February 28, 2008
All apologies
Earlier this month, Australia's parliament passed a resolution formally apologizing for one of the country's most egregious practices of institutionalized mistreatment of indigenous Australians. In issuing this apology, Australia is not alone. Apologies for past, state-sponsored misdeeds have become a burgeoning topic for many national legislatures, including the U.S. Congress. Although the direct impact of such apologies is often uncertain, they can have a clear effect on a country's foreign policy.
The apology introduced by Australia's new prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was unanimously approved by that country's parliament. Specifically, it recognized and apologized for the Australian government's formal role in the “Stolen Generations” The term applies to the government's forced removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families and placing them into state orphanages and other institutions. This state-sanctioned practice took place from the late 1800s until 1970, and it was designed to assimilate Aboriginal peoples into “white” Australian culture. Indeed, in a grotesquely paternalistic way, many viewed the practice as beneficial to those Aboriginal children removed from their families. Since the 1970s, as the government's role in creating the Stolen Generations has become more understood and less defensible, the momentum for a formal apology has grown. Rudd, fulfilling a campaign promise, issued the apology at the very opening of Australia's parliament: “We apologize especially for the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country. For the pain, suffering and hurt of these Stolen Generations, their descendants and for their families left behind, we say sorry.”
Many other countries face or have faced similar experiences of national shame that demand formal apologies. These experiences can be purely domestic, as in Australia's case. The United States formally apologized for its World War II detention of Japanese-Americans in 1988 and issued a similar apology for its nineteenth century overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1993. Without much fanfare, the Senate this month passed an Indian health care bill that contains an amendment apologizing to Native Americans for “official depredations, ill-conceived policies and the breaking of covenants.” Other situations demand apologies that cross international borders. Germany has issued many unambiguous apologies for its actions during World War II, and Japan has done the same, though in arguably more ambiguous terms.
There are several ways to evaluate these kinds of formal apologies. On the most immediate level, many are paired with direct, substantive action, such as reparation payments. Germany has paid billions of dollars to Holocaust survivors and the state of Israel since World War II. Other apologies may not include direct compensation for victims but create other structures or systems to provide tangible benefit to the aggrieved. Rudd ruled out reparations for members of the Stolen Generations in Australia, but his apology was matched by a pledge to create a “war cabinet” that would bridge partisan divides and work to address social and economic disparities between indigenous Australians and the rest of the country. He promised that the “war cabinet” would work to improve levels of education, health care, and housing for indigenous Australians within a five-year time frame.
The easiest apology, of course, is the one made with words alone. One reason the Senate's apology to Native Americans has not achieved greater attention is because it has been attached as an amendment to an otherwise routine bill. The United States has a long and disgraceful history of mistreatment of Native Americans, but because the apology neither appropriates new funds nor creates new programs, it can be issued as a legislative amendment with little fanfare. To be fair, these same characteristics make the apology much easier to offer in the first place. Even if an apology is paired with a change in policy, it can be perceived as insufficient. Although Rudd's apology to indigenous Australians was widely popular, there were some grumblings that his “war cabinet” was not enough. Aboriginal leader Aboriginal leader Patrick Dodson claimed that, “any group of people who have been treated badly under laws … deserve to pursue compensation judicially, legally, or politically, and they deserve our support.”
Less helpful are the apologies that appear ambiguous. Japan's first official “apology” for its actions during World War II came when it re-established diplomatic relations with China in 1972. In a Joint Communique with his Chinese counterpart, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka asserted that, “the Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.” Japanese Prime Ministers and governments since then have elaborated on this statement, but never in terms that were absolutely unequivocal. As a result, the culpability for Japan's actions during World War II remains uncertain for many people throughout East Asia—in China, Korea, and even in Japan itself. This historical ambiguity continues to sour regional relations to this day (for more, see The Water's Edge, October 2007).
