Daniel Widome

March 12, 2010

Afghan action

One of the early ways that the Obama administration set itself apart from its predecessor (and there were many) was in its re-conceptualization of the war in Afghanistan. Recognizing that the challenges presented by that conflict couldn't be neatly confined within political borders, the administration began to present them as part of a wider “AfPak” problem, which included Pakistan as much as it did Afghanistan. Although the term is more bureaucratic shorthand than anything else, the sentiment behind it is valid. The multiple economic and security challenges in the region are interconnected, and it is only logical that any solution would need to be interconnected, as well. Recent events in both Afghanistan and Pakistan have proven this, but they also suggest that the interconnectedness of the conflict is more complex than the “AfPak” term may imply. They also suggest that the definition of “success” will be as complicated as the definition of the problem.

In Afghanistan itself, U.S. and allied forces — together with their Afghan counterparts — launched a major offensive to clear the town of Marja, in the Helmand Province in southern Afghanistan. Billed as the largest effort of its kind since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the Marja offensive seeks to clear a region that has been an important Taliban sanctuary and a hub for drug production and trafficking. The effort is notable for more than just its magnitude. U.S. commanders have tried to emphasize that Afghan government forces have been given a lead role in the operation. Although the bulk of the fighting has been borne by U.S. and British soldiers, it is true that a significant number of Afghan troops have been involved in the operation.

The Marja offensive is also notable for what it is not. Although sharp fighting was reported early in the operation, the most significant challenge—openly acknowledged by U.S. commanders—will come after the fighting has ended. Since 2006, the Taliban has been increasingly successful in undermining government legitimacy across wide swaths of Afghanistan. Fighters are drawn from the local population and are difficult for U.S. forces to target without more troops on the ground. As Taliban forces are attacked, they disappear among the population, only to re-emerge when U.S. forces depart — as they inevitably do. The Taliban have instituted “shadow” governments in parts of the country that allied forces could not secure and that the regime of President Hamid Karzai could not control. In Marja, the objective is to restore that control and regain government legitimacy. Once the region is cleared of Taliban fighters, U.S. and allied forces will hold and secure the area as the Afghan government attempts to provide police, services, and development assistance. “We've got a government in a box, ready to roll in,” said General Stanley McChrystal, commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The challenge will lie in making the “government in a box” take root.

Just as U.S. and Afghan forces were beginning to clear Marja, news emerged of the capture of a major Taliban leader in Pakistan. U.S. and Pakistani intelligence agents arrested Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's military commander and the deputy to the movement's founder, in Karachi. He is the highest-ranking Taliban official yet arrested by U.S. or Pakistani forces, and he potentially could provide a wealth of intelligence about Taliban operations. His arrest also could place significant limitations on the capacity of the Taliban leadership, which might prove to be an important advantage as the Marja campaign unfolds. Several days after news of Baradar's arrest emerged, it was reported that two of the Taliban's “shadow governors” had also been arrested, also in Pakistan. Just as with Baradar's arrest, the capture of the shadow governors could provide a wealth of information and significantly hinder Taliban operations. At the very least, it provides a morale boost for U.S. and Afghan soldiers fighting in Marja.

Perhaps the most important fact about the recent Taliban arrests, however, is that they took place in Pakistan. In Baradar's case, the arrest occurred hundreds of miles from the Afghan border, giving immediate credence to the entire “AfPak” construction. The arrests could not have taken place without the cooperation of Pakistan's Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which sponsored the Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan in the 1990s. The ISI's support for the Taliban was deep-seated and complex, but it was rooted Pakistan's desire to have a stable western border. If that was possible, Pakistan could focus its defenses eastward, toward its main rival India. The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan upended this policy, forcing Pakistan into a very conflicted position. The tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have served as a base for Taliban fighters, but Pakistan has done little to eliminate their safe haven, despite facing its own growing threat from a Pakistani variant of the Taliban. The recent arrests may indicate a change of mood among the Pakistani leadership, particularly in the ISI. If they have become convinced that the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban are pieces of a larger threat to the region, and if they see their own security threatened by a resurgent Taliban movement in Afghanistan, Pakistani authorities may be more willing to crack down on Taliban fighters in their midst.

Taken together, the operation in Marja and the arrests in Pakistan could signal an important shift of momentum in the Afghan war, away from a resurgent Taliban and toward U.S. and Afghan government forces. This would be a significant fulfillment of Obama's Afghanistan strategy, pieces of which have been developed and revealed over the past year. Richard Holbrooke, the person credited by many as the source for the “AfPak” term, was appointed by Obama as his special representative in the region early in his presidency. Months of diplomacy by him, Stanley McChrystal, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and General David Petraeus (commander of the U.S. Central Command) may have helped convince Pakistan to cooperate more fully in fighting the Afghan Taliban. Last December, Obama announced the deployment of 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan to bolster McChrystal's new counter-insurgency strategy. The Marja operation is an important test of that strategy, which requires more soldiers to defend the civilian population from Taliban influence and to give the Afghan government a chance to reassert control.

Even if recent events do signal a change in momentum, it isn't clear that this would be sufficient to defeat the Taliban in the long-run. As novel as McChrystal's population-centric counter-insurgency may appear — especially in comparison to earlier U.S. tactics in Afghanistan — it really is nothing new. The “clear, hold, build” strategy is a classic approach to dealing with a robust insurgency and a weak central government. It is premised on the fact that an insurgency's greatest source of strength is its popularity among the civilian population. If that loyalty can be transferred to the preferred governmental authorities—if their “hearts and minds” can be won, in other words—the insurgency can be deprived of its lifeblood. The problem is that while this strategy is eminently logical on paper, it is not foolproof in practice. It is true that each insurgency is unique, and there is no indication that the Taliban holds the genuine loyalty of many Afghans; whatever popular support the Taliban has comes from intimidation and ethnic Pashtun solidarity. But the tactics employed by McChrystal do not differ from those used unsuccessfully in countless other counterinsurgency operations through history. He is further burdened by the inherent corruption and ineffectiveness of the Karzai regime, which has yet to acquit itself well. U.S. and allied forces will undoubtedly be able to “clear” and “hold” Marja, but if the Afghan government cannot “build,” their effort will be for naught.

None of this may matter. The goals of Obama's Afghan strategy, as presented last December, are strikingly clear: deny al-Qaeda a safe haven; reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the Afghan government; and strengthen Afghanistan's security forces and government. Notably absent from those goals is any mention of “defeating” the Taliban. This is probably borne both of necessity and good judgment. Politically, it would have been difficult for Obama to send McChrystal the 80,000 additional soldiers he requested, and it is questionable whether even that number would have been sufficient to destroy the Taliban. Strategically, the notion of conclusively “defeating” an insurgency is as old as the “clear, hold, build” strategy itself; barring enormous investment of resources and a nearly limitless appetite for destruction, central governments have poor track record of crushing insurgencies (for more, see The Water's Edge, May 2009). It is to Obama's credit that his Afghanistan policy matches capability with ambition so closely. But to succeed, expectations must be equally realistic. The Taliban will not be defeated. With more troops, better tactics, and closer cooperation from Pakistan, the most that the United States and the Afghan government ultimately can hope for is some kind of negotiated settlement with the Taliban. Given the tumult of Afghan history, such an outcome would not be half bad.

Foreign Policy Association, 5 March 2010

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:38 PM to Asia, Middle East, Trans-geographical | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

December 05, 2009

New orientation

Between the lofty, untested principles of political candidacy and the urgent and unexpected realities of governance lies something of a middle ground, or an overall orientation that can guide a president's foreign policy and serve as a prism through which he or she can interpret global events. In the first year of his presidency, and especially in the past month, Obama's general foreign policy orientation has begun to emerge.

A convenient way of interpreting such orientations is through political and economic geography. During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was oriented toward the containment of Communist expansion. This orientation was global in scale, but its geographic emphasis was Europe. Historically, this made sense. Both world wars had erupted in Europe, and the United States had invested significant resources in rebuilding and securing the continent after World War II. The region held a cultural affinity for millions of Americans, and it maintained close economic ties with the United States. Looking forward, the orientation on Europe also made sense. It represented the vanguard of Soviet expansion, with hundreds of thousands of troops in East Germany and the prospect of nuclear conflict representing the most dangerous security challenge in the world. Following the Cold War, the orientation of U.S. foreign policy began to drift, until 2001, when the 9/11 attacks refocused attention on the suppression of global terrorism.

Under President Obama, the suppression of terrorism still remains a paramount objective. But in his tone and his actions, it seems clear that terrorism is not the prism through which he views the world. Likewise, Obama places great value on the U.S. relationship with Europe. He has already paid several visits to the continent, and he is quite popular there. But from the U.S. perspective, the relative importance of Europe has been waning. This reality became increasingly clear in November.

During Obama's first trip to Asia this month, the president paid visits to Japan, Singapore, China, and South Korea. At each stop, the importance of Asia as Obama's prevailing foreign policy orientation became increasingly clear. Of all of the countries on his itinerary, it is Japan's relationship with the United States that has most resembled the United States' relationship with Europe. Japan rebuilt itself after World War II under the protection of the United States and developed a political and economic system that was friendly to the United States' Cold War ideology. To this day, Japan houses thousands of U.S. soldiers, and disagreement over the relocation of important U.S. bases on Okinawa dominated much of Obama's discussion with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. Obama also used Japan, as the oldest and most reliable U.S. ally on his itinerary, as the venue to deliver a wide-ranging speech on the importance of Asia. He emphasized the importance of long-standing U.S. treaty obligations in the region and the value of cultivating economic “spheres of cooperation, not competing spheres of influence.” Obama also announced that the United States would engage with the Trans Pacific Partnership, a regional Asia-Pacific free trade agreement that currently includes only four countries but could eventually form the basis for a much wider trade bloc.

In Singapore, Obama both reiterated a long-standing commitment in the region and began a new one. He participated in the meeting of leaders from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries, which U.S. presidents have made a habit of doing in recent years. But Obama also participated in a summit with leaders from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This was the first time a U.S. president had met with ASEAN leaders in a formal summit, and the act carried significant symbolic value. Paving the way for the joint summit was Obama's willingness to meet with a leader from Burma, an ASEAN member but also a notoriously repressive state. Obama's meeting with Prime Minister Thein Sein was the first time a U.S. president had directly interacted with a Burmese leader in over 40 years, and it was a reflection of his new strategy of trying to engage with the military regime there in the hope of encouraging reform. Obama's meeting yielded little in the way of specific concessions, but the fact that he valued deeper engagement in the region over a long-standing refusal to meet with Burmese leaders was an important shift in U.S. policy.

Obama's visit to China could be considered the heart of his trip to Asia. He held a town hall meeting with students in Shanghai and met with President Hu Jintao in Beiing. Critics have suggested that Obama left China with few concessions from the Communist regime. They note that he was unable to secure wider broadcast of his town hall meeting in Shanghai or convince the government to modify its currency policy or support a tougher approach toward Iran. On these points, the critics are correct. Whether that necessarily represents a failure, however, is not as clear. The reality is that the United States cannot dictate to China as it once could, or as it might wish to today. Not only is its economy large and growing, China also holds $800 billion in U.S. debt. It plays a significant role in financing the U.S. economy, and it has assumed a greater stake in a wider range of U.S. domestic policy than it ever has before. China has become increasingly concerned, for example, with the effect that health care reform legislation will have on the U.S. budget deficit. This is not to suggest that China can now dictate terms to the United States. But the economic and political realities have shifted such that the United States and China must now engage each other on more equal terms.

Obama's tour of Asia coincided with important developments on the other side of the United States, in Europe. In October, the European Union cleared the final hurdles toward ratifying the Lisbon Treaty (for more, see The Water's Edge, October 2009). Among the treaty's most important reforms was the creation of the posts of president of the European Council and of high representative for foreign and security policy (essentially an EU foreign minister). These positions could potentially strengthen the collective voice of the EU on the international stage. At a meeting of EU heads of government this month, Europe's leaders selected Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy to be president of the European Council and EU Trade Commissioner Lady Ashton of the United Kingdom as the high representative for foreign and security policy. By all accounts, these were sound selections. But neither individual has the stature of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who was rumored to be in the running for the Council presidency. By selecting such obscure personalities to fill these new positions, the leaders of the EU's individual member states took a deliberately cautious approach. Instead of taking advantage of the Lisbon Treaty to create a stronger international presence for the EU, Europe's leaders sought to prolong the status quo, in which foreign policy is largely directed from the 27 national capitals of the separate EU member states. In other words, serious change was deferred.

That Obama's trip to Asia overlapped with the EU's selection of new leaders was purely coincidental. But it underscored the shifting orientation of U.S. foreign policy. Where Asia presented a series of genuine challenges to a once pre-eminent United States, Europe deferred action that would have seriously increased its global stature. This is not to say that Europe will become any less important to U.S. interests or to suggest that any other issue (such as terrorism) will fade from the U.S. agenda. Nor is the shift of attention entirely due to any conscious decision, by Obama or anyone else. Instead, geographical and political reality has coincided with the term of a new U.S. president who is eager to conduct foreign policy in a fundamentally different manner than his predecessor. Compared to the historical emphasis placed on Europe, the relative importance of Asia for both U.S. domestic and foreign policy is increasing at a dramatic rate. Meanwhile, during George Bush's presidency, many Asian leaders felt ignored by a United States preoccupied with foreign wars. During his tour of the region, Obama hoped to send the message that “the United States is back.” This is the clearest indication yet that U.S. foreign policy will become increasingly oriented toward Asia, during Obama's presidency and beyond.

Foreign Policy Association, 3 December 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:59 AM to Asia, Europe, Trans-geographical | TrackBack (0)

September 24, 2009

Japan in Pittsburgh

When Lehman Brothers collapsed one year ago, Japan entered the worst of the global financial crisis with a unique perspective. It had experienced its own asset bubble in the late 1980s, and the slowness and inadequacy of its response led to a decade of stagnation and missed economic opportunity. One result of that experience was an abundance of caution. Japanese banks avoided many of the subprime loans that had laid the groundwork for the financial crisis in the United States, and high household savings rates and a favorable balance of trade placed it in a stronger position than many of its G20 peers.

Japan’s export-oriented economy could not escape the crisis, however. Even prior to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, Japan’s economy had been shrinking, and the value of its exports had declined. By late 2008, Japan officially slipped into recession, and in early 2009, it experienced its first current account deficit in 13 years, as global demand plummeted. Under Prime Minister Taro Aso, Japan responded with debt-financed stimulus packages totaling $270 billon, or approximately 5 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. Unlike Japan’s failed stimulus efforts in the “lost decade” of the 1990s, these packages did not finance bloated and unnecessary infrastructure projects. Instead, they focused on providing services to laid-off workers and on investing in green energy projects. Many economists, however, feared that these efforts had come too late to be truly effective.

At this week’s G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, Japan is represented by a new prime minister. Yukio Hatoyama and his Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a resounding electoral victory last month, sweeping away the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its nearly 55-year grip on power. Although he expressed generic disapproval with “American-style free-market economics” during the election campaign, Hatoyama’s economic policies differed little from Taro Aso’s. Instead, the DPJ campaign waged war on Japan’s underlying political structure. Hatoyama called for wholesale reforms of the bureaucratic machinery that had sustained the LDP’s longevity.

Achieving these structural reforms would be a tall order even in a solid economic climate. Today, they must compete with Japan’s pressing economic needs and its obligations to the global financial system. Hatoyama is something of an unknown quantity, especially on the diplomatic stage, and the G20 meeting represents his first international summit since taking office. Hatoyama will be closely watched by his fellow heads of government, as will his actions in the coming months. How he reconciles his desire for structural reform in Japan with the global imperative for economic crisis management is an open question. It is unclear yet if Hatoyama has an adequate answer.

The Asia Foundation, 23 September 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:08 PM to Asia, Trans-geographical | TrackBack (0)

August 28, 2009

Alliance adjustment

As Japan nears its August 30 election, a political era may be nearing an end. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), under the leadership of Prime Minister Taro Aso, is deeply unpopular and trails badly in pre-election polls; its nearly uninterrupted 54-year reign seems to be in its final days. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), led by Yukio Hatoyama, stands poised to win a plurality in the lower house of Japan's Diet, giving it license to form a new government. That alone makes the election unique in modern Japanese political history. But its potential effect on Japan's foreign policy and its relations with the United States is equally unique, and a DPJ victory may lead to subtle but real changes in the Japan-United States alliance.

Japan has been a close ally of the United States since the end of Word War II. U.S. forces occupied the country until a formal treaty of surrender came into effect in 1952, and ever since, the United States has maintained a significant military presence in Japan. The transition from wartime enemy to peacetime ally largely was driven by the Cold War. Taking advantage of Japan's strategic position and the long-standing aversion to Communism among its ruling class, the United States found a useful and valuable ally to counter Soviet influence in the Pacific region. The long-term presence of U.S. military bases could partly be justified by Article 9 of Japan's post-war constitution, which formally prohibited an offensive military force and only permitted “self-defense” forces. Without the burden of maintaining an extensive military apparatus, Japan was able to focus its post-war economic development on export-driven growth. Its economic success since World War II can partly be attributed to its alliance with the United States.

The LDP initially came to power as a strong supporter of the U.S. alliance, and the strength and stability of the partnership has helped sustain its longevity in office. For decades, the success of the alliance with the United States—together with a growing economy and low unemployment—seemed to justify LDP rule. But as the party grew comfortable in its power and success, it increasingly fell victim to corruption and controversy. A series of scandals in the 1980s were navigated with savvy leadership changes, cabinet shuffles, and coalition building. Economic stagnation and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, however, posed real threats to the LDP, as the growth and stability that had justified its leadership and fractured its political opposition began to wane.

Instead of succumbing to an outside rival, the LDP elevated Junichiro Koizumi to the premiership in 2001. Koizumi led a reform-minded faction within the party that advocated, among other things, a more assertive foreign policy. He was close personally with President Bush, and he deployed Japanese troops to support U.S. occupation efforts in Iraq. He also deployed Japanese refueling ships to aid U.S. naval efforts in the war in Afghanistan. Although Japanese forces were tightly constrained in both missions, these missions generated a great deal of controversy in Japan. Koizumi was adamant in his support of these missions, however, and they were but a piece of his iconoclastic and relatively reformist agenda. He attempted to change the LDP from within, and by appealing to voters directly, he was able to lead the party to a significant electoral victory in 2005. But since Koizumi stepped down in 2006, a succession of short-lived and increasingly unpopular LDP prime ministers has followed. Taro Aso has become known for his erratic and detached behavior, and approval ratings for his cabinet hover around 20 percent.

All signs point to a DPJ victory on August 30. In part, this is due to difficult economic conditions and to the dwindling patience for LDP rule. One consequence of a DPJ victory would be the humbling burden of responsibility that faces any party that moves from perpetual opposition to first-time governing. This transition would be particularly acute for the DPJ, as the LDP's bold on power has been so strong and persistent in recent Japanese history. In a general sense, the DPJ has emphasized the need for a more “equal partnership” in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Indeed, during Koizumi's tenure in office, the DPJ expressed opposition to the naval refueling mission in Afghanistan. But as victory has become more plausible in recent months, the clarity that comes from permanent opposition has seemed become more muddled. Early in the campaign, Hatoyama was unclear about whether he would end or continue the refueling mission if the DPJ won a governing plurality in the Diet. Since then, he has clarified his party's position: he will not end the mission immediately, but he will not seek to renew the law that authorized the mission when it expires in January. This is less extreme than positions offered by the DPJ in the past, but it represents a clear departure from the policy of the LDP.

On many issues of policy, though, the LDP and the DPJ hold remarkably similar positions. The main battleground in the election is Japan's administrative structure and the political culture that has sustained it. Although Japan is nominally a multiparty democracy, the pervasiveness and perseverance of the LDP has seemed to suggest otherwise. The LDP has maintained its decades-long dominance with an interdependent web of relationships between big businesses, powerful bureaucracies, and dynastic politicians. This web has proven remarkably resilient, as money, influence, and careers circulate through it with ease. But this powerful system also obscures lines of political accountability and is prone to inefficiency and corruption. The DPJ pledges to reform this system, curtail the influence of bureaucrats, and promote a “politician-led” government in which the real policymakers are accountable to voters and not entrenched in ministries. For the DPJ, structural reforms are the prerequisites for real policy change and for a politics that “values people above concrete projects.”

In that sense, the victor in Japan's election will be unlikely to radically change the nature of the alliance with the United States. The two countries will remain strong allies with many of the same interests in East Asia and around the world. But if the DPJ wins, as appears likely, the Obama administration may find itself facing a slightly different tone emanating from the new government in Tokyo. The DPJ will be keen to prove its independence both from the LDP's time-honored ways but also, to some degree, from the perception of dependence on the United States. Already, policymakers in Japan feel some anxiety toward an Obama administration that has seemed to identify China as the key state in East Asia. This anxiety was heightened with Obama's choice for U.S. ambassador to Japan. Many had expected the appointment to go to Joseph Nye, a widely respected international relations scholar with extensive government experience and ample knowledge of Japan. Instead, Obama selected John Roos, a prominent fundraiser during his election campaign with little grounding in international diplomacy. None of this will dramatically change or upset the U.S.-Japan alliance. But if the DPJ is victorious on August 30, the new U.S. ambassador's job may suddenly become a bit more interesting.

Foreign Policy Association, 27 August 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:01 AM to Asia, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

August 19, 2009

Reign's end

As Japan nears its August 30 election, a mixture of political weariness and anticipation fills the air. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), under the leadership of Prime Minister Taro Aso, is deeply unpopular and trails badly in pre-election polls; its nearly-uninterrupted 54-year reign seems to be in its final days. The opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), led by Yukio Hatoyama, stands poised to win a plurality in the lower house of Japan’s Diet, giving it license to form a new government. A combination of bleak economic conditions and even bleaker political mismanagement has led to this seemingly foregone conclusion. But change doesn’t come easily in Japan. Even if the LDP is ousted on August 30, the political structures and culture that have sustained its lengthy reign will not disappear overnight.

Although tiny glimmers of good news began to appear just this week, Japan has been hit very hard by the global economic downtown. Its economy shrank by more than eight percent in the past year, and its rapidly aging population makes long-term recovery and growth particularly challenging prospects. Unsurprisingly, the focus of the election is domestic and economic policy. The party manifestos of the LDP and the DPJ are similarly tinged by economic populism, and although they differ on some specifics, both parties broadly pledge to grow household income, increase employment, and cut taxes.

What’s remarkable, however, is the relative lack of ideological differentiation between the LDP and the DPJ. This is not by accident. Indeed, ideology is not even the main battleground in the election. It is instead primarily a fight over Japan’s administrative structure and the political culture that has sustained it. Although Japan is nominally a multi-party democracy, the sheer pervasiveness and perseverance of the LDP has seemed to suggest otherwise. Aside from a few months in 1993, the LDP has governed Japan uninterrupted since 1955. It secured power in the immediate post-war period through a combination of strong support for the Cold War alliance with the United States and a clear emphasis on export-driven growth.

Since then, the LDP has maintained its dominance with an interdependent web of relationships between big businesses, powerful bureaucracies, and dynastic politicians. This web has proven remarkably resilient, as money, influence, and careers circulate through it with ease. But this powerful system also obscures the lines of political accountability. Political change comes not from open competition among rival parties, but from opaque bureaucratic decree and from factional maneuverings within the LDP. Power – both wielding it and keeping it – has become the driving motivation for the party. This situation is prone to corruption and inefficiency, and it often deprives Japanese voters of a meaningful political choice.

For decades, the combination of a growing economy, low unemployment, and a steady alliance with the United States seemed to justify LDP rule. But as the party grew comfortable in its power and success, it increasingly fell victim to corruption and controversy. A series of scandals in the 1980s were navigated with savvy leadership changes, cabinet shuffles, and coalition building. Economic stagnation and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, however, posed real threats to the LDP, as the growth and stability that had justified its leadership and fractured its political opposition began to wane.

Instead of succumbing to an outside rival, the LDP elevated Junichiro Koizumi to the premiership in 2001. Koizumi led a reform-minded faction within the party that advocated a more assertive foreign policy and the privatization of large state-operated enterprises. Koizumi waged an internal campaign to purge the LDP of his opponents, and he appealed to voters directly to help him in the effort. In 2005, Koizumi led the party to one of its largest-ever electoral victories. But since Koizumi stepped down in 2006, a succession of short-lived and increasingly unpopular LDP prime ministers have followed. Taro Aso has become known for his erratic and detached behavior, and approval ratings for his cabinet hover around 20 percent.

Poised for victory, the DPJ has not advocated radical policies; overthrowing the dominant political party and proving its own, untested ability to govern are challenges enough. The change it does promote, however, cuts to the heart of the LDP’s hold on power. The DPJ pledges to curtail the influence of bureaucrats and promote a “politician-led” government in which the real policymakers are accountable to voters, not entrenched in ministries. Budgeting authority and the responsibility for policy planning and execution will be centralized in the cabinet, while more funds will be placed under local governments’ control. Politicians will be placed deeper within ministries to enforce discipline and ensure accountability among bureaucrats. For the DPJ, these reforms are the prerequisites for real policy change and for a politics that “values people above concrete projects.”

The DPJ certainly has identified the major structural features that have sustained the LDP’s longevity and impeded accountable policymaking. And if the polls are a reliable guide, many Japanese agree with the diagnosis. But even if the DPJ wins a historic victory on August 30, it is unclear how its reforms will fare. The entrenched bureaucracy that the DPJ has marked as its enemy is entrenched for a reason. As an entity, it sees itself as indispensible, in part because it is. Together with LDP politicians and business leaders, the bureaucracy has created and sustained an administrative system in which it is an essential component. The bureaucracy defends its prerogatives well, and it has outlasted scores of crusading politicians. A change in governing party alone may not be enough to dislodge its influence.

Perhaps the greatest threat to the DPJ’s agenda is that of co-optation. The challenges facing Japan are urgent and real. In the current economic climate, the desire for policy change may outweigh the need for structural reform. The resilient system that has fueled the LDP’s longevity may survive by adapting to serve new times and new political masters, and the impulse for reform may gradually wane. If the DPJ is victorious on August 30, it may find it easier to compromise with the current system than to force it to change.

The Asia Foundation, 19 August 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:42 PM to Asia | TrackBack (0)

May 29, 2009

Tigers' tail

This month, one of the world's longest and bloodiest wars drew to a close. After a massive months-long offensive, the Sri Lankan military cornered the remaining forces of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) into a small patch of territory in the northeast of the country, and on May 16, Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa declared victory in the 26-year conflict. This was a remarkable and welcome achievement for many reasons. What was particularly notable however, was that the victory seems to contradict much of modern military history. Insurgencies, especially those as resilient and sophisticated as that orchestrated by the LTTE, are not supposed to be resolvable through brute military force alone. Yet in Sri Lanka, this is what seems to have happened. The defeat of the LTTE presents lessons and challenges for the evolving U.S. strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Barack Obama has taken notice.

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, also known as the Tamil Tigers, were founded by Vellupillai Prahhakaran in 1976. From 1983, they waged a separatist war in the north and east of Sri Lanka, claiming to represent the country's ethnic Tamil minority against the majority Sinhalese government in a conflict that ultimately claimed over 80,000 lives. The LTTE was among the most sophisticated militant organizations in the world. For many years, they controlled much of northeastern Sri Lanka and operated as a ruling authority there, providing a full range of governmental services and effectively defending their territory through conventional military means. In addition to the land-based elements common to most insurgencies, the LTTE also had an air force and a navy, known as the “Air Tigers” and “Sea Tigers,” respectively. The LTTE had the dubious distinction of pioneering suicide bombing; their elite “Black Tigers” unit was responsible for the assassination of a former Indian prime minister and a Sri Lankan president. In short, the LTTE was among the most resilient and well-established insurgencies in the world.

Throughout the 26-year conflict, various attempts had been made to mediate between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE. In the late 1980s, India deployed an ill-fated peacekeeping force to the island, and Norway spearheaded a mediation effort early in this decade. These efforts eventually came to naught, and in 2008, the government launched a full-scale offensive against LTTE-held territory in the north of the country. In January of this year, the government intensified its campaign in an effort to deal the LTTE a final blow. As the LTTE retreated into densely populated regions, it made extensive use of civilians as human shields against government attack. But the government largely disregarded this tactic, as well as UN-mediated cease-fires and designated “safe zones” in which civilians could seek refuge. It pursued its offensive aggressively, inflicting severe civilian casualties. By April, the UN estimated that nearly 6,500 civilians had been killed in the offensive and about 14,000 had been injured.

In a sense, the Sri Lankan offensive created the first man-made humanitarian crisis of Barack Obama's presidency. In April, as the LTTE was being squeezed into an ever-smaller plot of territory, Obama expressed his “deep concern” about the situation and called for an immediate cease-fire. He also “call[ed] upon the Government of Sri Lanka to stop shelling the ‘safe zone' and blocking international aid groups and media from accessing those civilians who have managed to escape.” This month, just days before the LTTE's final defeat, Obama prefaced a televised statement on his decision to withhold photographs of detainee abuse—arguably a far more salient issue to a U.S. audience—with further concerns about the situation in Sri Lanka. He specifically “urge[d] the Tamil Tigers to lay down their arms and let civilians go,” and he repeated his calls for government forces to stop indiscriminately shelling civilian areas and to give international aid groups access to civilian refugees. The president's comments were amplified by similar statements from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and UN Ambassador Susan Rice.

Behind the proclamations, however, was something more remarkable: concrete action. The Obama administration acted to delay a $1.9 billion IMF loan to Sri Lanka due to the humanitarian crisis. According to one U.S. official, “the problem … [was] that the Sri Lankans have refused to engage on the humanitarian crisis as a priority,” and that delaying the loan was “an attempt to get [Sri Lankan] priorities back where they should be.” The administration acknowledged that the loan was only being delayed, not canceled, and that there was no particular expectation that the delay would compel the Sri Lankan government to change its behavior. Even so, the delay of the IMF loan—coupled with the administration's strong, coordinated criticism of the Sri Lankan government—represented a far more robust response to a humanitarian crisis than had been made by previous administrations in similar circumstances. The Clinton administration's tepid response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in particular, is known to have shaped the thinking of some Obama advisors; the president himself may have been similarly motivated.

Obama's response, however strong, did not stop the Sri Lankan government's offensive or delay the LTTE's ultimate demise. Humanitarian concerns aside, the conclusive endgame of Sri Lanka's civil war presents unsettling questions for the United States' own ongoing counter-insurgency operations. Recent military history suggests that the best (if not the only) way to defeat an ethnic- or religious-based insurgency is by protecting the civilian population, trying to win the “hearts and minds” of local noncombatants, and utilizing a “light” military footprint. Essentially, the goal is to deprive an insurgency of its base of support. An aggressive military response, on the other hand, plays into the insurgents' plans. It increases local resentment of the dominant power in the region and drives supporters to the insurgent cause. And given the irregular and asymmetrical method of insurgent warfare, blunt military responses rarely achieve their objectives; tanks and bombers cannot kill insurgents hiding in an urban area without putting a much greater number of civilians at risk, which ultimately serves an insurgent's political objectives. The evolution of the U.S. war in Iraq—from the 2003 invasion, to the bloody occupation period of 2004-2006, to the present “surge” strategy spearheaded by General David Petraeus—only reinforces these lessons.

In Sri Lanka, however, the government did not abide by these principles. It used an abundance of brute force to liquidate the LTTE insurgency. Tanks, planes, and artillery were utilized liberally, and little effort went into winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population. Instead of coaxing the LTTE to lay down its arms or persuading civilians to withdraw their support, the Sri Lankan government pummeled the insurgency mercilessly, along with anything or anyone in its immediate proximity. This strategy is not “supposed” to work. Yet it did. As President Obama oversees a large-scale reinvestment in the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the Sri Lankan experience raises some pertinent questions. Do the lessons that have been learned in Iraq and in previous insurgencies still hold? How and why did the Sri Lankan government succeed? Will the blatant humanitarian costs incurred by its approach eventually outweigh the military defeat of the LTTE, either in the short-term or in the long-term?

