January 31, 2008
Mistaken identities
Identity politics has become a defining force in the race for the Democratic presidential nomination. From New Hampshire to Nevada to South Carolina, some uncomfortable questions have been raised: Do whites tell pollsters they support Sen. Barack Obama but privately change their vote based on his race? Do Latinos overtly oppose Obama for the same reason? Do women vote for Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton under the sympathetic impression that her male competitors and members of the media attack her too harshly? Although it’s difficult to conclusively settle any of these issues, it’s equally clear that identity politics will continue to vex domestic politics for years to come. But the impact of identity will be felt far beyond the pollsters, pundits, and prognosticators. The unique identity of the next president could have a significant effect on U.S. foreign policy.
To be sure, the issues surrounding identity are more symbolic than substantive. While important foreign policy differences do exist between Clinton and Obama, they are not based on her gender or on his race — each candidate’s broad policy objectives are similar, both in substance and in opposition to those likely to be held by the eventual Republican nominee. But somewhat uniquely among world powers, the U.S. president is both the head of state and the head of government. He (or she) represents not just the government in power at a given time, but also the United States as a sovereign state. Compared to the United Kingdom, for example, the U.S. president plays the roles of both queen and prime minister. In such a situation, symbolism and substance can overlap in myriad ways, and this can have a real policy impact.
Both Clinton and Obama would break powerful symbolic barriers, both would exemplify the better ideals of “American exceptionalism,” and both would send a positive message abroad. But for Obama, the effect would be somewhat different, and arguably more concrete. Obama’s unique identity is not based on race alone. His father was Kenyan (and he still has family there), he spent a significant portion of his childhood in Indonesia, and he was raised in multiethnic Hawaii. This allows Obama to plausibly stake a claim to a greater sense of empathy with non-Americans, their interests, and their perceptions of the United States. In other words, Obama’s unique identity is qualitatively and substantively distinct from (though not necessarily “better” than) Clinton’s unique identity. Based on identity alone, both Clinton and Obama would make a strong symbolic statement as president. But Obama’s identity might arguably carry greater symbolic weight abroad, and it could even be of important substantive value.
The true substantive value of a candidate’s unique identity, however, is difficult to measure—identity exists, by definition, independent of merit. For this reason alone, it is tempting to dismiss identity politics as provincial, illogical or downright counterproductive. But this is a limited interpretation. In a sense, identity politics is democracy boiled down to its basics. Beneath all of the slogans and rhetoric, the policy papers and resumes, the endorsements and campaign cash, only the candidate’s irreducible identity remains constant. Such identity is immediately recognizable and requires no filter or interpretation. Voters support the candidate who looks, sounds, or acts like them, in the expectation that their support will be repaid once the candidate wins.
If not outright bad, this kind of identity politics is certainly primordial in nature. Strict identity politics is the norm in many tenuous democracies around the world. Political parties are often based not on ideology or principle but on tribe or ethnic group. People vote for “their guy,” and national politics frequently devolves into a contemporary extension of age-old, identity-based power struggles. Political systems intended to mitigate the excesses of identity politics (such as proportional representation) or detangle the roles of head of state from head of government (such as parliamentary government) sometimes even make the problems worse.
In an odd coincidence of old and new, identity politics abroad recently intersected with its U.S. cousin. In elections in Kenya in December, international observers witnessed tens of thousands of ballots altered in favor of incumbent President Mwai Kibaki (a member of the Kikuyu tribe). Despite the clear irregularities, Kibaki had himself sworn in as president literally minutes after the polls closed. Supporters and co-tribalists of Kibaki’s main opponent, Raila Odinga (a member of the Luo tribe), rioted violently in protest of the rigged election, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Kikuyu. Amidst the post-election violence and uncertainty, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asked Obama — then campaigning in Iowa — to tape a message of conciliation for the Kenyan people for broadcast on Voice of America. Obama’s Kenyan father was Luo, as are his remaining family members in that country. Evidently, many Luo joke that the United States will have a Luo president before Kenya does.
Thankfully, identity politics in the U.S. presidential campaign has not devolved to similar levels of tribalism and excess — yet. Although the United States does not possess the tribal complexities of Kenya, it does contain political “tribes” of its own. Clinton, of course, is the spouse of former President Bill Clinton. Although she was not born into her political “tribe,” she is an integral component of an immensely successful and highly organized political family, with all the loyalties, rivalries, and habits common to every tribe, ethnic or otherwise. If she wins the Democratic nomination and then the presidency, she will become the reigning member of a legitimate political dynasty.
In a country ever-conscious of identity, and in a presidential race steeped in its barrier-breaking potential, Clinton’s identity as a dynastic heir is just as unique and relevant as her identity as a women, or Obama’s as an African American. Indeed, identity is at once both permanent and malleable. Politicians always strive to create favorable identities in order to assemble winning coalitions of voters. But to a certain degree, they can never escape or reframe who they truly are. In the end, it is up to voters to make the final assessment.
San Francisco Chronicle, 1 February 2008
Foreign Policy Association, 24 January 2008
Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:15 PM to Africa, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
January 04, 2007
Africa Command
After years of general speculation and months of more specific rumors, I see that the Pentagon will officially create an Africa Command. This will replace the current arrangement, whereby military responsibility for the continent is divvied up among Central Command (for the Horn of Africa), Pacific Command (for Madagascar and other Indian Ocean islands), and European Command (for all the rest).