The least helpful apologies are the ones that aren't made. For years, under former Prime Minister John Howard, Australia refused to apologize for the Stolen Generations. This was not only very unpopular among many Australians, but it created a very negative impression of the country abroad. The United States is burdened with the similar impression. No U.S. president or Congress has ever formally apologized for slavery in the United States. There are many arguments about what form an apology for slavery could take, if direct reparations to the descendants of slaves would be a part of such an apology, and how useful an apology itself would even be. But in an international environment in which many already see the United States as a unilateral, selfish, and reckless actor, a formal apology for slavery could send a message of humility that would be useful on a global stage. Acknowledgement and remorse for past misdeeds, even if state-sanctioned, is by no means a sign of present-day weakness. Indeed, such honesty and transparency can convey national confidence and strength
It is impossible to determine the precise value of these formal, state apologies for past misdeeds. They may simply be “feel-good” exercises with no present-day relevance. Or, alternatively, they could play a major role in reconciling divisions within a society and in improving perceptions of a country beyond its own borders. In Australia, Rudd has made clear that he views the recent apology not as the end of a tragic chapter in that country's history but as the beginning of a new, more hopeful one. As a symbolic statement alone, the apology will have lasting value. And in foreign policy, symbolism is often as valuable as substance. This is a lesson applicable to all countries, regardless of past misdeeds or contemporary apologies.
Foreign Policy Association, 28 February 2008
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:30 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, Europe, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
November 22, 2007
Pakistani perils
In recent weeks, Pakistan has been wracked with a level of turmoil and uncertainty unique to that already unsteady state. Given its proximity to Islamic extremists—in Afghanistan, in Kashmir, and possibly within the government itself—as well as its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan is a country of particular importance to the United States. Turmoil and uncertainty there cannot be ignored, and U.S. politicians are certainly doing no such thing. Congressional leaders and presidential candidates alike are using the current unrest in Pakistan not only as a prompt to call for changes in U.S. policy, but as a chance to demonstrate their own geopolitical acumen. But it is unclear how much influence these domestic political leaders—or even the president, for that matter—can effectively exert on Pakistan.
On November 3, Pervez Musharraf—both President of Pakistan and chief general of its army—declared a state of emergency rule in his country, effectively suspending the constitution and imposing martial law. Since taking power in a bloodless coup in 1999, Musharraf has walked an increasingly precarious tightrope. He has had to manage the conflicting interests of often-corrupt leaders of Pakistan's main political parties, of historical rival India, of Islamic extremists in neighboring Afghanistan and within Pakistan itself, and of the United States and its post-9/11 efforts to fight terrorism. For much of the past eight years, Musharraf has deftly played these conflicting forces off of each other and maintained his hold on power. But increasing pressure from all fronts compelled him to declare the present state of emergency. Musharraf shut down private television stations and detained opposition figures in the political, judicial, and private sectors. He even cited Abraham Lincoln to justify his actions, noting that Lincoln had one “consuming passion during [the U.S. Civil War], and this was to preserve the Union … towards that end, he broke laws, he violated the Constitution, he usurped arbitrary power, he trampled individual liberties.” Musharraf has recently suggested that he will permit parliamentary elections early next year, but given the uncertainty surrounding the situation, his promises may carry little weight.
From the U.S. perspective, the turmoil in Pakistan presents a unique problem. The country is crucially important to U.S. interests, but the president and Congress have limited leverage to shape events there. In recent months, as the growing instability of Musharraf's rule was demonstrated by his disputes with Pakistan's Supreme Court, the Bush administration tried to broker a compromise of sorts. It promoted a plan whereby exiled former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who faced potential corruption charges in her own country, would return to Pakistan. Musharraf would drop the corruption charges against her and allow her to lead her party in parliamentary elections that, if successful, would make Bhutto prime minister again. In return, Bhutto would not protest Musharraf's continued tenure as president and grant his administration a veneer of democratic legitimacy. The current state of emergency has upset those plans in unpredictable ways. Musharraf even placed Bhutto under house arrest for several days, ostensibly for the former prime minister's own protection. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, John Negroponte traveled to Pakistan in an unsuccessful attempt to restart political reconciliation there and to convince Musharraf to lift the state of emergency. “I urged the government to stop such actions, lift the state of emergency and release all political detainees,” he said. “Emergency rule is not compatible with free, fair, and credible elections.”