Although these are important questions, it is clear that each insurgency is different. Counter-insurgency campaigns must be tailored to local conditions and cannot be transposed or grafted from one dissimilar conflict to another. It is entirely possible, if not probable, that the Sri Lankan government's aggressive approach may have planted the seeds for long-term resentment and instability that could temper the short-term success it has just achieved. The endgame of the Sri Lankan civil war certainly has been fraught with irony. The LTTE was a violent organization and the civil war was immensely destructive; the end of both is clearly a good thing. But the Sri Lankan government's final offensive was indiscriminate in its brutality, and it created a genuine humanitarian crisis.

As if to reinforce the irony, the Sri Lankan government has actually credited President Obama with playing a major role in the success of their offensive. “It is undeniable that the LTTE effectively folded shortly after President Barack Obama told the world that the terrorists were holding innocent Tamil civilians as hostages. He was one of the few world leaders to note that fact so forcefully … I believe that the president's statement had a great influence on the LTTE,” noted Jaliya Wickramasuriya, Sri Lanka's ambassador to the United States. If such a sentiment is genuine, Obama faces a new opportunity. He could use his new-found clout with the Sri Lankan government to urge it to relieve the still-ongoing humanitarian crisis and to build the foundation for a sustainable peace.

Foreign Policy Association, 28 May 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:15 AM to Asia, Trans-geographical | TrackBack (0)

February 26, 2009

Diplomatic celebrity

The first full month of Barack Obama's presidency was dominated by a debate over the economic downturn and by the administration's ultimately successful effort to pass a stimulus bill. But as the new president made his mark on the domestic front, he also began to introduce his administration to the international community. Hillary Clinton went on her first official trip as secretary of state, and her choice of destinations—and her performances there—offer clues as to how the new administration will conduct its foreign policy.

Clinton's inaugural overseas trip took her to Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and China. The choice of Asia for her first trip is notable. It reflects the emerging view that East Asia is a region of tremendous growth and dynamism, in terms of economics, demographics, and security. There was a time when the most important U.S. allies—and the first destination for a new secretary of state—would be in Europe. Japan and South Korea are strong U.S. allies, and a visit to their capitals represents a useful maintenance of that relationship. Indonesia is the world's largest Muslim-majority country and a burgeoning democracy, not to mention the boyhood home of the new U.S. president. Clinton is wise to take advantage of the President Obama's popularity in Indonesia, and the United States has a clear interest in strengthening that country's relatively young democracy. And China represents perhaps the most important bilateral U.S. relationship today, with the ongoing (and largely false) choice between treating the country as an ally or an adversary dominating many headlines. Any tour of East Asia that did not include China would be unthinkable.

Substantively, Clinton's trip was noteworthy as well. Before departing, Clinton laid out the broad objectives of her trip. She hoped to encourage the resumption of the Six-Party Talks with North Korea and to pursue cooperative efforts on climate change policies, especially with China. She also stressed the particular importance of the State Department's work on one the so-called “three D's” of national security --defense, diplomacy and development. “Too often, development is regarded as peripheral to our larger foreign policy objectives. This will not be the case in the Obama Administration. We will energetically promote development around the world … which we happen to believe will advance our shared security interests,” Clinton said Compared to much of the rest of the world, however, many countries in East Asia did not clamor eagerly for a change in U.S. presidents or policies. President Bush got along well with conservative governments in Japan and Australia, he championed a controversial nuclear agreement with India, and he managed relations with China in a low key but largely effective manner. In terms of policy, then, Clinton was not necessarily offering anything truly groundbreaking.

Stylistically, however, Clinton made a more distinct impression. In Indonesia, she appeared on a popular television talk show called “Awesome” and talked about her favorite bands (she cited the “music of [her] youth,” such as The Beatles and The Rolling Stones). In South Korea, she answered questions from students about how she fell in love with her husband. In China, State Councilor Dai Binggou complimented the Secretary of State on more than just her negotiating skills: “You look younger and more beautiful than you look on TV.” Some of this was to be expected—a new secretary of state, representing a new administration, is bound to get a great deal of attention on her first trip abroad. But the attention that Clinton received went beyond that. It is important to remember that her background is not as a diplomat but as an elected politician. More than that, Clinton endured the singular spotlight that only falls upon those select few who have lived in the White House for eight years. She knows how to draw attention, how to hold attention, and how to use it for her purposes; Clinton is a celebrity.

The skills of a political celebrity can be of tremendous value for a diplomat, who essentially conducts politics on a global scale. Even if Clinton did not promulgate any new policies or craft new diplomatic agendas in Asia, her trip must be considered a success because she was received in the countries she visited as a star. This kind of public diplomacy was in short supply during the Bush administration, and Barack Obama based much of his election campaign on changing the tone that the United States used to portray itself to the world. In this context, his selection of Hillary Clinton as secretary of state—as opposed to someone with a deeper or more specific background in diplomacy—makes a great deal of sense.

Clearly, Hillary Clinton is more than just a political celebrity. But her selection (and, so far, success) as a high profile secretary of state may hint at how the Obama administration as a whole will conduct its foreign policy. Regardless of political ideology, every president has an institutional interest in centralizing power in the White House. Obama is no different. Clinton may be the public face of U.S. diplomacy, and she may have populated the State Department with her chosen staff. But the real policymaking apparatus may actually exist in the National Security Council at the White House, which Obama has filled with aides and advisors for whom he has developed a trusting relationship over the course of his Senate career and his presidential campaign. Alternatively, Obama may have realized long ago that his early months and years as president would be dominated by his domestic agenda and the worsening economic situation. Entrusting foreign policy to a high-profile figure such as Clinton may have been a low-risk way of “outsourcing” a policy realm for which Obama has, at least for the time being, little time or interest.

These theories are not mutually exclusive, nor are they necessarily true. But Obama's appointment of a high profile, former political rival as secretary of state was an unexpected move when it was announced late last year. Although Clinton has performed ably so far, it is important to remember how implausible her appointment seemed just a few short months ago. Despite any inclination to centralize power at the White House, Obama cannot use the State Department simply as a public relations tool. And even if he was primarily interested in domestic policy, he cannot outsource foreign policy to a political celebrity. The likeliest theory, then, is simply that Obama picked the best person for the job, in order to help him fulfill his political agenda. Based on Clinton's first road-trip as the nation's top diplomat, Obama may well have chosen wisely.

Foreign Policy Association, 26 February 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:05 PM to Asia, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

December 29, 2008

Mumbai revelations

As gruesome as they were, last month's terrorist attacks in Mumbai were a bold wake-up call. The ten attackers entered Mumbai by boat, fanned out across the city, and attacked and laid siege to many of its most notable landmarks. Over the span of several days, 171 people were killed. The brazenness of the attacks reminded Indians that terrorism could still strike them, even in their largest city. But it also served as a reminder to the rest of the world of something that should have become obvious: the relatively new threat of state-less Islamic terrorism is inextricably linked to the older, state-based tensions between India and Pakistan.

The animosities between India and Pakistan stretch back to the founding of each country. When the British granted independence to its South Asian colony in 1947, two states were created: Muslim-majority Pakistan and predominantly Hindu India. The partition was a bloody and tumultuous affair, and it sowed the seeds for the tensions between the two countries that continue to this day. Pakistan and India have fought three major wars and numerous minor skirmishes over the past 60 years. The two countries' tit-for-tat nuclear weapons tests in 1998 did nothing to reduce the geopolitical or religious tensions, though it certainly raised the stakes of the rivalry to frightening new levels.

A source of much of much of the tension between India and Pakistan is the disputed territory of Kashmir. Uneasily and artificially divided by a “line of control” for the past 60 years, Kashmir has become a symbol of the tortured and seemingly intractable rivalry between India and Pakistan. In recent decades, one of Pakistan's preferred methods for exerting pressure in Kashmir has been supporting militant groups in the Indian-controlled portion of the territory. Pakistan officially denies supporting such groups, but it is widely suspected that they continue to receive protection (if not outright support) from forces within the Pakistani military, particularly from the powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI). One such group is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was founded in Afghanistan in the early 1990s and maintains connections with the Taliban and al Qaeda. LeT has become notorious, however, as one of the more vicious militant groups operating in Kashmir. Although it denies responsibility for the Mumbai attacks, the sole attacker captured alive after the assault claimed that he was a member of LeT, and other evidence seems to confirm the group's culpability. This has only served to increase tensions between India and Pakistan.

LeT's apparent complicity in the Mumbai attacks has immediate implications for U.S. counter-terrorism policy and for the incoming Obama administration. For one thing, any spike in tensions between nuclear-armed powers is automatically of interest to the United States. Energy, attention, and resources that could be applied elsewhere must be redirected toward this crisis. Ideologically, however, the threat displayed by LeT in Mumbai is not all that different than the threat posed by al Qaeda and its offshoots in the West. In the scope and prioritization of their objectives, the two groups are broadly similar. Each has a near-term, practical objective that drives the bulk of their operational activity. For LeT, this near-term goal is the expulsion of Indian forces from Kashmir, and for al Qaeda, it is the expulsion of U.S. forces Muslim lands.

But each group also has a longer-term objective, based on a more generalized, extremist ideology that serves more as an abstract inspiration than a practical, operational blueprint. In these longer-term goals, LeT and al Qaeda are kindred spirits. LeT hopes to restore Islamic rule across South Asia, and al Qaeda wants to restore the Islamic caliphate over all of the lands it laid claim to hundreds of years ago. Each group draws its long-term inspiration from the same radical font.

Ideology is a tough thing to defeat. In a more practical sense, however, groups such as LeT and al Qaeda can be targeted by military means, and it is in this context that the Mumbai attacks will most directly affect U.S. policy. As tensions rise between India and Pakistan, India will try to send a message by moving more troops to Kashmir and to its border with Pakistan. For its part, Pakistan will seek to defend its borders (and its honor) by reinforcing its forces in Kashmir and along its eastern frontier. Those reinforcements will come from Pakistan's other border, with Afghanistan, where they nominally have been securing restless tribal areas and preventing Taliban and al Qaeda forces from using the region as a base for operations in Afghanistan. So far, however, Pakistan has not been effective in this mission. The situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated greatly over the past year, in large part due to the ease with which Taliban and insurgent forces can move across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border for resupply and repositioning. If the border is porous now, it will become far more dangerous if Pakistan moved troops away from the area to bolster its defenses against India.

In Afghanistan, U.S. and NATO troops are trying to ensure stability and defeat a growing Taliban insurgency. President-elect Obama campaigned on a pledge to end the war in Iraq and bolster the U.S. effort in Afghanistan, where the U.S. mission has long been perceived as more justified and appropriate than the elective invasion of Iraq (for more, see The Water's Edge, July 2008). It was from Afghanistan that Osama bin Laden planned the 9/11 attacks, and it was there that the hijackers were trained. After Afghan mujahideen expelled the Soviet invaders in 1989, the United States abandoned its former allies, leaving a chaotic power vacuum that allowed the Taliban to seize power and granted al Qaeda a safe haven.

If history teaches any lesson about U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, then, it is that the mission should be completed. But with the situation rapidly deteriorating in that country, a military worn-out by years of deployment in Iraq, and a growing economic crisis at home, many commentators and even some Obama supporters are questioning the wisdom of sending more troops to Afghanistan. It is a country with a long reputation for resisting outside invaders, and if Osama bin Laden hasn't been captured yet, he likely won't be caught with a few thousand additional soldiers.

Another school of thought takes a more nuanced position. Afghanistan remains an important country for the United States, and it would be unsafe and unwise to simply leave. At the same time, sending more troops to the country would be insufficient to defeat the insurgency and could, in fact, only make it worse. Instead, the United States must pursue a more wide-ranging strategy, in terms of both methodology (military support as well as economic support) and geography (stabilizing Afghanistan, demanding accountability from Pakistan, and urging restraint from India). Obama seems to be adopting a position along these lines: “We're going to have to make a series of not just military but also diplomatic moves that fully enlist Pakistan as an ally in that region, that lessen tensions between India and Pakistan, and then get everybody focused on rooting out militancy in a terrain, a territory, that is very tough.”

In a very straightforward way, then, the Mumbai attacks will have a direct effect on U.S. counter-terrorism policy. The attacks were launched by a group that has connections with the Taliban and al Qaeda and that is being protected by Pakistan's ISI. This raises tensions between Pakistan and India, distracting the former from its already meager efforts to support the U.S. mission in Afghanistan and tempting the latter to exact revenge on its long-standing rival. The crux of this geopolitical maze is, of course, Pakistan. Directly or indirectly, it fosters violence and instability in both Afghanistan and India, and its fragile democracy is wracked by corruption, economic woe, and competing factions within its own military. If Osama bin Laden is still alive, he is probably in Pakistan. And to make the situation even more unsettling, Pakistan also has nuclear weapons. Instead of an Afghanistan strategy, then, President-elect Obama is likely to think more in terms of a Pakistan strategy, or at the very least a regional one. He is fortunate that members of his own nascent administration have already thought along similar lines. During the Democratic primaries, Obama and Vice President-elect Joe Biden (then a fellow presidential candidate) shared similar views on Pakistan. They supported efforts to increase non-military aid to the country but to tie further military aid to the Pakistan's actual performance in shutting down Taliban safe havens within its borders (for more, see The Water's Edge, November 2007).

As horrific as the Mumbai attacks were, they serve as a potent reminder that South Asia's security challenges are deeply interconnected. Any policy that truly hopes to address them must encompass Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India in a coherent manner and recognize that resolving the deep-seated interstate tensions could help to undermine the region's potent intrastate (and state-less) threats. Already, rumors are swirling that Obama may appoint a high-powered special envoy to focus exclusively on South Asia; Richard Holbrooke, negotiator of the Dayton Accords that ended the war in Bosnia in the 1990s, has been floated as a potential appointee to this post. If these rumors are true, he may find that bringing peace to the Balkans was easy by comparison.

Foreign Policy Association, 28 December 2008

Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:53 PM to Asia, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

February 28, 2008

All apologies

Earlier this month, Australia's parliament passed a resolution formally apologizing for one of the country's most egregious practices of institutionalized mistreatment of indigenous Australians. In issuing this apology, Australia is not alone. Apologies for past, state-sponsored misdeeds have become a burgeoning topic for many national legislatures, including the U.S. Congress. Although the direct impact of such apologies is often uncertain, they can have a clear effect on a country's foreign policy.

The apology introduced by Australia's new prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was unanimously approved by that country's parliament. Specifically, it recognized and apologized for the Australian government's formal role in the “Stolen Generations” The term applies to the government's forced removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families and placing them into state orphanages and other institutions. This state-sanctioned practice took place from the late 1800s until 1970, and it was designed to assimilate Aboriginal peoples into “white” Australian culture. Indeed, in a grotesquely paternalistic way, many viewed the practice as beneficial to those Aboriginal children removed from their families. Since the 1970s, as the government's role in creating the Stolen Generations has become more understood and less defensible, the momentum for a formal apology has grown. Rudd, fulfilling a campaign promise, issued the apology at the very opening of Australia's parliament: “We apologize especially for the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country. For the pain, suffering and hurt of these Stolen Generations, their descendants and for their families left behind, we say sorry.”

Many other countries face or have faced similar experiences of national shame that demand formal apologies. These experiences can be purely domestic, as in Australia's case. The United States formally apologized for its World War II detention of Japanese-Americans in 1988 and issued a similar apology for its nineteenth century overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1993. Without much fanfare, the Senate this month passed an Indian health care bill that contains an amendment apologizing to Native Americans for “official depredations, ill-conceived policies and the breaking of covenants.” Other situations demand apologies that cross international borders. Germany has issued many unambiguous apologies for its actions during World War II, and Japan has done the same, though in arguably more ambiguous terms.

There are several ways to evaluate these kinds of formal apologies. On the most immediate level, many are paired with direct, substantive action, such as reparation payments. Germany has paid billions of dollars to Holocaust survivors and the state of Israel since World War II. Other apologies may not include direct compensation for victims but create other structures or systems to provide tangible benefit to the aggrieved. Rudd ruled out reparations for members of the Stolen Generations in Australia, but his apology was matched by a pledge to create a “war cabinet” that would bridge partisan divides and work to address social and economic disparities between indigenous Australians and the rest of the country. He promised that the “war cabinet” would work to improve levels of education, health care, and housing for indigenous Australians within a five-year time frame.

The easiest apology, of course, is the one made with words alone. One reason the Senate's apology to Native Americans has not achieved greater attention is because it has been attached as an amendment to an otherwise routine bill. The United States has a long and disgraceful history of mistreatment of Native Americans, but because the apology neither appropriates new funds nor creates new programs, it can be issued as a legislative amendment with little fanfare. To be fair, these same characteristics make the apology much easier to offer in the first place. Even if an apology is paired with a change in policy, it can be perceived as insufficient. Although Rudd's apology to indigenous Australians was widely popular, there were some grumblings that his “war cabinet” was not enough. Aboriginal leader Aboriginal leader Patrick Dodson claimed that, “any group of people who have been treated badly under laws … deserve to pursue compensation judicially, legally, or politically, and they deserve our support.”

Less helpful are the apologies that appear ambiguous. Japan's first official “apology” for its actions during World War II came when it re-established diplomatic relations with China in 1972. In a Joint Communique with his Chinese counterpart, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka asserted that, “the Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.” Japanese Prime Ministers and governments since then have elaborated on this statement, but never in terms that were absolutely unequivocal. As a result, the culpability for Japan's actions during World War II remains uncertain for many people throughout East Asia—in China, Korea, and even in Japan itself. This historical ambiguity continues to sour regional relations to this day (for more, see The Water's Edge, October 2007).

The least helpful apologies are the ones that aren't made. For years, under former Prime Minister John Howard, Australia refused to apologize for the Stolen Generations. This was not only very unpopular among many Australians, but it created a very negative impression of the country abroad. The United States is burdened with the similar impression. No U.S. president or Congress has ever formally apologized for slavery in the United States. There are many arguments about what form an apology for slavery could take, if direct reparations to the descendants of slaves would be a part of such an apology, and how useful an apology itself would even be. But in an international environment in which many already see the United States as a unilateral, selfish, and reckless actor, a formal apology for slavery could send a message of humility that would be useful on a global stage. Acknowledgement and remorse for past misdeeds, even if state-sanctioned, is by no means a sign of present-day weakness. Indeed, such honesty and transparency can convey national confidence and strength

It is impossible to determine the precise value of these formal, state apologies for past misdeeds. They may simply be “feel-good” exercises with no present-day relevance. Or, alternatively, they could play a major role in reconciling divisions within a society and in improving perceptions of a country beyond its own borders. In Australia, Rudd has made clear that he views the recent apology not as the end of a tragic chapter in that country's history but as the beginning of a new, more hopeful one. As a symbolic statement alone, the apology will have lasting value. And in foreign policy, symbolism is often as valuable as substance. This is a lesson applicable to all countries, regardless of past misdeeds or contemporary apologies.

Foreign Policy Association, 28 February 2008

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:30 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, Europe, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

November 22, 2007

Pakistani perils

In recent weeks, Pakistan has been wracked with a level of turmoil and uncertainty unique to that already unsteady state. Given its proximity to Islamic extremists—in Afghanistan, in Kashmir, and possibly within the government itself—as well as its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan is a country of particular importance to the United States. Turmoil and uncertainty there cannot be ignored, and U.S. politicians are certainly doing no such thing. Congressional leaders and presidential candidates alike are using the current unrest in Pakistan not only as a prompt to call for changes in U.S. policy, but as a chance to demonstrate their own geopolitical acumen. But it is unclear how much influence these domestic political leaders—or even the president, for that matter—can effectively exert on Pakistan.

On November 3, Pervez Musharraf—both President of Pakistan and chief general of its army—declared a state of emergency rule in his country, effectively suspending the constitution and imposing martial law. Since taking power in a bloodless coup in 1999, Musharraf has walked an increasingly precarious tightrope. He has had to manage the conflicting interests of often-corrupt leaders of Pakistan's main political parties, of historical rival India, of Islamic extremists in neighboring Afghanistan and within Pakistan itself, and of the United States and its post-9/11 efforts to fight terrorism. For much of the past eight years, Musharraf has deftly played these conflicting forces off of each other and maintained his hold on power. But increasing pressure from all fronts compelled him to declare the present state of emergency. Musharraf shut down private television stations and detained opposition figures in the political, judicial, and private sectors. He even cited Abraham Lincoln to justify his actions, noting that Lincoln had one “consuming passion during [the U.S. Civil War], and this was to preserve the Union … towards that end, he broke laws, he violated the Constitution, he usurped arbitrary power, he trampled individual liberties.” Musharraf has recently suggested that he will permit parliamentary elections early next year, but given the uncertainty surrounding the situation, his promises may carry little weight.

From the U.S. perspective, the turmoil in Pakistan presents a unique problem. The country is crucially important to U.S. interests, but the president and Congress have limited leverage to shape events there. In recent months, as the growing instability of Musharraf's rule was demonstrated by his disputes with Pakistan's Supreme Court, the Bush administration tried to broker a compromise of sorts. It promoted a plan whereby exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who faced potential corruption charges in her own country, would return to Pakistan. Musharraf would drop the corruption charges against her and allow her to lead her party in parliamentary elections that, if successful, would make Bhutto prime minister again. In return, Bhutto would not protest Musharraf's continued tenure as president and grant his administration a veneer of democratic legitimacy. The current state of emergency has upset those plans in unpredictable ways. Musharraf even placed Bhutto under house arrest for several days, ostensibly for the former prime minister's own protection. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte traveled to Pakistan in an unsuccessful attempt to restart political reconciliation there and to convince Musharraf to lift the state of emergency. “I urged the government to stop such actions, lift the state of emergency and release all political detainees,” he said. “Emergency rule is not compatible with free, fair, and credible elections.”

For Congress, the most obvious lever to affect the situation in Pakistan is the foreign aid that the United States provides to that country. Since 9/11, the United States has given over $10 billion in aid to Pakistan. The bulk of that amount—more than $6 billion—has come in the form of “Coalition Support Funds,” which are intended to reimburse U.S. allies for their assistance in the “war on terrorism.” Fifteen percent of the total aid has gone toward security assistance, which Pakistan has used primarily to purchase major weapons systems, while another 15 percent has gone toward budget support, which represents direct cash transfers to the Pakistani government. Just 10 percent of U.S. aid has fallen under the category of development and humanitarian assistance. Many experts have questioned the accountability of this aid—especially the 90 percent that goes directly to the Pakistani military or to Musharraf's government, and in particular the aid that falls under the categories of “Coalition Support Funds” and budget support. “We don't have a good sense of where it goes,” says Rick Barton of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Accordingly, several presidential candidates have seized on U.S. aid to Pakistan as a potential point of leverage. Senator Joe Biden (D-DE), chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposed a plan that would triple non-security aid to Pakistan to $1.5 billion annually and condition security aid on performance. “I'd spend more if we get better returns—and less if we don't,” said Biden. He would also provide Pakistan with a “democracy dividend” of an additional $1 billion in aid during the country's first year of democratic rule. Senator Barack Obama (D-IL)—like Biden, a presidential contender and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—proposed similar steps. In a letter to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Obama suggested that aid to Pakistan should continue in the areas of counter-terrorism, public education, health, micro-enterprise development, humanitarian assistance, and democracy and rule of law programs. He further called for a temporary suspension of all other funding for Pakistan until the Bush administration certifies that no U.S. assistance is being used to repress the democracy; that parliamentary elections have been scheduled, restrictions on the media have been lifted, and those detained as a result of state of emergency have been freed; and that Pakistan has developed a comprehensive strategy to root out Taliban and al Qaeda forces in northwest Pakistan.

Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain (R-AZ) expressed a concern of many policy makers and experts about the risk of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic extremists. “If they gain control … we are going to have big problems in Afghanistan and the area," McCain said. Such concerns prompted the New York Times to publish a story on assistance that the United States has given to Pakistan to help it secure its nuclear arsenal. The newspaper had refrained from publishing the story for three years, due to requests from the Bush administration, but recent events prompted a change in policy. Evidently, since 9/11, the administration has spent $100 million—buried in secret portions of the federal budget—to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal. The aid primarily took the form of equipment and training, but concerns on both sides limited the extent of the program. U.S. officials were wary of divulging sensitive technology or procedures about its nuclear arsenal, and Pakistan was wary of giving the United States too much access or information about its own fledging arsenal. So far, the Bush administration insists that Pakistan's nuclear weapons remain safe. “I don't see any indication right now that security of those weapons is in jeopardy, but clearly we are very watchful, as we should be,” said Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The crisis in Pakistan has also highlighted a more fundamental question about U.S. foreign policy, one that was raised in a highly truncated form by the CNN moderator in a recent debate among the Democratic presidential candidates: “Is human rights more important than American national security?” From a political standpoint, the answer is clear. Few self-respecting politicians would publicly suggest that anything is more important than U.S. national security, and most of the candidates at the debate gave this safe, predictable answer. But Obama challenged the premise of the question itself, noting that human rights and national security “are not contradictory … they are complimentary.” He further noted that, “Pakistan's democracy would strengthen our battle against extremists.” Coming from a candidate who had made headlines with previous pronouncements regarding Pakistan, this was a very sensible perspective (for more, see The Water's Edge, August 2007). Perhaps more importantly, the episode demonstrated the folly—if not outright danger—of trying to address fundamental questions of U.S. foreign policy in 30-second sound bites at a raucous, highly politicized debate.

U.S. interests in Pakistan are clear, and they are profound. A solid case can be made that the current instability is at least partially the result of U.S. policy toward the region over the past five, 10, or 50 years. Certainly, it's important to understand how poor policy choices in the past may have created complex problems today. But in the current election season, the eyes of politicians and voters alike are directed toward the future. Although the prospects of affecting the situation in Pakistan in the short-term may be dim, U.S. policies today will surely help shape the politics and economies of the region far into the future. If for no other reason, voters should ensure that their elected officials understand the issues at hand and have clear ideas about how to address them.

Foreign Policy Association, 22 November 2007

Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:50 PM to Asia, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

October 25, 2007

Inferiority complex

In recent weeks, the House of Representatives has dipped its toe into a pool of international and historical animosity. The partial success of a resolution condemning the 1915 mass killings and deportations of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire—it passed a House committee but has not yet been considered by the full House—took many by surprise. In reality, the furor surrounding this resolution was simply the latest episode in the long story of Congressional involvement with overseas historical controversies, particularly by the House. But in its repeated attempts to prove relevant and meet narrow constituent demands, the House of Representatives inadvertently risks becoming a detrimental force in U.S. foreign policy.

On October 10, the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed House Resolution 106 by a vote of 27 to 21. The resolution did not mandate any specific action, but it offered official condemnation of the mass killings and deportations of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Support from Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and dozens of co-sponsors suggested that the resolution might make it to the House floor, where it very likely would win passage. On a factual basis, the resolution stood on solid ground. Scholars and experts agree that the Ottoman Turks deported and killed anywhere from a few hundred thousand to several million ethnic Armenians during World War I—actions that may fairly be described as genocide. Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA), Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, noted that, “one of the problems we have diplomatically globally is that we have lost our moral authority which we used to have in great abundance.”

On a political basis, however, the resolution generated enormous controversy. Modern Turkey—the geographic successor to the Ottoman Empire—has always been extremely (if not irrationally) sensitive about this period in its history. Turkey briefly recalled its ambassador to the United States, and its top general, Yasar Buyukanit, proclaimed, “if this resolution passed in the committee passes the House as well, our military ties with the U.S. will never be the same again.” All eight living former U.S. secretaries of state signed a joint letter to Pelosi warning that the resolution “would endanger our national security interests.” In the face of these attacks, as well as opposition from the Bush administration and from military leaders who noted Turkey's logistical importance in supporting the war in Iraq, Pelosi has backtracked from her early willingness to move the resolution to the House floor: “Whether it will come up for a floor vote or not, what the action will be remains to be seen.” For now, the resolution lies in limbo.

This wasn't the first time the House has inserted itself into a matter of historical controversy abroad. In July, it passed a resolution calling on Japan to formally acknowledge its coercion of women from China, Korea, and other occupied countries into sexual slavery as “comfort women” during World War II. Although wartime abuses by the Japanese military are firmly established as historical fact, the question of how contemporary Japanese governments acknowledge such abuses is very much a contentious issue. Japan's ambassador to the United States, Ryozo Kato, said passage of the resolution, “will almost certainly have lasting and harmful effects on the deep friendship, close trust and wide-ranging cooperation our two nations now enjoy.” Unlike the Armenian genocide resolution, the comfort women resolution ultimately passed both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the full House. But the two resolutions shared many similarities. Each was non-binding, each dealt directly with important U.S. allies overseas, and each unearthed old historical controversies.

Perhaps the most important similarity between the Armenian genocide resolution and the comfort women resolution is their shared functional origin: the House of Representatives. Under the Constitution, the House is clearly designated as the lower chamber of the legislature. Although all revenue bills must originate there, it is the Senate that must approve executive appointees and ratify international treaties. To be sure, the legislature is inherently limited in the foreign policy role it can play. But by design and by tradition, the Senate has always been the pre-eminent chamber of Congress in terms of foreign policy. This has stuck the House with something of an inferiority complex. Passing non-binding resolutions on seemingly obscure, historical issues often seems like a good way for an internationally-handicapped House to have a voice in foreign policy.

The House's foreign policy inferiority complex is magnified by structural factors. The House has always been the “people's chamber.” Senators serve six-year terms, represent entire states, and have only been directly elected for less than 100 years. Representatives, on the other hand, serve two-year terms, represent much smaller and more homogenous districts, and have been directly elected throughout U.S. history. The distinctions between the two chambers are very much by design. The Senate was to be a sober, deliberative body somewhat insulated from rapid swings of public opinion, while the House was to be more directly responsive to the immediate, localized interests of the electorate. To a remarkable degree, the structure works as intended. The main sponsor of the Armenian genocide resolution is Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA), whose district is home to approximately 75,000 Armenian-Americans—one of the largest concentrations of ethnic Armenians in the United States. The main sponsor of the comfort women resolution was Representative Mike Honda (D-CA), who represents a district that is nearly 30% Asian—a figure that includes many Chinese- and Korean-Americans.

The fact that House members are particularly responsive to their constituents' interests (and money) is perhaps a good thing—it's how representative democracy is supposed to work. But the House is doubly limited in its influence on U.S. foreign policy. Not only does it face the functional limitations inherent to the legislative branch, the House must also cope with the structural handicap that comes from being the lower chamber of Congress. This means that its forays into foreign policy often carry the unfortunate distinction of being both toothless and shortsighted. Neither the Armenian genocide resolution nor the comfort women resolution mandated any change in U.S. policy. But by digging up far-away historical controversies in order to prove relevant and meet narrow constituent demands, the House risks overlooking vital contemporary context.

Although measures condemning the Armenian genocide have been introduced in Congress in the past, the timing of this most recent resolution is uniquely counterproductive. In recent years, Turkey has become increasingly wary of the West, in general, and the United States, in particular. Turks overwhelmingly opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and since then, Turkish popular perception of the United States has only worsened. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, just 9% of Turks had a favorable impression of the United States this year, down from 52% in 2000. Shortly after the House Foreign Affairs committee passed the Armenian genocide resolution, the Turkish parliament authorized its government to strike PKK strongholds in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq—a move motivated, in part, by perceived U.S. inaction toward recent attacks by that group in southeastern Turkey. As a secular, democratic, and predominantly Muslim state located in a strategic corner of the globe, Turkey is an indispensable U.S. ally. Although modern Turkey is far too sensitive about abuses committed by its imperial predecessor, measures such as the Armenian genocide resolution threaten to embolden vitriolic and nationalist elements in Turkey that could turn the country away from the West. However real the Armenian genocide may have been, it serves no one's interests to endanger the U.S.-Turkey relationship for reasons of limited contemporary value and zero substantive consequence.

