December 12, 2006
Re-elected Chavez stronger than ever
As expected, Hugo Chavez handily won re-election as Venezuela’s president on Sunday. Beyond demonstrating Chavez’s widespread popularity across certain segments of Venezuelan society—he won about 60 percent of the vote—the election provided a more general reminder of Chavez’s greatest attribute: his finely honed instincts for political survival. Such instincts led him to victory in Sunday’s election, but they also regularly lead him to notoriety in the staid world of international diplomacy.
Foremost among Chavez’s perceived offenses is the fiery rhetoric is often directs toward the Bush administration. Chavez famously referred to President Bush as “the devil” in his address to the UN General Assembly in September, and he reused that moniker in his victory speech on Sunday. In the past, he has described the U.S. Secretary of State—“Condolencia,” to Chavez—as illiterate and referred to Donald Rumsfeld as “Mr. Dog.” Such rhetoric has earned Chavez disdain from the Bush administration, and indeed, he outwardly suspects that the United States seeks to remove him from power. With his blunt and fiery rhetoric, Chavez draws world attention to this perceived threat. In doing so, however, he deftly serves his own instincts for political survival. The brilliance of Chavez’s strategy lies not in its proven success. It lies in the fact that the Bush administration is unwittingly and helplessly complicit in Chavez’s political survival.
Assume for a moment that Chavez is correct and that the Bush administration really does want to remove him from power. Chavez certainly has reason to fear this; in fact, Chavez believes that the Bush administration has already targeted him. In 2002, Chavez was briefly removed from power in an abortive coup attempt. Although he ultimately regained his position after a brief detention, Chavez is convinced that the United States was behind the coup attempt. At the very least, the Bush administration was too quick to recognize Chavez’s usurpers. At most, the United States provided material and moral support for the coup plotters.
This atmosphere of antagonism has led many to agree with Chavez that the Bush administration has him in its crosshairs. But as long as Chavez plays the perennial victim and retains the international spotlight, the United States would find it very difficult to oust him quietly. Even if Chavez faced an internal threat—another coup attempt, for example—suspicion would immediately fall upon the Bush administration. Chavez has essentially created a situation in which he can trace any attempt to oust him back to the United States. In the process, he would demonstrate his own prescience.
Alternatively, assume that Chavez is incorrect and that the Bush administration has neither the plans nor the intention to oust him. The United States buys 60 percent of Venezuela’s oil output, and the country is the fourth largest supplier of petroleum to the United States. Although some analysts claim that Venezuela’s oil industry has been poorly managed under Chavez, the Bush administration would be loath to upset the mutually beneficial arrangement that currently exists. And as much as it may disapprove of Chavez’s friends and fiery rhetoric, the Bush administration must certainly appreciate a stable leadership that keeps the oil flowing. President Bush—or the parodied members of his cabinet—would need to have very thin skin indeed to allow themselves to be goaded into action against Chavez.
Even if the Bush administration is not actually targeting Chavez, he has convinced enough people that it is. And every second that Chavez remains in power—in effect, defying the world’s most powerful country and its very unpopular leader—serves to solidify his political security. In the eyes of the world and his fellow Venezuelans, Chavez is able to beat the United States without even fighting it. All the while, he graciously fuels the U.S. economy with Venezuela’s abundant oil.
Chavez’s fiery rhetoric, then, is part of an astute strategy to ensure his own political survival. It is fair to ask, however, if Chavez’s political survival is good for Venezuela. No one can deny Chavez’s popularity. He is admired tremendously by certain segments of the Venezuelan population, and international observers have certified each of his elections—including Sunday’s—as sufficiently free and fair. His “Bolivarian missions” have directed much of Venezuela’s oil wealth towards its poorer citizens, funding health care, literacy, and housing programs. And Chavez certainly represents a healthy break from a long line of light-skinned Venezuelan leaders. His presidency has empowered wide swathes of Venezuelan society that had previously felt disenfranchised and downtrodden.
The exciting rhetoric that ensures Chavez’s political survival, however, also reflects a worrying trend in his leadership style. Instead of implementing his desired reforms through Venezuela’s pre-existing political structure upon taking office, Chavez immediately wrote (and won approval for) a completely new constitution. This constitution centralizes a great deal of power in the executive branch of the Venezuelan government, at the expense of the legislative and judicial branches. Chavez argues that such institutional changes were necessary to achieve his desired reforms and to purge endemic corruption from Venezuelan politics. Indeed, such changes have proven popular among Chavez’s poorer supporters. But Chavez’s opponents contend that the president is a demagogue, interested only in his own power and in substituting easy, short-term fixes for the difficult, long-term reform most needed to help Venezuela’s poor.
Chavez’s re-election locks him in as Venezuela’s president until 2012, unless he modifies the constitution to extend his term before then. With his domestic mandate renewed, look for Chavez to return to his favored pastime on the world stage, and remember that every time he compares Bush to the devil, he ensures his own political survival that much more.
The Providence Journal, 7 December 2006
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:22 PM to Americas
June 26, 2006
Prisons and policy
The vast network of overseas U.S. military bases has long been a source of international discontent. Most bases generate this ill will by taking up valuable local real estate, through the misbehavior of U.S. servicemen based abroad, or by use of the facilities for unpopular combat operations. But arguably the most contentious U.S. base fits none of these criteria and is notorious for a completely different reason. And despite widespread outcry and the efforts of several Senators and Congressmen, the legislative branch can do little to rectify the situation.
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base has always been an anomalous base. A relic of the United States' first imperial forays in the early twentieth century, Guantanamo has existed in a unique legal limbo since Fidel Castro seized power over 40 years ago. The treaty governing the U.S. lease can only be broken with the consent of both parties, which the United States has yet to provide. In protest, Cuba has refused to accept the annual rental dues paid by the U.S. government.