For Congress, the most obvious lever to affect the situation in Pakistan is the foreign aid that the United States provides to that country. Since 9/11, the United States has given over $10 billion in aid to Pakistan. The bulk of that amount—more than $6 billion—has come in the form of “Coalition Support Funds,” which are intended to reimburse U.S. allies for their assistance in the “war on terrorism.” Fifteen percent of the total aid has gone toward security assistance, which Pakistan has used primarily to purchase major weapons systems, while another 15 percent has gone toward budget support, which represents direct cash transfers to the Pakistani government. Just 10 percent of U.S. aid has fallen under the category of development and humanitarian assistance. Many experts have questioned the accountability of this aid—especially the 90 percent that goes directly to the Pakistani military or to Musharraf's government, and in particular the aid that falls under the categories of “Coalition Support Funds” and budget support. “We don't have a good sense of where it goes,” says Rick Barton of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Accordingly, several presidential candidates have seized on U.S. aid to Pakistan as a potential point of leverage. Senator Joe Biden (D-DE), chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, proposed a plan that would triple non-security aid to Pakistan to $1.5 billion annually and condition security aid on performance. “I'd spend more if we get better returns—and less if we don't,” said Biden. He would also provide Pakistan with a “democracy dividend” of an additional $1 billion in aid during the country's first year of democratic rule. Senator Barack Obama (D-IL)—like Biden, a presidential contender and a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—proposed similar steps. In a letter to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Obama suggested that aid to Pakistan should continue in the areas of counter-terrorism, public education, health, micro-enterprise development, humanitarian assistance, and democracy and rule of law programs. He further called for a temporary suspension of all other funding for Pakistan until the Bush administration certifies that no U.S. assistance is being used to repress the democracy; that parliamentary elections have been scheduled, restrictions on the media have been lifted, and those detained as a result of state of emergency have been freed; and that Pakistan has developed a comprehensive strategy to root out Taliban and al Qaeda forces in northwest Pakistan.
Republican presidential candidate Senator John McCain (R-AZ) expressed a concern of many policy makers and experts about the risk of Pakistan's nuclear weapons falling into the hands of Islamic extremists. “If they gain control … we are going to have big problems in Afghanistan and the area," McCain said. Such concerns prompted the New York Times to publish a story on assistance that the United States has given to Pakistan to help it secure its nuclear arsenal. The newspaper had refrained from publishing the story for three years, due to requests from the Bush administration, but recent events prompted a change in policy. Evidently, since 9/11, the administration has spent $100 million—buried in secret portions of the federal budget—to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal. The aid primarily took the form of equipment and training, but concerns on both sides limited the extent of the program. U.S. officials were wary of divulging sensitive technology or procedures about its nuclear arsenal, and Pakistan was wary of giving the United States too much access or information about its own fledging arsenal. So far, the Bush administration insists that Pakistan's nuclear weapons remain safe. “I don't see any indication right now that security of those weapons is in jeopardy, but clearly we are very watchful, as we should be,” said Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The crisis in Pakistan has also highlighted a more fundamental question about U.S. foreign policy, one that was raised in a highly truncated form by the CNN moderator in a recent debate among the Democratic presidential candidates: “Is human rights more important than American national security?” From a political standpoint, the answer is clear. Few self-respecting politicians would publicly suggest that anything is more important than U.S. national security, and most of the candidates at the debate gave this safe, predictable answer. But Obama challenged the premise of the question itself, noting that human rights and national security “are not contradictory … they are complimentary.” He further noted that, “Pakistan's democracy would strengthen our battle against extremists.” Coming from a candidate who had made headlines with previous pronouncements regarding Pakistan, this was a very sensible perspective (for more, see The Water's Edge, August 2007). Perhaps more importantly, the episode demonstrated the folly—if not outright danger—of trying to address fundamental questions of U.S. foreign policy in 30-second sound bites at a raucous, highly politicized debate.
U.S. interests in Pakistan are clear, and they are profound. A solid case can be made that the current instability is at least partially the result of U.S. policy toward the region over the past five, 10, or 50 years. Certainly, it's important to understand how poor policy choices in the past may have created complex problems today. But in the current election season, the eyes of politicians and voters alike are directed toward the future. Although the prospects of affecting the situation in Pakistan in the short-term may be dim, U.S. policies today will surely help shape the politics and economies of the region far into the future. If for no other reason, voters should ensure that their elected officials understand the issues at hand and have clear ideas about how to address them.
Foreign Policy Association, 22 November 2007
Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:50 PM to Asia, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
October 25, 2007
Inferiority complex
In recent weeks, the House of Representatives has dipped its toe into a pool of international and historical animosity. The partial success of a resolution condemning the 1915 mass killings and deportations of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire—it passed a House committee but has not yet been considered by the full House—took many by surprise. In reality, the furor surrounding this resolution was simply the latest episode in the long story of Congressional involvement with overseas historical controversies, particularly by the House. But in its repeated attempts to prove relevant and meet narrow constituent demands, the House of Representatives inadvertently risks becoming a detrimental force in U.S. foreign policy.