The effects of the comfort women resolution were somewhat less severe, but they were equally unhelpful, and equally unintended. For many reasons, East Asian politics continue to be shaped by World War II and by the region's conflicting interpretations of wartime history. Japan has never truly grappled with or acknowledged its wartime responsibility, and Japan's neighbors frequently use this fact to inhibit current relations. There is no doubt that the Japanese military forced women from occupied countries into sexual slavery during the war. But when presented with the House resolution, nationalistic Japanese politicians felt compelled to respond. “It is extremely regrettable that the resolution is definitely not based on facts,” noted Taro Aso, then Japanese Foreign Minister. This comment and others like it had little direct effect on U.S.-Japan relations. But in the hypersensitive diplomatic world of East Asia, where historical slights can inflame contemporary problems, such comments do not help Japan’s relations with China, Korea, or any other formerly occupied country.

None of this is to suggest that members of the House of Representatives should remain silent on issues of foreign policy. It is their responsibility as elected officials to represent their constituents and to shape public policy. Indeed, in a democracy, it is absolutely vital that citizens are engaged in the foreign policy-making process, and the House facilitates this function. But in its attempts to simultaneously prove relevant on the international stage and meet narrow constituent demands, the House of Representatives risks being counterproductive, if not outright harmful. As it continues to delve into contentious issues of history and foreign policy, the House would be well advised to temper its passion with a dose of much-needed context.

Foreign Policy Association, 25 October 2007

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:17 PM to Asia, Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

September 03, 2007

Bleak comparison

Parallels between the war in Iraq and the war in Vietnam practically draw themselves. Many have long since noted the most obvious similarities: In each conflict, the United States struggled to defeat an unconventional enemy, using unorthodox tactics, in an unforgiving environment.

Recently, President Bush drew his own parallel: “Then as now, people argued the real problem was America’s presence and that if we would just withdraw, the killing would end.” Of course, any comparison between the wars in Vietnam and Iraq is bound to be nearly as controversial as the conflicts themselves. But beyond the hyperbole, relevant comparisons are there to be made. And as the momentum to exit Iraq gathers steam, the lessons from Vietnam can be particularly illuminating.

During the U.S. war in Vietnam, roughly from 1965 to 1973, troop levels varied greatly, climbing to a peak of over 500,000 in early 1969. The withdrawal of combat troops, however, actually began in earnest that very same year, as President Nixon tried to implement his “Vietnamization” policy of shifting the burden of the fight to the South Vietnamese. Troop levels dropped gradually over the coming years, as South Vietnam shouldered a greater combat burden and as negotiations with North Vietnam progressed in fits and starts. Withdrawal of combat troops from Vietnam was completed in 1972 (although “advisers” remained behind), and the Paris Peace Accords — which formally ended U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War — were signed in early 1973. From the U.S. perspective, these accords provided an expedient cover for the military withdrawal, or a “peace with honor,” as Nixon described it. Of course, neither the United States nor its South Vietnamese allies saw much of either. The Paris accords ultimately fell apart, and South Vietnam fell to the North in 1975.

By contrast, U.S. troop levels in Iraq have remained fairly consistent through the war — 100,000-200,000 since the invasion, in 2003. This has remained true both through Bush’s own strategy of “Vietnamization” (when the emphasis was on training Iraqis to assume security responsibilities from the United States) as well as his latest “surge” strategy (emphasizing the security of Baghdad with U.S. troops).

Moving forward, the comparison with Vietnam falls apart even more. The various Iraqi resistance groups lack a formal state sponsor with which the U.S. could negotiate a withdrawal; despite its clear influence, Iran cannot play the role of North Vietnam today. A regional diplomatic dialogue may emerge alongside the withdrawal process, and the U.S. will surely try to coordinate its departure with the Iraqi government. But the eventual U.S. withdrawal will probably not be accompanied by the same kind of political or diplomatic cover that the Paris Accords offered in Vietnam. As unsuccessful as the Paris Accords were, though, it isn’t clear that such cover is really that valuable.

Despite these differences, one important lesson can be gleaned: Withdrawal does not occur for withdrawal’s sake alone. The U.S. departure from Vietnam did not occur in isolation, and the eventual U.S. withdrawal from Iraq won’t, either. In each case, the military departure will be part of a broader political and military strategy with goals beyond the simple extrication of U.S. forces. Given its global standing, the United States does not have the luxury of simply leaving devastated, chaotic countries in its military’s wake. Rather, any military withdrawal from Iraq will be but one component of a broader strategy designed to ensure stability and security in that country. This is not to say that such a strategy will be successful; it certainly wasn’t so in Vietnam, and the prospects are dim for anything better in Iraq. But it does suggest that the withdrawal from Iraq will not be quick, and it will not be easy. This is a reality that will confront Democrats and Republicans alike.

Another interesting parallel between Vietnam and Iraq does present itself. Throughout the prolonged, gradual withdrawal from Vietnam, the United States continued to suffer casualties. It also remained very engaged in combat operations, specifically in the form of the aerial bombardment of North Vietnam. From the perspective of many on both sides of the conflict, then, the U.S. withdrawal process was somewhat illusory — the troops may have been leaving, but the war was still on. The same will probably be true in Iraq. The United States has invested so much in its military infrastructure in Iraq that a complete, 100 percent withdrawal remains unlikely for the foreseeable future. And even as the troops begin to leave, their air cover will remain in place, based from carriers in the Persian Gulf and from other bases throughout the region.

Compared with Vietnam, the bombers over Iraq may be faster and their bombs smarter. But as in Southeast Asia, it’s unlikely that the Iraq war will end when the last U.S. soldier leaves the battlefield.

Providence Journal, 4 September 2007

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:43 PM to Asia, Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

August 30, 2006

Past imperfect

As expected, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the controversial Yasukuni war shrine this month. It was Koizumi's sixth visit to the shrine and most likely his last, as he is due to step down as prime minister in September. But it was also his first ever visit on August 15, the anniversary of Japan's surrender in the Pacific War. As such, it represented a particularly brazen act of symbolism.

The resulting protests from Japan's regional neighbors, however, differed little in tone or content from the condemnations of Koizumi's earlier visits. "Koizumi's shrine visits a 'poison' for Sino-Japanese relations," said a headline on the website of China's state-run Xinhua; "South Korea denounces Koizumi's shrine visit" said one in The Korea Times of South Korea; North Korea's KCNA news agency stated bluntly that the visit "clearly prove[s] that Japan is a cancer-like entity in preserving regional peace as it is seized by such revanchism and fever to revive militarism." The reason for this is as perverse as it is straightforward: However much they may heighten regional tensions--in fact, because they heighten regional tensions--Koizumi's repeated visits to Yasukuni actually serve the interests of every power in East Asia.

The Yasukuni Shrine was created by the Emperor Meiji in 1869 to honor Japan's war dead. Among those currently comemorated at Yasukuni are 14 convicted war criminals that were executed or imprisoned following the Pacific War. China, Korea, and other countries that were occupied by Japan during the war accordingly interpret Koizumi's visits as tacit yet official approval of Japan's actions during that period. Indeed, Yasukuni is emblematic of Japan's much larger problem of reconciling its collective memory of the Pacific War with its actual behavior. The shrine is not responsible for Japan's difficulties in grappling with its own history (and such difficulties would still torment the country in the shrine's absence), but Yasukuni provides a physical manifestation of the problem. It serves as a rallying point for the vocal nationalist minority that reveres fantastical conceptions of Japan's militarist glory. This right-wing sentiment provides the necessary context for Koizumi's visits and provokes resentment--across the region--to all things Japan. And the regional fury, in turn, fuels the harsher side of Japanese nationalism: The cycle perpetuates itself.

This mutually reinforcing suspicion spurs distrust between Japan and its neighbors. Strangely, however, it also serves each country's interests. China, where anti-Japanese sentiment is naturally abundant, is the clearest example. Official displays of outrage help legitimize the ruling Communist Party, whose legacy rests on its resistance to Japanese invaders in the 1930s and 1940s. But other countries follow a similar pattern. Hatred of Japan is one of the few things that unite North and South Korea in mutual nationalist fury. Both countries resent Japan's claim on the Dokdo Islands--or the Takeshima Islands, to the Japanese. Japan annexed the islands--along with the rest of Korea--in the early twentieth century, but it refused to relinquish its claim on them after it was expelled from Korea after the Pacific War. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has indicated that he will not hold a summit with any Japanese prime minister that visits Yasukuni. Singapore, like much of the rest of East Asia, was also occupied by Japan during the Pacific War. In the wake of Koizumi's latest visit to Yasukuni, its foreign ministry released a statement noting that the visits "are not helpful to the larger common interest of building closer relations and cooperation in East Asia, including Southeast Asia."

Righteous indignation obviates the need for these countries to craft a meaningful policy toward Japan. Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing is fond of demanding "concrete actions" from Japan in the spirit of "taking history as a mirror and looking forward to the future." He has been less forthcoming, however, in describing exactly what that means. And why should he? Authoritarian governments are always interested maintaining their power above all else, and a great way to do that is to rant demagogically about some perceived enemy. For China especially, Japan represents the perfect foe, with a long history of mutual enmity and distrust between the two countries that began long before the Pacific War.

But China's instinctive aggravation with Yasukuni serves more than just a domestic political purpose. It's also a simple way to cripple regional diplomacy. For all the talk of China's "rise" and Japan's "graying," the two countries are indisputably the most important powers in East Asia--and, although it is neither as safe nor productive as cooperation, China prefers competition. Whenever Koizumi visits Yasukuni, China reverts to a predictable litany of complaints grounded in a war it fought (and won) decades ago. Most unproductively--and with uncanny predictability--it uses the visits as excuses to cancel diplomatic summits and other bilateral exchanges. Since Koizumi first visited Yasukuni in 2001, the leaders of China and Japan have not held a formal summit meeting, and China has refused to endorse such a meeting for as long as the visits to Yasukuni continue.

Still, Japan has every reason to absorb the moral condemnation from across East Asia. Koizumi, for his part, also uses his Yasukuni visits to advance his own foreign policy agenda in his own country. Since taking office, he has attempted to nudge Japan into becoming a fuller and more responsible member of the international community. Koizumi has advocated revisions to Japan's constitution that would allow the Self-Defense Forces to engage in a wider variety of peacekeeping operations, and he has strongly pushed for a permanent Japanese seat on the U.N. Security Council, in the face of China's consistent and instinctive opposition.

Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni are, in part, attempts to bolster domestic support for this comparatively muscular vision. They stir domestic debate about Japan's global role and focus attention on his foreign policy vision. (They also give a voice to Japan's angry nationalist minority, making Koizumi's own foreign policy goals seem moderate in comparison.) In essence, Koizumi's visits shift the debate about Japan's international role rightward, positioning his own vision as the increasingly reasonable option.

Of course, none of this is very healthy for Japan or its neighbors. Given his country's difficulty in grappling with its own history, Koizumi's game is cynical and irresponsible, and it stokes long-divisive sentiments in Japanese society. Koizumi adds insult to injury by seeming to revel in the controversy his Yasukuni visits generate. He recently told reporters that he "still [doesn't] understand why China and South Korea criticize my visits to Yasukuni." Meanwhile, with a dollop of creativity and initiative, China could use Koizumi's visits as prompts to address the bilateral issues that are relevant today, such as its lingering territorial disputes with Japan or drilling rights in the East China Sea. But, as long as its leaders can get away with attacking Japan for 60-year-old sins, they have no need to find creative solutions for tough bilateral problems.

As long as Japan grants even a hint of official recognition to the war criminals commemorated at the shrine, it will be impossible for the Japanese to come to grips with what their country did in the Pacific War. And, as long as Japan's neighbors fixate on Yasukuni as a means to prevent Japan from taking on a larger, more responsible role in international affairs, regional politics will stagnate. Of course, even though this month's visit to Yasukuni was Koizumi's last as prime minister, his successors will likely continue the practice anyway. Shinzo Abe, currently Koizumi's chief cabinet secretary and the frontrunner to replace him as prime minister, has already visited Yasukuni himself and has gone on record in asserting his right to do so. (A recent poll by Nihon Keizai Shimbun showed that, while 39 percent of Japanese would oppose visits to Yasukuni by future prime ministers, 43 percent would support them.) This means that the powers of East Asia will continue to blindly fight yesterday's war. And they will enjoy every minute of it.

The New Republic, 30 August 2006

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:20 AM to Asia

July 20, 2006

Strained alliance

By all outward appearances, the recent summit between President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was a tremendous success. It certainly seemed that way as Koizumi—an avid Elvis fan—beamed from behind his gold-rimmed sunglasses during a visit to Graceland with the president. But behind the smiles, the U.S.-Japan relationship is actually undergoing a period of strain. This strain may ultimately work to the benefit of both countries, but only if it is managed correctly.

The post-war Japanese constitution expressly renounces war as a sovereign right of the state. This has not stopped Japan from developing its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) into one of the most capable militaries in East Asia. During the Cold War, this served U.S. interests well, as Japan provided a bulwark against communist expansion in the region. Today, as the exaggerated concept of “China-as-enemy” becomes more accepted, Japan’s military prowess continues to serve U.S. interests.

But Japan is becoming more essential to U.S. interests in less codified ways. Under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the United States maintains an array of military bases in Japan that can be used in the defense of Japan proper or to maintain “peace and stability” in East Asia. But a recent report by the Nautilus Institute found that U.S. AEGIS destroyers based at Yokosuka were maintaining semi-regular patrols in the Sea of Japan that bestrode potential missile flight paths from North Korea to the United States. In other words, U.S. military assets based in Japan were taking part in U.S. homeland defense operations. This activity could be interpreted as running afoul of both the U.S.-Japan treaty as well as Japan’s pacifist constitution.

Conversely, the U.S.-Japan relationship can be interpreted as also becoming less essential but better codified. Earlier this year, the two countries agreed on a comprehensive realignment of U.S. military forces in Japan. Some U.S. bases in Okinawa will be closed and consolidated, and the military will relocate several thousand personnel from Japan to Guam. Although Japan will remain home to significant numbers of U.S. troops, the agreement represented an explicit and mutual understanding that the U.S. military presence in Japan would be reduced.

These two countervailing tendencies in the U.S.-Japan alliance—it becoming more essential but less codified, and vice versa—highlight the need for a more mature relationship between the two countries. Under Prime Minister Koizumi, Japan has inched closer to constitutional revisions that would make it easier for the SDF to participate in peacekeeping and support operations abroad. Such potential revisions have met with opposition both in Japan and among its neighbors, who never hesitate to remind the world of Japan’s atrocities during World War II. It is certainly true that Japan has not adequately reconciled its collective memory with its wartime actions, and Koizumi’s repeated visits to the controversial Yasukuni shrine only aggravate already-serious regional tensions. But it is also true that when China, Korea, and others hold Japan hostage to its own history, they perpetuate a circular argument incapable of generating meaningful diplomatic progress. A Japan that is a fully capable member of the global community will benefit both the United States and East Asia as a whole.

From the perspective of the United States, more transparency is required in its relationship with Japan. Most importantly, the Bush administration would be well advised to avoid further vilification of China. While that country may one day represent a genuine security threat, an exaggeration of that threat for domestic political purposes only aggravates the already tense and long competitive China-Japan relationship.

Fundamentally, the United States and Japan remain strong allies. Koizumi supported the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and provided SDF resources in each theater. Last year, Japan and the United States agreed to designate China-Taiwan tensions as a “mutual security concern.” Amid the recent North Korean missile tests, the United States has accelerated plans to install Patriot anti-missile batteries in Japan and publicized the routine deployment of another AEGIS destroyer to the region. And Elvis theatrics aside, the successful Koizumi-Bush summit exemplified the close relationship between the leadership of the two countries.

Clearly, the U.S-Japan relationship will continue to form the bedrock of East Asian security for some time to come. But unless the tensions inherent in the relationship are relieved in smart, pragmatic ways, it will become increasingly over-burdened and ineffective.

Providence Journal, 20 July 2006

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:48 PM to Asia

May 18, 2006

Important bases

The U.S. military is cleaning house. Existing bases are being retooled or eliminated, and new ones are popping up in some unexpected places. These are the overseas bases that are now vital to the U.S. military—and the new ones that will change its global footprint for years to come.

Andersen Air Force Base & Apra Harbor, Guam
The base: Andersen can handle aircraft ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles to long-range strategic bombers, and Apra Harbor can service everything from nuclear submarines to aircraft carriers. The naval base is also home to one of the three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons worldwide, which provides mobile, long-term storage of land-combat equipment and supplies near potential trouble spots.
Its importance: Located in the Pacific Ocean about 2,000 miles from Asia, Guam is close enough to the mainland to be vital in any conceivable conflict yet distant enough to preclude a surprise blow from an adversary. Andersen is one of the few locations with the necessary hanger facilities to protect the B-2’s sensitive, radar-evading skin, and strategic bombers regularly cycle through the base to project power toward mainland Asia. The best part: unlike other large bases in the region, Guam is U.S. territory.

Balad Air Base/Camp Anaconda, Iraq
The base: Most prominent of the “enduring bases” being constructed in Iraq, Balad is located just north of Baghdad. It is one of the busiest airfields in the country, accommodating both Air Force fighters as well as transport aircraft. Camp Anaconda, adjacent to the air base, serves as a main base and logistics center for U.S. troops serving throughout central Iraq.
Its importance: Balad’s facilities and location make it more than just an ideal base from which to fight insurgents in Iraq. It is also perfectly positioned to project U.S. power throughout the Middle East, and it will likely do so for many years to come. Although this convenience might serve wider U.S. interests, it doesn’t sit too well with Balad’s Iraqi neighbors—U.S. soldiers have nicknamed Camp Anaconda “Mortaritaville” after a common greeting they receive.

Bezmer Air Base, Bulgaria
The base: Bezmer reflects a broader trend toward lighter, more austere bases in Eastern Europe and away from the larger military complexes in Western and Central Europe. To keep a low profile in the host countries, the Pentagon is reluctant to even refer to Bezmer and its Eastern European equivalents as “bases,” and it stresses that the host countries retain full control of their facilities.
Its importance: Compared to U.S. bases in “old” Europe, Bezmer and its Eastern European equivalents are cheaper to operate and closer to potential hot spots in the Middle East and Central Asia. In times of conflict, the military will use these facilities to “surge” men and materiel toward the front lines. The hope is that former-Soviet bloc host countries will be more amenable to U.S. bases than other hosts in “old” Europe and be less likely to block their use in a time of conflict.

Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory
The base: Located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia served as a base for B-52s during the 1991 and 2003 wars with Iraq and during post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan. Its isolated anchorage is also home to both Army and Marine seaborne prepositioning squadrons for land-combat equipment and supplies.
Its importance: Isolation—and British sovereignty—make Diego Garcia a far more secure base for U.S. forces than any mainland base in Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia. Specialized shelters to protect the sensitive stealth equipment of visiting B-2s have recently been installed, and strategic bombers regularly rotate through the base. The atoll is also an important part of the U.S. Space Surveillance Network of telescopes, radars, and listening stations.

Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba
The base: Originally intended as coaling station for the U.S. Navy, Guantánamo Bay (or “Gitmo”) remains an important logistical base for Navy units operating in the Caribbean. It also serves as a hub for counter-drug and migrant interdiction operations.
Its importance: Gitmo’s greatest strategic asset is its hazy legal status—it is U.S.-controlled, but it is not U.S. territory. Although it’s not the only place through which “enemy combatants” (neither POWs nor convicted criminals) could be processed, it is readily accessible from the U.S. mainland, and its staff and facilities have experience in detention operations from their time as host to Haitian and Cuban refugees. As a result, Gitmo is one of the most well-known and reviled U.S. bases worldwide. The Bush administration has repeatedly rejected high-profile calls to shut down the base.

Manas Air Base, Kirgizstan
The base: Manas was established at Bishkek’s international airport in the months following 9/11 as a hub for multinational operations in Afghanistan. It has since grown into a substantial base in the heart of Central Asia, playing host to combat aircraft, their supporting personnel, and associated facilities.
Its importance: In addition to its proximity to Afghanistan, Manas is located near the immense energy reserves of the Caspian Basin, as well as the Russian and Chinese frontiers. Kirgizstan has not threatened to follow Uzbekistan’s example and expel U.S. forces, which suggests that Manas could become a linchpin of the enduring U.S. presence in Central Asia. Recognizing its value, Kirgizstan is talking about raising the rent from $2 million to $207 million per year.

Foreign Policy, 15 May 2006

Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:43 PM to Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics

April 04, 2006

Dubious dialogue

On March 18, the foreign ministers of Australia, Japan, and the United States met in Sydney for a "Trilateral Strategic Dialogue." As usual, the United States was the primary driver of the agenda, and, invariably, the focus was on China. But instead of promoting regional unity, the "strategic dialogue" was an example of how the United States is driving the region apart. In the process, it is doing China a great favor.

To understand why, it helps to look at the relationships between each of the trilateral partners and China. Japan came into the meeting with the most strained relationship. Japan and China have long been the most important powers in East Asia, and tensions between them have only grown in recent years. On Monday, the Japanese foreign minister (and trilateral participant), Taro Aso, sharply lamented the growth in China's military spending: "It's not clear what China is using the money for [and it] creates a sense of threat for surrounding countries."

Australia, on the other hand, came into the dialogue with a decidedly different view of China. Australian Prime Minister John Howard has attempted to find a balance between aligning with Asia, on the one hand, and with the United States, on the other. He supported the U.S. invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq, but he also recently signed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Co-operation -- a move he had long resisted but ultimately approved for the sake of better relations with Australia's Asian neighbors. Perhaps more important, Australia's export market is becoming increasingly reliant on China's voracious economy.

The United States, for its part, viewed the dialogue as a way to augment its array of bilateral alliances in the region. But China could easily have viewed the dialogue as just the latest U.S. attempt to contain it. In Congress, vilifying China -- large, menacing, and conveniently Red -- has become a bipartisan pastime. Last year, politicians united in exploiting public fear to scuttle the purchase of U.S.-based Unocal by CNOOC, a state-owned Chinese oil firm. And in advance of the trilateral meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned that China could become a "negative force" in the region. In the trilateral partnership, the U.S. position is clearly more in line with Japan's than Australia's.

This alignment of interests was clear to all, and Australia sought to disavow any notion that the trilateral dialogue was designed to counter China. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer noted that "a policy of containment of China would be a very big mistake." But regardless of its true purpose, the dialogue was shrouded in speculation and opacity. The media consequently portrayed it as a nascent anti-China alliance -- so for all intents and purposes, that is what it was. The only mention of China in the joint statement emanating from the dialogue was an anodyne reference to its "constructive engagement in the region": a sure sign that the trilateral members had difficulty finding common ground.

China, for its part, has not been standing still while the United States attempts to bolster its regional alliances. In December, the inaugural East Asian Summit was held, in Kuala Lumpur. An outgrowth of ASEAN, the summit was inevitably dominated by China, through its sheer size; should this summit evolve into an organization, China's influence within it will only grow. The price for Australian participation in the summit, however, was its signature on the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation. For Howard, this was not an insignificant price to pay, for the treaty severely limits Australia's ability to assist in the Bush administration's "war on terror." Despite his conservative credentials, it is difficult to imagine Howard paying a similar price for the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue.

Indeed, Australia is keen to exploit and expand its relationship with China. On Monday, during a visit to Australia by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Downer signed an agreement to sell uranium to China. An official in the Australian foreign ministry noted that the United States was "hardly in a position" to criticize the agreement, given the Bush administration's recent deal to sell nuclear fuel to India. Wen, for his part, diplomatically made note of Australia's precarious positioning between the United States and China: "We believe that countries which are allied with the United States can also be China's friends, and Australia is one of them."

None of this should suggest that the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue is a wasted effort. Surely the United States, Japan and Australia have many common interests, and it is in each country's best interest to pursue continued cooperation with one another. Likewise, the sheer opacity of many aspects of China's growth is reason enough for caution.

But the United States must avoid sending mixed signals -- to allies, foes and everyone in between. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. position toward China is closer to Japan's than to Australia's. Because the United States and Japan are longstanding allies, this is understandable. But Australia is also an ally, and not the first -- or the only -- one to find itself needlessly torn between the United States and China.

There once was a time when a country, faced with such a choice, would clearly pick the United States. That time may be over.

Providence Journal, 5 April 2005

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:51 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, U. S. Politics

February 17, 2006

Yasukuni, Yomiuri, & Asahi

Fine summary of all things Yasukuni in the latest issue of the Economist. Nothing new or groundbraking, but this bit caught my attention:

... [O]pposition to a rising mood of nationalism is coming from an unlikely source from within the conservative establishment itself: the Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's -- indeed the world's -- biggest-circulation newspaper. Under Tsuneo Watanabe, the group's 79-year-old chairman and an éminence grise within the political establishment, the Yomiuri came to be the flag-waver for a more assertive Japan, one that argued for a revision of the pacifist constitution foisted on Japan by General Douglas MacArthur in 1947, and that bristled at any foreign criticism of the Yasukuni shrine.

Recently, however, Mr Watanabe has ordered the Yomiuri Shimbun to change its tune. Yasukuni, he now says, is the source of all Japan's problems with its neighbours; the Yomiuri and its more liberal rival, the Asahi Shimbun, have joined forces to push for a state alternative to the shrine, where the war dead can be honoured with less controversy. The LDP, however, has turned this idea down.

In particular, Mr Watanabe reserves his bile for Mr Koizumi—partly, perhaps, out of personal pique that the prime minister does not hang on his every word, as predecessors did. Equating Tojo with Hitler, Mr Watanabe told the New York Times last week that “Mr Koizumi worships at a shrine that glorifies militarism. This person Koizumi doesn't know history or philosophy, doesn't study, doesn't have any culture. That's why he says stupid things, like, ‘what's wrong about worshipping at Yasukuni?' Or, ‘China and Korea are the only countries that criticise Yasukuni.' This stems from his ignorance.” The Yomiuri is now running a series of articles examining Japan's wartime record, and promises to come up with a “verdict” by August. It is unlikely, though, to lay the past to rest. [emphasis mine]

The notion that two of Japan's largest and most establishment-linked newspapers would attack Koizumi so aggressively over Yasukuni strikes me as peculiar. I'm inclined to agree with the Economist's correspondent here in that this is more of a spat among old-school Japanese elite, and that Watanabe is upset at Koizumi's success in challenging the conservative LDP way of doing things.

The idea of a state-sponsored alternative to Yasukuni is not new, however, nor is it a likely solution. National monuments cannot simply be replaced by government fiat and be expected to win widespread acceptance overnight. If the Bush administration created a new version of the Washington Monument and told everyone that it was just as good as the original, would tourists buy it?

No, the most interesting bit of the Economist's fine summary is this bit about the revolt of Japanese big media. While Watanabe's motives may be based more on personal insult than on genuine conviction, I think any effort to challange authority or to question conventional wisdom in Japan is a good thing. Oddly, it is such qualities that endear Koizumi to so many. If Watanabe really is repelled by Koizumi's threat to the old LDP order in Japan, he has an ironically Koizumi-esque way of showing it.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:12 AM to Asia

January 05, 2006

Asian mice

From the good folks at Kyodo, here's a nice round-up of Koizumi's latest news conference:

''China and South Korea should not close the doors for talks due to this one issue [visits to Yasukuni],'' Koizumi said when asked how he will try to mend fences with the neighboring countries.

''I suppose it is a question about the lack of summit exchanges due to the Yasukuni issue, but I think the issue of visiting Yasukuni Shrine should not be made into a diplomatic problem,'' Koizumi said, reiterating his stance of not budging over the contentious visits.

The China Daily, however, offers some extra information:

"I can't understand why foreign governments would intervene in a spiritual matter and try to turn it into a diplomatic problem," Mr. Koizumi said, adding that he visited the shrine to pray for peace, according to the [New York] Times.

"I've never once closed the door to negotiations with China and South Korea," he added.

The remarks drew immediate condemnation from Seoul, with Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon responding that Koizumi needed a "better understanding of history" and should earn the "trust and respect of other countries," the report said.

In what seems to be a recurring personality trait, Koizumi is being too cute for his own good. Most likely, he knows this, and he just doesn't care. Of course his visits to Yasukuni are, on the surface, a "personal" and a "spiritual" matter. Of course Korea and especially China are using them as a crutch for wont of real diplomacy.

But Yasukuni ain't no run of the mill shrine, and Koizumi knows it. Note that this press conference was "nationally televised." Koizumi's not playing to a Korean or a Chinese audience; he's playing to a Japanese one. And he's not alone -- it's the same game played by each leader in the region when it comes to relations with Japan. They are like mice scurrying about in their little wheels, knowing full well that no matter how fast they run, they'll never get anywhere.

The damndest thing, though, is that this suits each little mouse just fine. They earn nationalist points at home and forego any prospect of genuine diplomatic progress abroad. As long as that remains desirable (or at the very least, acceptable) to East Asian leaders, no one should be surprised at the absence of diplomacy or sanity in the region.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:45 AM to Asia

December 23, 2005

Peaceful development

A new white paper from the Chinese government represents its latest attempt to downplay fears of its rapid growth:

"To stick to the road of peaceful development is the inevitable way for China to attain national prosperity and strength and its people's happiness," said the document, which was issued by Premier Wen Jiabao's State Council, or cabinet. It added: "China's development will never be a threat to anyone."

[...]

"China's road of peaceful development is a brand-new one for mankind in pursuit of civilization and progress, the inevitable way for China to achieve modernization and a serious choice and solemn promise made by the Chinese government and the Chinese people," the paper said, drawing a distinction between China's rise and that of Japan a generation ago. "China did not seek hegemony in the past, nor does it now, and will not do so in the future when it gets stronger."

The Post's piece goes on to note that some in the Communist Party assign negative connotations to the term "rise." The preferred nomenclature henceforth will be "peaceful development." I have to say I'm with the party on this one. The notion of "China's rise" has created a nice little cult of fear-mongering around it. But while "peaceful development" may be a tad more difficult to demonize, I'm sure it won't stop some from trying.

And among the first of those to try, perhaps, would be new Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso. He certainly has a different take on China's "peaceful development:"

A neighboring country has an atomic bomb and its military spending has been rising for 12 consecutive years. There is no transparency and I view that as a concern, a threat," Aso told a news conference.

But a Foreign Ministry spokesman said Tokyo's position was that it did not see the Chinese military as a "direct threat", meaning it did not expect an invasion by Chinese troops.

I'm glad Japan doesn't expect an invasion by Chinese troops, for that would be rather foolish. The important thing, however, is that Aso's statement really isn't far off-base. China does neighbor Japan, it does possess nuclear weaponry, and its military spending is anything but transparent. While labeling China as a "threat" does stretch reason a bit, labeling the country as a "concern" is perfectly legitimate and, I might suggest, rather accurate.

But for the Japanese Foreign Minister to speak so truthfully is to disregard any hope that the statement will be taken seriously, for the Japan-China relationship is anything if not dysfunctional. On cue, the Chinese Foreign Ministry shot down Aso's statement:

China pursues the road of peaceful development. China's development has made worldly recognized contribution to the peace and stability of the region and the world and presented enormous opportunities for the development of Asian countries, including Japan. This is a fact obvious to all. It is extremely irresponsible for a Japanese foreign minister to make such remarks. One can't help question the real motive of the Japanese Foreign Minister to foment a groundless argument of China's threat at such a moment.