Guantanamo's hazy legal status--it is U.S. controlled, but it is not technically U.S. territory, nor is it the territory of a sensitive U.S. ally--has contributed to the base's negative image. Since early 2002, Guantanamo has been used as a detention facility for "enemy combatants" captured in the so-called war on terror. The term "enemy combatants" deliberately situates the detainees somewhere between POW status (with which they would be entitled protection under the Geneva Convention) and criminal status (with which they would have to be formally charged and tried for a crime).
The legal limbo in which Guantanamo detainees are held, as well as the reportedly poor conditions at the facility, have understandably elicited outrage from the Muslim world. But many western governments and human rights groups have also attacked Guantanamo. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan have called for its closure, as did a recent report by the UN Committee Against Torture. Amnesty International has referred to Guantanamo as the "gulag of our times." The pressure to close the facility began shortly after its creation in 2002 and has only increased since.
In recent weeks, however, several events have given this chorus of condemnation new focus. In May, the U.S. military reported the most serious prisoner revolt yet at the base, when several inmates staged a suicide attempt to draw guards into a room, at which point other prisoners attacked the guards with makeshift weapons. More recently, guards discovered three inmates who had succeeded in killing themselves. Although there had been many unsuccessful suicide attempts by Guantanamo detainees since 2002, these were the first to succeed. Rear Admiral Harry Harris, commander of Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, described the suicides not as "[acts] of desperation, but [as acts] of asymmetric warfare committed against us," and Colleen Graffy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, described them as a "good PR move to draw attention."
The widespread opposition to Guantanamo, both domestically and internationally, has not escaped Congress' attention. Late last year, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) succeeded in adding an amendment to a defense appropriations bill that read, in part: "No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment." McCain's amendment, while not specifically limited to the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo, was certainly motivated by the international criticism of the facility and the reports of mistreatment there, in addition to his own experiences as a POW in Vietnam. The Bush administration threatened to veto any bill containing McCain's amendment, with particular resistance coming from Vice President Dick Cheney. Ultimately, faced with mounting public pressure, the president consented to McCain's amendment.
Along with his signature, however, Bush also issued a "signing statement." This statement was neither generated by Congress nor reviewed by that body prior to presidential signature. It presented the administration's interpretation of the new law, noting that, "the executive branch shall construe [the law] in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President ... as Commander in Chief." Some legal scholars interpreted this as evidence that the administration would only abide by the restrictions laid out in McCain's amendment at its own discretion.
Despite the legislature's difficulty in affecting change at Guantanamo, the judicial branch has had some success in influencing events there. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), the Supreme Court found that U.S. citizens designated as enemy combatants by the executive branch had the right to challenge their detainment. In Rasul v. Bush (2004), the Court determined that the U.S. court system had the authority to decide whether foreign nationals held at Guantanamo were rightfully imprisoned. And in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), for which a decision is forthcoming, the Court will rule on the legality of the military commissions established by the Hamdi case and on the refusal to classify Guantanamo detainees as prisoners of war.
The string of legal challenges surrounding the Guantanamo detainees has succeeded in shedding some light on the conditions there and in providing the detainees with a modicum of legal recourse. But progress has been slow and inconsistent. The Pentagon, as part of the executive branch, clearly favors continued and unfettered operation of the Guantanamo facility. Journalists have been strictly limited in their coverage of Guantanamo, and several reporters who had been sent to cover the recent suicides were expelled from the base shortly after their arrival. This behavior is perfectly consistent on the Pentagon's part, as recent decades have witnessed an ever-greater centralization of war powers in the executive branch of government. Since 9/11, this trend has only accelerated.
In addressing the issue of the Guantanamo detention facility, then, two of the three branches of government are fundamentally handicapped. As is the case with most aspects of military policy, the executive branch is preeminent--change must come from the top. But to the surprise of many, such policy change is looking increasingly possible. "I'd like to close Guantanamo," President Bush said recently, while also indicating his interest in the Supreme Court's forthcoming ruling in Hamdan. Bush reiterated that statement this week in Austria, addressing the issue before what was expected to be a barrage of criticism during meetings with European leaders.
Although the Pentagon has not let UN human rights experts inspect the Guantanamo facilities, it has granted access to the International Committee of the Red Cross. And even congressional critics of the detention facilities, such as Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX), have noted improvement in the conditions there. During a recent visit, she noted that, "the Guantanamo we saw today is not the Guantanamo we heard about a few years ago ... what we've seen here is evidence that we've made progress."
Despite assertions from administration critics to the contrary, however, the Guantanamo detention facility cannot simply be closed overnight. The administration would be unlikely to release every detainee, because several probably represent genuine security threats. It is unlikely that each detainee's host country would agree to assume custody of them either, for even the hint of collusion with Guantanamo would be poisonous for many governments around the world. And if the administration were to look for alternative locations to house the detainees, it would find that all arrows point right back to Guantanamo. By virtue of its unique history, the base is tailor-made for legally ambiguous operations--that's why the detainees were sent there in the first place. For these reasons and others, the administration clearly is in no hurry to close the detention facilities.
Nevertheless, policy change on the question of Guantanamo is no longer inconceivable. Opposition to the detention facilities there--from foreign leaders, Congress, the courts, U.S. citizens, and current and former Guantanamo detainees themselves--has been the necessary prerequisite for the shift of tone coming from the executive branch. That fact alone shows that time and public pressure can sometimes be more effective in changing policy than any judicial ruling or Congressional amendment.
Foreign Policy Association, 22 June 2006
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:26 AM to Americas, Middle East, U. S. Politics
May 18, 2006
Important bases
The U.S. military is cleaning house. Existing bases are being retooled or eliminated, and new ones are popping up in some unexpected places. These are the overseas bases that are now vital to the U.S. military—and the new ones that will change its global footprint for years to come.
Andersen Air Force Base & Apra Harbor, Guam
The base: Andersen can handle aircraft ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles to long-range strategic bombers, and Apra Harbor can service everything from nuclear submarines to aircraft carriers. The naval base is also home to one of the three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons worldwide, which provides mobile, long-term storage of land-combat equipment and supplies near potential trouble spots.