On October 10, the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed House Resolution 106 by a vote of 27 to 21. The resolution did not mandate any specific action, but it offered official condemnation of the mass killings and deportations of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Support from Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and dozens of co-sponsors suggested that the resolution might make it to the House floor, where it very likely would win passage. On a factual basis, the resolution stood on solid ground. Scholars and experts agree that the Ottoman Turks deported and killed anywhere from a few hundred thousand to several million ethnic Armenians during World War I—actions that may fairly be described as genocide. Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA), Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, noted that, “one of the problems we have diplomatically globally is that we have lost our moral authority which we used to have in great abundance.”
On a political basis, however, the resolution generated enormous controversy. Modern Turkey—the geographic successor to the Ottoman Empire—has always been extremely (if not irrationally) sensitive about this period in its history. Turkey briefly recalled its ambassador to the United States, and its top general, Yasar Buyukanit, proclaimed, “if this resolution passed in the committee passes the House as well, our military ties with the U.S. will never be the same again.” All eight living former U.S. secretaries of state signed a joint letter to Pelosi warning that the resolution “would endanger our national security interests.” In the face of these attacks, as well as opposition from the Bush administration and from military leaders who noted Turkey's logistical importance in supporting the war in Iraq, Pelosi has backtracked from her early willingness to move the resolution to the House floor: “Whether it will come up for a floor vote or not, what the action will be remains to be seen.” For now, the resolution lies in limbo.
This wasn't the first time the House has inserted itself into a matter of historical controversy abroad. In July, it passed a resolution calling on Japan to formally acknowledge its coercion of women from China, Korea, and other occupied countries into sexual slavery as “comfort women” during World War II. Although wartime abuses by the Japanese military are firmly established as historical fact, the question of how contemporary Japanese governments acknowledge such abuses is very much a contentious issue. Japan's ambassador to the United States, Ryozo Kato, said passage of the resolution, “will almost certainly have lasting and harmful effects on the deep friendship, close trust and wide-ranging cooperation our two nations now enjoy.” Unlike the Armenian genocide resolution, the comfort women resolution ultimately passed both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the full House. But the two resolutions shared many similarities. Each was non-binding, each dealt directly with important U.S. allies overseas, and each unearthed old historical controversies.
Perhaps the most important similarity between the Armenian genocide resolution and the comfort women resolution is their shared functional origin: the House of Representatives. Under the Constitution, the House is clearly designated as the lower chamber of the legislature. Although all revenue bills must originate there, it is the Senate that must approve executive appointees and ratify international treaties. To be sure, the legislature is inherently limited in the foreign policy role it can play. But by design and by tradition, the Senate has always been the pre-eminent chamber of Congress in terms of foreign policy. This has stuck the House with something of an inferiority complex. Passing non-binding resolutions on seemingly obscure, historical issues often seems like a good way for an internationally-handicapped House to have a voice in foreign policy.
The House's foreign policy inferiority complex is magnified by structural factors. The House has always been the “people's chamber.” Senators serve six-year terms, represent entire states, and have only been directly elected for less than 100 years. Representatives, on the other hand, serve two-year terms, represent much smaller and more homogenous districts, and have been directly elected throughout U.S. history. The distinctions between the two chambers are very much by design. The Senate was to be a sober, deliberative body somewhat insulated from rapid swings of public opinion, while the House was to be more directly responsive to the immediate, localized interests of the electorate. To a remarkable degree, the structure works as intended. The main sponsor of the Armenian genocide resolution is Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA), whose district is home to approximately 75,000 Armenian-Americans—one of the largest concentrations of ethnic Armenians in the United States. The main sponsor of the comfort women resolution was Representative Mike Honda (D-CA), who represents a district that is nearly 30% Asian—a figure that includes many Chinese- and Korean-Americans.
The fact that House members are particularly responsive to their constituents' interests (and money) is perhaps a good thing—it's how representative democracy is supposed to work. But the House is doubly limited in its influence on U.S. foreign policy. Not only does it face the functional limitations inherent to the legislative branch, the House must also cope with the structural handicap that comes from being the lower chamber of Congress. This means that its forays into foreign policy often carry the unfortunate distinction of being both toothless and shortsighted. Neither the Armenian genocide resolution nor the comfort women resolution mandated any change in U.S. policy. But by digging up far-away historical controversies in order to prove relevant and meet narrow constituent demands, the House risks overlooking vital contemporary context.