Our friend Qin Gang at the Foreign Ministry is conveniently tying all the rhetorical threads together for us. First, there's absolutely no reference to a "rise" of any kind, but only to "peaceful development." The he notes the irreseponsibility of Aso's statements, not based on their merit, but rather on the nationality of who spoke them. Finally, we descend into the typical questioning of Japanese motives, etc.

All in all, nothing new in the tragic comedy that is Japan-China relations.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:45 PM to Asia

December 05, 2005

Enjoying the mandate

Koizumi has obviously been enjoying his recently renewed electoral mandate. A couple weeks ago, he announced proposed revisions to the Japanese constitution:

[Koizumi] urged Japan to match its weight as the world's second biggest economy by cooperating more with the international community, a reference to the LDP's planned overhaul of the Constitution. "We need to take up the challenges of strife and conflict that may face international society over the next 50 years," Koizumi said.

[...]

The proposed LDP revision keeps the clause banning war, but clearly stipulates Japan may keep a military force for self-defense and for participating in international peacekeeping efforts.

"In addition to activities needed for self defense ... the defense forces can take part in efforts to maintain international peace and security under international cooperation, as well as to keep fundamental public order in our country," the draft says.

No surprise, really. Not only is this perfectly consistent with Koizumi's reputation, but it's also quite logical. Japan has a long way to go to reconcile its own collective historical memory, but it's a mature nation with the second largest economy in the world. Even with the constitutional revisions, Japan will still possess the most pacifist constitution of any developed country.

But some details are less than optimal. First, he announced his proposed changes at an LDP rally celebrating the 50th anniversary of the party. Constitutional amendments are surely political to one degree or another, but the staging of his announcement appears to be a tad partisan. And second, some of the proposed changes are less than optimal:

The draft constitution also weakens provisions on the separation of church and state.

It says the public institutions may engage in religious activity "in cases within the boundary of social rituals and customary activities."

The present charter totally bans the state from religious activity.

[...]

The LDP's draft would also make it easier to amend the constitution, requiring only majorities in both houses of parliament to endorse a change instead of the current two-thirds.

That religious bit is clearly aimed at Yasukuni, and at clearly up any perceived impropriety of Koizumi's repeated visits to the shrine. As for the process bit, I tend to prefer my constitutions harder to amend.

On cue, the Chinese protested:

Given the current atmosphere and conditions, the 7th China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Leaders' Meeting is postponed to be held until an appropriate time. During this period, China will continue to perform its functions as a coordinator for the cooperation between the three parties. It is hoped that the cooperation between the three parties can develop steadily despite the various obstacles.

And again on cue, Koizumi responded with characteristic aplomb:

"China is the one who decided to postpone the talks. That is fine with me."

"Yasukuni isn't something that can be used as a diplomatic card. Even if China and South Korea try to use it as a diplomatic card, that won't work," [Koizumi] said.

Saying it won't make it so, Junichiro, no matter how much you wish it to be.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:51 PM to Asia

November 18, 2005

Cautious approach

In advance of Bush's visit to China, the Christian Science Monitor has run a great little series on China's military modernization and the threat it represents. The first article looks at China's emerging "army within an army," a modern nub of a fighting force emerging out of what remains a large, low-tech military. The second examines the U.S. response to Chinese military modernization from the vantage point of Guam, strategically placed in the Western Pacific.

What's best about the series is that it absolutely refuses to be taken in by irrational fear-mongering. In the emerging boom market of Chinese scare literature, passages of realism like this are refreshing:

While China may be able to bloody the US Navy if it comes close to China's shores, the US Navy no longer employs this tactic in a Taiwan scenario, analysts say. One active Japanese army general who has war-gamed Taiwan many times says that China has only bad outcomes at present. If China tries to sink US ships with waves of aircraft, it will probably lose much of its Air Force, he states: "As a military planner you have to live to fight another day.... I have done the gaming many times from the Chinese side, and I've never won. My worst nightmare job is to be the Chinese operational planner for a Taiwan invasion. I have questioned whether China would sink a single US ship."

Putting aside the irony of a Japanese general playing China in a war game, I don't mean to suggest that China should be dismissed as a threat. Rather, the CSM series represents an increasingly rare, rational look at what China's military modernization really means and how much uncertainty is involved in trying to gauge the real challange it poses.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:43 AM to Asia

November 09, 2005

Interceptions

The pace of aerial training in East Asia has evidently picked up in recent months:

Japanese fighter jets have been scrambled 30 times to turn away Chinese planes approaching Japan's airspace in the last seven months, more than twice the 13 times in the same period last year, officials said Wednesday.

The interesting thing isn't so much that these intercepts are taking place but that their rate has increased in conjunction with the rising political tensions. Still, that itself won't have too much of an effect on the diplomatic side of things. Through the Cold War, NATO and Warsaw Pact aircraft played an intricate game of cat-and-mouse. The only points at which it got interesting were when the intercepts translated (intentionally or otherwise) into actual shoot-downs. Events in recent years have only demonstrated that such a risk remains a current one.

Where this news of increased aerial intercepts could have an effect is on the domestic Japanese political front. More nationalist elements could use it as further evidence that Article 9 of the constitution should be amended, or at least revisted. The tensions could also serve as fodder for calls for increased defense spending. In the late 1990s, when North Korea tested a missile by lobbing it over Honshu, Japan responded by launching its very first spy satellites. The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force is already quite capable, but I don't think any armed service -- be it an "Air Force" or a "Self-Defense Force" -- would pass up the chance to lobby for more resources.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:43 PM to Asia

October 18, 2005

Serious condemnation

Predictable feedback from the neighbors over Koizumi's recent trip to Yasukuni. First, from China:

The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement on Monday to condemn Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, a place where World War II criminals were honored.

Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing urgently summoned Japanese Ambassador to China Koreshige Anami and seriously read the statement, expressing strong condemnation for Koizumi's visit.

Well, at least the Foreign Minister didn't read the statement casually. Of course, the Koreans aren't to be outdone:

Apparently in response [to Koizumi's visit], Cheong Wa Dae [the office of the ROK president] said Monday it is scrapping a bilateral summit scheduled for the end of the year. Since 2003, the two countries’ leaders have held annual "shuttle summits" in each others’ countries. Koizumi made the trip to Korea in June. There are now calls in the ruling party to stop the summits.

“Until now there had been discussion of the president’s visit to Japan, but as of today, we can no longer say that we are looking into the possibility,” Choeng Wa Dae spokesman Kim Man-soo told reporters. “That means there may be a change in the president's schedule.”

And just to make sure their neighbors got the right message, almost 200 Japanese MPs visited Yasukuni the day after Koizumi did so himself.

I wish I could say something insightful or creative here, but unfortunately, this charade is already so well-worn that I've already said it. I suppose all I can add now is that the Japanese cannot reasonably claim any degree of surprise or separation from their PM's behavior. They have long known Koizumi's stance on (and fondness for) Yasukuni, and while last month's elections may have focused on postal reform, Japan's regional relationships were an important point of electoral contention. The Japanese gave Koizumi a resounding victory, and they knew what they were getting.

In the same vein, Koizumi's most recent trip to Yasukuni could carry greater weight abroad than his previous visits. Following so closely after his election victory, Koizumi's visit and the sentiment it represents can be seen as one and the same as those of the Japanese people. This is no rebellious PM following his own instincts at the expense of popular will; this is a resoundingly popular PM, fresh from a political reaffirmation, doing something he knows will be noticed (and criticized) far and wide.

Say what you will about Koizumi and his Yasukuni visits (and I have -- they're foolish, but so too is the response to them), but he knows exactly what he's doing. It's such brashness that sets Koizumi apart from the stale mold that typically defines Japanese politicians, and which directly contributed to his recent electoral victory. So maybe he just can't help himself.

UPDATE: This Guardian piece contains two interesting tidbits about Koizumi's visit. The first:

In an apparent attempt to placate Japan's Asian neighbours, who regard Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo as a symbol of Japanese militarism, Mr Koizumi wore a business suit rather than ceremonial dress and did not enter the revered inner shrine, choosing instead to pray and make a token monetary offering at the outer shrine.

And:

An unrepentant Mr Koizumi insisted he had paid his respects at Yasukuni as a private citizen and had done so to demonstrate his commitment to peace, not to celebrate Japanese militarism. In a swipe at Beijing and Seoul, he added: "A foreign government should not take issue with the way the Japanese express condolences to the Japanese war dead, as well as to the world's war dead."

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:22 AM to Asia

October 17, 2005

Electoral license

I suppose when you gamble in calling a snap election, win that election, and then push through a rather bold reform of the postal system, a prime minister is entitled to a little mischief. Nothing too unexpected in Koizumi's latest visit to Yasukuni, I suppose, but I have to say I am disappointed. This is of most interest:

The visit, Koizumi's fifth since taking office in April 2001, will also be highly controversial as it comes just about two weeks after the Osaka High Court ruled his previous visits violated the constitutional separation of religion and state. [emphasis mine]

I hadn't heard about this court decision -- been a bit occupied of late. Hopefully, I'll be able to check it out in greater detail shortly.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:32 AM to Asia

September 14, 2005

Koizumi konquers

Haven't written nearly as much as I would've liked on Sunday's election in Japan, but I'm not sure there's much I would add to the already abundant coverage. While I disagree with Koizumi's dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq and with his disconcertingly frequent visits to Yasukuni, the guy's a rebel. Japanese politics have long been marked by stasis, cronyism, and predictability. Koizumi threw a wrench into that system by calling the snap election several weeks ago, and his boldness -- unique among Japanese politicians, along with his hair -- won Koizumi a victory. Postal reform, which was the impetus for this recent spate of political drama, will (and should) be pushed through Diet successfully this time around. Apparently, even some LDP rebels now support it.

Koizumi's accomplishment is made all the more remarkable when you remember that he's the leader of the LDP, which has ruled Japan virtually uninterrupted since occupation. It's tough to be seen a genuine reformer when your party has been in charge for so long. Yet Koizumi did it, and he did so in the face of a relatively well-organized opposition party, the DPJ. If Japan needs something as much as it needs structural reform, it's a legitimate, stable, and loyal political opposition. The DPJ could very likely represent such healthy opposition, though it did get fairly well drubbed on Sunday. As the Economist mentioned recently, when a Koizumi victory already appeared likely, the optimal outcome of the election would have been a permanent defeat of the old-guard LDP rebels who opposed postal privatization while only temporarily hurting the DPJ. My guess is that the LDP old guard is severely hurt, but those stale, old politicians are canny -- they're not done for good, at least not yet, even if postal privitization passes the Diet.

As for the DPJ, they took quite a beating, and the party's president, Katsuya Okada, has stepped down in the face of defeat. One can only hope that the party remains intact and able to perform in the role of loyal opposition; already, there are calls for the DPJ to select a more media-savvy, Koizumi-esque president. The outcome is further ironic when you consider that in terms of actual "reform", the DPJ platform probably had Koizumi's beat. Had they won, the DPJ most likely would have taken a more sensible policy with regard to Japan's Asian neighbors, and they would have withdrawn SDF troops from Iraq. These would have been good things, along with the obvious benefit of solidifying the DPJ's role as a legitimate alternative to the LDP and in moving Japan's politics in a more honest, tranparent, and competitive direction. But Koizumi's a politician unlike many others in Japan, and his version of retail politics -- however subjective it may be -- marks a big step forward for Japanese democracy. Koizumi's victory was well-deserved, based on his courage and personaility alone. While the DPJ's platform may have been a better one for Japan, succeeding in a world of competitive democracy requires more than just a sound platform. Warts and all, it's a world toward which Japanese politics must continue to move.

MainichI has an interesting piece on regional reaction to Koizumi's victory. Noteworthy is John Howard's effusive and genuine congratulations, which makes sense given Australia's recent friendliness with Japan. The piece also notes the dry, unenthusiastic congratulations from South Korea, while observing that China "did not immediately react to Koizumi's win." Can't find anything on Xinhua or the Foreign Ministry's sites to that effect myself. I wonder what they think of Koizumi's victory?

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:36 PM to Asia

No more secrets

Is the veil lifting over Communist China?

China said on Monday that it would no longer treat the death toll in natural disasters as a state secret, a step that could lead to greater transparency in a country that has a long history of providing partial or misleading data about diseases, accidents, and state-directed atrocities.

That's nice. I wonder if details of their military budget will be next.

Also, be sure to note in the article the name of the agency that oversees state secrets. It's a priceless example of authoritarian brashness and simplicity.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:27 PM to Asia

August 31, 2005

Patriot's game

Concerned about graphic violence and historical inaccuracy in your video games? Fear not:

PowerNet Technology, a Chinese online gaming firm, has developed a new online game in cooperation with the China Communist Youth League (CCYL) named "Anti-Japan War Online," which will begin commercial operation by the end of 2005, Interfax reported Wednesday.

"The game will allow players, especially younger players, to learn from history. They will get a patriotic feeling when fighting invaders to safeguard their motherland," Interfax reported, citing a PowerNet Project Manager, surnamed Liu.

I guess "motherland" is a relative term ...

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:41 PM to Asia

August 28, 2005

Dispute resolution

From time to time in this space, we've taken a look at the passions that small, uninhabited islands can evoke in otherwise mature, reasonable states. One of the first cases we examined at was that of Takeshima/Tokto, which has tormented Japan and South Korea for some time now.

On Friday, South Korea released several decades-worth of diplomatic documents that record the evolution of the dispute over the islands. Perhaps most noteworthy is that back in the 1960s, Japan proposed settling the dispute in the International Court of Justice, while South Korea advocated third-party (read: U.S.) mediation. What's most bizarre, if not necessarily noteworthy, is what the chief of the Asian Bureau of Japan's Foreign Ministry is recorded as saying about the islands:

It's only about the size of Hibiya Park [in Tokyo]. The problem could be solved by blowing it up.

Sure, this statement is several decades old. But the dispute over Takeshima/Tokto remains a live one, and it's things like this that make it hard for many in Asia to forgive Japan for its past militarism. It's also just a funny thing for a diplomat to have said.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:29 PM to Asia

August 16, 2005

Remembrance addendum

More on Japan's 60th anniversary observances yesterday from the New York Times:

In the first apology delivered on Aug. 15 by a prime minister since the 50th anniversary of the war's end, Mr. Koizumi said: "Our country has caused tremendous damage and pain to the peoples of many countries, especially Asian countries, through colonial rule and invasion. Humbly acknowledging such facts of history, I once again reflect most deeply and offer apologies from my heart."

He added, "I would like to forge a future-oriented relationship of cooperation based on mutual understanding and confidence with Asian countries by squarely facing up to the past and correctly understanding history."

Interesting bits here are that Koizumi's was the first August 15 apology delivered by a Japanese PM in ten years, and that he explicitly redirected his statement of historical contrition toward the future. The key phrase is "correctly understanding history." It's odd that Kyodo didn't cite that line directly, but regardless, it wasn't enough for the Chinese. Xinhua conveys both the cold response:

China yesterday urged Tokyo to fully match its words of remorse over Japan's aggressive history with concrete actions.

"We've noted Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's statement," Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said.

Taking a serious and responsible attitude towards its militaristic aggressive history serves Japan's long-term and fundamental interests, he added.

... and the hot one:

The result of a survey conducted by a well read weekly "China Newsweek" via the Sina news portal shows that nearly 98 percent of all the 76,000 respondents equate the phrase "militarism and right wing force" with Japan in their mind.

When asked whether Japan should be forgiven for its criminal past, more than half of the polled said no - even if the Japanese would repent on their knees just as the Germans did.

As for the direction of the future Sino-Japanese relation, a percentage of 59.64 gave a dim outlook, foreseeing a future war between the two powerhouse nations over energy resources.

That Xinhua's wrath is wrapped in the guise of a third-party survey actually represents journalistic integrity, for them.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:59 AM to Asia

August 15, 2005

Limiting offense

Koizumi marked the 60th anniversary of Japan's surrender today with predictably remorseful words:

"We will do our utmost to further develop friendly relations with the rest of the world and gain more trust from the world as a nation that cherishes peace."

But of course, it wouldn't be a proper Japanese remembrance ceremony without a modicum of ambiguity:

A one-minute silent prayer was offered at noon after the Japanese national anthem was played and Koizumi delivered his address. At noon on Aug 15, 1945, then Emperor Hirohito made a historic radio address announcing Japan's surrender.

Following a moment of silence, Emperor Akihito voiced strong hope that Japan will never again wage war, saying, "Looking back on history, I ardently hope that the horrors of war will never be repeated."

A moment of silence preceded by the Japanese national anthem, and the son of Hirohito offering not a specific apology but a rather anodyne and generic condemnation of conflict in general -- there's nothing wrong here, but it's not quite right, either. It's as if the Japanese leadership walks to the brink of complete contrition and then stops, wondering why anyone has a problem with going 99% of the way. Kyodo's report inadvertently elaborates on this further:

Representing the bereaved families in the ceremony, 75-year-old Takao Yorimitsu vowed to carry on the will of the people who have died in the war.

"With a renewed determination, we vow that each and every citizen will protect the peace and freedom that you had wished for more than anything else," Yorimitsu, a resident of Kochi Prefecture, said in a message to those who died in the war.

Not to besmirch Mr. Yorimitsu or even Japanese veterans of the war, but I question whether Japan of the 1930s and 1940s wished for peace and freedom "more than anything else."

Meanwhile, Koizumi avoided Yasukuni on Monday, which was wise on his part. That didn't stop members of his cabinet from visiting the shrine, however. Though this probably isn't the most politically sensitive thing for these ministers to do, it's perfectly within their rights to do so. And as the Kyodo piece points out, these ministers made very clear that they were visiting the shrine for personal rather than political reasons. For his part, Koizumi visited a relatively uncontroversial tomb for unknown war dead.

What does all this mean? Not much, really. There wasn't enough contrition to please the Chinese, Koreans, and others who are most offended by Japan's behavior, and I doubt there will ever be enough to please everyone. The day's observances in Japan were imbued with an utterly unsurprising level of ambiguity. But most of the ambiguity came from people around the prime minister and not from Koizumi himself. This may be due to Japan's upcoming elections and the resulting need to more finely tune political imagery, or it may not. Either way, I think Koizumi was in a bit of a bind. The best he could do was offer the requisite apology, offending those who were already offended and offending no one else any further. In that, he seems to have succeeded.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:25 PM to Asia

August 12, 2005

Historical issues

In this season of disquieting anniversaries and rocky politics (more on that later), the Japanese Foreign Ministry is doing its part to smooth the waters:

The Foreign Ministry on Friday posted on its website information about Japan's positions on history with regard to other Asian nations before and during World War II and postwar compensation.

The information has been posted only in Japanese so far, which in itself is very interesting. The most virulent critics of Japan's post-war recollection are those foreign states once occupied by Japan but with the impudence to have rejected adoption of the Japanese language. And the Japanese Foreign Ministry is not an understaffed, underfunded, backroom ministry that lack the capacity to produce material in multiple languages. So perhaps the Foreign Ministry is targetting a domestic audience, first and foremost, with this information. That's not entirely unreasonable, but it still doesn't explain the absence of English and Chinese translations, at the very least.

My guess is that this is just one of many examples of the eccentricity and ambiguity of Japnese society. Think of the dance often performed by the Japanese: matching effusive apologies for wartime misdeeds with simultaneous government visits to Yasukuni, modest diplomatic gestures with the simultaneous approval of revisionist textbooks, and conciliatory words with aggressive gestures along disputed maritime boundaries. Who knows how the government -- or even society as a whole -- feels about questions of wartime recollection. It is so quitessentially Japanese to be profoundly proper yet frustratingly opaque at the same time.

In any event, with the material in Japanese only, it's not of great use to me. The Foreign Ministry does, however, have an entire section of their website devoted to "Historical Issues." Until the Ministry produces their new material in English -- maybe a month or so away, we're told -- this section will have to suffice

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:35 PM to Asia

August 11, 2005

Council membership

Jai may think it's lame to cite a piece from Foreign Policy's website, but thankfully I face no such constraints:

But these same qualifications [for a Japanese seat on the UN Security Council] raise an important question: Has Japan truly conducted a foreign policy worthy of a world leader? What difference does it make if Japan frequently serves as a rotating member of the Security Council if its diplomats are seen as wallflowers? When has Japan introduced bold new initiatives or helped build coalitions to lead an international effort? How much stronger would Japan’s bid for membership be if Tokyo had led a global effort to address the crisis in Darfur? How many times has Japan’s foreign ministry offered to help broker a peace between disputing parties? Critics are mistaken to assume that a pacifist nation has no place on the Security Council. (You could argue that Japan’s modern incarnation is one of the most in keeping with the United Nations’ mission.) But it’s also true that Japan cannot use its “peace constitution” as an excuse for its own diplomatic inaction or lack of imagination.

Read the whole piece; it's not long, and it's largely correct. I would only disagree, in my estimation of the depth of China's opposition to a Japanese seat on the Council. Even if Japan had taken a more consistent foreign policy leadership role over the years, absolutely nothing would dissuade the Chinese in their opposition to Japanese membership on the Council. No amount of post-war contrition from the Japanese, I feel, will ever be enough for China. Or rather, the contrition that China wants will never come from a government freely elected by the Japanese people. It's one of the pesky things about a democracy ...

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:17 AM to Asia

August 07, 2005

Anniversary celebrations

This weekend marked the 60th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing. As if to remind us how far Japan has come since then, and to highlight the uncertainties of its future, the past week has brought a bevy of important developments. Collectively, they serve as a reminder of who and what will dominate the next 60 years of Japanese foreign policy.

First, the New York Times had a nice overview piece of recent tensions between Japan and China. I read it almost as a reminder that relations between the two countries remain very uneasy, despite the relative calm since the Chinese protests last spring. Couple interesting tidbits in the piece. The first:

A right-wing vandal seemed to capture a growing sentiment last week when he tried to scrape off the word "mistake" from a peace memorial in Hiroshima that said of Japan's war efforts: "Let all the souls here rest in peace, as we will never repeat this mistake."

This phrase on the Hiroshima cenotaph has been a point of controversy and ambiguity for some time. Does the "we" refer to Japan, the United States, or humanity in general? Is the "mistake" the U.S. dropping of the atomic bomb, the Japanese initiation of the Pacific War, or violent conflict itself? Obviously, this particular vandal interpreted the inscription as a slight so general as to indict Japan for its wartime transgressions. On the 60th anniversary of the atomic bombing, such vandalism is indicative of a very real sentiment on Japanese society.

And then there's this:

In Tokyo, 291 teachers have been reprimanded in the last year and many may face dismissal for refusing to stand before the rising-sun flag at school enrollment and graduation ceremonies and sing Japan's national anthem, "Kimigayo," or "His Majesty's Reign," considered symbols of Japanese imperialism by most Asians and some Japanese. Those signals of respect used to be optional, or shunned because of their associations with Japan's past militarism.

In some ways, it's a story like this that is the most disconcerting. Politicians will do what politicians will do; they have their own constituencies, their own agendas, and their own ways of doing things that often do not accurately or proportionally represent popular sentiment. But to be reprimanded for not participating in an optional show of respect to the national anthem smacks of a deeper and narrower cultural bias.

Also this week, the Japanese Defense Agency released a report on China's military build-up:

"Beijing is shifting from using its air and sea forces for defensive purposes to unifying its defensive and offensive capabilities," the report observed.

The report said Japan should carefully study whether the objectives in China's military modernization do not exceed the scope needed for its defense.

Putting aside the subtle irony of whether it is the place of one country to determine the defense needs of another, it appears that the Japanese report follows in the same vein as the Pentagon's report a few weeks ago. It sounds a cautious note about China's increasing military expenditure and capabilities, but isn't excessively alarmist.

The Chinese, of course, chose to read the report in the most offensive light:

Japan publicly plays up the so-called "China's threat" in its official documents. It is completely groundless and extremely irresponsible. Instead of helping build mutual security trust, it will only misguide the public and lead to mutual misgivings and emotional antagonism, thus undermining China-Japan relations. We hope the Japanese side to make more efforts in the benefit of stronger mutual trust and friendship between our two sides by proceeding from the overall picture of the long-term development of our relations, rather than doing the opposite.

Nothing surprising there. As with their reaction to the Pentagon's report, the Chinese have an obligation to protest its findings, an obligation that provides only limited insight into China's actual military policy. If they're upset about the Japanese report, though, they're sure to be even more upset by this:

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has called for the creation of a fully fledged army for self-defense in its draft of proposed revisions to the Constitution.

The LDP's constitutional revision committee has been discussing how to revise the pacifist Constitution, with the focus being on how to review Article 9 that renounces Japan's right to wage war and maintain armed forces.

The timing here is almost too exquisite to be accidental. Japan's "peace constitution" is the greatest legacy of the country's suffering (and culpability) during the Pacific War. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- 60 years ago this week -- were the horrific culmination of that war. I can't imagine how the LDP thought the timing of these discussions would in any way benefit their attempt to modify Article 9, so perhaps it really was accidental. But along with "China's rise," it is the evolution of Article 9 that will define the East Asian security environment in the long-term.

I'm somewhat torn regarding Article 9. On one hand, it really is a profound repudiation of force as a means to settle inter-state disputes. Coming from a country with a history as violent as Japan's gives it even greater moral weight. On the other hand, the Self-Defense Forces are already some of the most capable "militaries" in the world, yet their capabilities are hampered by politics and by the force structure that such politics dictate. Japan still has serious problems in reconciling its collective memory of the Pacific War with historical reality, and any talk of reforming Article 9 should be paired equally with (if not exceeded by) a genuine dialogue with other East Asian states on wartime reconciliation. But Japan is a leading member of the capitalist, democratic world, and It should take full responsibility for the obligations that its strength and position grant it. Accordingly, Article 9 should be re-examined, on a constant basis, with the intention of ultimately modifying it as public opinion will allow. Sixty years on, such a process represents nothing less than the culmination of Japan's post-war re-entry into the community of nations.

Again, China isn't amused. In response to the LDP's deliberations, as well as to the supposedly brazen differences between the Diet's 60th anniversary resolution and its 50th anniversary one, Xinhua boils it all down to one sentence:

Without a guilty conscience, Japan is attempting to turn itself into a regional military bully.

Exaggeration of fact, yes. Exaggeration of sentiment? Not at all.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:03 PM to Asia

July 21, 2005

Obligatory boilerplate

Some obligatory boilerplate reaction to the Pentagon's report on China's military capabilities:

China yesterday expressed "strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition" to a Pentagon report on its military power, describing the dossier as an attempt to spread "the China threat" theory.

[...]

According to [Vice-Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi], China's increased defence spending has mainly been used to improve living conditions for soldiers and officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

The PLA also upgraded some weapons in order to "deal with the complicated international situation, safeguard national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity," he said. This is the right of China as a sovereign country, and other nations do not have the right to intervene," Yang added.

Classic -- the Chinese do not disappoint. And the White House knows its role, too:

"We're committed to peace and stability in the region, but that should not be viewed as us viewing China as a threat," White House spokesman Scott McClellan told reporters.

"We're looking to move forward in a constructive and cooperative way with China, and we certainly have a very open and candid discussion with China on many issues," added the spokesman.

"We do have concerns about the size and pace of China's military modernization, and it's important for us to pay close attention to it."

Nothing surprising here, either. It's theater, really. These immediate responses and reactions -- and indeed, the general gist of the Pentagon's report -- could have been reasonably predicted in advance. Yet despite the foregone nature of the Chinese anger and the U.S. backpedaling, they are steps that had to be taken. With the predictable (and most public) responses out of the way, we can now move on to the more genuine reactions to the Pentagon's report. These will come from official and independent sources alike, on both sides of the Pacific, and it will be interesting to see where how they play out.

One other item of note: Headlines around the world announced either the release of the Pentagon's report or China's angry reaction to it with pretty good degrees of reliability. Yet while headlines announcing McClellan's conciliatory message featured quite prominently in Chinese media outlets, I could find no such headlines in U.S. outlets. Consider what I've discussed here previously, and think about that for a second. Can this selective headlining really be passed off as coincidental? Whose interests does this reflect? Who exactly does it serve?

What was that Yang was saying about the "China threat" theory?

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:07 PM to Asia

July 20, 2005

PRC power

The Pentagon has issued its long-awaited report on China's military capabilities. Its conclusion: China is building up its military. No surprise there.

I haven't looked at the report too closely yet, but I'm sure there is much in it that will serve as natural fodder for China vilifiers and fear-mongerers. Still, it seems that the Pentagon was attempting to strike a realistic tone in releasing the report:

At the Pentagon on Wednesday, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Peter Pace, said that although China's military might is growing he sees no reason to think that Beijing is interested in starting a war.

"You judge military threat in two ways: one, capacity and two, intent. There's lots of countries in the world that have the capacity to wage war," Pace said. "Very few have the intent to do so. Clearly, we have a complex but good relationship with China, so there's absolutely no reason for us to believe there's any intent on their part."

Can't really argue with that reasoning. No matter how it's used, I'm certain that the Pentagon's report makes for very interesting reading. If anything in particular catches my eye, I'll mention it here.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:23 PM to Asia

CNOOC'd out

I haven't said much about CNOOC's bid for Unocal so far, in part due to my intense frustration over the bipartisan irrationality exhibited around it on cable news, in congressional hearings, and among the pop punditry. Indeed, it's a sad day when the Cato Institute represents the voice of reason in their congressional testimony:

My comments will be confined to the fear that such a transaction would harm national security by making the United States more dependent upon foreign oil or, relatedly, that the proposed transaction threatens to provide China with an "oil weapon." I believe those fears are ill founded. In short:

-Energy independence provides no economic protection against supply disruptions abroad and no guarantee that supplies will be secure in the future. America's vulnerability to oil supply disruptions is primarily related to how much oil we consume, not where the oil we consume happens to originate.

-America need not worry about access to international oil supplies. Embargoes or supply diversions cannot keep oil out of U.S. ports and there are plenty of sellers in world oil markets. Only a naval blockade could prevent American from buying all the oil it needs from international oil markets.

-Unocal's reserves are not large enough to provide CNOOC with significant market power in the global oil economy.

-Because China is a net oil importer, it has every incentive to maximize production and none to curtail production. Accordingly, American and Chinese interests in the oil market coincide.

And in much pithier Cato-speak:

When I first read that the China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) had offered to buy Unocal for about $7 a share more than Chevron offered, my initial reaction was that this is none of my business. Foreign and U.S. investors who own shares in Unocal have a right to sell their shares to anyone they please

Well, it looks like it might all be rather moot now:

Chevron sweetened its offer for Unocal late yesterday in an 11th-hour move to thwart a rival offer from Cnooc, a government backed Chinese oil company, executives close to the negotiations said.

Unocal's board voted to accept Chevron's increased offer worth $17 billion, or $63 a share in cash and stock, and rejected a still higher all-cash offer from Cnooc worth $67 a share as too politically risky, the executives said.

The Times notes that CNOOC could still make a counter-offer before Unocal's shareholders meet on August 10, and I honestly can't guess whether they will. Likewise, I'm not too concerned about whether Chevron or CNOOC ends up with Unocal. If we believe in the market, than we must trust that it will settle itself out. If we believe in fear mongering -- and these days, with regard to China, it seems that all too many do -- than we root for Chevron.

The point isn't that Chevron is somehow more deserving of Unocal than CNOOC, or vice versa. Rather, it's that the irrational vilification of China has reached near-paranoid heights. The frightening thing is that such vilification has viable constituencies nearly everywhere you look; Democrats and Republicans alike find the fear mongering in their political interests. It's a shuddering thought that the defender of common sense in this case is Cato.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:55 PM to Asia, U. S. Politics

July 19, 2005

More fun with state media

When you see a piece entitled "Chinese military gets transparent shopping list" on Xinhua's website, it's natural to be somewhat confounded. Chinese state media, the PLA, and transparency are not three things commonly associated with one another. But who knows, maybe Xinhua's finally coming around:

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) yesterday claimed to have saved 1.8 billion yuan (US$218 million) in the past three and a half years as increased transparency granted outsiders a rare glimpse of the workings of the Chinese military. [emphasis mine]

That sounds juicy. I'd love to have a "rare glimpse of the workings of the Chinese military." And you know what? I can think of a few others that might enjoy that, as well. Let's read on:

PLA General Logistics Department sources said the army had spent more than 12 billion yuan (US$1.46 billion) on basic supplies last year, a 64 per cent increase over 2003.