Its importance: Located in the Pacific Ocean about 2,000 miles from Asia, Guam is close enough to the mainland to be vital in any conceivable conflict yet distant enough to preclude a surprise blow from an adversary. Andersen is one of the few locations with the necessary hanger facilities to protect the B-2’s sensitive, radar-evading skin, and strategic bombers regularly cycle through the base to project power toward mainland Asia. The best part: unlike other large bases in the region, Guam is U.S. territory.
Balad Air Base/Camp Anaconda, Iraq
The base: Most prominent of the “enduring bases” being constructed in Iraq, Balad is located just north of Baghdad. It is one of the busiest airfields in the country, accommodating both Air Force fighters as well as transport aircraft. Camp Anaconda, adjacent to the air base, serves as a main base and logistics center for U.S. troops serving throughout central Iraq.
Its importance: Balad’s facilities and location make it more than just an ideal base from which to fight insurgents in Iraq. It is also perfectly positioned to project U.S. power throughout the Middle East, and it will likely do so for many years to come. Although this convenience might serve wider U.S. interests, it doesn’t sit too well with Balad’s Iraqi neighbors—U.S. soldiers have nicknamed Camp Anaconda “Mortaritaville” after a common greeting they receive.
Bezmer Air Base, Bulgaria
The base: Bezmer reflects a broader trend toward lighter, more austere bases in Eastern Europe and away from the larger military complexes in Western and Central Europe. To keep a low profile in the host countries, the Pentagon is reluctant to even refer to Bezmer and its Eastern European equivalents as “bases,” and it stresses that the host countries retain full control of their facilities.
Its importance: Compared to U.S. bases in “old” Europe, Bezmer and its Eastern European equivalents are cheaper to operate and closer to potential hot spots in the Middle East and Central Asia. In times of conflict, the military will use these facilities to “surge” men and materiel toward the front lines. The hope is that former-Soviet bloc host countries will be more amenable to U.S. bases than other hosts in “old” Europe and be less likely to block their use in a time of conflict.
Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory
The base: Located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia served as a base for B-52s during the 1991 and 2003 wars with Iraq and during post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan. Its isolated anchorage is also home to both Army and Marine seaborne prepositioning squadrons for land-combat equipment and supplies.
Its importance: Isolation—and British sovereignty—make Diego Garcia a far more secure base for U.S. forces than any mainland base in Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia. Specialized shelters to protect the sensitive stealth equipment of visiting B-2s have recently been installed, and strategic bombers regularly rotate through the base. The atoll is also an important part of the U.S. Space Surveillance Network of telescopes, radars, and listening stations.
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba
The base: Originally intended as coaling station for the U.S. Navy, Guantánamo Bay (or “Gitmo”) remains an important logistical base for Navy units operating in the Caribbean. It also serves as a hub for counter-drug and migrant interdiction operations.
Its importance: Gitmo’s greatest strategic asset is its hazy legal status—it is U.S.-controlled, but it is not U.S. territory. Although it’s not the only place through which “enemy combatants” (neither POWs nor convicted criminals) could be processed, it is readily accessible from the U.S. mainland, and its staff and facilities have experience in detention operations from their time as host to Haitian and Cuban refugees. As a result, Gitmo is one of the most well-known and reviled U.S. bases worldwide. The Bush administration has repeatedly rejected high-profile calls to shut down the base.
Manas Air Base, Kirgizstan
The base: Manas was established at Bishkek’s international airport in the months following 9/11 as a hub for multinational operations in Afghanistan. It has since grown into a substantial base in the heart of Central Asia, playing host to combat aircraft, their supporting personnel, and associated facilities.
Its importance: In addition to its proximity to Afghanistan, Manas is located near the immense energy reserves of the Caspian Basin, as well as the Russian and Chinese frontiers. Kirgizstan has not threatened to follow Uzbekistan’s example and expel U.S. forces, which suggests that Manas could become a linchpin of the enduring U.S. presence in Central Asia. Recognizing its value, Kirgizstan is talking about raising the rent from $2 million to $207 million per year.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:43 PM to Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics
November 03, 2005
Trading planes
Hugo Chavez, weapons proliferator:
If they don't comply with the contract ... we can do whatever we want with these aircraft, whatever the hell we want. Maybe we'll give 10 [U.S.-built, Venezuelan-operated F-16s] to Cuba or to China so they can study the technology," Chavez said.
"We could give them away and buy aircraft from China or from Russia. ... We don't need any U.S. imperialism," he said.
While F-16s are hot planes, Venezuela's are early models, originally exported in the pre-Chavez 1980s. I'm sure China or Cuba or Russia would gladly take some, but I'm not sure how much of a technological coup it would be. So it's quintessential Chavez: more style than substance. But then again, as Chavez has proven thus far, style can be pretty substantial all by itself.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:12 AM to Americas
September 29, 2005
Rusty tools
Looks like Canada's military is stretched too thin:
The military budget should double and the Canadian Forces should sign up thousands of new recruits, a Senate committee said Thursday.
The budget should be $25-billion to $35-billion a year instead of the $14.3-billion earmarked this year and the Forces should have 90,000 people in uniform instead of the 62,000 authorized today, the report said.
Canada has never been the military juggernaut that its southern neighbor has been, but its armed forces have developed a reputation for professionalism and skill in peacekeeping operations the world over (a few scandals aside). Today, the Canadian Armed Forces are an active component of the NATO ISAF force n Afghanistan.
Apparently, such extensive do-gooding does little good from a wear-and-tear perspective. Perhaps the most apt (and amusing) quote from the report sums it up best:
“Canadians should think of Canada's military as a tool box for the government to use to fix things that are of vital interest to Canadians ... our tools are rusting.”
Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:21 PM to Americas
September 12, 2005
Mexican assistance
It's not exactly fresh news, but I wanted to make reference to the arrival of Mexican military personnel in the United States before it became too stale. Traveling north to assist with Katrina relief operations, the Mexican troops were the first of their kind to have done so since 1846, a nifty historical fact that was included in most of the media coverage last week.