Although measures condemning the Armenian genocide have been introduced in Congress in the past, the timing of this most recent resolution is uniquely counterproductive. In recent years, Turkey has become increasingly wary of the West, in general, and the United States, in particular. Turks overwhelmingly opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and since then, Turkish popular perception of the United States has only worsened. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, just 9% of Turks had a favorable impression of the United States this year, down from 52% in 2000. Shortly after the House Foreign Affairs committee passed the Armenian genocide resolution, the Turkish parliament authorized its government to strike PKK strongholds in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq—a move motivated, in part, by perceived U.S. inaction toward recent attacks by that group in southeastern Turkey. As a secular, democratic, and predominantly Muslim state located in a strategic corner of the globe, Turkey is an indispensable U.S. ally. Although modern Turkey is far too sensitive about abuses committed by its imperial predecessor, measures such as the Armenian genocide resolution threaten to embolden vitriolic and nationalist elements in Turkey that could turn the country away from the West. However real the Armenian genocide may have been, it serves no one's interests to endanger the U.S.-Turkey relationship for reasons of limited contemporary value and zero substantive consequence.
The effects of the comfort women resolution were somewhat less severe, but they were equally unhelpful, and equally unintended. For many reasons, East Asian politics continue to be shaped by World War II and by the region's conflicting interpretations of wartime history. Japan has never truly grappled with or acknowledged its wartime responsibility, and Japan's neighbors frequently use this fact to inhibit current relations. There is no doubt that the Japanese military forced women from occupied countries into sexual slavery during the war. But when presented with the House resolution, nationalistic Japanese politicians felt compelled to respond. “It is extremely regrettable that the resolution is definitely not based on facts,” noted Taro Aso, then Japanese Foreign Minister. This comment and others like it had little direct effect on U.S.-Japan relations. But in the hypersensitive diplomatic world of East Asia, where historical slights can inflame contemporary problems, such comments do not help Japan’s relations with China, Korea, or any other formerly occupied country.
None of this is to suggest that members of the House of Representatives should remain silent on issues of foreign policy. It is their responsibility as elected officials to represent their constituents and to shape public policy. Indeed, in a democracy, it is absolutely vital that citizens are engaged in the foreign policy-making process, and the House facilitates this function. But in its attempts to simultaneously prove relevant on the international stage and meet narrow constituent demands, the House of Representatives risks being counterproductive, if not outright harmful. As it continues to delve into contentious issues of history and foreign policy, the House would be well advised to temper its passion with a dose of much-needed context.
Foreign Policy Association, 25 October 2007
Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:17 PM to Asia, Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
September 03, 2007
Bleak comparison
Parallels between the war in Iraq and the war in Vietnam practically draw themselves. Many have long since noted the most obvious similarities: In each conflict, the United States struggled to defeat an unconventional enemy, using unorthodox tactics, in an unforgiving environment.
Recently, President Bush drew his own parallel: “Then as now, people argued the real problem was America’s presence and that if we would just withdraw, the killing would end.” Of course, any comparison between the wars in Vietnam and Iraq is bound to be nearly as controversial as the conflicts themselves. But beyond the hyperbole, relevant comparisons are there to be made. And as the momentum to exit Iraq gathers steam, the lessons from Vietnam can be particularly illuminating.
During the U.S. war in Vietnam, roughly from 1965 to 1973, troop levels varied greatly, climbing to a peak of over 500,000 in early 1969. The withdrawal of combat troops, however, actually began in earnest that very same year, as President Nixon tried to implement his “Vietnamization” policy of shifting the burden of the fight to the South Vietnamese. Troop levels dropped gradually over the coming years, as South Vietnam shouldered a greater combat burden and as negotiations with North Vietnam progressed in fits and starts. Withdrawal of combat troops from Vietnam was completed in 1972 (although “advisers” remained behind), and the Paris Peace Accords — which formally ended U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War — were signed in early 1973. From the U.S. perspective, these accords provided an expedient cover for the military withdrawal, or a “peace with honor,” as Nixon described it. Of course, neither the United States nor its South Vietnamese allies saw much of either. The Paris accords ultimately fell apart, and South Vietnam fell to the North in 1975.