Ok, that's a start -- some mundane figures to whet the palette. I bet the good stuff's just around the corner:

According to General Logistics Department regulations, all PLA material procurement information, except that involving military and commercial secrets, must be made public. [emphasis mine]

Oh well, I guess that's to be expected. Not only would a glimpse inside the PLA's procurement policies aid our understanding of China's military capabilities, but it would cast light on the lucrative intersection of PLA officers and their commercial ventures. Such areas, I would imagine, would probably fall under the categories of "military and commercial secrets." While somewhat of a let down, it's at least reassuring to know that Xinhua is maintaining its reputation as state mouthpiece par excellence.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:47 AM to Asia

July 15, 2005

Trash talking

Some Chinese sword-rattling to take us into the weekend:

"If the Americans draw their missiles and position-guided ammunition on to the target zone on China's territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclear weapons," the official, Major General Zhu Chenghu, said at an official briefing Thursday.

Simply because Zhu said this doesn't make it official Chinese policy. But his comments are certainly sufficient to raise some eyebrows, especially when one reads on:

"War logic" dictates that a weaker power needs to use maximum efforts to defeat a stronger rival, he said, speaking in fluent English. "We have no capability to fight a conventional war against the United States," Zhu said. "We can't win this kind of war." [emphasis mine]

Zhu is correct here. Hysterical claims of military modernization to the contrary, China cannot defeat the United States in a conventional military conflict, at least not for the next 10-15 years. Even in no-holds-barred nuclear exchange, the United States would have the upper hand simply due to the qualitative and quantitative advantage of its nuclear arsenal (though admittedly, the "upper-hand" in such a scenario would be rather pyrrhic).

The Chinese general slips off into the deep end, however, with this:

"If the Americans are determined to interfere, then we will be determined to respond," he said. "We Chinese will prepare ourselves for the destruction of all the cities east of Xian. Of course the Americans will have to be prepared that hundreds of cities will be destroyed by the Chinese." [emphasis mine]

First off, I doubt the Chinese would really be prepared for "the destruction of all the cities east of Xian." Second, the Chinese would be flatly incapable of destroying "hundreds of [U.S.] cities." There is much uncertainty surrounding the Chinese nuclear arsenal. Most estimates credit China with at most several hundred warheads but with only around 20 land-based missiles -- kept unfuelled and unarmed -- that could reach the continental United States. Furthermore, most experts believe the Chinese have only one (or maybe two) submarines capable of launching intercontinental missiles. Such valuable yet fragile submarines rarely stray far from Chinese waters, from which their missiles cannot reach the United States. China is working on an improved missile design, for land- and sea-based use, but their deployment date is still some years away.

The Chinese military knows its weaknesses. So what is Zhu doing? Already, we're seeing some reaction. The official Chinese position is that Zhu's comments were, "just his personal views;" the United States calls them "irresponsible;" the Taiwanese say they reveal the mainland's "hideous face of terror."

I believe that Zhu's comments, as off the cuff as they may seem, are really a very deliberate political maneuver. The Chinese leadership knows that it very likely could not conquer Taiwan; it knows that it would be impossible to do so if the United States became involved on Taiwan's side, which it likely would. The threat to nuke the United States, much like the recently passed anti-secession law, is just another step in the game of chicken over Taiwan. With each step, the Chinese leadership hopes to instill just a little more hesitation on the part of U.S. policy-makers and to buy more time to upgrade its military capabilities. If conflict ever came to the Taiwan Straits, China hopes that such incrementally increased trepidation would postpone U.S. entry into the conflict just long enough to make such entry pointless.

But Zhu's comments also serve a broader strategic function, beyond the confines of the Taiwan Strait. He is a nearly perfectly positioned messenger: he has the credibility of a high-ranking military officer but not the expectations of sobriety or political correctness that would burden a more senior official. His statements, then, cannot be taken as official policy, but they cannot be entirely discounted either. As such, they will create quite a stir among the more hawkish or conservative media outlets and punditry: "A Chinese general threatening to nuke the United States? Why, of course China is a threat!"

Such comments only feed the vilification machine that has picked up speed in recent years. And in case you forget, let's run-down who benefits from this: the media, first, for whom the idea of another superpower bogeyman makes great copy, and political ideologues of all stripes, second, who require a threatening enemy to justify their narrow ideologies, outdated policies, and stale careers. But who benefits the most from China vilification? None other than the Chinese themselves, for whom such irrational fear only strengthens. It casts China in a cloud of fearsome opacity, giving their leaders a freedom of movement that would be denied them if they were treated as genuine, reciprocal, political partners. In short, the Chinese like to be mysterious, and they like to keep their competitors guessing. Zhu's comments do just that; fear-mongerers rejoice.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:11 PM to Asia

July 12, 2005

Pro-China

Interesting update on the Yasukuni front:

Dozens of pro-China lawmakers in the governing Liberal Democratic Party launched a study group Tuesday out of concern over Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's controversial visits to the war-related Yasukuni Shrine. [emphasis mine]

I like how Kyodo describes as "pro-China" any movement seemingly at odds with Yasukuni and its establishment support. And who knows, maybe these lawmakers really are "pro-China" -- just like U.S. legislators who opposed the Iraq war were "pro-Saddam." It really is an unforgivable sin to oppose the establishment so blatantly.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:40 PM to Asia

June 27, 2005

Contradiction corrected

This seems to represent an interesting bit of progress:

Israel and the US have reportedly agreed to defuse a row over Israel's arms sales to countries such as China.

The two are to sign a deal promising each will take the other's concerns into account when selling weapons, Israel's Haaretz newspaper says

As I've noted before, there has seemed to be a contradiction in Bush administration policy between its loyalty to Israel and its fear of China. With this new agreement, it seems that fear of China has won out. Haaretz provides some context:

The memorandum [outlining the arms agreement], which is to put an end an export crisis with the U.S., will state that the U.S. and Israel are "strategic partners" and that each country will be considerate of the other's concerns about military technology being transferred to other countries. The countries "arousing concern" will be specified separately.

The dispute erupted at the end of last year following Washington's demand that Israel not return to China spare parts of Harpy UAVs (drones). The Israeli-manufactured UAVs had been sold to China and were sent here for repairs. This conflict is one of the gravest ever to erupt between the two countries in recent years.

Under the agreement, to be termed "Declaration of Understanding on Technology Exports," both countries will undertake to maintain transparency regarding weapons sales to countries considered worrisome. The U.S. will explicitly pledge not to ban defense deals on commercial grounds, thereby allaying Israeli defense establishment concerns that the Americans would try to hurt Israeli defense businesses and push them out of the international market."

So there appears to be plenty of soft, gentle language here to hide the fact that the Bush administration is pulling rank on the Israelis. And I have to admit, I'm surprised that they came down on Sharon decisively. Maintaining illogical and unsustainable policy contradictions has seemed to be par for the course for the Bush administration, so I have to give them credit for coming down on one side of the issue. Whether erring on the side of Chinese fear over Israeli loyalty was the right call isn't the issue; that the Bush administration actually made a tough choice is.

The Chinese, for their part, are a bit peeved:

Accusing the Bush administration of "carping" and "outside interference," China issued a sharp complaint Monday after Israel cancelled a controversial Israeli-Chinese arms deal under pressure from the United States.

The Israeli decision halted the sale of drone aircraft capable of seeking out radar installations. It was the result of a U.S. campaign to block China from obtaining advanced military technology that could be used against Taiwan and U.S. forces supporting the island in any confrontation.

Well, ok. One should remember that China really had no choice but to complain. I'm sure they'd like to give Israel their business in order to repair their radar-seeking drones, but in the big picture, they're just drones. This deal won't in any serious way crimp China's military modernization. Indeed, its relevance isn't on the Chinese side of the equation; it's on the U.S.-Israeli side. China can take care of itself.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:08 PM to Asia, Middle East, U. S. Politics

June 25, 2005

Prophesying China, in print

Allow me to humbly point to my latest piece in the Providence Journal. For regular readers of Natural Selection, there's not much new here -- it's based in large part on ideas and language hashed out here. Regardless, check it out at the ProJo or in extended entry, if you're not into the whole registration thing.

Let me also give a special shout-out and thanks to Brian Bishop, William Touret, and everyone else at Rule Free Radio on WARL 1320 AM. Had a fine time chatting with you folks about all things "martial energy."

Daniel Widome: Beware of self-fulfilling prophecy -- U.S. should face China's rise rationally

I THINK I USED to like Robert Kaplan. Or, rather, I see value in some of his earlier works that blended travelogue, historical reflection, and political analysis. But in a recent piece in The Atlantic Monthly -- revealingly entitled "How We Would Fight China" -- Kaplan seems to have fallen victim to an all too common and particularly narrow point of view: the neo-conservative vilification of China. That he has only demonstrates how pervasive such a shortsighted perspective has become and how dangerous it is to U.S. interests.

Kaplan seems to have taken so whole-heartedly to the vilification of China that his Atlantic piece can be used as a prime example of it. He describes China's "martial energy" as "constitut[ing] the principal conventional threat to America's liberal imperium."

China's size, it's true, cannot be denied. But defining its "martial energy" as "the principal conventional threat" to U.S. interests? In today's world, that's a bold assertion.

Of course, Kaplan knows this. He tries to explain himself when he describes how China's antiquated but growing submarine fleet could threaten the U.S. Navy: "[O]ne can imagine that China could launch an embarrassing strike against us, or against one of our Asian allies." Sure, one could imagine that. One could just as easily imagine the opposite, too.

The rest of Kaplan's piece follows in this vein, demonstrating an ever-expanding fascination with China and its popularly termed "rise." In just the past few weeks, both U.S. News and World Report and Time magazine have featured cover stories on China's rise. Indeed, the country's size and influence -- and the growth of each -- are ample. The copious ink spilled in covering them is perhaps not out of proportion with their importance.

Kaplan's piece, however, represents a darker and increasingly common side of this China fascination. In China's rise, to be sure, there is reason for wariness; but Kaplan's perspective goes well beyond wariness into the realm of unnecessary fear. Increasingly, it's a perspective that pervades the media consciousness.

Such vilification derives not only from China's rise but also from an equally large vacuum in neo-conservative self-perceptions. Certain ideologies define themselves more by what they're against than by what they're for. Although the "war on terror" has provided a legitimate and unifying foe for neo-conservatives to rally around, "terror" -- insofar as it can actually be defined as an enemy -- doesn't quite fill the shoes of a big, menacing state-based opponent. In other words, al-Qaida is no Soviet Union. But China -- oppressive, militaristic and expansive -- comes much closer.

The recent China vilification has its roots in scholarly works that hypothesized the capabilities of a potentially hostile China. Neo-conservative writers and ideologues joined the bandwagon in the late 1990s, replacing scholarly conditionality with breathless certainty, and China vilification has since snowballed to its current prevalence.

A common vilification argument rests on the classical great-power theory, which holds that rising powers inevitably come into conflict with existing ones. But history and theory should be used to illuminate the future, not to blind us to its unforeseen directions. China's rise, fundamentally, is unprecedented and uncertain. Such uncertainty is naturally disconcerting for those who instinctually demand certainty and the benefits it brings.

Predicting conflict with China doesn't just provide certainty in an otherwise uncertain situation. It also justifies a range of diplomatic and military policies that would otherwise be impossible to implement. More important, a hostile China represents a self-fulfilling, self-indulgent prophecy, which justifies a faulty ideology and perpetuates the political careers that rely on it.

It is perfectly fair to ask whether China's rise poses a threat to the United States. I think it very well might -- but it also might not. Again, that's the point: China's rise is a fundamentally uncertain phenomenon.

So much of the recent thinking on China seems to move beyond the frustrating uncertainty of reality and into the convenient certainty of fantasy. But though the United States should absolutely prepare for the possibility of a hostile China, such anticipatory policies must be based on rational judgment that prioritizes genuine U.S. interests -- not on breathless vilification that prioritizes political careers and ideological impetus.

I imagine the Chinese view this phenomenon and its pervasiveness with some amusement. Whether or not they seek conflict, they must surely be pleased at being unpredictable and confounding to U.S. policy makers and citizens alike. That China's "rise" is met by such a knee-jerk, fear-based reaction makes U.S. attitudes seem predictable and one-dimensional. The situation only empowers the Chinese; it gives them the freedom of movement that neo-conservatives love to ascribe to them.

So the prophecy becomes self-fulfilling: Irrational fear of China irrationally empowers China. And whom does that serve? Certainly not the United States.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:25 AM to Asia, Trans-geographical

June 22, 2005

Brothers again

Interesting little twist, following up from yesterday's post:

China called on Japan yesterday to respect the rights of Chinese fishermen, including those from Taiwan.

"The Chinese side is strongly dissatisfied with Japan's forcible expulsion of Taiwan fishermen from Chinese territory around the Diaoyu Islands," Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said yesterday at a regular briefing.

"For Japan to forcibly expel Taiwanese fishermen doing their work from that area is a violation of China's rights and sovereignty," Liu said. "We ask that Japan pays attention to the Chinese side's concerns and practically and prudently handles the related problems."

There's something kind of neat about this. Here you have a cluster of uninhabited islets, contested by China, Taiwan, and Japan. The Taiwanese send a frigate or two to escort some fishing boats as a demonstration of sovereignty. And then China speaks up on the side of the Taiwanese, some of whom, after all, consider themselves the rightful government of all of China. It seems that when it comes to territorial disputes with Japan, Chinese sovereignty -- no matter what side of the civil war you were on -- is still a strong unifying force.

So perhaps this is the solution to China-Taiwan tensions: vilify Japan. It's one of the few things that pretty much all of East Asia can agree on these days, after all. But what of Japan itself? Wouldn't it be bad if all the states of East Asia were able to put aside their differences at the exclusion of one of their own? Nah. Unlike China and everyone else in East Asia, the Japanese haven't been sufficiently repentful anyway. They pretty much deserve all the unconstructive condemnation they can get.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:47 PM to Asia

June 21, 2005

Right idea, wrong location

So a Chinese naval ship entered the waters around a group of disputed islands, thus upsetting Japan:

"This area belongs to us historically, geographically and legally," [a leader on the ship] told reporters before boarding along with a cross-party group of 15 MPs.

"We must defend our sovereignty and protect our fishing rights." [emphasis mine]

Unsurprising, really, until you realize the Chinese ship in question was, more specifically, Taiwanese. Anyone else see the irony here? Taiwan is surely justified in its desire to defend its soverignty. But I have to say, I don't think Japan is its biggest concern in that regard.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:15 PM to Asia

June 18, 2005

Reporting from the past

The Mainichi Shimbun has gotten its hands on dispatches from George Weller, an American journalist who was among the first to enter Nagasaki during the U.S. occupation. The dispatches were filed but never published -- U.S. occupation censors blocked them out of fear of how unsanitized reporting of a nuclear wasteland might affect popular perceptions of atomic weapons. From his very first dispatch:

The atomic bomb may be classified as a weapon capable of being used indiscriminately, but its use in Nagasaki was selective and proper and as merciful as such a gigantic force could be expected to be.

Interesting as that is, the rapid evolution of Weller's views as reflected in his dispatches is what is more intriguing. Check them out.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:40 PM to Asia

June 16, 2005

Imbalanced scale

Remember that sale of F-16s to Pakistan a couple months ago? U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Christina Rocca sure does:

Rocca has said that Washington’s decision to sell F-16 fighter jets to Islamabad sends a clear signal of its determination to stand by Pakistan’s legitimate defence needs. Testifying before the U.S. House International Relations Sub-committee on Asia, Ms Rocca ruled out a possibility that the sale would upset the current regional military balance or lead to an arms race and added that "it only shows our commitment to help Pakistan in its long haul." [emphasis mine]

Not upsetting the current regional military balance, huh? That may or may not be technically accurate, but it sure doesn't jive with what the Bush administration was saying a couple months ago:

The United States has unveiled plans to help India become a "major world power in the 21st century" even as it announced moves to beef up the military of New Delhi's nuclear rival, Pakistan.

Under the plans, Washington offered to step up a strategic dialogue with India to boost missile defense and other security initiatives as well as high-tech cooperation and expanded economic and energy cooperation. [emphasis mine]

So while the sale of F-16s to Pakistan might not have upset the regional military balance, that's just incidental. The Bush administration really does want to upset the regional military balance -- only on the other [Indian] end of the scale. That adds up really well, doesn't it?

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:20 PM to Asia

June 15, 2005

Prophesying China

I think I used to like Robert Kaplan. Or rather, I see value in some of his earlier work. But the more I learn about him and some of his other work, the more my impression fades. Especially since 11 September 2001, he seems to have gone off the realist deep end. Nothing proves this more than his recent piece in the Atlantic (which I realize I've discovered rather late in the game). Conveniently, his piece is provided in its entirety -- free from the Atlantic's seawall -- here:

For some time now no navy or air force has posed a threat to the United States. Our only competition has been armies, whether conventional forces or guerrilla insurgencies. This will soon change. The Chinese navy is poised to push out into the Pacific -- and when it does, it will very quickly encounter a U.S. Navy and Air Force unwilling to budge from the coastal shelf of the Asian mainland. It's not hard to imagine the result: a replay of the decades-long Cold War, with a center of gravity not in the heart of Europe but, rather, among Pacific atolls that were last in the news when the Marines stormed them in World War II. In the coming decades China will play an asymmetric back-and-forth game with us in the Pacific, taking advantage not only of its vast coastline but also of its rear base -- stretching far back into Central Asia -- from which it may eventually be able to lob missiles accurately at moving ships in the Pacific.

In any naval encounter China will have distinct advantages over the United States, even if it lags in technological military prowess. It has the benefit, for one thing, of sheer proximity. Its military is an avid student of the competition, and a fast learner. It has growing increments of "soft" power that demonstrate a particular gift for adaptation. While stateless terrorists fill security vacuums, the Chinese fill economic ones. All over the globe, in such disparate places as the troubled Pacific Island states of Oceania, the Panama Canal zone, and out-of-the-way African nations, the Chinese are becoming masters of indirect influence -- by establishing business communities and diplomatic outposts, by negotiating construction and trade agreements. Pulsing with consumer and martial energy, and boasting a peasantry that, unlike others in history, is overwhelmingly literate, China constitutes the principal conventional threat to America's liberal imperium.

He's laying it on a bit think, isn't he? I should mention that his piece is entitled, "How We Would Fight China." So from the outset, Kaplan has shown his hand. By title alone, it's clear he's adopted an over-played and under-sourced metaphor of China-as-the-new-Soviet-Union. It's also clear that he's going to offer his expert military opinion of how the U.S. should counter the insidious Chinese threat. But instead, he offers up this:

There are many ways in which the Chinese could use their less advanced military to achieve a sort of political-strategic parity with us. According to one former submarine commander and naval strategist I talked to, the Chinese have been poring over every detail of our recent wars in the Balkans and the Persian Gulf, and they fully understand just how much our military power depends on naval projection -- that is, on the ability of a carrier battle group to get within proximity of, say, Iraq, and fire a missile at a target deep inside the country. To adapt, the Chinese are putting their fiber-optic systems underground and moving defense capabilities deep into western China, out of naval missile range -- all the while developing an offensive strategy based on missiles designed to be capable of striking that supreme icon of American wealth and power, the aircraft carrier. The effect of a single Chinese cruise missile's hitting a U.S. carrier, even if it did not sink the ship, would be politically and psychologically catastrophic, akin to al-Qaeda's attacks on the Twin Towers. China is focusing on missiles and submarines as a way to humiliate us in specific encounters. Their long-range-missile program should deeply concern U.S. policymakers.

With an advanced missile program the Chinese could fire hundreds of missiles at Taiwan before we could get to the island to defend it. Such a capability, combined with a new fleet of submarines (soon to be a greater undersea force than ours, in size if not in quality), might well be enough for the Chinese to coerce other countries into denying port access to U.S. ships. Most of China's seventy current submarines are past-their-prime diesels of Russian design; but these vessels could be used to create mobile minefields in the South China, East China, and Yellow Seas, where, as the Wall Street Journal reporter David Lague has written, "uneven depths, high levels of background noise, strong currents and shifting thermal layers" would make detecting the submarines very difficult. Add to this the seventeen new stealthy diesel submarines and three nuclear ones that the Chinese navy will deploy by the end of the decade, and one can imagine that China could launch an embarrassing strike against us, or against one of our Asian allies. Then there is the whole field of ambiguous coercion -- for example, a series of non-attributable cyberattacks on Taiwan's electrical-power grids, designed to gradually demoralize the population. This isn't science fiction; the Chinese have invested significantly in cyberwarfare training and technology. Just because the Chinese are not themselves democratic doesn't mean they are not expert in manipulating the psychology of a democratic electorate.

Sure, it's not science fiction. But it also isn't original. The notion that the threat posed by China's military would be an unconventional one is not new. More specifically, literature abounded in the 1990s that the Chinese navy might deploy submarines and missile forces in creative and asymmetrical ways to unbalance U.S. carrier battle groups. To be sure, in 15-25 years, the mainline Chinese military might pose a legitimate challenge to the U.S. military -- but not now. Let there be no mistake: while a U.S. military conflict with China in the near-term would not be bloodless, it would be a cake-walk. Folks of Kaplan's vein know this intellectually, but they can't betray it, for reasons I'll discuss in a bit. Hence, the fear-mongering, not of the China that is, but of the China that might be. So not only is Kaplan guilty of irresponsible fear-mongering, but he is monumentally unoriginal in doing so.

Still, I can't claim that Kaplan's piece is entirely without value. Indeed, why else would I be quoting so extensively from it? China's rise, as it is popularly termed, is a genuinely fascinating phenomenon. Its size and influence -- and the growth of each -- are ample, and the copious ink spilled in covering them is perhaps not out of proportion with their actual importance. Likewise, I don't think anyone can say with any degree of certainty how close China's rise will match historical precedent or theoretical predictions. History and theory, as always, should be used to illuminate the future, not to blind us to its unforeseen directions.

So despite China's logical short-term quest for stability, will its rise inevitably bring it into conflict with the United States? I think such a scenario is very possible -- but not very likely. Certainly, it is no more or less likely than a cataclysmic readjustment of China's domestic politics. And that's the whole point -- China's rise is fundamentally uncertain. Such uncertainty is naturally disconcerting for many folks, especially for those who have an instinctual demand for certainty and for how such certainty can directly benefit them. Predicting conflict with China justifies a wide range of diplomatic and military policies that would otherwise be impossible to implement. More importantly, a hostile China represents a self-fulfilling, self-indulgent prophesy that justifies faulty ideology and perpetuates the political careers that rely on it.

How so? It's simple, really. First, academic pieces appear in scholarly military literature about the possibilities of a conflict with China in the medium-term. Then, half-wit conservative operatives jump on the bandwagon. They add some time-tested, confrontational rhetoric, mix in some dire predictions, and cap it all off with prescriptions for a confrontational China policy and for increased military spending to keep up with the Chinese menace. By this point, more and more pieces appear about China's burgeoning economy and about the United States' imbalance of trade with that country. These voices, these pieces, these pundits, all this noise -- it becomes a poisoned stew, one which contains just enough truth to avoid being laughed off the front page, but one that nonetheless seeps into the mass consciousness of not only the average voter, but also of current and future policy makers. These people will actually be the ones in positions to solve or aggravate problems. Ultimately, though, such a climate of fear justifies an unjustifiable ideology, employs otherwise unemployable political and foreign policy operatives, and aggrieves an otherwise unaggrieved rising foreign power. Already, the contradictions inherent in such an ideology have become apparent.

Am I suggesting that China's rise is indisputably in the U.S. interest, or that such a rise will be smooth sailing from a U.S. perspective? Hardly -- I haven't done so before, and I'm not doing so now. The truth is, I don't know what role China will play in the world over the next 10-30 years, and neither does anyone else. I am fairly certain, however, that classical theories of great power politics will only be partially applicable in the case of China -- the 21st century is simply too far removed from the concert of Europe, the balance of power, and the Cold War of the past two hundred years. Blame this on technology, "globalization," or on post-modern politics -- I'm sure the uncertainty stems from all of these reasons, and from many more. And the United States should certainly brace itself for such uncertainty. But such anticipatory policies must be based on sound, rational judgement that prioritize genuine U.S. and international interests, not on half-baked, breathless fear-mongering that prioritizes political careers and bureaucratic impetus.

Kaplan, I fear, has become caught up in this China fetishization and fear-mongering, and that troubles me. I'd like to believe that he's a sharp fellow -- he's certainly written some fine pieces in his time. But unfortunately, the China fear-mongering apparatus is already well-entrenched, and it is expanding. I imagine the Chinese must view this with a certain degree of amusement. Whether they seek conflict or not, they surely must be pleased that they are unpredictable and confounding to U.S. policy-makers and citizens alike. Such a situation only empowers China; it gives them the freedom of diplomatic movement that U.S. fear-mongerers love to ascribe to them. And so, the prophesy becomes self-fulfilling. Irrational fear of China irrationally empowers China. And who does that serve? Certainly not the United States.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:07 PM to Asia

June 14, 2005

Same old story

More trouble at Yasukuni, again centered around the Chinese. This time, however, the ruckus concerns Chinese of the island variety:

A group of indigenous Taiwanese gave up an attempt Tuesday to stage a rally at Yasukuni Shrine because they didn't want to clash with rightists.

They had hoped to protest Yasukuni's enshrinement of their relatives who died fighting for Japan in the war.

About 50 descendents or relatives led by indigenous legislator Kao Chin Su-mei arrived near the shrine in central Tokyo in the morning on two buses. They decided to scrub the protest after police told them the shrine was surrounded by 100 rightwingers, Kao Chin said.

My initial thought, having read those paragraphs, was that the police were somehow acting in a shady manner to scare the Taiwanese away from Yasukuni. But sure enough, as the piece later reports, there were genuine "rightwingers" waiting for the Taiwanese at the shrine. The piece also drops this little tidbit concerning Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni:

The government said the prime minister's visits to the shrine are not official events and public money has not been spent on them.

But it did not explain why Koizumi signs the shrine's guest book using his official title.

Fine point, and a contradictory one, too. Unfortunately, it's also completely irrelevant. Koizumi is never going to stop visiting Yasukuni, especially if the Chinese want him to. I've said it before and I'll say it again: the solution to the current tensions in East Asia cannot be solved at Yasukuni alone. The shrine's symbolism has long since trumped its actual importance, consequently giving Yasukuni an entirely new brand of straight-jacket relevance. While it will remain a hot potato in East Asian politics, no conceivable action by Koizumi with regard to Yasukuni will be enough to satisfy the Chinese, Koreans, Taiwanese, and others. And that, precisely, is why the Chinese and others love to keep hanging the shrine over Japan's head.

While history cannot be completely ignored, and while Japan's collective memory can be disturbingly aloof, it's high time for East Asian politics to move beyond the Pacific War.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:31 PM to Asia

May 26, 2005

Ineffectual ringmaster

The Bush administration offers its comments on Japan's recent rough stretch:

A senior U.S. State Department official on Thursday expressed concern about recent conflicts between Japan and China and South Korea and encouraged them to resolve their differences, saying their relations are ''essential to stability and prosperity in Asia.''

China and Japan ''have many common interests, and we encourage stable relations between them and engagement on a full range of issues,'' U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill said in a House of Representatives hearing.

Nothing wrong with that. Though as is often the case with ostensibly impartial diplomatic statements, the United States is clearly taking sides. Japan's been a very well-behaved U.S. ally of late, and the administration looks out for its own. Plus, China is the next big enemy, anyway (right?), so there's no use in just delaying the inevitable testiness.

But what of South Korea, which like Japan but unlike China remains a rather legitimate U.S. ally? The Koreans have certainly had their issues with Japan, as well. Assistant Secretary Hill didn't forget about them:

Despite the discord between Japan and South Korea, Hill was upbeat on future relations.

''My own belief is that our democratic allies have both the will and the ability to resolve their disputes,'' he said, noting that the United States has urged the two countries to mend their ties and ''not to allow their differences to escalate.''

Again, nothing wrong with that. But fixing up relations between the United States' "democratic allies" in East Asia will require more than just generic congressional testimony, especially in light of things like this:

South Korea demanded Thursday that Japan discipline its No.2 diplomat after reports of a comment that his government could not share intelligence on North Korea because Washington no longer trusted Seoul.

The remark, attributed to Deputy Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi of Japan and reportedly made to a group of South Korean lawmakers in Tokyo on May 11, was disclosed this week in Seoul. The incident has pushed South Korea's already troubled relations with Japan to a new low.

On Thursday the South Korean Foreign Ministry called in the Japanese ambassador, Toshiyuki Takano, and demanded an apology. The Seoul government warned that bilateral relations could be "seriously affected."

According to South Korean politicians who were present at the meeting, Yachi said: "Since the United States does not have sufficient trust in South Korea, Japan finds it a problem to share information it has received from Washington with South Korea." [emphasis mine]

Who knows if what Yachi said was technically accurate. Thing is, it doesn't matter. A Japanese diplomat implies a lack of U.S. trust in Korea, and the Koreans, in turn, warn that this will damage bilateral relations -- with Japan. Think about that. If and when you do, chances are you'll have given it greater consideration than any of the parties involved in this ridiculous but all-too-serious spat.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:39 PM to Asia

May 25, 2005

Open for business

As previously discussed here, the BTC pipeline has finally opened for business, to great fanfare:

The presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey pulled orange levers Wednesday to send the first flow of Caspian Sea crude into a $3.2 billion pipeline seen as key to reducing the West's reliance on Middle East oil.

By year's end, the 1,100-mile pipeline is to ship up to 1 million barrels a day to Turkey's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.

President Bush, whose administration is seeking to diversify energy sources, said in a letter read at the ceremony by Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman that the pipeline "opens a new era in the Caspian Basin's development."

There's a fair variety of coverage about this opening, including a snippy piece in the Independent and a nostalgic, Azeri-focused take in the Times. Of greatest interest to me, however, is a fine piece in the Christian Science Monitor focusing on what the BTC pipeline means for Turkey:

For Turkey, which has few energy supplies of its own, the pipeline is the initial step in its effort to become a major energy player, not as a producer but as a transit point. In an era when countries are increasingly looking to diversify their energy sources, Turkey hopes to establish itself as a kind of energy supermarket, betting that controlling oil routes will turn out to be as strategically valuable as producing the stuff.

"Geographically, Turkey is endowed with advantages, so we would like to use those advantages to give Turkey a role as a supplier of energy resources," says a senior Turkish foreign ministry official involved in energy issues. "It gives Turkey relevance." [emphasis mine]

I've long been fascinated by Turkey's unique geopolitical position, and the BTC pipeline is a classic example of Turkey utilizing that position to its advantage. That Turkey benefits from the BTC pipeline as an energy transit point is no surprise. Nor, for that matter, is the obvious Turkish desire to have seen the pipeline project through to its completion, and on the specific BTC routing. But I doubt Turkey alone could have swung the route to its advantage. No, it called upon its stalwart ally in the United States to twist some arms and provide some capital. And why? Because Turkey is the indispensable country, for so many others, in so many ways. Remember that the BTC project stretches back years. In its earlier phases, before any ground had been broken, Saddam Hussein still ruled Iraq. To keep him in his box -- the desired Iraq strategy during the 1990s -- Turkey was vital. No one had any way of knowing that the United States would seek and execute a pretext to occupy Iraq, nor could anyone know that Turkey would be under the strong but democratic rule of a mildly Islamist Prime Minister, nor could anyone know that the party led by that Prime Minister would deny U.S. troops access to Turkey as a staging ground for invasion. The only constant was Turkey's prime geopolitical position and, despite invasion rebuffs, its alliance with the United States. My point is that the two are inextricably linked, and Turkey consequently has much greater influence than any other country its size ordinarily should. And as times and priorities change, so does the nature and orientation of Turkey's influence. As the CSM concludes:

"It was originally a US strategic thing, to get around Iran and Russia," says Gareth Winrow, an energy and foreign policy expert at Istanbul Bilgi University. "Now there is the EU wanting to diversify its resources and build new pipelines.