Two pieces in particular, however, stand out for providing more than just the standard coverage of the troops' arrival. The first touches upon a relief convey that crossed the border on its way to assist Katrina refugees in San Antonio:
Mexican Army troops encamped Thursday evening on a field at a former U.S. Air Force base, setting up a mobile kitchen and large tents to sleep in, part of a plan to spend up to a month in San Antonio to help evacuees of Hurricane Katrina.
[...]
They traveled from Mexico City on to U.S. soil for the first time in 159 years, receiving a hero's welcome from small groups of onlookers who lined the highways and streets as they passed.
Honking car horns, "bienvenidos'' signs and cheering people wrapped in or waving Mexican flags welcomed them to San Antonio.
"It makes me feel good that my heritage is helping out the United States,'' said John Ortega, 46, a member of the Jarret Volunteer Fire Department which brought two fire trucks as part of the welcome wagon. "This is historic and I'm glad to see this happen.''
Simultaneously, a Mexican amphibious assault ship bearing marines and supplies has been operating off the Mississippi coast:
"Our president called George Bush, and three days later we came here," said Oscar Martinez Pretelin, an officer aboard the Papaloapan, a 440-foot-long, troop-landing ship. "We are honored to help the United States."
About 75 Mexican Marines landed Thursday on the beach just east of the Beau Rivage casino to begin cleaning up Biloxi, Miss., especially around schools and churches.
One of the Marines, Mario T. Rodriguez, said he left a small city in the far south of Mexico to volunteer for hurricane relief duty. He has a 3-month-old daughter with his wife at home.
"The U.S. is so rich, but even a rich country can need help," he said.
Nothing to add beyond the obvious or already-reported, but I think the Mexican assistance definitely stands out among all the other foreign offers received thus far.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:10 PM to Americas
August 24, 2005
Fatwa justification
Citgo may soon become the gas station of choice:
"We want to sell gasoline and heating fuel directly to poor communities in the United States," [Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez] said at the end of a visit to Cuba.
Chavez did not say how Venezuela would go about providing gasoline to poor communities. The Venezuelan state oil company, PDVSA, owns Citgo, which has 14,000 gas stations in the United States.
Cheap gas, eh? It sure seems that everyone is freaking out about gas these days. But are Americans concerned enough that they would be willing to accept the generosity of a well-armed, revolution-minded, and assasination-prone Hugo Chavez? Actually, they probably would. Despite the tantrums thrown by those in the Bush administration and the fatwas issued by the Christian Coalition, I think most Americans are pragmatic enough to opt for good economics over bad policy. Cheap gas from a non-Muslim -- how can you go wrong?
Of course, the kindness of Chavez's heart knows no limits:
Chavez and Cuban President Fidel Castro also offered to give poor Americans free health care and train doctors free of charge.
See, he just had to go and include Castro on the deal. That'll scuttle the whole damn thing.
Bah. Who needs free health care anyway?
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:37 AM to Americas
August 23, 2005
Chavez's game
I had meant to bring this up a while back:
Chavez said late Monday that the U.S. government, which "won't stop caressing the idea of invading Cuba or invading Venezuela," should be warned of the consequences.
"If someday they get the crazy idea of coming to invade us, we'll make them bite the dust defending the freedom of our land," Chavez said to applause.
And this, too:
Chavez noted the immense contribution towards social progress made by the socialist countries, including China, Cuba and the Soviet Union. He heralded the relationship between the people of Cuba and Venezuela today.
The Venezuelan president also welcomed the delegation from the U.S. “We have very special guests with us,” he said. “The anti-imperialist youth of the United States of America.” He called the people of the U.S. “brothers” to Venezuela, and pointed to the progressive traditions of Walt Whitman and Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. as a small example of the progressive history of the U.S.
When Chavez said, “One day, the people of the United States will join with the people of the world to save this planet,” the crowd erupted in cheers.
All in all, typical Chavez: quaint, amusing, and populist. But as is being widely reported, some aren't taking Chavez's antics very well:
Speaking on his own channel, the Christian Broadcasting Network, Pat Robertson said President Chávez should be targeted because he was a "terrific danger" whose country, a big supplier of oil to the US, was "a launching pad for communist infiltration and Islamic extremism all over the country".
Furthermore, killing the Venezuelan leader would be "a whole lot cheaper than starting a war ... We have the ability to take him out, and I think the time has come that we exercise that ability."
I can't really take this too seriously, but many in the Bush administration are, at least to a certain extent. To their credit, they're distancing themselves from Robertson's statements. Unfortunately, that won't mean a whole lot. My speaking and acting in such an extravagant manner, Chavez has cleverly secured his position. Any move the Bush administration may wish to take against Chavez, overt or otherwise, will be nearly impossible to carry out in the spotlight that Chavez's rhetoric has cast on U.S. policy. And if the Bush administration doesn't want to act against Chavez, then he has lost absolutely nothing in speaking so directly -- it fits his populist reputation and image, and his domestic audience loves it.
My point is that Robertson's statements are analogous to Chavez's own over-the-top rhetoric. By playing Chavez's game and by receiving such wide media coverage, Robertson gives Chavez a credibility he might otherwise not have had. He also gave Chavez the rather unique opportunity to represent the sober voice of reason in this particular spat:
"I don't know who that person is,'' Chavez told reporters before he boarded a plane in Havana, where he met with Cuban President Fidel Castro, one of his closest allies, for four days. "I don't care what he said. I prefer to talk about life, about the things we've been working on.''
The Bush administration’s attempts to distance itself from Robertson, whether genuine or not, are not what's making headlines; they are thus largely irrelevant. It is Robertson and his ridiculous comments that are making headlines. Whether you like Chavez or not, it's undeniable that Robertson has just done him a nice, big favor.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:13 PM to Americas
August 13, 2005
Hans Island
To file in the "Dispute Over Barren Rocks" Folder (which, incidentally, is not as sparse as one might think):
Hans Island is a tiny,barren spot between Greenland and Canada's far north-east, lying about 1,100km from the North Pole. Like others in the frigid region, the island, a desolate patch measuring just 1.6 sq km, has "no strategic or practical value", in the estimation of David Rudd, president of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies.