By contrast, U.S. troop levels in Iraq have remained fairly consistent through the war — 100,000-200,000 since the invasion, in 2003. This has remained true both through Bush’s own strategy of “Vietnamization” (when the emphasis was on training Iraqis to assume security responsibilities from the United States) as well as his latest “surge” strategy (emphasizing the security of Baghdad with U.S. troops).
Moving forward, the comparison with Vietnam falls apart even more. The various Iraqi resistance groups lack a formal state sponsor with which the U.S. could negotiate a withdrawal; despite its clear influence, Iran cannot play the role of North Vietnam today. A regional diplomatic dialogue may emerge alongside the withdrawal process, and the U.S. will surely try to coordinate its departure with the Iraqi government. But the eventual U.S. withdrawal will probably not be accompanied by the same kind of political or diplomatic cover that the Paris Accords offered in Vietnam. As unsuccessful as the Paris Accords were, though, it isn’t clear that such cover is really that valuable.
Despite these differences, one important lesson can be gleaned: Withdrawal does not occur for withdrawal’s sake alone. The U.S. departure from Vietnam did not occur in isolation, and the eventual U.S. withdrawal from Iraq won’t, either. In each case, the military departure will be part of a broader political and military strategy with goals beyond the simple extrication of U.S. forces. Given its global standing, the United States does not have the luxury of simply leaving devastated, chaotic countries in its military’s wake. Rather, any military withdrawal from Iraq will be but one component of a broader strategy designed to ensure stability and security in that country. This is not to say that such a strategy will be successful; it certainly wasn’t so in Vietnam, and the prospects are dim for anything better in Iraq. But it does suggest that the withdrawal from Iraq will not be quick, and it will not be easy. This is a reality that will confront Democrats and Republicans alike.
Another interesting parallel between Vietnam and Iraq does present itself. Throughout the prolonged, gradual withdrawal from Vietnam, the United States continued to suffer casualties. It also remained very engaged in combat operations, specifically in the form of the aerial bombardment of North Vietnam. From the perspective of many on both sides of the conflict, then, the U.S. withdrawal process was somewhat illusory — the troops may have been leaving, but the war was still on. The same will probably be true in Iraq. The United States has invested so much in its military infrastructure in Iraq that a complete, 100 percent withdrawal remains unlikely for the foreseeable future. And even as the troops begin to leave, their air cover will remain in place, based from carriers in the Persian Gulf and from other bases throughout the region.
Compared with Vietnam, the bombers over Iraq may be faster and their bombs smarter. But as in Southeast Asia, it’s unlikely that the Iraq war will end when the last U.S. soldier leaves the battlefield.
Providence Journal, 4 September 2007
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:43 PM to Asia, Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
August 30, 2006
Past imperfect
As expected, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the controversial Yasukuni war shrine this month. It was Koizumi's sixth visit to the shrine and most likely his last, as he is due to step down as prime minister in September. But it was also his first ever visit on August 15, the anniversary of Japan's surrender in the Pacific War. As such, it represented a particularly brazen act of symbolism.
The resulting protests from Japan's regional neighbors, however, differed little in tone or content from the condemnations of Koizumi's earlier visits. "Koizumi's shrine visits a 'poison' for Sino-Japanese relations," said a headline on the website of China's state-run Xinhua; "South Korea denounces Koizumi's shrine visit" said one in The Korea Times of South Korea; North Korea's KCNA news agency stated bluntly that the visit "clearly prove[s] that Japan is a cancer-like entity in preserving regional peace as it is seized by such revanchism and fever to revive militarism." The reason for this is as perverse as it is straightforward: However much they may heighten regional tensions--in fact, because they heighten regional tensions--Koizumi's repeated visits to Yasukuni actually serve the interests of every power in East Asia.
The Yasukuni Shrine was created by the Emperor Meiji in 1869 to honor Japan's war dead. Among those currently comemorated at Yasukuni are 14 convicted war criminals that were executed or imprisoned following the Pacific War. China, Korea, and other countries that were occupied by Japan during the war accordingly interpret Koizumi's visits as tacit yet official approval of Japan's actions during that period. Indeed, Yasukuni is emblematic of Japan's much larger problem of reconciling its collective memory of the Pacific War with its actual behavior. The shrine is not responsible for Japan's difficulties in grappling with its own history (and such difficulties would still torment the country in the shrine's absence), but Yasukuni provides a physical manifestation of the problem. It serves as a rallying point for the vocal nationalist minority that reveres fantastical conceptions of Japan's militarist glory. This right-wing sentiment provides the necessary context for Koizumi's visits and provokes resentment--across the region--to all things Japan. And the regional fury, in turn, fuels the harsher side of Japanese nationalism: The cycle perpetuates itself.