"These things are coming together - US interests, EU interests, and Turkish interests, and it's something Turkish officials know they can play on."

Another benefit of the BTC pipeline to Turkey, of course, is the reduced specter of dangerous tanker traffic in the Bosporus. That congested waterway is already much too polluted, and the prospect of vastly greater petroleum traffic within meters of Istanbul pleased no one. So while the BTC pipeline may entrench an unpleasant Azeri government, and while oil companies may be profiting exorbitantly, and while locals may have been displaced in the pipeline's construction, and while the whole project just perpetuates an unhealthy petrochemical obsession, it saves the Bosporus from greater pollution. Say what you will in opposition to BTC, but I think millions of Istanbulis are at least somewhat grateful for it.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:41 PM to Asia, Europe, Middle East

May 24, 2005

Connecting the dots

Our old friend Kong Quan at the PRC Foreign Ministry had something to say about Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi's slap in the face:

On the evening of May 23, in response to questions from the press, Spokesperson Kong Quan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the Chinese Government attaches great importance to Sino-Japanese relations and has made unremitting efforts to the improvement and development of the relations, which is well demonstrated by Vice Premier Wu Yi's visit to Japan. It is regrettable that, during her visit in Japan, the Japanese leader repeatedly made remarks on the visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which is inconducive to the improvement of the Sino-Japanese relations. The Chinese side strongly feels unsatisfied with it and sincerely hopes that both sides will work together to implement the five-point proposition put forward by President Hu Jintao, so that the Sino-Japanese relations could develop on a sound and stable track. [emphasis mine]

I must say, I'm surprised by Mr. Kong's forthrightness. He may not have spelled things out piece by piece, but tying Vice Premier Wu's snub to Koizumi's recent (and apparently unappreciated) comments on Yasukuni is pretty much spot on, I'd say.

Koizumi, for his part, got a little uppity:

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on Tuesday brushed aside China's claim that Japanese leaders' position on the war-related Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo led to the sudden cancellation of a meeting between himself and Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi.

"Not only the Chinese side has its say -- both sides have something to say," Koizumi told reporters at his office, referring to remarks by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman in Beijing that the Yasukuni issue prompted Wu to cancel the Monday meeting.

"I said I would meet. I'm not the one who canceled it," Koizumi said. "Don't you think the Chinese side is the one sticking to this issue?"

[...]

Koizumi indicated Tuesday that the Chinese claim will have no effect on his visits to the Shinto shrine as he reiterated about future visits, "I will make an appropriate decision." [emphasis mine]

Well that's a good way to de-escalate things, don't you think? I'm beginning to think that China and Japan actually prefer to be snippy with each other.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:43 AM to Asia

May 23, 2005

Sudden duty

This is pretty cold:

Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi abruptly canceled a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on Monday and returned to China a day ahead of her original schedule, prompting a sharp rebuke from top Japanese officials.

Tokyo was told Wu had shortened her stay in Japan due to an order from Beijing to return home for a ''sudden duty,'' Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda said. [emphasis mine]

Apparently, that "sudden duty" was to "screw the Japanese."

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:20 PM to Asia

May 21, 2005

More Yasukuni

Returning to a favorite topic here at Natural Selection, Koizumi clarified the distinction between his professional responsibilities and his personal interests:

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said Friday that when he visits the notorious Yasukuni Shrine he does so as a private individual and not in his capacity as premier, Kyodo News reported.

"I pay a visit as a person and not as duty of the prime minister," Koizumi was quoted as saying at a House of Councillors Budget Committee session.

"Junichiro Koizumi, who is prime minister, is paying a visit as an individual," he reiterated. [emphasis mine]

As I've discussed here before, Yasukuni in many ways is the crux of Japan's unsettled historical and diplomatic position in East Asia. The point Koizumi is making here is certainly legitimate, but it also misses the point in a monumental and quintessentially Japanese way. Koizumi's personal interests simply don't matter in this case, just as the personal interests of any head of government become secondary to professional considerations upon taking office.

His own visits aside, Koizumi also touched obliquely on the actual nature of Yasukuni:

On Friday, Koizumi reiterated that his visits to the Shinto shrine in Tokyo were to pay respect to those who died and to vow that Japan would never again wage war.

"The criticism that this glorifies war is not right," Koizumi said.

Well, maybe, but that doesn't matter. Taken together, Koizumi is basically dodging the whole Yasukuni issue. He is more cognizant of the Yasukuni controversy than perhaps anyone else. Yet he innocently defends his right to visit the shrine as he pleases, and he glances away the suggestions that Yasukuni itself is a problematic place. I think I can say with a fair degree of certainty that Koizumi's statements are far from the "concrete actions" that China has requested from Japan.

Despite this, Koizumi lamely claimed that his visits to Koizumi should have nothing to do with Japan's Security Council bid:

"My visits to Yasukuni Shrine and Japan's bid for permanent membership are separate issues and have no links," Koizumi told reporters

No matter how true such a statement should be, I'm fairly certain that Koizumi's barking up the wrong tree here. While I've criticized China for its recent, unimaginative, and historically-handicapped diplomacy vis a vis Japan, Koizumi himself is far from blameless for the current tensions.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:44 PM to Asia

May 14, 2005

China's charm

The IHT ran a piece today entitled, "Beijing charms its neighbors." Given China's recent behavior to the contrary, I wondered what this could possibly be referring to. Turns out, it's this:

China's increased economic power and these changing perceptions have prompted countries along China's periphery to readjust their relations with Beijing. As China's influence continues to grow, many of these countries look to Beijing for regional leadership or, at a minimum, take into account China's interests and concerns in their decision-making.

China's new proactive regional posture is reflected in virtually all policy spheres - political, multilateral, economical and military. Politically, bilateral relations with its neighbors have never been better; many formerly antagonistic relationships (Russia, India, Vietnam, South Korea, Indonesia) are now thriving.

Multilaterally, China's engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Central Asia reveals a key element in Beijing's enhanced regional profile - an increased appreciation of "soft power." Chinese media, music, food and popular culture are spreading as never before, while Chinese tourists are fanning out across the region.

Fair points, I agree. But I'm just not used to seeing such a positive appraisal of China's role in East Asian politics, especially not within the past few months. The piece goes on to suggest that while China's "charm offensive" does not necessarily threaten U.S. interests in the region, the positive feelings so assiduously being nurtured by China are strikingly universal. If for no other reason, China's burgeoning domestic market makes this assertion a reality -- China's (exporting) neighbors want a piece of the economic pie.

But much as East Asia may be united in its positive outlook toward China, it's also united by something much more negative and much less contemporary. Japan, appearing to wane in influence relative to China's meteoric rise, once occupied the better part of the region under rather brutal circumstances. The Chinese, for their part, have recently manipulated such historical resentment for domestic and international political gain. While to some this may appear a striking example of crass, unimaginative diplomacy, it may actually be rather astute, given the regional context. What better way to demonstrate regional leadership than by beating up on a universally resented historical foe? In terms of Japan-China relations, stirring up such tension does no good for China. But weighed against the unspoken camaraderie won in the process with its other Asian neighbors, maybe China knew what it was doing all along.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:42 PM to Asia

May 10, 2005

Fighter femmes

I see that the Pakistani Air Force will soon have some female pilots in its ranks. This has to be seen as a positive, if tentative, step. The real question is whether they'll be allowed to fly any of the fancy F-16s recently rangled from the United States. Perhaps, in the off-chance that the female pilots are allowed to fly the F-16s, the whole deal over the fighters will have been worthwhile. Or perhaps not.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:07 PM to Asia

May 06, 2005

Real exit strategy

Like many other countries before it (but very much unlike the United States in the future), it seems that Japan plans to withdraw its troops from Iraq. I can't say I'm terribly surprised by this. Koizumi already demonstrated his loyalty to the United States by contributing troops in the first place, which was no easy thing for him to do. And now that a popularly-elected government has been formed, the rationale for U.S. allies to keep their forces in Iraq is becoming weaker by the day. I don't think it's a coincidence that the Diet-imposed mandate for SDF operations in Iraq expires on December 14. Formal Iraqi elections, based on a fresh constitution, are due on December 15.

Another question: what will the Aussie soldiers who are protecting the SDF troops do once the Japanese leave?

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:25 PM to Asia, Middle East

May 03, 2005

Protester profile

There's a very good piece in the IHT about the kinds of Chinese who formed the backbone of the recent anti-Japan protests. Working class types, you would suppose? Nope -- middle class, urban professionals predominantly:

[Li Bin, the chief executive of a health-club chain] says his generation feels pride about China's status in the world. But he thinks the Japanese still look down on Chinese, much as they did 60 years ago. "The Japan issue is deep in our bones," he says.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:43 PM to Asia

May 02, 2005

Koizumi in Europe

Good account of Koizumi's meetings in Luxembourg with EU leaders, including interesting bits about the jockeying over the EU arms embargo on China as well as on the EU's apparent support for Japan's Security Council bid.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:19 PM to Asia, Europe

April 29, 2005

Homecoming

This is curious:

China's Communist Party chief and Taiwan's opposition Nationalist leader have agreed at historic talks to work to reduce cross-strait tension.

They made a commitment to "promote the reaching of an agreement to end the hostile situation", a spokesman said.

It was the first meeting between party leaders since the Nationalists lost the civil war and fled to Taiwan in 1949.

Whatever Lien's visit to the mainland means, Xinhua sure likes it.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:52 PM to Asia

April 28, 2005

Joining the club

Koizumi's in India to advance the two countries' joint goal of joining the UN Security Council. Together with Brazil and Germany, Japan and India have formed a quartet that has been actively lobbying for each member's admission to the Security Council, and their efforts have attained visibility with Kofi Annan's recent suggestions for UN reform. Making the Security Council more representative is an altogether proper and appropriate thing. While many other countries will also clamor for admission (Nigeria, South Africa, Pakistan, and Indonesia come to mind), this current quartet is an excellent start, for geographical, political, economic, popular, and historical reasons.

The trick, however, is getting the permanent five members of the Security Council to sign off on the reforms. To get anything serious done at the UN, you can't have strong opposition from any of those five permanent members. Who might oppose expanding the Security Council? Well, several, conceivably, insofar as any addition to the club would dilute the current members' power. But China, as always, stands out as a paragon of imaginative and productive diplomacy. In its current spat with Japan, China has not just voiced opposition to Japan's membership bid but has also actively made the point of supporting the bids of the quartet's other three aspirants. Whether this is intended to peel off members from the quartet's ranks is unclear -- thus far, the Chinese have not exhibited that much ingenuity in their recent diplomacy. And besides, the quartet members have had remarkable solidarity with each other throughout the process, which itself is an intriguing and promising development -- how else could you get four very different, very disparate, very important countries to cooperate so effectively and in such good faith?

My bet is that China is just doing this to spite Japan. While the Chinese might enjoy being the lone Asian power on the Security Council, they won't have that perk for long -- the impetus for some kind of UN reform is too strong. Unfortunately, however, I can't say I'm really surprised by the Chinese behavior. Even if they were not mired in their current tensions with Japan, simple geopolitics and national ego would almost dictate a Chinese opposition, in much the same way that France and the United Kingdom would oppose giving up their positions on the Council for a single EU seat. So why am I complaining? Perhaps it's because China is so undeniably an emerging power, one would almost hope for an equally new sense of diplomatic verve and creativity. Alas, it's not to be. China, so far, seems to be playing by the diplomatic rules of the game as they have been defined by its predecessors. Maybe it will take a bigger power to redefine the rules for the better.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:23 PM to Asia, Trans-geographical

April 27, 2005

Fun with state media

Think Chinese state media can't get any more heavy-handed than Xinhua? Think again:

Germany's correct attitude toward history has won it respect from various European countries and made it an important member of the European Union (EU). Japan, on its part, has been landed in an unprecedented isolation due to its willful distortion of history, denial of aggression and whitewash of its atrocities.

Germany actually serves as a realistic and bright mirror for Japan. Japan that wants to be a "normal country" should seriously compare itself with Germany, to see how Germany approaches history and takes history as a mirror.

The People's Daily Online has helpfully devoted a whole section to Sino-Japanese relations. In the above selection, they get extra points for using the "history as a mirror" metaphor, which seems to be a favorite phrase of obfuscation by the Chinese Communists. It'd be nice if they had some policy to back it up.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:37 PM to Asia

April 24, 2005

China's turn

Xinhua has said its piece on the Koizumi-Hu summit. I quote extensively, because it's hard to beat Xinhua in its original:

Hu initiated five proposals on developing the Sino-Japanese relations.

First, the Japanese government should strictly abide by the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, the Peace and Friendship Treaty, and the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration, take specific actions to forge a friendly and cooperative relationship with China facing the 21st century.

Secondly, the Japanese government should regard history as a mirror to reflecting on its wartime past. The aggression by the Japanese militarists against China in the 1930s and 40s brought tremendous loss and suffering to the Chinese people.

Remorse expressed for Japan's aggression against China and other Asian countries should be translated into action and no move should be made to hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and the people of other Asian countries again.

The Japanese side should take a serious and conscientious attitude toward the history, and deal with historic problems in a serious and sincere manner.

Thirdly, the Taiwan question should be correctly handled. The issue lies in the core of China's interest, involves the national sentiment of 1.3 billion Chinese people. China hopes the Japanese side fulfill its commitments by demonstrating through concrete actions its adherence to the one-China policy and opposition to Taiwan independence.

Fourthly, differences between the two nations need to be resolved through dialogues and peaceful negotiations. The two governments should actively work together to protect the relations from being hurt again.

Fifthly, the two countries should further strengthen communication and cooperation in various areas, encourage friendly contacts and activities between the two peoples, so as to further increase understanding and broaden mutual benefits, pushing the Sino-Japanese relations forward in a healthy and stable pace. [emphasis mine]

Nothing terribly new or unexpected here. I think the reference to "not hurting the feelings of the Chinese people" is a particularly helpful suggestion. At this point, following Koizumi's speech at Bandung, I'm more interested in seeing what the Chinese offer. This is a good start:

Chinese authorities on Sunday continued their tough vigilance against anti-Japan demonstrations, with police dispersing thousands of people who had gathered with the intention to demonstrate in Zhuhai City in the southern province of Guangdong.

In Beijing, police continued to keep a cautious watch outside the Japanese Embassy, where security had been tightened since earlier this month to head off vandalism.

There were no signs of protests in other Chinese cities. [emphasis mine]

To be sure, this behavior is more in line with what we should expect from the Chinese Communists. That it actually represents a smart thing diplomatically (and not one in terms of Chinese political freedoms) is one of the many tortured contradictions embedded in the current China-Japan tensions.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:38 PM to Asia

April 23, 2005

Who's Koizumi and Koizumi's Hu

Good background piece in the Washington Post today on how Koizumi's particularly assertive policies have fueled uncertainty in East Asia and the current tensions with China. Koizumi has always been seen a prime minister of a different cut, with his wavy hair and relatively young age. In terms of policy, he is one of the first post-war Japanese prime ministers to really try to move Japan past its war stigma and into a more deserving and appropriate role on the world stage. As we've seen, that's much easier said than done.

In terms of his summit with Hu, it seems to have been somewhat icy and inconclusive. Most reports seem to indicate Koizumi's public tone as more positive than Hu's, but who really knows what happened during their 55 minute meeting. That they met at all, though, must be seen as a positive sign.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:59 PM to Asia

April 22, 2005

Spirits of humility and otherwise

If not a "concrete action", Koizumi's latest speech is certainly a big deal. From Xinhua's remarkably straight reporting:

Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said Friday that with feelings of "deep remorse" and "heartfelt apology" over its wartime atrocities engraved in mind, Japan would stick to the principle of resolving all matters by peaceful means.

"In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations," Koizumi said at the opening ceremony of the ongoing Asian-African summit in Jarkata. "Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility."

"With feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind, Japan has resolutely maintained, consistently since the end of World War II, never turning into a military power but an economic power, its principle of resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to use of force," he said.

The prime minister said 50 years ago, Japan stood before the Asian and African nations assembled at Bandung to declare its determination to develop itself as a peaceful nation. "That spirit of 50 years ago remains steadfast to this day."

"Japan once again states its resolve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world in the future as well, treasuring the relationship of trust it enjoys with the nations of the world," Koizumi said. [emphasis mine]

To be sure, Xinhua's straight "reporting" here consists mostly of direct quotes from Koizumi's speech, and the quotes happen to suit its particular agenda. Regardless, Koizumi's statement is definitely important. In surveying the other relevent media outlets, the Daily Yomiuri notes that Koizumi's words emulate a similar statement of remorse issued by then-PM Tomiichi Murayama 10 years ago. It also notes that Koizumi's speech was "the first time that a Japanese prime minister had referred to the issue of the so-called Japanese perception of history ... at a major international conference." Kyodo, for its part, notes that Koizumi's speech takes on even greater importance in light of his scheduled meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the Bandung conference tomorrow:

While Koizumi said he believes it was ''only natural'' for Japan to demand an apology and compensation for the damage done during the protests, he added that would not form the major portion of his meeting with Hu.

''It is only natural to file a protest,'' Koizumi said. ''But taking up that alone is not the main purpose of the talks.'' He added some Japanese people have also damaged Chinese property in Japan in recent weeks. [emphasis mine]

Koizimi's statement is strong, clear, and remarkably unambiguous. While it alone cannot settle the recent tensions in East Asia, it's hard to imagine what more the Chinese (and South Koreans, let's not forget) could reasonably expect from the Japanese PM. Koizumi's upcoming upcoming tête-à-tête with Hu is also promising, as is his stated expectation for the meeting. He has every right to demand an official Chinese apology for the protests, simply because the evidence of government complicity in them is so clear. In light of Chinese attempts to bury their contemporary responsibility under Japan's historical one, Koizumi seems to have conducted himself admirably in recent days. The Chinese cannot reasonably expect much more from him until they themselves make some effort at contrition. And according to Xinhua -- this time, back in their more comfortable role as state mouthpiece -- they are:

A boycott of Japanese goods will damage the interests of both China and Japan, said Bo Xilai, Chinese minister of commerce.

In a recent interview with local press, Bo said some people have advocated to boycott Japanese commodities to express dissatisfaction with Japan's denial of its "aggression history." In fact, on the sidelines of the economic globalization, the production factors have been allocated in accordance with the law of value, and nations have been interdependent in the economic development.

Many famous Japanese brand goods are actually made by joint ventures, he said.

He voiced the belief that the people of advocating the boycott would express their patriotism in a sensible way, safeguard the stability of society and put their patriotism in their work to push forward the economic development.

He said the Chinese and Japanese peoples and economic circles have benefited from bilateral economic and trade relations, which is reciprocal. [emphasis mine]

So all is hopeful leading up to the Koizumi-Hu meeting? Not quite:

Just hours before Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi apologized, a Cabinet minister and more than 80 Japanese lawmakers visited a Tokyo shrine to Japan's war dead. China's Foreign Ministry expressed "strong dissatisfaction over the negative actions of some Japanese politicians" in visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, which also honor's Japan's executed war criminals.

"That President (sic) Koizumi expressed this attitude in this arena is welcome. We welcome it," ministry spokesman Kong Quan told reporters at a summit of Asian and African leaders. "But to express it is one aspect. What's of much more importance is the action. You have to make it a reality." [emphasis mine]

The role of Yasukuni in this whole affair is positively maddening. But Kong's statement at least sheds some light on what "concrete actions" the Chinese might have in mind for Japan to take. Koizumi's words are appreciated, yes, but how sincere are they when they are preceded by such a blatant visit to Yasukuni by a member of the PM's cabinet and 80 lawmakers? The whole episode is all too easily dismissed as a classic example of Japanese ambiguousness. If true, one would almost expect China's frustration to increase. But what if the timing of Koizumi's speech and the lawmakers' Yasukuni visit is not a result of Japanese ambiguousness but of Japanese democracy? Koizumi does not have the benefits of a massive state and media apparatus with which to control events or the movements of politicians in his own country, as someone like Hu Jintao does. I can't help but think of the parallels with Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount in 2000, which set off the Palestinian intifada that rages to this day. The visit was ill-timed and insulting, but in a democracy such as Israel (or Japan), the government cannot dictate the travel of every lawmaker. Hopefully, the current tensions in East Asia will not follow anything approaching the unfortunate route that they took in the Middle East following Sharon's ill-timed visit.

In any event, the Chinese have been just as ambiguous as the Japanese, especially with regard to the "concrete actions" they demand. Koizumi seems to have done as much as he can at this point, but the Chinese reaction was spoiled by this ill-timed Yasukuni visit by the lawmakers. It gave China a perfectly good excuse to dismiss Koizumi's statement and to prolong the haggling. Is the implication, then, that all would be well if Yasukuni were declared off-limits to government leaders? As powerful a force as Yasukuni is, I can't believe the Chinese would rest easy if such a scenario would come to pass. Too many outstanding issues would remain, from maritime boundary disputes to the UN Security Council to the ever-present textbook tensions. And besides, Yasukuni will remain an important and politically necessary stop for Japanese politicians for the foreseeable future. Blame that on Japanese ambiguousness or on Japanese democracy, but by continually barking up the Yasukuni tree, China is just making a bunch of noise. I am eager to see how the Koizumi-Hu summit goes tomorrow. Perhaps, with their leaders finally meeting face-to-face, Japan and China can stop shouting past each other.

UPDATE: The full text of Koizumi's speech is here, and a piece on China's explicit prevention of more anti-Japan protests this weekend is here.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:32 PM to Asia

April 21, 2005

Hopeful signs

Have the Chinese had enough of the protests?

The party's Central Propaganda Department held a rare emergency meeting on China-Japan relations at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Tuesday.

There, the Chinese Communist Party urged 3,500 senior political and military officials not to take part in unapproved demonstrations or any other actions that could harm social stability.

[China's foreign minister, Li Zhaoxin] also called on senior party, military and government officials to increase the "sense of law'' and be "calm and reasonable,'' according to the China Central Television network.

Although Li repeated China's stance that Japan should take a correct view on its wartime history, he said: "Currently, our country is in an important period of building a moderately well-off society in all aspects. We must fully realize and appropriately handle the importance of China-Japan relations.'' [emphasis mine]

Instead of protests, the Chinese Communists seem to prefer the lecture circuit route:

A group of former Chinese diplomats are giving a speech tour in Chinese universities to help officials and students correctly understand Sino-Japanese relations, according to official sources.

The speech tour, launched by the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, started on April 19 and will last six days with stopovers in Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Chengdu and Beijing, the official source said.

The series of speeches is meant to make government and CPC officials and students of higher learning institutes correctly understand the current international situation, the history and present situation of the Sino-Japanese relations as well as China's policy toward Japan.

Speakers of the group said Japan is an important neighbor of China, and the interests of the two countries have been intertwined with each other. Such a trend will continue in the context of economic globalization. [emphasis mine]

This all sounds rather promising, especially in light of this perspective:

The banners had been carefully printed, the slogans memorized. Then the students and young unleashed onto the streets of China's largest, most sophisticated city, where they were to speak sacred truths and make the enemies of the people tremble.

Chinese today have little experience in mass organized protests, so when the government tolerated -- some would say encouraged -- a huge anti-Japanese demonstration here that flirted with turning into a riot over the weekend, for many it bore echoes of the mass manipulation of students of another era, the Cultural Revolution. [emphasis mine]

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:14 AM to Asia

U.S.-Israel-China and arms

I humbly point to my latest Providence Journal piece, which I also include -- in its unedited, pre-publication, no-registration-required format -- in the extended copy of this post. It expands upon the U.S.-Israel-China arms triangle I first mentioned here.

Daniel Widome: Arms sales -- Liking Israel more than fearing China

Upon taking office, many Bush administration neo-conservatives saw China as this country’s main strategic rival. Officer cadets at West Point were taught that war with China was not a question of if but of when. Though 9/11 dramatically shifted everyone’s focus, one still cannot go a day without seeing headlines on China’s growing demand for energy, its active diplomacy in previously neglected corners of the world, or its rapidly modernizing military. In short, China is still there, still growing, and it still keeps neo-cons up at night.

Accordingly, you would think that the Bush administration would do everything it could to check China’s growing power, especially its military power. If you thought so, you would be right—in part. For sometimes allies listen to you, and sometimes they don’t. Other times, however, you don’t even mean what you tell them.

Following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the European Union imposed an arms embargo on China. Recently, however, the EU has moved to lift that embargo. For China, it is an embarrassing reminder of a long-ago incident; for the EU, the embargo stands in the way of the respect (and trade opportunities) that an emerging China deserves.

President Bush made very clear his opposition to lifting the arms embargo during his recent tour of Europe. Even prior to the neo-con fetishization of China as strategic rival, successive U.S. presidents have pledged to defend Taiwan against military attack from the mainland. While any conflict with nuclear-armed China would be a risky proposition, the prospect of facing advanced, European-made, Chinese-aimed weapons is even more disconcerting for U.S. commanders. Due to NATO co-development, many such weapons would actually be based on U.S. technology. Needless to say, these are not the kinds of weapons that West Point cadets were trained to face.

Bush’s European diplomacy, in a pleasant exception to the prevailing pattern, has seemed to pay off. The EU is now backtracking from a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. More hopefully, and perhaps more realistically, the talk coming from Brussels now hints that any future lifting of the embargo would be predicated on verifiable and specific improvements in China’s human rights record.

Another U.S. ally, however, is not listening to President Bush. An upcoming Pentagon report highlights Israel’s longstanding transfer of arms technology to China and its role in China's military modernization. It notes that China is about to launch the J-10 fighter, which will represent a significant leap in its air force’s capabilities—and which bears an uncanny resemblance to the Lavi, a prototype fighter that Israel developed from the U.S. F-16. The Bush administration has cried foul and registered its concerns with Israel. But the Israeli response? Nothing.

What explains the difference between the EU’s response to U.S. pressure and Israel’s? Is the Bush administration exerting the same level of pressure on Israel as it is on the EU? Or is Israel simply more stubborn than the EU member states? If China truly represents this country’s greatest strategic rival, why allow any ally to supply it with arms technology?

The answers to these questions might be perfectly innocent and simply indicate an Israeli stubbornness. The U.S. relationship with Israel is, after all, fraught with sensitivities and complexities. But President Bush has, if nothing else, proven himself to be a strong supporter of Israel and a close confidante of Ariel Sharon. Such support yields influence, the kind that can be used when the stakes are high. I have no doubt that if Bush truly wanted Israel to cease its arms technology transfers to China, he could find a way to make it happen. Israel, for its part, would not be happy to be denied further access to Chinese markets and yuan. But if the United States said so, it would happen. Yet it has not.

Either the Bush administration’s neo-cons suddenly see China as an emerging partner and not as a future adversary, or they are so friendly with Israel that their diplomatic carrots overrule every conceivable stick at each turn. I am inclined to believe the latter. Regardless, this U.S.-Israel-China triangle represents a fundamental hypocrisy in the Bush administration’s foreign policy. It begs an unnecessary and impossible question: Which extreme view is paramount, devotion to Israel or fear of China?

Such a policy construction endangers those West Point-trained officers who may one day have to face the Chinese in battle, the Taiwanese who face daily intimidation from the mainland, and ordinary Chinese—whose conditions may improve, incidentally, with the Europeans’ wise use of diplomatic carrots and sticks. For all of their sakes, let us be glad that the EU is an ally that listens.

Daniel Widome, based at Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies, is a former editor in chief of the Brown Journal of World Affairs and is author and editor of Natural Selection (http://watsonblogs.org/dwidome).

Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:59 AM to Asia, Middle East, U. S. Politics

April 20, 2005

Baby steps

Now how can Japan turn down China's demand for "concrete actions" to resolve the current tensions when they themselves are so graciously bending over backwards? To be sure, the Chinese offer represents the bare minimum of what's appropriate, and they'll need to reach out a bit more if they want to follow my advice of making reconciliation a truly collaborative process.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:07 PM to Asia

Friends when you need them

Some tentative chit-chat over an Australia-Japan free trade deal during Australian PM John Howard's visit to Tokyo. From the Sydney Morning Herald:

Before the talks with Mr Koizumi, John Howard played down the significance of securing a free trade agreement with Japan to the overall relationship between the two countries. "We are not talking here about inaugurating a free trade negotiation," he said. "We're talking about an examination, a scoping study, a feasibility study -- whatever way you want to describe it." The relationship would stay strong even if nothing eventuated, he said.

Australia's two-way trade with Japan last year was valued at $44.3 billion and could be expected to grow, mostly in Australia's favour, if there was a free trade deal. The biggest beneficiaries would be the farming and services sector, analysts said.

The Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, visited Tokyo last month to pave the way for negotiations on a deal. But Australia has been unable to overcome the fierce opposition of Japan's agriculture officials and the farming sector.

But regardless of any delay in a trade deal, the two countries have been particularly chummy of late, a state of affairs which has manifested itself half a world away. I'm sure the Japanese loved the timing of Howard's visit -- it's nice to be reminded of friends in the region (though that's somewhat in dispute) when the big kid on the block is causing such headaches.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:57 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ

April 19, 2005

Pipeline extension

It seems that the BTC pipeline (previously discussed here) will grow a tad longer, across the Caspian to the shores of Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, the United States has generously offered to assist Azerbaijan with Caspian security:

The so-called Caspian Guard will reportedly be headquartered in Baku and comprised of American troops trained for rapid response missions for regional crises. The guard is part of Rumsfeld’s overall strategy to re-craft America’s overseas military units from bulky Cold War bases to more deployable units flexible enough to put together different force packages for different operations. While specific information on the unit is hard to obtain, a recent report in the Wall Street Journal quoted Chief of U.S. European Command, General James Jones addressing the U.S. Congress about the guard. Jones said the U.S. plans to allocate some $100 million to cover the guard’s first 10 years of activities.

Awfully kind of Rumsfeld to lend a hand. I'm sure the support was offered solely out of the goodness of his heart.

UPDATE: Some more info here.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:49 PM to Asia, Middle East

April 18, 2005

Concrete mirrors

The visit of Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura to China this weekend does not appear to have been fruitful:

China refused to apologise for anti-Japanese protests yesterday, its foreign minister Li Zhaoxing telling his Japanese counterpart: "The Chinese government has never done anything for which it has to apologise to the Japanese people." [emphasis mine]

Koizumi, for his part, hopes a higher-level dialogue might smooth things over. Perhaps.

In yet another fine Xinhua piece, however, the Japanese are called upon to "take 'concrete actions' to face up with and self-examine its history of invasion." Well, ok. But exactly what "concrete actions" does China have in mind?

In line with the spirit of "taking history as a mirror and looking forward to the future" and the three key political documents on bilateral ties, China hopes the two countries can co-exist peacefully, maintain friendship for generations to come, conduct cooperation on a mutually beneficial basis and seek commondevelopment, Li said.

"That will serve the long-term interests of the two countries as well as world peace, stability and development," said the Chinese foreign minister.

Li said the a correct view of history is a precondition for improving and developing China-Japan relations.

China hopes that the Japanese side will take concrete actions to foot its pledge of facing up with and self-examining its history of invasion, and stop doing things that would harm the feeling of the Chinese people so as to thoroughly tackle relevant problems, Li said.