Yet the island in recent weeks has become a flashpoint that highlights Canada's sovereignty problems in the Arctic. Canada and Denmark both claim Hans Island, an unlikely disputed claim left unresolved since a 1973 treaty. Both countries occasionally seek to buttress their position by landing there. This summer, it was Bill Graham, Canada's defence minister. Denmark complained and dispatched an icebreaker to reinforce its own claim. The two governments agreed to meet in September to discuss the island's status.
This story has been brewing for the past few weeks, but the FT piece provides the best overview I've seen thus far. As with many other disputes in the aforementioned "Barren Rocks" Folder, this one is actually rather interesting, in a petty sort of way. Like most other spats of this kind, the value of the Hans Island dispute isn't so much in its specifics as it is in the more relevant issues the dispute highlights. In this case, those issues are the growing importance of the fabled Northwest Passage -- in the context of both a booming China as well as global warming -- and Canada's increasing inability to exert sovereignty over the passage. Plus, a quant shadow of colonialism is cast over the whole dispute; that Denmark even has a claim to Hans Island stems from the fact that nearby Greenland is a Danish overseas dependency.
In any event, Hans Island isn't big news, and it shouldn't be. That doesn't make it uninteresting, however, or even completely irrelevant.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:44 PM to Americas
August 01, 2005
Possible solution
For some reason, I find this extremely amusing:
Asked whether he would send a blessing to Chavez, [Rosalio Castillo, Venezuela's only cardinal in the Roman Catholic Church] said: "More than a blessing, I'd give him an exorcism."
I wonder if that solution wouldn't also address Bush's problems with Chavez ...
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:28 PM to Americas
June 07, 2005
Fun with headlines
From CNN: "OAS members balk at U.S. intervention plan."
From the Washington Post: "Bush Calls for Democracy in Western World."
I'm pretty sure both pieces are referring to the same event. In this particular case, I think it's safe to count Hugo Chavez as a CNN reader.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:32 AM to Americas, Trans-geographical
May 19, 2005
Live and let live
I've long been confounded by Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. He elicits unusually intense, polarized feelings among supporters and detractors alike, and these feelings are shared by many of the media outlets covering Venezuela. As a result it's tough to find sober, even-handed assessments of Chavez and his policies
In my view, one of the more reliable of the anti-Chavez media outlets is the Economist. Occasional cheekiness aside, the Economist has always provided a reliable, honest, well-written glimpse into the world of the center-right. Most of their Chavez reportage, while lacking a certain foaming intensity, has been rather predictably negative. I was a bit surprised, then, when I read the following assessment of U.S. policy toward Chavez:
So what should be done about Mr Chávez? The short answer is not much. The first point to understand about Venezuela's president, a former army officer, is that, like Mr Castro, he thrives on being Washington's bogeyman. For much of the past few years, American policy towards Venezuela has been run by junior officials who have appeared to flirt with regime change. In 2002, the United States failed to condemn, and may have connived in, a short-lived coup against Mr Chávez. That not only sent the wrong message in a region where democracy still needs to be nourished. It played into Mr Chávez's hands, giving him an excuse for repression.
This strikes me as a remarkably sober and altogether logical assessment, and it confirms my faith in the Economist. Chavez is undoubtedly popular among many Venezualan communities, and I don't think he needs an imperialist bogeyman in order to stay in power. But U.S. meddling, or even the impression thereof, only plays into Chavez's demagogic instincts. Ignoring Chavez might deprive him of some of the spotlight that he so craves, leaving him with less of an excuse for his military expenditures and autocratic inclinations.
It would be impossible for the United States to completely ignore Chavez, of course. Not only is he practically a neighbor, but he's one whose oil is vital for the U.S. economy. So by all means, the U.S. government and U.S. firms should continue to conduct fair and equitable business with Venezuela. As for Chavez? Just let him be. Maybe he'll act up in an attempt to garner attention. But without the United States as a clear provocateur, the subsequent international response would justifiably be more broad-based and multilateral.
But a non-interventionist U.S. policy in Latin America? Never gonna happen.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:10 PM to Americas
April 03, 2005
Tit-for-tat, plane-for-plane
In a nice example of dishing out what you've been dealt, the Russian ambassdor to India has criticized the U.S. decision to sell F-16s to Pakistan:
These aircrafts (F-16s) are used for surveillance over a large area. [The] United States should reconsider its decision as it could tilt the strategic balance in the region ... it will be a pity if the ongoing peace process to build confidence and goodwill, which is at a fragile state, is interrupted by U.S. decision.
Valid criticism, perhaps, and also a not-so-subtle attempt to harken back to the chummy Soviet-Indian relationship of the Cold War. But does anyone catch the contemporary reflection here? Russia itself has recently sold military equipment to Venezuela, to much U.S. consternation. Russia is also in talks to sell Chavez some MiG-29s -- fighters, coincidentally, that are roughly comparable to F-16s. So the United States criticizes Russian warplane sales to Venezuela, and Russia returns the favor by criticizing U.S. warplane sales to Pakistan.
Will any policy change come from this? Of course not. It's just a cute tit-for-tat that will fade away soon enough, and it probably won't have any lasting effect on U.S.-Russian relations. One thing does stand out for me, however. In the above analogy, Venezuela and Pakistan pair up neatly. Now that is an association I've never thought about ...
Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:10 PM to Americas, Asia
March 30, 2005
Just another week
This week, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez bought military equipment from Spain ...