This mutually reinforcing suspicion spurs distrust between Japan and its neighbors. Strangely, however, it also serves each country's interests. China, where anti-Japanese sentiment is naturally abundant, is the clearest example. Official displays of outrage help legitimize the ruling Communist Party, whose legacy rests on its resistance to Japanese invaders in the 1930s and 1940s. But other countries follow a similar pattern. Hatred of Japan is one of the few things that unite North and South Korea in mutual nationalist fury. Both countries resent Japan's claim on the Dokdo Islands--or the Takeshima Islands, to the Japanese. Japan annexed the islands--along with the rest of Korea--in the early twentieth century, but it refused to relinquish its claim on them after it was expelled from Korea after the Pacific War. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun has indicated that he will not hold a summit with any Japanese prime minister that visits Yasukuni. Singapore, like much of the rest of East Asia, was also occupied by Japan during the Pacific War. In the wake of Koizumi's latest visit to Yasukuni, its foreign ministry released a statement noting that the visits "are not helpful to the larger common interest of building closer relations and cooperation in East Asia, including Southeast Asia."
Righteous indignation obviates the need for these countries to craft a meaningful policy toward Japan. Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing is fond of demanding "concrete actions" from Japan in the spirit of "taking history as a mirror and looking forward to the future." He has been less forthcoming, however, in describing exactly what that means. And why should he? Authoritarian governments are always interested maintaining their power above all else, and a great way to do that is to rant demagogically about some perceived enemy. For China especially, Japan represents the perfect foe, with a long history of mutual enmity and distrust between the two countries that began long before the Pacific War.
But China's instinctive aggravation with Yasukuni serves more than just a domestic political purpose. It's also a simple way to cripple regional diplomacy. For all the talk of China's "rise" and Japan's "graying," the two countries are indisputably the most important powers in East Asia--and, although it is neither as safe nor productive as cooperation, China prefers competition. Whenever Koizumi visits Yasukuni, China reverts to a predictable litany of complaints grounded in a war it fought (and won) decades ago. Most unproductively--and with uncanny predictability--it uses the visits as excuses to cancel diplomatic summits and other bilateral exchanges. Since Koizumi first visited Yasukuni in 2001, the leaders of China and Japan have not held a formal summit meeting, and China has refused to endorse such a meeting for as long as the visits to Yasukuni continue.
Still, Japan has every reason to absorb the moral condemnation from across East Asia. Koizumi, for his part, also uses his Yasukuni visits to advance his own foreign policy agenda in his own country. Since taking office, he has attempted to nudge Japan into becoming a fuller and more responsible member of the international community. Koizumi has advocated revisions to Japan's constitution that would allow the Self-Defense Forces to engage in a wider variety of peacekeeping operations, and he has strongly pushed for a permanent Japanese seat on the U.N. Security Council, in the face of China's consistent and instinctive opposition.
Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni are, in part, attempts to bolster domestic support for this comparatively muscular vision. They stir domestic debate about Japan's global role and focus attention on his foreign policy vision. (They also give a voice to Japan's angry nationalist minority, making Koizumi's own foreign policy goals seem moderate in comparison.) In essence, Koizumi's visits shift the debate about Japan's international role rightward, positioning his own vision as the increasingly reasonable option.
Of course, none of this is very healthy for Japan or its neighbors. Given his country's difficulty in grappling with its own history, Koizumi's game is cynical and irresponsible, and it stokes long-divisive sentiments in Japanese society. Koizumi adds insult to injury by seeming to revel in the controversy his Yasukuni visits generate. He recently told reporters that he "still [doesn't] understand why China and South Korea criticize my visits to Yasukuni." Meanwhile, with a dollop of creativity and initiative, China could use Koizumi's visits as prompts to address the bilateral issues that are relevant today, such as its lingering territorial disputes with Japan or drilling rights in the East China Sea. But, as long as its leaders can get away with attacking Japan for 60-year-old sins, they have no need to find creative solutions for tough bilateral problems.