For his part, Nobutaka said the Japanese government will adhere to the spirit of "taking history as a mirror and looking forward to the future" and develop Japan-China friendship from the viewpoint of the overall situation of bilateral ties. [emphasis mine]

What exactly is "taking history as a mirror and looking forward to the future"? Is that the "concrete action" the Chinese want Japan to take? I'm sorry, but any mediation of the current tensions has to be a team effort, with ideally several East Asian states participating fully and willingly. China's presciption is one for vague humiliation, not realistic resolution.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:45 PM to Asia

April 17, 2005

Party investment

The Economist notes a key point in the China-Japan situation that I had overlooked:

The protests first turned violent in the south-western city of Chengdu on April 2nd, and erupted with particular fury in Beijing a week later. They were the biggest to take place in China since tens of thousands took to the streets across the country in 1999 in response to the bombing of China's Belgrade embassy by American aircraft during the Kosovo war. Those protests, initially condoned by the authorities, fizzled out after three or four days, when the government made it clear that enough was enough. This time the government appears more hesitant. Some Chinese activists predict further disturbances.

The big difference is that this time Japan is the target. In a country where public protest is usually quickly suppressed, anti-Japanese sentiment has proved hard for the authorities to handle. The [Communist] party bases its legitimacy in part on its (somewhat overstated) record of fighting Japanese occupation forces in the 1930s and 1940s. It traces its intellectual origins to a movement inspired by anti-Japanese protests in 1919. Animosity towards Japan is regarded as the hallmark of a patriot.

[...]

[This] year is replete with potential flashpoints: May 4th (the anniversary of the 1919 protests), July 7th (Japan's full-scale invasion of China in 1937); the 60th anniversary on August 15th of Japan's surrender and September 18th (the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931). [emphasis mine]

So the Chinese protests are not simply reflecting recent tensions or centuries-old competition with Japan. In the historical medium-term, the Chinese Communist identity is tightly interwoven with the struggle against Japanese invaders in the 1930s and 1940s. What this means is that the Party is much more invested in these protests than it was in the 1999 protests against the U.S. bombing of the Belgrade embassy. Those protests were conducted with implicit state approval, as the Economist notes, but they dissipated quickly, and U.S.-China relations didn't take much of a hit. This time, contemporary politics, historical memory, and political reputation are blending together to create an situation that is quite dangerous and unpredictable. I may have been too glib in my earlier assessment of the domestic politics of things.

What's at stake? China-Japan relations, sure, but if the Party isn't careful, maybe a whole lot more.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:39 PM to Asia

April 16, 2005

The Yasukuni Conundrum

More protests in China today, over the same contentious historical memory/textbook/UN Security Council/drilling issues with Japan. This is becoming an unnervingly common phenomenon in China, but this weekend's protests seem to have taken on a somewhat uglier flair:

Protesters vandalized three Japanese-themed restaurants before breaking at least nine windows at the consulate. They also broke the cash register at a ''shabu-shabu'' restaurant in Shanghai's prime shopping district.

On a road near the consulate, screaming protesters mobbed seven Japanese-style barbecue restaurants, prompting management to lock the doors. Some mounted cartoon effigies of Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi above the restaurant doors.

[..]

The Japanese Embassy said two Japanese men suffered minor injuries while being harassed by demonstrators in Shanghai.

According to the embassy, the two men were looking at a Japanese restaurant where a fire had occurred when they suddenly found themselves surrounded by a group of Chinese.

They fled to a police car stopped nearby, but the demonstrators followed and surrounded the vehicle. One of the car's rear windows was then smashed, with the pair suffering scratches from the flying glass. [emphasis mine]

Meanwhile, our good friends at Xinhua contribute additional helpful reportage of the situation. It is true that some very nasty fellows are interred at Yasukuni Shrine, and it is also true that Japanese Prime Ministers have a peculiar and wholly unnecessary habit of visiting Yasukini regularly -- it seems somehow symbolic of a national, collective complex. Furthermore, when I was at Yasukuni in 2003, the adjoining war museum contained some panels and displays that would not inaccurately be described as revisionist history, as this photo I took points out with sickening understatement.

But before I even got the museum, I had to walk through the heart of the shrine complex itself. Upon turning the corner to enter the Yaskuuni grounds, I thought I was in the wrong place. Music was playing, children were laughing, and yakisoba was sizzling. Out of sheer luck, I had stumbled upon the Mitama Matsuri (a Japanese festival), which takes place each summer at Yasukuni, and which I also took the following snapshot of. I must have stood out in the crowd that day -- a slack-jawed American, expecting a solemn venue, instead was wandering aimlessly through throngs of jubilant Japanese.

The contrasts here are obvious: jovial festivities at a controversial war monument, revisionist descriptions at an otherwise immaculate war museum. What does this mean? I'm not entirely sure, but I left Yasukuni that sweltering July day with my preconceived notions simultaneously confirmed and destroyed. Yasukuni is not the center of Japanese militarism and hatred that Chinese, Koreans, and others may take it for. But it does validate the worst kind of collective memory, confirming beyond any doubt that Japan has a long way to go in truly coping with its militarist past.

Contemporary politics, however, are too complicated to make blame a one-way street. While Japan collectively has much to do in reconciling its war memory with historical reality, it also embodies an amazing success story of a peaceful, prosperous, post-war recovery. Its Asian neighbors cannot, in good conscience, deny Japan the respect it deserves based solely on its actions over 60 years ago. To continue to do so represents not only a lack of diplomatic imagination, but a moral crime that smacks of hypocrisy.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:28 PM to Asia

Xinhua wakes up

Well, it looks like Chinese state media has finally taken notice of the recent nationwide protests against Japan. But this is just too cute:

Dear Chinese Friends:

I agree that Japan should come to terms with its past history. I also agree that Japan should not gain a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council. The Japanese government's attitude towards Japan's terrible mistakes of the early 20th Century, as indicated by its white-washed history books, its leaders' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, and statements by its politicians, all reveal that Japan is clearly not ready to gain entry into the U.N. Security Council at the present time. The fact that many Japanese politicians are still in denial of some of the most terrible crimes against humanity in history is very scary and a cause for concern in East Asia.

However, having said, let me make a plea to the protesters: Please, please don't blame the ordinary Japanese citizens living in China. It is O.K. to oppose the Japanese government, but it is not O.K. to hate an entire nationality of people. Some of the Japanese living in China are very friendly to China and may not share the views of their country's right-wing politicians. The same can be said of Americans living in China. Remember, many of us foreigners are private citizens. We do not work for or represent our governments.

If you hate an entire race of people and blame the people for the mistakes of their government, that is just wrong, wrong, wrong! This kind of hate and racism is the very thing that leads to wars, genocide, and discrimination. Yes, Japan did very terrible things in World War II. And yes, the U.S. shouldn't have bombed the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia in May 1999. But if you blame the Japanese and Americans who are friendly to China ,and who disagree with their governments' foreign policies, then China will lose its foreign friends. [emphasis mine]

It's not clear who this is supposed to be coming from. But boy, when Xinhua gets the whiff of a story -- especially one that's a couple weeks old -- they sure go after it with gusto.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:34 AM to Asia

April 15, 2005

Constitutional changes

This is probably a good idea:

A key legislative panel suggested today that Japan change its constitution to recognise that it has a military for self-defence after 60 years of official pacifism and to let a woman take the throne.

After five years of debate, a non-partisan group of 49 lawmakers studying revisions to the 1947 constitution imposed by the US said Japan's supreme law had many "gaps" with the modern age.

The report called for a national referendum of constitutional reforms. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has already backed revisions.

Kyodo and the Daily Yomiuri weigh in on the panel's recommendations, as well. The bit about women attaining the imperial throne shouldn't be too controversial, but you can bet that any attempt to touch Article 9 would set off howls in the region, especially given current conditions.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:13 PM to Asia

April 14, 2005

Headline placement

I'm sorry, but Xinhua is just sometimes too good to be true. On Thursday afternoon, the prominent headline in the upper right corner of their page reads, "China supports Germany to play greater role in UN." Score one jab against Japan's bid for a Security Council seat and three jabs for the other aspiring seat-holders (Brazil and India rounding out the foursome). Also credit China with some technical points for its goody-goody politicking of a key EU member state.

Move a couple headlines down the column on Xinhua's front page to see more news from Germany: "Schroeder to Japan: be 'self-critical' over history". Score another jab against Japan's collective wartime memory. Actually, this last jab might have to be waved off as a low blow.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:15 PM to Asia, Europe

Protesting protests, and drilling

The Japanese Foreign Ministry doesn't much like its Chinese counterpart's "blame Japan" strategy:

The Chinese government is obliged under international law to take responsibility to ensure the life and safety of foreigners, guarantee the legal activities of foreign enterprises and protect diplomatic missions. Expressing such statements, which seem to allow such violence, are to ignore the rule and order of the international community and cannot be said to be the behavior of a responsible government. The Government of Japan claims an apology and compensation for damages and so on from the Chinese side concerning these present incidents, and calls for its faithful responses.

That's all well and good. But when you consider that on the very same day Tokyo also announced that it would allow Japanese firms to conduct exploratory drilling in disputed waters, the Foreign Ministry's statement seems rather bolder. The Chinese Foreign Ministry, however, is itself no slouch:

Some citizens, dissatisfied with Japan's wrong attitudes and actions on issues concerning its history of aggression, took to the streets spontaneously to demonstrate and protest. The Chinese Government has been requiring demonstrators to remain calm and rational and express their attitudes in a lawful and orderly manner. We are not in favor of some individual incidents of extremist behavior in the protests. The relevant Chinese departments, the police included, have done a great deal to ensure the safety of Japanese organizations and citizens in China. Timely measures were taken so that the situation was quickly under control ... You can imagine what will happen without the timely mobilization of police force and other measures. [emphasis mine]

Very smooth. The rest of Spokesperson Qin Gang's press conference is just as good, and I highly recommend checking it out (along with the Foreign Ministry's very posh briefing room). The official Chinese line on Japan's drilling decision was unsurprisingly sharp, as well.

With the diplomatic ball back in Japan's court, Koizumi called for dialogue and is moving to send his Foreign Minister to China to do just that.

This Japanese drilling decision builds upon the Chinese protests, which were in response to some controversial Japanese textbooks, which followed Japan's recent coziness with Taiwan. All of this, within the past few months, is but the most recent iteration of centuries of competition between China and Japan. Such historical perspective is important to keep in mind. Still, the recent tension between China and Japan is noteworthy, and its magnitude does not represent the norm in East Asian politics. It is quite justifiably drawing greater attention from the world press, including the BBC and the IHT (as usual). The latter, especially, was able to extract some choice quotes from East Asian scholars:

"There are structural tensions between China and Japan, because they're both rising powers, and the question of history just adds emotional weight to those tensions," [Shi Yinhong, an expert on international relations at the People's University in Beijing] said. "Things look bad; this isn't a temporary downturn in relations.

[...]

"I don't have any doubt that Sino-Japanese relations are going to get worse before they get better," said Alan Dupont, an expert on East Asian security at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney. "I can see very clearly how tensions could result in military clashes in the East China Sea."

For people in the know, the recent tension between Japan and China might not be something that will painlessly blow over. It certainly requires close monitoring.

UPDATE: I hate to keep citing the IHT, but if they keep publishing good pieces like this one, I won't be able to stop:

Enraged about tendentious textbooks and territorial disputes in the East China Sea, Sun Wei, a college junior, joined thousands of Chinese protesting Japan in a rare legal march on the streets of Beijing last weekend.

Yet he said his enthusiasm waned when an overwhelming force of police and plainclothes security officers herded the crowd into tight groups, allowing people to take turns throwing rocks and eggs at the Japanese Embassy.

Told that they had "vented their anger" long enough, Sun and others were later shuffled onto buses and driven back to campus.

"It was partly a real protest and partly a political show," Sun said in an interview this week. "I felt a little like a puppet."

Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:22 PM to Asia

April 13, 2005

Euro-Sino update

I'm glad to see that the Europeans are starting to take my advice. While the IHT piece suggests that the EU arms embargo on China will eventually be lifted, it won't come cost-free for the Chinese:

Cristina Gallach, spokeswoman for Javier Solana, the EU's chief diplomat, said: "The timeline that we had in mind [for lifting the embargo] has bumped into several difficulties. The most important is the anti-secession law, and also relations between China and Japan."

[...]

[Javier Solana's personal representative on nonproliferation] Gianella said: "Nobody has said we are going to lift our embargo for free. It would require an important concrete step to be taken by the Chinese."

[...]

Asked whether the EU now planned to make the lifting of the embargo conditional on a gesture by China on human rights, [a French diplomat] said: "This link is indeed beginning to emerge in the discussion."

This can only be seen as a good thing. While an outright lifting of the embargo probably isn't called for, diplomacy is nothing without carrots and sticks. It seems that U.S. prodding has really made the EU realize that it's the party holding the chips in this equation, and incidentally, such prodding seems to be more effective than that dished out to other Chinese arms providers. The suasion the EU applies to entice European states to meet their club's membership criteria -- liberal economics, political freedoms, and more -- can be adapted to deal with the Chinese, with whom EU membership is clearly not an issue. Whether the embargo is eventually lifted, then, depends on what concessions the EU can reasonably extract from China. Determining the point at which the benefits of such Chinese concessions outweigh the very serious consequences of lifting the arms embargo will be very tricky. But no one ever said being a global player would be easy.

Elsewhere in the IHT, we have a very nice piece on the "strategic triangle" between the United States, the EU, and China:

"The United States sees China as a rising power and looks more at its hard power, while the EU sees it more as a society in transition," said David Shambaugh, an expert on China at George Washington University in Washington. "So while the EU's style is conciliatory, consensual, behind-the-scenes, the United States is more confrontational and focused on security issues."

Nothing original about the "strategic triangle" concept here -- everyone acknowledges that when one of these three entities moves, the others feel the reverberations. But the piece not-so-implicitly recognizes the EU as a genuine strategic force in foreign policy. Such force doesn't come from institutions or personalities or military might. Rather, it comes from this power of suasion that the EU is so uniquely configured to wield. Almost inadvertently, and by sort of backing into it, the EU is slowing finding its footing on the world stage.

UPDATE: Some more details here.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:13 PM to Asia, Europe

April 11, 2005

Post-protest

No new anti-Japan protests in China today, but I've come across a couple of interesting tidbits. First, a Chinese blog with what appears to be photos of the protests. I can't read the Chinese, but there's some colorful English on a few of the banners that I have no trouble interpreting.

Second, al Jazeera carries an AFP piece on the silence of Chinese state media regarding the protests, a phenomenon I've also been following. So far, it doesn't seem like there's any particular reason for the state media to cover the protests. They are obviously attracting attention abroad, where it counts, and they have had no trouble thus far in attracting self-sustaining attention within China. The government seems to want to offer the protests only tacit support -- anything more overt would be too clumsy and possibly counter-productive. China, after all, only likes free assembly up to a point.

Third, while Chinese state media may be silent, the Foreign Ministry has no such luxury. And their message? Blame Japan:

It must be pointed out that the Chinese side should not be held responsible for the nowadays situation of China-Japan relations. The Japanese side must seriously take and properly handle the history of Japanese aggression against China and other major issues of principle bearing on the feelings of the Chinese people. It should do more to enhance mutual trust and safeguard the overall interests of China-Japan relations, instead of doing the contraries.

Well, that's certainly a productive suggestion. I'm sure Koizumi will have that all wrapped up by tomorrow morning.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:55 AM to Asia

April 10, 2005

Friend to foe

Laura Rozen (via Matt Yglesias) points out a Boston Globe piece on an upcoming report that highlights the Israeli transfer of arms technology to China and its role in China's ongoing military modernization. Laura and Matt, quite wisely, further explore how and why such a pessimistic assessment could be used to justify particular expenditures in the U.S. defense budget. As has been noted here, there remains a strong constituency in U.S. policymaking and military circles that considers China to be this country's primary strategic adversary in the medium- to long-term. It is clearly within their interest to highlight China's growing military and geostrategic capacity, which has also been noted here.

In such a context, then, it's clear why the United States is pushing the EU so hard to retain its arms embargo on China. But why not a similar kind of pressure on Israel, whose technology transfers to China are nothing new? To be sure, the United States has known about such transfers for some time, and the Bush administration has registered its displeasure. But such complaints do not seem to have shut off the technology spigot from Israel to China. Why? Is the Bush administration exerting the same level of pressure on Israel as it is on the EU? Is Israel particularly more stubborn than the EU member states? If the Bush administration truly wanted Israel to cease its technology transfers to China, couldn't it find the right pressure points on which to squeeze Israel? I honestly don't know. But I'm inclined to think that there is more here than meets the eye.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:55 PM to Asia, Middle East, U. S. Politics

April 09, 2005

"If you are a patriot then you must oppose Japan"

More honest outpouring of Chinese public opinion:

Thousands of Chinese smashed windows and threw rocks at the Japanese embassy and ambassador's residence in Beijing on Saturday in protest against Japan's wartime past and its bid for a U.N. Security Council seat.

Protesters pushed their way through a paramilitary police cordon to the gates of the ambassador's residence, shouting "Japanese pig come out."

As of posting time, no mention of the protests from Xinhua, but Kyodo's got it covered. They note that the Chinese government is not without remorse, commenting that, "China expressed regret at the throwing of rocks later Saturday." Well, to be fair, perhaps the rocks were a bit much.

The title quote comes from the stoic correspondents of the BBC.

UPDATE: Good stuff from the Christian Science Monitor, as Japan registers a formal complaint and the protests in China expand beyond Beijing. As of Sunday evening, still not a peep from Xinhua.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:56 PM to Asia

April 08, 2005

Buses to boats

The Christian Science Monitor makes an interesting connection between the newly inaugurated bus service in Kashmir and naval geopolitics. Jim Bencivenga of the Monitor notes that any hint of reduced tensions on India's northwestern land border with Pakistan will direct military planners' attention southward, toward the ocean that bears their country's name, and northeastward, toward a China that poses a qualitatively very different threat than Pakistan.

On the merits, this emphasis on the naval geopolitics of Asia is probably appropriate. India has recently increased naval expenditures, perhaps following some strategic advice offered a few years ago. China, for its part, is also rapidly expanding its naval capabilities, and it has not overlooked the Indian Ocean in the process. More broadly, the comparison and/or rivalry between China and India is an issue of great importance, and it has been written about quite extensively. The Economist noted as much in a recent survey of China:

An unstated assumption of this survey has been that India and China are rivals. That is certainly the way it seems from India. In economic growth, global influence and military might, India cannot help but measure itself against its neighbour. Ever since China's rout of India in a brief but bloody war in 1962, this comparison has been tinged with a sense of injustice, humiliation and suspicion.

But this is a rather one-sided competition. India desperately wants the international standing and respect that China already enjoys. In particular, it wants this status symbolised, as China's is, through a permanent, veto-wielding seat on the United Nations Security Council. If China measures itself against any country, however, it is America.

Its relationship with India, moreover, is changing: diplomatic relations are better than at any time since 1962, and trade is booming. The two civilisations have cultural, religious and trading links dating back 2,500 years. They are not doomed to be enemies. So is this the dawn of a new era of partnership and co-operation, the creation, as some suggest, of an “India-China nexus” that will change the world?

But what of this connection to Kashmir, as the Monitor attempts to make? Surely, any sign of communication across the Line of Control in Kashmir is good news. But a new bus service does not represent a guarantee or ironclad predictor of better relations with Pakistan. Indeed, if the United States has anything to say about things, it seems that it would act to increase India-Pakistan tensions, for whatever reason. While India may justifiably see China as its long-term, strategic competitor, I don't think that new bus service in Kashmir will enable it to wholeheartedly shift its military, diplomatic, or budgetary emphasis toward China. In terms of state-based challanges to Indian interests, Pakistan will remain at the top of the list in the near-term. The tortuous (and typical) ups-and-downs in Kashmir alone should not be taken by India as a sign to swing the entirety of its gaze around the compass.

UPDATE: Nice piece on India-China in the IHT.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:43 PM to Asia

April 07, 2005

Neighborly relations, Round 2

There's been some conflicting reports about Malaysian PM Abdullah Badawi's recent visit to Canberra. The IHT casts a rather positive light on things:

A decade ago, a prominent Malaysian politician had sharp words about Australia's relationship with East Asia: "If I look at a map, I believe that it says that Australia is not part of Asia," he said.

On Thursday, that same politician, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, now Malaysia's prime minister, was in Canberra exchanging warm compliments with Prime Minister John Howard and announcing that the two countries were starting talks on a free-trade agreement.

When a reporter asked Abdullah whether Australia would be invited to a summit of East Asian leaders in Kuala Lumpur later this year, the prime minister said, "My policy has been one of inclusiveness and not excluding anyone." [emphasis mine]

But other sources paint a much more pessimistic picture. The Sydney Morning Herald cuts right to the chase:

The Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, declined to invite Australia to the East Asian summit it will host later this year during his talks with the Prime Minister, John Howard, in Canberra yesterday, though the two leaders agreed to begin negotiations on a free trade pact.

The failure of the Federal Government to secure an invitation prompted accusations from Labor that Mr Howard's refusal to sign ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, a non-aggression pact already signed by China, Japan and South Korea, had jeopardised Australia's chances of inclusion in the new regional economic community.

Earlier in the week, the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, threw his support behind Australia's inclusion in the East Asian summit, which would provide a crucial economic and strategic opportunity for Canberra. [emphasis mine]

Of course, both accounts could be true, and agreeing to begin negotiations on a free trade pact is a promising outcome. But the discrepancies in tone stand in stark contrast to the generally positive coverage of John Howard's meeting with Indonesian President Yudhoyono earlier this week. Yudhoyono, for instance, had indicated his support for Australia's inclusion in the upcoming East Asia Summit, which Badawi declined to second.

And what of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation to which the SMH refers? It's true that in his characteristic style -- one which helps fuel criticism that he is too close to President Bush and U.S. foreign policy -- John Howard declined to sign the non-aggression treaty, primarily because he wanted to retain the freedom to strike at threatening terrorist targets in neighboring states, if the need arose. Howard's snubbing of the treaty was made all the more insulting given that took place during a special ASEAN-Australia "commemorative summit" in Laos last year. But that didn't seem to bother Yudhoyono too much, at least with regard to an invitation to the upcoming East Asia summit, nor does it seem to bother Japan (which, admittedly, is not a member of ASEAN nor is a primary sponsor of the upcoming summit).

So what to make of Badawi's reluctance to invite Australia? Who knows. Badawi will be the host of the summit, so he is justifiably more sensitive to the guest list than any other Asian leader. And to be sure, the Australian relationship with Malaysia goes back a long way and remains strong. Perhaps the variable and somewhat conflicting coverage of the Howard-Badawi meeting, then, has more to do with the vagaries of the media than with the any actual troubles in the relationship between Australia and Malaysia.

UPDATE: Nice recap of Australia's "Asia week" from the BBC.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:44 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ

April 06, 2005

Too much of a good thing

Despite its authoritarian nature and otherwise stringent antipathy toward anything resembling free assembly, the Chinese government has been known to harness popular opinion when it was deemed to suit the national(ist) interest. It should be no surprise, then, that in the case of China's recent difficulties with Japan -- in which historical grievances have amplified the contemporary ones -- public opinion has been used generously for the good of the cause.

This is a risky course to take for any authoritarian state, of course. Let the public loose -- even if for a good, nationalist cause -- and they are liable to get a little out of control:

Faced with a spreading grass-roots campaign in China to boycott Japanese goods to protest Japanese war crimes, two high-ranking Chinese government officials met Wednesday with Japanese business leaders and called instead for greater trade between China and Japan.

Tang Jiaxuan, a former Chinese foreign minister and ambassador to Tokyo who now serves as a senior government adviser, met with a senior executive from the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. Wu Yi, a deputy prime minister in charge of trade, met with the president of the Japanese YKK Group, according to reports on the state-run Xinhua news agency.

The two meetings were evident attempts to counter an anti-Japanese campaign that officials may fear has gotten out of hand. While state-controlled media such as China Daily seem to have encouraged anti-Japanese sentiment, the extent of it may have taken the Beijing government by surprise. [emphasis mine]

This is as clear a sign as any that China knows it's not in its interest to let tensions with Japan rise beyond a certain point. The two countries are too economically interconnected for either to gain from a serious degradation of relations. Perhaps in 10, 15, or 20 years, things will be different -- Japan could be relatively weaker economically, or China could have a much more modern and competent military with which to throw its weight around. But for now, China is content to use tensions with Japan to rile up helpful nationalist sentiment and to remind observers that it's an emerging power. Once the threat of losing Japanese investment and trade becomes plausible, it's time to reel in the people ...

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:03 PM to Asia

Contradictory?

I've seen two accounts of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Pakistan, one unambigiously positive, the other less so.

First, from BBC:

"China will never seek hegemony," said Mr Wen, who is on his first South Asian tour since taking office last year. [emphasis mine]

And second, from the Pakistani press:

China on Tuesday held out a categorical assurance to Pakistan to defend its "sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity" as Prime Minister Wen Jiabao began a three-day visit to the country. [emphasis mine]

Hmm ... while not literally in contradiction with each other, don't these two statements send slightly different messages?

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:02 PM to Asia

April 05, 2005

Contested texts

In what has become almost an annual ritual, the Japanese Education Ministry's recent approval of textbooks for the 2006 school year has been met with regional outrage. What will be some of the changes for the coming academic year?

Of the newly approved middle school textbooks, some augment more basic content in the hope of increasing the basic academic abilities of students, which is said to have been declining recently.

Textbooks for all of the nine subjects taught at middle school, except for art, have had advanced content added to them.

The number of pages in textbooks for the main five subjects -- Japanese, mathematics, science, social studies and English -- have increased by an average of 10 percent.

The advanced content includes: Inequality (in mathematics for the first grade), quadratic formula (in mathematics for the third grade), regularity of inheritance (in science) and ion (in science). Also, the periodic table of the elements is used in all science textbooks.

There's nothing controversial about "increasing the basic academic abilities of students," is there? In principle, no. It's the reference in one of the textbooks to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre -- in which estimates of Chinese killed run as high as 300,000 -- as an "incident" in which "many people" died, and in another civic studies text to the disputed Takeshima/Tokto islands as being illegally occupied by South Korea. Such language is not unprecedented, nor is the reaction to it. That the regional uproar is so unsurprising is a testament to Japan's tortured and (some would argue) incomplete reconciliation with its role in World War II and its collective memory thereof.

What makes this year's textbook ruckus even more interesting, however, is the unusually tense regional context. In recent months, Japan has found itself at increasing diplomatic odds over Taiwan and with China and South Korea. What's more, Japan has been throwing its weight around further afield by deploying troops to Iraq and in angling for a seat on the UN Security Council. I think this is entirely appropriate. Japan's economic weight is not matched by its diplomatic clout, creating an imbalance that is unnecessary and harmful 60 years after World War II. But a Japan that appears unremorseful for its past -- especially in the eyes of the powerful neighbors that bore the worst of that past -- isn't the best impression to give for a country that aspires to greater world influence.

But this cuts both ways. To be sure, Japan has at the very least been incomplete in its historical reckoning. But at what point will such reckoning become "complete," and who will judge this? It's very possible that China, South Korea, and others have made a strategic decision to rely on Japan's historical reconciliation (or a perceived lack thereof) as a key tool in their contemporary dealings with Japan. There are a plethora of important economic and security issues with which Japan and its neigbors must reckon on a daily basis. But if Japan's neighbors continually hang the burden of imperial history over its head, regional relations will only be able to proceed so far. It is such a realization that leads to frustration in Japan and encourages the growth of far-right, unhelpfully nationalistic sentiment.

It was in this vein that I was struck when reading about the current textbook dust-up. Consulting Chinese or Korean sources, one might naturally assume that the controversial textbooks are indoctrinating the youth of Japan en masse. But for the most controversial textbook, which was among those updated yesterday, this isn't necessarily the case:

The history textbook was adopted in 2002 by less than 0.1 percent of schools, all of them for children with disabilities, although it became an instant bestseller when it went on sale at general bookstores in mid-2001. [emphasis mine]

This doesn't by any means diffuse the controversy, but it provides a needed perspective that is often overlooked -- the textbook ruckus may be more about smoke than fire. It also suggests an important point regarding any potential improvement in contemporary East Asian relations. Finger pointing aside, a complete reconciliation of issues surrounding Japan's collective war memory may be something that Japan alone cannot accomplish.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:36 PM to Asia

April 04, 2005

Neighborly relations

Opponents of Australian PM John Howard's foreign policy like to point out what they see as his overemphasis on relations with the United States to the detriment of those with Australia's Asian neighbors. This criticism has been several years in the making, and it usually consists of a few key points. First, relations with Indonesia, Australia's most populous (and most proximate) neighbor and the country with the world's largest Muslim population, have been somewhat strained ever since the Australian-led UN mission in East Timor in 1999. Second, Howard has simultaneously brought Australian foreign policy closer to that of the United States, most notably by fully participating in the U.S. mission in Iraq. Taken together, Howard's critics argue, such actions and others represent a fundamental foreign policy shift away from Asia and too close to the United States.

But is this critique wholly justified? Peter Hartcher of the Syndey Morning Herald thinks not:

The whole framework for Australian political discussion about foreign affairs has been a false and fruitless one for decades. This is the idea that there are only two options -- Asia or "the West", which, in Australian politicalspeak, means the US -- and there is some sort of trade-off for a government in emphasising one over the other.

[...]

An exporter wants markets to grow everywhere, and wants a government that will open the way wherever it might be blocked. And the woolgrower knows that it is no use to sell to China if the US is in trouble, because the US is the key market for China's textile exports. And so on. The exporter needs America and Asia.

Likewise, in diplomacy a country's influence is increased if it has weight with a larger number of other countries. To achieve an agreement on arms proliferation or fisheries practices or just about anything, a government needs influence in Washington and Asia, and, of course, elsewhere too.

Such an assessment is quite timely. This week, the heads of government of both Indonesia and Malaysia will visit Canberra. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's visit has already concluded. His country's relationship with Australia has been driven by sacrifice and emotion in recent months and years, through shared terrorist bombings and through Indonesia's recent natural disasters. In the context of the latter, Australia has offered nearly US$1 billion for tsunami relief, and nine Australian servicemen have recently died in the provision of that aid. In his address at Parliament House, Yudhoyono emphasized these connections. He also vowed to promote Australia as an integral part of Asia, and he pledged to begin cooperation with Australia on a new security pact.

Such a successful visit, it would seem, by such an important Asian neighbor should go a long way in silencing critics of Howard's "unbalanced" foreign policy. It seems that much of Australian public opinion would support Howard's recent diplomacy, as well. If the visit by Malaysian PM Abdullah Badawi later this week is only half as successful as Yudhoyono's -- an outcome which is far from guaranteed -- Howard's critics may be left with even less to say.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:15 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ

April 03, 2005

Tit-for-tat, plane-for-plane

In a nice example of dishing out what you've been dealt, the Russian ambassdor to India has criticized the U.S. decision to sell F-16s to Pakistan:

These aircrafts (F-16s) are used for surveillance over a large area. [The] United States should reconsider its decision as it could tilt the strategic balance in the region ... it will be a pity if the ongoing peace process to build confidence and goodwill, which is at a fragile state, is interrupted by U.S. decision.

Valid criticism, perhaps, and also a not-so-subtle attempt to harken back to the chummy Soviet-Indian relationship of the Cold War. But does anyone catch the contemporary reflection here? Russia itself has recently sold military equipment to Venezuela, to much U.S. consternation. Russia is also in talks to sell Chavez some MiG-29s -- fighters, coincidentally, that are roughly comparable to F-16s. So the United States criticizes Russian warplane sales to Venezuela, and Russia returns the favor by criticizing U.S. warplane sales to Pakistan.