In Spain's biggest arms deal for many years, its arms factories will supply 10 C-295 transport planes, four coastal patrol corvettes and four smaller coastguard patrol boats to Mr Chavez's army. [Spanish PM] Zapatero said the vehicles would be used to monitor coastlines, combat terrorism and drug traffickers, and mount rescue operations during natural disasters. The deal was announced by the Spanish Prime Minister during a visit to Venezuela yesterday when he also met fellow left-wing leaders from Colombia and Brazil. [emphasis mine]
... and called for a "new geopolitical map … to counterbalance the global dominance of the United States:"
"This meeting has the objective of evaluating the situation of our countries and looking for solutions to accelerate the South American integration project as a geopolitical component that we are driving forward with our souls, because it is the only path that we have: the Latin American Union," affirmed Chávez. [emphasis mine]
All in all, a fairly unexceptional week for Chavez.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:02 PM to Americas, Europe
Chinese trailblazing
On the topic of China's expanding influence in the developing world, the Economist recently ran a piece (locked, unfortunately, behind a subscription firewall) about Brazilian-Peruvian cooperation on completing a paved road link between Brazil's agricultural heartland and Peru's Pacific ports. The motivation? The vast Chinese market for Brazilian soya. But as the article points out, benefits will also be found closer to home:
This great road link is not a new idea. Peru's government hacked a trail through the jungle to the border in 1965. In the 1970s, a military government bought a 700-metre suspension bridge from Austria to span the Madre de Dios, a mightier river than the Acre. But the steel girders for the bridge have remained in their boxes since arriving in Peru in 1978. They might have remained there for another quarter-century had Lula's government not shown enthusiasm for the project. It is putting up $420m of the $892m cost for the highway. For Peru, the road is expected to provide some 20,000 jobs, one way or another, during construction. Once open, officials hope it will attract business and more jobs to some of the country's poorest towns in the Andes and the jungle. They talk of a new export market opening up in Brazil for such products as paprika and artichokes.
Brazil's ambitions for the road are even grander. It already sends 18% of its exports to Asia, and that share is rising fast. China is lapping up Brazilian soyabeans and wood pulp, much of which is produced in the country's centre-west region. At present, these goods have to be carried to Atlantic ports or trucked across Argentina to Chile. The new road will provide a much shorter route. Officials expect a daily flow of some 400 40-tonne trucks from Brazil. This should encourage investment in Peru's inefficient and run-down ports.
This is an excellent example of how China's burgeoning power can be a force for good. With the vast Chinese market as motivation, developing states have an added incentive to complete long-dormant infrastructural improvements, thus benefiting local economies. The losers in this process, of course, are the same ones often cited by globalization and neoliberal opponents. The local environment is bound to be strained by the increased commercial traffic, and indigenous cultures may be displaced or even destroyed by the influx of outsiders. But this case just goes to show that the new geopolitical and economic realities created by an emerging China are much too complex to be singularly dismissed or condemned. The trick will be to recognize and adapt to such new realities, and perhaps even to modulate them if they get out of hand.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:11 PM to Americas, Asia
March 24, 2005
Rifles and words
Rumsfeld on Chavez (yesterday):
"I can't imagine why Venezuela needs 100,000 AK-47s, I can't imagine what is going to happen to 100,000 AK-47s," Mr Rumsfeld said before meeting Brazil's President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. "I personally hope the [delivery] doesn't happen...if it did, it wouldn't be good for the hemisphere.”
Chavez on Bush (earlier this month):
"We have enough evidence ... If anything happens to me, the person responsible will be the president of the United States," Chavez told reporters [...] On Friday, Chavez said his country would not stop supplying oil to the United States unless "the U.S. government gets a little bit crazy and tries to hurt us".
Chavez supporters to no one, or everyone, in particular (last week):
Chanting "fatherland or death," dozens of President Hugo Chávez's supporters lined up in formation, vowing to defend the country if the United States tries to invade. [...] "If an invasion comes, we know what we're going to do," said Manuel Mayan, 36, saluting during training in a parking lot Tuesday night, the first attended by international journalists.
So what's going on here? Is the United States going to depose Chavez? Probably not. Not only do many insist that the Bush administration has already tried and failed to do just that, but Chavez has manipulated the media dynamic perfectly to ensure his survival. He has instituted restrictive codes on private, opposition media outlets, but more importantly, he has called Bush at his own game. By accusing Bush clearly and unequivocally of trying to knock him off, he will seem like a prophet if it comes to pass. And despite the harsh words, the Bush administration remains strategically stymied in its attempts to vilify Chavez. In the meantime, the supposed threat from Bush serves as a rallying cry for Chavez supporters and as a strong reason for Chavez to keep his new AK-47s close to home.
Is Chavez fomenting revolution? Actually, he is -- by his own admission, he seeks to spread his "Bolivarian Revolution" across Latin America. But will he impose his revolution violently? Doubtful. Leftist governments have proliferated across South America in recent months, with little to no bloodshed in each case. The largest ongoing, leftist insurgency in Latin America is in Columbia, a fact which, incidentally, has been used as a rationale for Venezuela's recent arms purchases. But FARC, to take a popular example, has been unsuccessful in seizing power in Colombia, despute decades of fighting. So while Chavez's role in the recent rise of leftist governments may be unclear, he has, at the very least, taken credit for inspiring them, and they have proven more successful and less bloody than some of the more popularized leftist movements in Latin America. That the various leftists have taken power successfully -- and peacefully, by and large -- can be viewed as a victory for Chavez. It can also be viewed as an affirmation that Chavez doesn't need to export violence (or AK-47s) to achieve his revolutionary objectives.
So is this war between Bush and Chavez confined to rhetoric? Yes, but just barely. Feelings run very high both for and against Chavez, in much the same way as they do for Bush. But for now, the war of words helps both leaders. For Chavez, it bolsters his bunker mindset, pitting him against the forces of rapacious imperilaism, and it helps justify his rule and his excesses. For Bush, it reinforces the perception that the United States faces foreign foes and needs to adjust its energy and military policies accordingly. Throughout this rhetorical war, furthermore, Venezuela continues to sell oil to the United States, in a fair exchange of money for energy, clearly benefiting both countries. For their conflict to escalate any further, something would have to upset this current, seemingly tenuous, but actually quite stable balance between Bush and Chavez -- one of the two leaders would have to take their conflict beyong words. Right now, such an escalation would be in neither Bush nor Chavez's interest. But Chavez has a record of winning waiting games, outlasting opponents from his unsuccessful first coup in 1992 to the abortive coup against him ten years later. At the current rate, then, odds are that Chavez will win his latest waiting game, this time against the Texas Yanqui up north.
