discourse
One of Romney's specific critiques, however, is particularly valid. New START only addresses the active, strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. It does not address the thousands of nuclear weapons in reserve or the shorter-ranged, tactical weapons maintained by both countries. Many of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons pose no direct threat to the United States. They are either intended to deter an attack from China or are dedicated to air defense or naval purposes. Omitting them from New START does not upset the strategic balance between the United States and Russia. But it does leave out an entire class of nuclear weaponry, one that may be less secure than strategic weapons and potentially more amenable to actual use. The omission of tactical weapons does nothing to undermine a treaty that was never designed to include them. But this does not mean that they should go unaddressed. New START also does not include the arsenals of other nuclear powers, such as France and China. Although these countries have far fewer weapons than the United States or Russia, every nuclear weapon—in any country's arsenal—is a dangerous, potentially destabilizing tool.
This is where New START's greatest value may lie. Not only does it continue the tradition of transparency and verifiability between the United States and Russia, but it advances the overall cause of arms control diplomacy. If New START is ratified, it will reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and bring them closer in number to the more limited stockpiles of the world's other nuclear powers. When nuclear arsenals are measured in the hundreds and not the thousands, then every nuclear weapon in the world—and not just those of the United States and Russia—will become eligible for a negotiated reduction. The fate of this process likely will be determined in the coming days and weeks, in the chamber of the U.S. Senate.
Foreign Policy Association, 22 July 2010
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:42 PM to | Comments (13) | TrackBack (0)