Will any policy change come from this? Of course not. It's just a cute tit-for-tat that will fade away soon enough, and it probably won't have any lasting effect on U.S.-Russian relations. One thing does stand out for me, however. In the above analogy, Venezuela and Pakistan pair up neatly. Now that is an association I've never thought about ...

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:10 PM to Americas, Asia

April 02, 2005

Pearly Pakistani port

Returning briefly to the topic of China's geopolitical coming-of-age, I noticed this interesting piece that I had missed when originally published a month ago. It highlights Chinese assistance in developing a deepwater port at Gwadar, in Pakistan. The Chinese and Pakistanis have a long history of close, strategic cooperation, and this particular case seems to be a win-win deal for both countries. The reason? Location, location, location. Pakistan gets the investment boost it needs to complete a long-dormant intrastructural improvement. But Gwadar also happens to be in the far southwest of Pakistan, giving it additional strategic flexibility vis-a-vis India by having a deepwater alternative to Karachi that is further from Indian territory.

For China, this location is also beneficial. Gwadar is right on the Strait of Hormuz, through which all seaborne Persian Gulf oil must pass. One can safely assume that in return for investment, Pakistan will give China a fair number of privileges at its new port. Gwadar seems to be one of China's "string of pearls," as they've been called: a network of strategically located seaports and naval bases that allow China to project power in the places it needs to but physically cannot from its own territory. Come to think of it, the concept of estabilishing bases in strategic corners of the world is a time-honored tradition among great powers. If that's what China hopes to become, it sure is following from the right playbook.

I note this story not out of some irrational fear that China will necessarily become the next great menace to the United States (though it surely ain't perfect). Rather, I'm intrigued in it more as a case study of how a country becomes a power in the 21st century, considering the end of the Cold War, the advent of globalization, the "war on terror," and everything else. I think this process is eminently fascinating, and China currently provides the best example of how a modern-day geopolitical butterfly will emerge from its increasingly confined cocoon.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:30 PM to Asia, Middle East

March 31, 2005

Baku-ed up

First, the Commander of the Turkish Navy visits Azerbaijan and pledges assistance to ensure the security of its Caspian oil fields. Then, we learn that the Turkish Land Forces Commander will visit Baku in April to discuss joint Turkish-Azeri military exercises. Why all the chumminess?

In the 1990s, much ink was spilled about Turkey's foreign policy ambitions in Central Asia. The break-up of the Soviet Union had produced a bevy of newly independent, ethnically Turkic states in Central Asia in need of recognition and assistance. The fall of the Soviet empire had also produced a power vacuum, into which new, outside influence could be exerted. Turkey, it was felt, was the state that would most logically take advantage of these new circumstances. And to some extent, it did. But shifting governments, economic difficulties, European obsessions, and natural disasters continually directed Turkish attention away from Central Asia. Following 11 September 2001, Central Asia took on a whole new level of geopolitical significance, and the Turkish window of opportunity closed.

But Turkey still had its foot in the door, most significantly in the form of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. This pipeline, long a dream of Turkish and U.S. geostrategists, will take oil from Azerbaijan's Caspian fields directly to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. While costlier than a shorter pipeline-tanker combination favored by the Russians -- look at any map of the Black Sea region to see why -- the BTC pipeline will save the narrow and already overcrowded Bosporus and Dardanelles passages (and the adjacent millions in Istanbul and its environs) from vastly increased tanker traffic. Through port fees, of course, the BTC option also favors Turkey economically. After years of deliberation, construction, and delays, the BTC pipeline is finally scheduled to open later this year. The Turks already control the petroleum terminus at Ceyhan -- can it be any wonder that they want to help secure its origin at Baku? In the process, Turkey may inch its way back to a position of influence in Central Asia.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:18 AM to Asia, Europe, Middle East

March 30, 2005

Chinese trailblazing

On the topic of China's expanding influence in the developing world, the Economist recently ran a piece (locked, unfortunately, behind a subscription firewall) about Brazilian-Peruvian cooperation on completing a paved road link between Brazil's agricultural heartland and Peru's Pacific ports. The motivation? The vast Chinese market for Brazilian soya. But as the article points out, benefits will also be found closer to home:

This great road link is not a new idea. Peru's government hacked a trail through the jungle to the border in 1965. In the 1970s, a military government bought a 700-metre suspension bridge from Austria to span the Madre de Dios, a mightier river than the Acre. But the steel girders for the bridge have remained in their boxes since arriving in Peru in 1978. They might have remained there for another quarter-century had Lula's government not shown enthusiasm for the project. It is putting up $420m of the $892m cost for the highway. For Peru, the road is expected to provide some 20,000 jobs, one way or another, during construction. Once open, officials hope it will attract business and more jobs to some of the country's poorest towns in the Andes and the jungle. They talk of a new export market opening up in Brazil for such products as paprika and artichokes.

Brazil's ambitions for the road are even grander. It already sends 18% of its exports to Asia, and that share is rising fast. China is lapping up Brazilian soyabeans and wood pulp, much of which is produced in the country's centre-west region. At present, these goods have to be carried to Atlantic ports or trucked across Argentina to Chile. The new road will provide a much shorter route. Officials expect a daily flow of some 400 40-tonne trucks from Brazil. This should encourage investment in Peru's inefficient and run-down ports.

This is an excellent example of how China's burgeoning power can be a force for good. With the vast Chinese market as motivation, developing states have an added incentive to complete long-dormant infrastructural improvements, thus benefiting local economies. The losers in this process, of course, are the same ones often cited by globalization and neoliberal opponents. The local environment is bound to be strained by the increased commercial traffic, and indigenous cultures may be displaced or even destroyed by the influx of outsiders. But this case just goes to show that the new geopolitical and economic realities created by an emerging China are much too complex to be singularly dismissed or condemned. The trick will be to recognize and adapt to such new realities, and perhaps even to modulate them if they get out of hand.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:11 PM to Americas, Asia

"Look East," stay stable

What's one of the surest signs that China is aspiring for greater status and power? Meddling in African politics, of course:

China is increasingly making its presence felt on the continent - from building roads in Kenya and Rwanda to increasing trade with Uganda and South Africa. But critics say its involvement in politics could help prop up questionable regimes, like Mr. Mugabe's increasingly autocratic 25-year reign.

"Suffering under the effects of international isolation, Zimbabwe has looked to new partners, including China, who won't attach conditions, such as economic and political reform" to their support, says a Western diplomat here. Of China's influence on this week's elections, he adds, "I find it hard to believe the Chinese would push hard for free and fair elections - it's not the standard they're known for."

[...]

Here in Zimbabwe, China also may be helping to support one of Africa's more oppressive regimes. The radio-jamming equipment that has prevented the independent Short Wave Radio Africa from broadcasting into the country is Chinese, according to the US-funded International Broadcast Bureau. [emphasis mine]

In Africa, it seems, China is taking a page right out of the U.S. Cold War playbook. I doubt China cares as much about Mugabe, Kibaki, or Kagame as it does about oil, gas, and platinum. Stability (translation: reliable access to resources) is China's guiding light in Africa. Sometimes this will be to the benefit of Africans, especially when the Chinese interpretation of stability includes development assistance, intrastructural improvements, or increased trade. Promoting stability in Africa, of course, will also frequently place China on the unsavory side of events. But controversy is nothing new to China, and I'm sure it's much more concerned with the domestic variety than the African.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:23 PM to Africa, Asia

March 27, 2005

Running guns (and planes)

The U.S. decision to supply F-16s to Pakistan was rightly big news late last week. U.S. policy toward that country is rife with contradictions. Pakistan is a "major non-NATO ally," yet much of its population is radically Muslim and militantly anti-United States; it was vital in the invasion of Afghanistan and remains so in the ongoing "war on terror," yet it is an arch-proliferator of WMD; it fits within Bush's mission to spread democracy and smite tyranny, yet it's ruled by an unelected military leader. And as Jai has noted, while F-16s would be overkill for al-Qaeda hunting, they're perfect for nuke-carrying. India's displeasure, then, is perfectly understandable.

The Bush administration appears to have been prepared for this. Just as the transfer of fighters to Pakistan is announced, the State Department unveils plans to make India a "major world power." At the very least, it's quaint and amusing that the U.S. government has granted itself such kingmaking authority. But the details?

We understand fully the implications, including military implications, of [helping India become a major world power]. This includes political moves, like the President will invite Prime Minister Singh -- is inviting Prime Minister Singh to visit him in July here in the United States. The President would also like to travel to South Asia later this year or early next year and those presidential meetings, in turn, will be consolidating an enhanced dialogue on three tracks.

First, strategic dialogue. The strategic dialogue will include global issues, the kinds of issues you would discuss with a world power. Regional security issues, things like the tsunami situation or Nepal. And India's defense requirements, high-tech cooperation, expanding the current High Technology Cooperation Group and manufacturing licenses, even working towards U.S.-India defense co-production.

Thus, it would follow that the U.S. will respond positively to the current Indian request for information on its bid to sell -- or its bid for people who are willing to sell India its next generation of multi-role combat aircraft and the U.S. will work with U.S. companies that seek to participate in the competition for this sale.

That's not just F-16s. It could be F-18s. But beyond that, the U.S. is ready to discuss even more fundamental issues of defense transformation with India, including transformative systems in areas such as command and control, early warning and missile defense. Some of these items may not be as glamorous as combat aircraft, but I think for those of you who follow defense issues you'll appreciate the significance. [emphasis mine]

Basically, what we have here is the Bush administration buying off and balancing bitter foes with weaponry. There is certainly a precedent for this -- ever wonder why Egypt gets so much from the United States? In that case, however, the circumstances are much clearer. The United States had long supported Israel, so increased aid to Egypt sent a particular message. More importantly, the United States had brokered a peace process between the two countries, culminating at Camp David in 1978, in which proportional military assistance to Israel and Egypt represented a deliberate component of a broader, more strategic process. In the case of India and Pakistan, however, the U.S. strategy appears to be lacking. Inasmuch as there is a India-Pakistan peace process, the United States is not its sole broker, and its leverage is consequently lacking. Any attempt to modulate the situation through arms transfer is necessarily risky and incomplete, given the lack of broader, strategic framework for peace.

In lieu of an effective strategy, then, the Bush administration is playing geopolitics (nothing new there) with weapons transfers, a situation made ironic by the staunch U.S. opposition to Europe for trying to do the same. Pakistan, which probably doesn't deserve additional nuclear delivery vehicles but is an invaluable U.S. ally, gets weapons. India, a vibrant if imperfect democracy that represents the only legitimate target of such delivery vehicles, gets its own weapons (maybe even F-18s, if it's lucky!) as a sop. And what does the United States, the region, or the world get for all these weapons transfers? Peace, or at least a legitimate hope, practical road map, or reliable framework thereof? Nope.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:20 PM to Asia, U. S. Politics

March 26, 2005

Rising sun

Rhetoric in East Asia has been heating up in recent days. As previously noted, Japan and South Korea have been engaged in a bit of a spat over some uninhabited islands (Takeshima to the Japanese, Tokto to the Koreans). A Japanese prefectural assembly had asserted Japanese soverignty over the disputed islets, stoking a century-old Korean anomosity toward Japan in its most common, contemporary forms -- irritation over Japanese officials' visit to Yasukuni Shrine, where several Japanese war criminal are interred, and anger over historical revisionism in Japanese textbooks.

Earlier this week, however, South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun raised the stakes beyond the standard schoolyard tussle:

In a statement posted on the presidential office website, Mr Roh has called on citizens to prepare to sacrifice economic and other exchanges with Japan.

"There could be a hard diplomatic war ... that may reduce exchanges in various sectors and cause economic difficulty," he said.

"But we do not have to worry much about it ... we are determined to take the hardship on our shoulders if we really have to." [emphasis mine]

Roh has since backpedaled a bit, Japanese PM Koizumi responded diplomatically, and the South Koreans reciprocated in kind. One needs to keep this issue in perspective. Roh was appropriate in specifying the situation as a "diplomatic war" -- under no circumstances will Japan and South Korea come to blows over these islands. But diplomacy is nothing if not rhetoric, and Roh's was unusually pointed and emotive. If nothing else, it succeeded in drawing further attention to strains in the Japan-South Korea relationship. Such strains, as Roh pointed out, extend far beyond some uninhabited islands -- they are deep, long-standing, and utterly unresolved. Indeed, the Takeshima/Tokto spat is not a cause but a result of a rapidly developing trend -- an increasingly assertive Japan bumping into an East Asia that still remembers all too well (and none too fondly) the last time Japan asserted itself.

It's no surpise, then, that South Korea isn't the only state casting a wary glare at Japan. As also previously noted here, it is Japan's relations with China that will likely represent a key dynamic of the twenty-first century. Japan, also this week, joined with the United States in opposing the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China. Strategically, and on the merits, this makes sense. It also makes for tenser relations between the two countries. In a remarkable, if somewhat questionable display of Chinese grassroots activism (did somebody say information-based public diplomacy?), some 400,000 Chinese have signed an on-line petition opposing Japanese membership on the Security Council. According to one of the petition's organizers, "we are soliciting the signatures to oppose Japan's bid because Japan does not qualify as a normal country and it does not deserve the seat on the U.N. Security Council." And what's the official Chinese line?

We understand that Japan hopes to play a bigger role in international affairs. Meanwhile we hope that Japan adopts a correct and responsible attitude towards history issues. You may have also noticed Chinese public recently commented a lot on Japan's efforts to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. We do hope that the Japanese side will deal with the history issues properly in order to win trust from others.

For Asian neighbors such as Taiwan, Korea, and China -- and even for neighbors further afield such as Australia and Iraq -- Japan is increasingly making its presence felt. Its technological prowess, economic muscle, and historical baggage give Japan greater weight on the world stage than any other mere country, and each move it makes sends reverberations in proportion to such weight. Keep an eye on Japan.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:40 PM to Asia

Ironic invitation

Narendra Modi, the controversial BJP chief minister of Gujarat, made headlines several weeks ago when the United States denied him a visa to attend a hotel owners convention in Florida. Through the wonders of technology, Modi was able to address the convention regardless. Through the joy of irony, however, he took the opportunity to invite Jeb Bush to Gujarat, to "show [him] what love and hospitality means." A sincere invitation? Who knows. But you have to give Modi credit for his sense of irony, at the very least, and for his apparent graciousness -- from one controversial governor to another.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:51 PM to Asia, U. S. Politics

March 25, 2005

Happy Easter

While a tad off-topic for Natural Selection, I couldn't help but note this story from the Philippines [emphasis mine throughout]:

Seventeen people were nailed to the cross in a macabre re-enactment of Jesus Christ's suffering and death on Good Friday in the Roman Catholic Philippines.

[...]

The event started out with Filipino actors dressed as Roman Centurions arresting a Jesus Christ character, who then led the penitents up a two-kilometer dirt road to a paddy field where they were crucified with five-inch nails.

Ruben Enaje, 45, who played the central Jesus Christ character, was nailed on the cross for the 19th year Friday. He said it was his way of atoning for his sins, and for thanking God for his blessings.

Enaje's face contorted in pain as the nails were driven to his palms and feet. He was made to hang in the cross for nearly 10 minutes before being pulled down as a throng of tourists gasped in disbelief.

He was later rushed to an ambulance.

I don't think there's much I can add. Though I will say -- perhaps for the first and last time here on Natural Selection -- that I agree with the Catholic church on this one:

The Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines earlier this week called on Filippinos not to "join the flagellants or crucifixions."

Archbishop Oscar Cruz said: "such extreme acts of piety are no longer required."

"It is enough that Jesus Christ was the one who did it for us."

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:25 PM to Asia, Trans-geographical

March 23, 2005

Downer, up from down under

In an update to the earlier noted deployment of additional Australian soliders to Iraq to defend Japanese troops, it seems that Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer paid a visit to Tokyo earlier this week:

In a wide-ranging speech to the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) following his meeting with Koizumi, Downer said the deployment of an additional 450 Australian troops to maintain security in Muthanna Province and protect GSDF troops there underlined Australia's commitment to its cooperative relationship with Japan.

"We know that the initial decision to deploy defense forces to Iraq was a complex one for Japan, but it was the right decision to make and we're very pleased to be working with Japan, and with other coalition partners, to help Iraq build a better future," he said.

Asked if Australian casualties while guarding Japanese forces would affect the relationship, Downer said, "We'll live with the consequences as Australians of our own decisions and not pass the blame to Japan if that happened."

It's nice to hear Downer say that Australian casualties in Iraq wouldn't affect relations with Japan. Of course, Downer is at an advantage in knowing that Muthanna is one of the safer provinces in Iraq. If, however, Australians were to die in Iraq -- they have yet to lose a soldier in combat, despite being one of the few countries involved in the Iraq war since the initial invasion -- it would cause a stir. The recent deployment of additional troops isn't very popular in Australia, nor is the Japanese deployment in general overwhelmingly popular in that country. If Aussie deaths were linked in the public consciousness to the defense of armed but impotent Japanese soldiers, it very well might have an effect on Australian mass perceptions of Japan and on the relationship between the two countries. So if all of Downer's stoicism is put to a tragic test by unfortunate news from Iraq, public opinion may leave him behind.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:16 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, Middle East

March 22, 2005

Wise wavering

I saw in the FT and the Washington Post today that the EU appears to be wavering in its earlier consensus to lift its arms embargo on China. This is a welcome development on several levels.

First, just on the merits of the news, one has to be pleased by the EU's recent hesitation. As firm a believer as I am in free trade, certain commodities -- such as arms -- are better left uncommon, untraded, and unused. Furthermore, China has shown itself willing and able to boost its military expenditures even without overt European assistance. And despite its torrid economic growth, the People's Republic remains a repressive and authoritarian state, wholly unworthy of being rewarded with additional access to modern weaponry. Indeed, the EU's wavering can largely be attributed to the anti-secession bill recently rubber-stamped by China's National People's Congress and targeted explicitly at Taiwan. This bill, suffice to say, does not inspire confidence in China's ostensibly peaceful intentions.

Second, and important in a broader European context, the FT and Washington Post articles both mention that resistance to lifting the embargo is coming from Britain and Germany, with France holding out. It seems Chirac is still holding on to the notion that the EU can represent a "counterweight" to the United States in world affairs and that building stronger ties to China is a means to accomplish this. While on some matters, such as trade and immigration, the EU can act effectively as a single entity, the prospects for any kind of a more developed EU global footprint (the CFSP notwithstanding) are slim to none. The French position not only represents a futile goal, then, but it is also indicative of an old-think, twentieth century system of pole-based geopolitics. While the United States might possess overwhelming superiority in the rudiments of state power, recent events have only proven that state power is neither invincible nor infallible. Europe's comparative advantage vis a vis the United States, then, is not in the traditional modes of state power, such as force and raw power, but rather in the more post-modern modes of influence, such as suasion and norm-setting (over-popularized and -simplified as "soft power"). By simply setting an example of stability, democratic governance, and liberal economics -- and without the threat or use of coercive force -- the EU has had a great effect on Central and Eastern European states hoping to meet EU membership criteria on the path to eventual admission. While China clearly is not a prospective EU member, the general strategies and principles used to affect change in Europe can certainly be applied to misbehaving states further afield. So if Chirac aspires for the EU to act as a "counterweight" to the United States, there are ways to do this, as long as he thinks creatively and becomes unbound from a narrow version of history based solely upon classical balance of power notions. In this regard, lifting the arms embargo on China would not be a step in the right direction.

And third, in terms of U.S. policy, the recent EU wavering could signify a welcome success in the Bush administration's diplomatic playbook. Despite the ongoing "war on terror," Bush administration officials hold on to their opinion of China as an emerging strategic competitor to the United States. Such geopolitical geniuses, then, clearly view U.S. national interests as being served by the EU's retention of its arms embargo on China. Bush's recent visit to Europe -- during which he surely gave Blair, Schroeder, and Chirac an earful about the retaining the embargo -- has been matched by firm and extensive diplomatic lobbying. Thus far at least, such lobbying seems not to have been paired with improper accusations or outright deceit. When the Bush team has resorted to such tricks in the past, results have been decidedly mixed. Perhaps this recent turn of events will convince the administration that a little honest diplomacy among friends can actually get the job done.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:48 PM to Asia, Europe, U. S. Politics

March 20, 2005

Surprising (mis)trust

The Washington Post (via Kevin Drum) reports on some Bush administration fibbing:

In an effort to increase pressure on North Korea, the Bush administration told its Asian allies in briefings earlier this year that Pyongyang had exported nuclear material to Libya. That was a significant new charge, the first allegation that North Korea was helping to create a new nuclear weapons state.

But that is not what U.S. intelligence reported, according to two officials with detailed knowledge of the transaction. North Korea, according to the intelligence, had supplied uranium hexafluoride -- which can be enriched to weapons-grade uranium -- to Pakistan. It was Pakistan, a key U.S. ally with its own nuclear arsenal, that sold the material to Libya. The U.S. government had no evidence, the officials said, that North Korea knew of the second transaction.

There's already a fair amount of predicable outrage among liberal bloggers about this, and it's certainly justified. But I have to admit that I'm a tad surprised by Kevin's response to it. I share his opinion that Pakistan is a particularly tricky nut, and any president would be forced, by necessity, into some hypocrisy in dealings with that complicated country.

But shock at Bush misleading Asian allies over nuclear proliferation? Please. It's not as if he didn't mislead his own constituents (forget the unfortunate fact that he got away with it). I'm consistently surprised by the sheer willingness to trust Bush simply because he is the president. This was a widespread feeling before the Iraq invasion, by Bush friend and foe alike. As the facts inevitably broke against him, some people inched toward skepticism -- but not everyone. But why? If this country learned nothing else from Nixon, isn't that position and stature do not equal trust and credibility? Wasn't this country founded on an explicit skepticism for authority? Isn't this country constitutionally organized on the premise that power needs to be checked in order to be trusted?

This brings me to one of my main gripes with how John Kerry ran his campaign. Suffice to say, the man was not a smooth talker. But he was sharp. His vote in favor of the Iraq war resolution, I believe, was improper. But intellectually, he had a very compelling argument to defend his vote. Kerry could have said that, on principle, he is in favor of empowering the executive in matters of foreign policy. The war resolution, many seem to have forgotten, was not a declaration of war -- this country will probably never have another one of those. Rather, it simply authorized the president to take action as he saw fit to deal with Iraq's (supposed) WMD. Kerry's mistake -- as he should have explained it and, I believe, as he actually felt -- was not necessarily that he voted for the resolution. Rather, it was that he trusted the president -- a mistake made by all too many Americans, and thus one that many voters would have understood. To be sure, many in Congress were already sharp enough at the time to not trust the president, but you work with that you got.

Regardless, I simply cannot understand shock at any of the Bush administration's loose associations with the truth. If he misled those who elected him, I am utterly unfazed that he might have misled our Asian allies. Trust is earned, not endowed -- is that such a hard thing for Americans to grasp?

Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:06 PM to Asia, U. S. Politics

March 17, 2005

Historical ironies

Courtesy of Der Spiegel, we have a very nice run-down of recent news on the Japan-China front, which regular readers will know as an early interest here on Natural Selection. Along with much else of note, the piece reminds me of a historical irony which I am shocked and deeply embarrassed to have initially overlooked: Taiwan is a former Japanese colony. Not only that, but Japan won Taiwan by force from China, in the 1894-95 war between the two countries. In addition, Taiwan's colonial experience was uniquely more positive than that of Japan's many other early twentieth century colonies, with some Taiwanese sentimentality toward Japan lingering to this day. That Japan has now more explicitly linked its security to Taiwan -- in obvious opposition to China -- represents an intriguing irony. The history between Japan and Taiwan -- more than just mere irony, to be sure -- should be kept in mind as the East Asian security dynamic continues to evolve.

Japan's also having some problems with South Korea over a few islands. South Korea, as opposed to Taiwan, harbors absolutely no sentimentality for Japan or for its period as colonial underling. So there's no historical irony there for me to overlook ... I don't think.

UPDATE: More background on Japan-South Korea animosity here.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:19 PM to Asia

February 22, 2005

Pacific politics, Iraqi desert

When faced with charges of "unilateralism," supporters of the war in Iraq often counter with the fact that many countries comprise the "coalition of the willing," with forces currently serving in-country. While certainly true, the forces offered by many states amount to little more than token contributions, with the United Kingdom, South Korea, Italy, and Poland leading the way with the most substantial contigents. Over the past 24 months, furthermore, several countries have withdrawn their garrisons, most notably Spain last year. But back in March 2003, when a fair number of countries supported the invasion of Iraq in principle, only one country besides the United States and the United Kingdom supported it with troops: Australia. Now, with the Dutch on their way out, the Aussies have taken a somewhat unexpected step: they will send more troops to Iraq.

The 450 new troops will be in addition to Australia's current 800-odd troops serving in and around Iraq, and to be sure, Prime Minister John Howard's decision to deploy them faces serious questions from the opposition Labor Party back home. Fortunately for the new arrivals, they will be stationed in the relatively quiet southern sector of the country. And their primary charge? To protect other troops. To be sure, the "other troops" in question are no ordinary troops. They are members of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces, constitutionally-prohibited from using any more than a bare minimum of force, and then only in strictly-defined situations of self-defense. Performing humanitarian and construction duties primarily, their mere presense in Iraq is significant in the context of Japan's evolving foreign and defense policies, as discussed recently in this space. Some do, of course, suppose [free registration required to view] the Japanese presence in Iraq is more complicated than any mere obligation to its alliance with the United States.

Regardless, the deployment of additional Australian troops to Iraq to defend Japanese soldiers contains an intriguing sub-plot outside the realms of Iraq, the Islamic world, and U.S. foreign policy. It offers a unique insight into the relationship between Australia and Japan. Both countries have long been staunch allies of the United States and have been steadfast in their support of the Bush adminstration's "war on terror." But they are also each important actors in East Asia, who recently worked closely together to provide and coordinate tsunami relief in the Indian Ocean. They also represent the most important, firmly "Western" states in East Asia, defined in terms of free market economics and representative politics if not in terms of history and culture. And perhaps related to this fact, they each face very proximate, very populous neighbors -- Indonesia for Australia and China for Japan. As also discussed here previously, the strategic jockeying that these geopolitical realities represent and instigate is already well underway. If Junichiro Koizumi and John Howard can strengthen their respective positions at home by cooperating in the far-abroad (and by pleasing the United States in the process), so be it.

Meanwhile, back in Iraq, some have noted the peculiar irony of Australian soldiers watching over Japanese as the latter build roads and bridges in a wartime environment. While this particular World War II reference may fall short of outright relevance, it does make one realize that historical ironies need not be relevant in order to be profound. Times do, indeed, change.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:29 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, Middle East

February 20, 2005

Shadow boxing in East Asia

Perhaps understandably, the main story resulting from this weekend's meetings between U.S. and Japanese security officials was not the reclassification of Taiwan as an explicit point of concern for the two allies. Rather, North Korea took up much of the press conference with the principals and stole most of the headlines. Given that country's recent withdrawal from the six-party talks, its admission of nuclear weapons capability, and its outright proximity (and thus immediately threatening nature) to Japan, this is clearly justified. Not without a sense of history and a flair for the melodramatic, North Korea's state newspaper claimed the meeting in Washington represented nothing less than the second coming of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

But what of Taiwan, which on Friday was pegged to be the big news coming out of this weekend's meeting? The joint statement issued following the meeting sterilely notes that the United States and Japan shall, "encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue." Likwise, the allies pledge to, "develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally." No doubt the U.S. archetype of such a "constructive role" for China would be to lure North Korea back into the six-party talks. At the same time, mutual definitions of constructiveness begin to diverge as the venue moves southward. The Chinese, for their part, saw through the diplo-speak this weekend and registered their "grave concern" in decidedly more interesting language. If for no other reason, the explicit reference to "Taiwan" in the joint U.S.-Japan statement marks it as significant. From the Chinese perspective, it amounts to outside interference in an internal affair and even to tacit recognition of Taiwan's independence from the mainland (which it has been, functionally if not technically, for many years). For the same reasons, the reference to Taiwan marks the latest in a series of comparatively bold steps in Japanese foreign and defense policy, from sending troops to Iraq to attempting to launch its own spy satellites. Taiwan, at the heart of the matter, of course welcomed the U.S.-Japan statement.

Still, the exchange of words is likely to be the most substantive near-term result of the changes in the U.S.-Japan security relationship. There will be no major force redeployments, no major shift of military postures. Perhaps that's a good thing, a sign of old friends whose regular routine works so well that rhetorical tweaks are what count as excitement. Still, if anyone doubted U.S. posture, one needs only to heed the CIA's warning this week that, "improved Chinese [military] capabilities threaten U.S. forces in [East Asia]." It would seem that Japan concurs.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:04 PM to Asia

February 18, 2005

The China Syndrome: A Contagious Bug?

This weekend will apparently mark a turning point in the U.S.-Japan security relationship, according to the Washington Post (Japan to Join U.S. Policy on Taiwan). Stretching back to the post-war occupation of Japan and grounded in the country's U.S.-written constitution, this relationship is frequently (and often breathlessly) declared the bedrock of East Asian security for the past 60 years. Now, it seems, Japan is feeling the dragon's breath, and for the first time will expressly cite Taiwan as a mutual security concern with the United States.

Japan is justified in its wariness toward China, as the article points out. China is large, rapidly growing, and has a voracious appetite for investment and natural resources. Historically, it also harbors substantial ill will toward Japan, not only due its bloody occupation/war in the early twentieth century but also to what it perceives as a lack of remorse by Japanese leaders for their country's past misdeeds even to this day. History aside, however, it is simply natural for the two largest economies of East Asia to view each other as adversaries.

So does this new security understanding with the United States shift the balance of power in East Asia? Hardly. China may remain nominally Communist and practically authoritarian, but today, its economic interests are largely one and the same as its strategic ones. Mainland Chinese leaders know that the perception of a threat is often as useful as an actual threat, and that at the current time, it would have a hard-time regaining Taiwan by force even if the United States and Japan stayed on the sidelines. In 10-20 years' time, the military calculation may be different. But today, China's leaders can make their point more efficiently through saber-rattling than through saber-using.

The new revisions to the U.S.-Japan security partnership may deter China from pursuing its efforts to change the military calculation. But do the changes add anything that is not already present? Japan is already a key strategic partner of the United States. In the event of Chinese military action across the Taiwan Straits, Japan might be hard-pressed to remain neutral. And Japan, despite the infamous war-denouncing Article 9 of its Constitution and its amicably-named "Self-Defense Forces," aleady possesses a very robust and modern defense capability. While it certainly enjoys having the United States in its corner, it is by no means solely dependent on U.S. force projection for its security.

So why, then, a redefinition of the security partnership? War, as Clausewitz said, is politics carried out by other means; so, too, are the strategic partnerships designed to deter war. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has gone against the grain of Japanese public opinion in sending Self-Defence Force units to Iraq. While acting against a perceived and growing threat from China may be a comparatively more popular move, it resembles Koizumi's Iraq decision in one key way: it is reactive to a U.S. initiative. One must wonder to which audience(s) Koizumi is directing this move, to what end, and most importantly, why. It is sure to annoy China, delight Taiwan, and enjoy mixed reaction among the Japanese. But much like his earier Iraq decision, Koizumi's move is guaranteed to please the Bush administration. Before September 11, 2001 and for much of the 1990s, the unspoken question in U.S. military circles was not if we would fight a war with China but when. Now, the "war on terror" necessarily takes strategic precendence. But there likely remains a strong constituency within the current U.S. administration that continues to see China as a long-term strategic adversary. Formalizing and redefining the security relationship with Japan makes good sense for such thinkers in the United States. The question is, after Koizumi's Iraq decision, does it make good sense for Japan?

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:50 PM to Asia