UPDATE: Edited to reflect suggestions in the comments.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:39 PM to Americas, U. S. Politics
March 15, 2005
Diplomatic color
Sometimes, out of the staid, cautious morass that is diplomatic rhetoric, a golden nugget of honesty, humor, and outright ridiculousness surfaces. The FT noted over the weekend that the United States is developing a strategy to "contain" Hugo Chavez's Venezuela. This is potentially a big deal. Not only has Chavez developed a record of treading on U.S. toes (as noted previously here and here, as well as in today's Washington Post), but the very word "contain" conjures up memories of George Kennan, NSC-68, and other unpleasant things.
The details of such a Venezuelan "containment" policy, then, would be most interesting. Of course the policy is at an "early stage" of development and details are scarce. Thankfully, however, we get some spicy rhetoric to tide us over. Roger Pardo-Maurer, deputy assistant secretary for western hemisphere affairs at the Pentagon, justified the U.S. policy shift by categorizing Chavez's regional behavior as a "hyena strategy" -- widely considered to be one of the more insidious branches of the scavenger school of international relations. There's no off-switch to Pardo-Maurer, however. In another, otherwise informative and well-written piece in the FT on Chavez's recent arms purchases, Pardo-Maurer cites the "orgy of corruption" behind Venezuela's defense procurement strategy. This stands in clear contrast, I am sure, to the more pedestrian, monogamous variety of corruption.
Such vivid rhetoric from the Americans is only fair, really. Just a few months ago, Chavez apparently rebuffed Condoleeza Rice's romantic interest in him, claiming that he "[could not] make that sacrifice for [his] nation." I'm sure Condi's glad to have closure on that front.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:37 PM to Americas
March 12, 2005
How to shake a Bush
If you're the leader of a Latin American country these days, it's not hard to get on the United States' bad side. First, it's helpful to have a history of working against the grain of U.S.-Latin American relations. Second, welcome the leader of an "evil" country for a state visit. Third, sign a number of cooperation agreements with said "evil" country, defend such country's nuclear ambitions, and proclaim solidarity with it in the face of U.S. aggression. And finally, it doesn't hurt to buy some weapons from Russia at the same time. Rejecting increased oil production in the face of rising prices can be helpful, too.
By the way, does anyone else find it interesting that one of the seven languages available on the IRNA website is Serbian? That's intriguing for any number of reasons.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:33 AM to Americas, Middle East
March 11, 2005
Condi's Viennese Waltz
Just when you thought that the second Bush administration would come to its internationalist senses after a Rambo-esque first term (oh wait, you didn't really think that, did you?), Condi Rice confirms that the United States will withdraw from the Vienna protocol. This protocol -- a component of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations -- was of course originally a U.S. proposal, which makes the irony only sweeter.
Basically, the Vienna Protocol lets the International Court of Justice (not to be confused with the International Criminal Court, which the Bush administration has long opposed) intervene in cases where criminal suspects are denied access to diplomats from their own country when jailed abroad. Naturally, the protocol would be of equal use to Americans abroad in signatory countries as it would to foreign nationals in the United States. Come to think of it, it would be of even greater use to Americans, given our globe-trotting numbers and ample, often unfavorable political reputation abroad.
Does this decision have anything to do with the ICJ's recent ruling against the United States in the case of 51 Mexicans on death row? Of course not, says State Department spokesman Adam Ereli. We'll review the cases in question -- but you better believe we won't be put in this sticky spot by international law ever again.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:01 AM to Americas, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics
March 10, 2005
Information-based public diplomacy
As was previously noted in this space, our Canadian neighbors to the north have opted out of the U.S. missile defense shield. Given the history of U.S.-Canadian cooperation in North American defense (most concretely through NORAD), this decision was by no means a foregone conclusion. It resulted in perhaps understandable consternation on the part the United States.
Most unexpected, however, was the blistering shot fired at Condoleeza Rice by Lloyd Axworthy, former Canadian foreign minister and current president of the University of Winnipeg. In a column constructed as an open letter to Rice, Axworthy did much more than attack the merits of ballistic missile defense. He struck directly at the Bush administration:
Your boss did not avail himself of a[n] … opportunity to visit our House of Commons during his visit, fearing, it seems, that there might be some signs of dissent. He preferred to issue his diktat on missile defence in front of a highly controlled, pre-selected audience.
Such control-freak antics may work in the virtual one-party state that now prevails in Washington. But in Canada we have a residual belief that politicians should be subject to a few checks and balances, an idea that your country once espoused before the days of empire.
Them's fightin' words, for sure. Unexpectedly for Axworthy, his "Missile Counter-Attack" became hit among web-savvy, liberal, blogger-types south of the 49th parallel. The popularity of his open letter was based not just on its content -- most in this demographic already opposed the missile defense shield and praised Canada when it opted out of the program. Rather, its tone -- so honest, so unrestrained, so ... unpolitical -- spoke directly to bloggers' hearts. Whether Axworthy knew it or not (and he most likely did not), he had just blogged in print.
But Axworthy's no dummy. In a follow-up, rhetorically tighter column, he recounts his blog revelation as it developed through a storm of supportive email:
Most striking is the volume of messages sent by Americans from every part of that vast and diverse country, and most particularly the tone and substance of those messages. What most are saying is that they appreciate receiving a point of view from Canada that is different from that offered by their own government -- and one that is rarely seen or heard in their own media.
Clearly, there are many in the United States who share the same serious misgivings about missile defence as do the majority of Canadians, but who can't find anyone to stand up and represent their concerns. There is a sense of frustration among many "Dear Condi" correspondents that debate on issues in the U.S. is too narrow-gauged, without a choice of options.
As one put it, most succinctly: "There are many here in the U.S. who agree with you. We're just locked in a soundproof room."