I have two initial takes on this. First, it's a smart and long-overdue move. Rightly or wrongly, Africa is becoming an ever-more important region for U.S. foreign policy. Abundant natural resources, the threat of Islamic extremism, and growing Chinese influence will draw greater U.S. attention to Africa in the coming years, in addition to the continent's host of development challenges. Under the current arrangement, in which military responsibility for Africa is split among more established geographic commands, continent-wide policy coordination is unnecessarily difficult, and the perception of Africa as an unimportant and inconsequential region is perpetuated. In addition, this sounds promising:
Unlike in other traditional command posts, the four-star general who would be in charge of AFRICOM would probably have a civilian counterpart from the State Department to coordinate nonmilitary functions of the US government. The expectation is that diplomacy and economic and political aid will often prove more critical to achieving US goals in Africa than relying on military solutions.
In Africa, perhaps more than anywhere else, an effective policy will be one that deftly interweaves political, military, and economic components. Folks such as Robert Kaplan and Thomas Barnett have long emphasized the important and often overlooked diplomatic role played by the military combatant commands. Giving an explicit civilian face to AFRICOM would help send the message that U.S. policy toward Africa encompasses more than just a military component, and that the structural assets of a combatant command may be the most efficient way to sustain a comprehensive political and economic policy there.
Second, the creation of AFRICOM can't help but remind me of the subtle ridiculousness of the Pentagon's Unified Command Plan. Although I do not doubt its utility or even its necessity, there is something very ... imperial about dividing the world into military zones of operation.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:38 AM to Africa | TrackBack (0)
April 05, 2005
Not so funny
Proof that Robert Mugabe is a funny man:
Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe emerged strengthened and typically combative at the weekend after the overwhelming, but disputed, victory of his Zanu-PF party in parliamentary elections.
Mr Mugabe, 81, and in power for 25 years, vowed on Saturday that he would rule until he was 100. Asked when he planned to retire, he laughed: "When I am a century old." [emphasis mine]
That's a good one. It would be even better if he didn't actually mean it.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:22 AM to Africa
March 30, 2005
"Look East," stay stable
What's one of the surest signs that China is aspiring for greater status and power? Meddling in African politics, of course:
China is increasingly making its presence felt on the continent - from building roads in Kenya and Rwanda to increasing trade with Uganda and South Africa. But critics say its involvement in politics could help prop up questionable regimes, like Mr. Mugabe's increasingly autocratic 25-year reign.
"Suffering under the effects of international isolation, Zimbabwe has looked to new partners, including China, who won't attach conditions, such as economic and political reform" to their support, says a Western diplomat here. Of China's influence on this week's elections, he adds, "I find it hard to believe the Chinese would push hard for free and fair elections - it's not the standard they're known for."
[...]
Here in Zimbabwe, China also may be helping to support one of Africa's more oppressive regimes. The radio-jamming equipment that has prevented the independent Short Wave Radio Africa from broadcasting into the country is Chinese, according to the US-funded International Broadcast Bureau. [emphasis mine]
In Africa, it seems, China is taking a page right out of the U.S. Cold War playbook. I doubt China cares as much about Mugabe, Kibaki, or Kagame as it does about oil, gas, and platinum. Stability (translation: reliable access to resources) is China's guiding light in Africa. Sometimes this will be to the benefit of Africans, especially when the Chinese interpretation of stability includes development assistance, intrastructural improvements, or increased trade. Promoting stability in Africa, of course, will also frequently place China on the unsavory side of events. But controversy is nothing new to China, and I'm sure it's much more concerned with the domestic variety than the African.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:23 PM to Africa, Asia
February 28, 2005
Burundi votes
In the 1990s, nothing symbolized the plight of Africa in the western media more than the horrific Rwandan genocide. But Rwanda was not alone in experiencing violent ethnic strife, for when the plane carrying Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana was shot down in 1994 -- considered the signal for the genocide to begin -- President Cyprian Ntayamira of neighboring Burundi died with him. And while the absolute numbers of people killed in the ensuing strife between the majority Hutu and minority Tutsi populations was greater in Rwanda -- an estimated 800,000, compared to approximately 300,000 in Burundi -- the sheer barbarity and tragedy in the latter country surely knew no match.
On Monday, however, the better part of 3.1 million eligible voters in Burundi cast their ballots on a new power-sharing constitution. They were, at long last, implementing a key component of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, signed in 2000 by the mulitple, opposing parites in Burundi's civil strife. The details of the new constitution are necessarily complex. Tutsis make up approximately 15% of Burundi's population, against the Hutus' 85%. Yet the constitution stipulates a National Assembly split 60% to 40% in favor of Hutus, while the Senate, armed forces, and cabinet must be divided evenly among Hutus and Tutsis. The president is to be directly elected, and intriguingly, the ethnically-based political parties must contain a certain percentage of the opposing ethnic group among its slate of candidates.
Initial reports indicate a very high turnout among eligible voters in the referendum, which is expected to result in the adoption of the new constitution. If that is indeed the case, parliamentary and then presidential elections will come later in the year, in a gradual expansion of democratic, representative government. But as some have noted, voting may represent the easy part. Burundi's only other taste of democracy, in 1993, resulted in the election of Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, to replace Pierre Buyoya, a Tutsi, as president. Four months later, Ndadaye was dead at the hands of Tutsi soldiers. He was but the first of hundreds of thousands to die in Burundi's most recent blood-letting. Perhaps now, weary and having witnessed first-hand the effects of systemic ethnic violence, Burundians will finally experience democracy beyond the ballot box.