And in his revelation, Axworthy sees an avenue for Canada:
... Canada has an opportunity to substantially transform the way we approach our relations with Americans by investing in information-based public diplomacy. The scope and span offered by the Internet presents a platform for Canadian-based information, analysis and ideas. Perhaps an online newspaper presenting a daily compendium of articles, think-pieces, commentary and debate, drawn from Canadian sources, would attract the interest of many Americans -- in fact, many from around the world.[emphasis mine]
Blogging as decentralized mode of national foreign policy? You bet. The medium is explicitly designed for the informal and organic exchange of ideas. Even in countries that consider themselves the archetypes of representative democracy, ideas go unnoticed and voices go unheard. Agents duly nominated and confirmed as the personification of foreign policy only represent a discrete, filtered agenda that itself may never have been tested through the ballot box. It is already widely accepted that international civil society, using electronic media and blogs as its connective tissue, is perhaps the most genuine venue and outlet for decentralized public diplomacy. Blogs -- chaotic, uncontrolled and uncontrollable, vibrant, and unruly -- are quintessentially public.
It is noteworthy, however, that Axworthy harnesses blogging to Canadian national interest. For those intimately familiar with (or mildly amused by) Canadians, this is a quaint and proper assertion. It is, of course, by no means exculsive -- blogs by definition are open-source, free to be used by any and all, for ill or for good, in any number of conceivable capacities. What is remarkable, however, is not that Axworthy is but the latest non-blogger to discover the potential of the medium. Rather, he is perhaps one of the first of high-level diplomatic caliber to connect blogging (a non-traditional means) to state diplomacy (a very traditional end). In much the same way that this Watsonblogs community seeks to connect the blogosphere with the academy, Axworthy may have inadvertently taken the first steps to connect the blogosphere with diplomacy. While blogging has long been an obvious fit with international civil society, perhaps one day it will be an equally obvious fit with national governments. One cannot predict precisely how this would come about (Foreign Ministers blogging? State Department-hosted blogging? Transnational networks of government officials communicating via blogs, in the spirit of Anne-Marie Slaughter's recent work?), but it's exciting to ponder.
Where will Axworthy's comments lead? In and of themselves, probably no where. But his experience -- a blog revelation in a formal, diplomatic mind -- will hopefully become commonplace among former, current, and future ministers of state and foreign service types. At the same time, access to and awareness of blogging and electronic media will grow among everyone else, even among those with no apparent stake in diplomacy, and the geographic borders that divide states will inexorably melt away. Gradual and imperceptible, perhaps, but the change will come.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:46 PM to Americas, Trans-geographical
March 06, 2005
Counter-hegemonic
The other night I saw "The Revolution Will Not Be Televised," provided to me by a source that will go unnamed. This Irish-produced documentary was originally conceived as a full-access, behind-the-scenes look at the Venezuela of President Hugo Chavez. Conveniently, for the filmmakers and viewers alike, the cameras were rolling during an abortive and controversial attempted coup in April 2002, when Chavez opponents removed the former paratrooper from office, only to see his return to power in the face of mass demonstrations a few days later.
I've had a hard time getting my bearings on Hugo Chavez. His charismatic, personality-driven, leftist brand of nationalistic populism has managed to excite both supporters and detractors to extreme levels, within Venezuela and abroad. Indeed, the very fact that his "Bolivarian Revolution" has taken place in Venezuela -- one of the world's leading petroleum producers and a top oil exporter to the United States -- makes the stakes even higher. Conservative outlets revile Chavez, ostensibly for his authoritarian tendencies and his friendly relations with foreign leaders such as Castro, Qaddafi, and Hussein, but also for his anti-Bush administration rhetoric and his perceived opposition to free-market principles. More liberal outlets love Chavez, not only for his nationalizing instincts and his expansion of social programs for poorer Venezuelans but also for his ethnic (non-white) background and his anti-imperialism rhetoric. The more sensational stories run from suggesting the United States sponsored the April 2002 coup attempt against Chavez to (somewhat relatedly) quoting the Venezuelan president as stating that Bush wants to kill him. In other words, feelings toward Chavez stretch across a very wide spectrum, with the same facts used in arguments both for and against him and other "facts" being in dispute outright. Thus for someone without a long-standing knowledge or familiarity with Venezuela, it can be uniquely challenging to develop an accurate, complete impression of Chavez from the media alone.
One of the best things about "The Revolution Will Not Be Televised" was its insight into the Venezuelan media. Apparently, an array of privately-owned television stations continually rail against Chavez and manipulate images for the benefit of their white, middle- and upper-class benefactors. For Chavez and his primarily non-white, lower-class supporters, state-owned Channel 8 is their only means of competing on the airwaves. It's interesting, then, that a new, all-news cable channel being promoted as the "counter-hegemonic" alternative to CNN will have as the head of its board of directors Andres Izarra, who is perhaps more widely known in his day job as Venezuela's Minister of Information. To be sure, Telesur (mottto: "Our North is the South") will be a regional venture, with staff and support from across South America. Contradictions, perhaps inevitably, abound. Telesur will receive seed money from the state (presumably Venezuela), but it will not be managed by the state; it will receive additional financial contributions from large oil companies and will run advertisements from "private and public institutions," but "there will not be consumer advertisements." So for those of us yearning for a more objective, dispassionate, and complete view of Venezuelan politics, Telesur may fall short. At the very least, however, it will provide yet another source of information in a media environment that is arguably already over-saturated. While perhaps a strain on the senses, such a plethora of media sources -- and the patience required to wade through them all -- may be the only way to determine what's really happening in Venezuela.
UPDATE: The Washington Post has since picked up on Telesur, providing some helpful context.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:48 AM to Americas
February 24, 2005
Near-miss up north
Canada, seemingly struck with a bout of sovereignty, has decided to opt out of the U.S. missile defense shield. In another day, faced with another foe, the geographical implications of such a decision could be problematic. Today, however, the geographical implications are fuzzier -- as are the foes. Given the system's stellar track record thus far, Canada's decision is simply ... indefensible.