As long as Japan grants even a hint of official recognition to the war criminals commemorated at the shrine, it will be impossible for the Japanese to come to grips with what their country did in the Pacific War. And, as long as Japan's neighbors fixate on Yasukuni as a means to prevent Japan from taking on a larger, more responsible role in international affairs, regional politics will stagnate. Of course, even though this month's visit to Yasukuni was Koizumi's last as prime minister, his successors will likely continue the practice anyway. Shinzo Abe, currently Koizumi's chief cabinet secretary and the frontrunner to replace him as prime minister, has already visited Yasukuni himself and has gone on record in asserting his right to do so. (A recent poll by Nihon Keizai Shimbun showed that, while 39 percent of Japanese would oppose visits to Yasukuni by future prime ministers, 43 percent would support them.) This means that the powers of East Asia will continue to blindly fight yesterday's war. And they will enjoy every minute of it.
The New Republic, 30 August 2006
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:20 AM to Asia
July 20, 2006
Strained alliance
By all outward appearances, the recent summit between President Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was a tremendous success. It certainly seemed that way as Koizumi—an avid Elvis fan—beamed from behind his gold-rimmed sunglasses during a visit to Graceland with the president. But behind the smiles, the U.S.-Japan relationship is actually undergoing a period of strain. This strain may ultimately work to the benefit of both countries, but only if it is managed correctly.
The post-war Japanese constitution expressly renounces war as a sovereign right of the state. This has not stopped Japan from developing its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) into one of the most capable militaries in East Asia. During the Cold War, this served U.S. interests well, as Japan provided a bulwark against communist expansion in the region. Today, as the exaggerated concept of “China-as-enemy” becomes more accepted, Japan’s military prowess continues to serve U.S. interests.
But Japan is becoming more essential to U.S. interests in less codified ways. Under the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, the United States maintains an array of military bases in Japan that can be used in the defense of Japan proper or to maintain “peace and stability” in East Asia. But a recent report by the Nautilus Institute found that U.S. AEGIS destroyers based at Yokosuka were maintaining semi-regular patrols in the Sea of Japan that bestrode potential missile flight paths from North Korea to the United States. In other words, U.S. military assets based in Japan were taking part in U.S. homeland defense operations. This activity could be interpreted as running afoul of both the U.S.-Japan treaty as well as Japan’s pacifist constitution.
Conversely, the U.S.-Japan relationship can be interpreted as also becoming less essential but better codified. Earlier this year, the two countries agreed on a comprehensive realignment of U.S. military forces in Japan. Some U.S. bases in Okinawa will be closed and consolidated, and the military will relocate several thousand personnel from Japan to Guam. Although Japan will remain home to significant numbers of U.S. troops, the agreement represented an explicit and mutual understanding that the U.S. military presence in Japan would be reduced.
These two countervailing tendencies in the U.S.-Japan alliance—it becoming more essential but less codified, and vice versa—highlight the need for a more mature relationship between the two countries. Under Prime Minister Koizumi, Japan has inched closer to constitutional revisions that would make it easier for the SDF to participate in peacekeeping and support operations abroad. Such potential revisions have met with opposition both in Japan and among its neighbors, who never hesitate to remind the world of Japan’s atrocities during World War II. It is certainly true that Japan has not adequately reconciled its collective memory with its wartime actions, and Koizumi’s repeated visits to the controversial Yasukuni shrine only aggravate already-serious regional tensions. But it is also true that when China, Korea, and others hold Japan hostage to its own history, they perpetuate a circular argument incapable of generating meaningful diplomatic progress. A Japan that is a fully capable member of the global community will benefit both the United States and East Asia as a whole.
From the perspective of the United States, more transparency is required in its relationship with Japan. Most importantly, the Bush administration would be well advised to avoid further vilification of China. While that country may one day represent a genuine security threat, an exaggeration of that threat for domestic political purposes only aggravates the already tense and long competitive China-Japan relationship.
Fundamentally, the United States and Japan remain strong allies. Koizumi supported the U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and provided SDF resources in each theater. Last year, Japan and the United States agreed to designate China-Taiwan tensions as a “mutual security concern.” Amid the recent North Korean missile tests, the United States has accelerated plans to install Patriot anti-missile batteries in Japan and publicized the routine deployment of another AEGIS destroyer to the region. And Elvis theatrics aside, the successful Koizumi-Bush summit exemplified the close relationship between the leadership of the two countries.
Clearly, the U.S-Japan relationship will continue to form the bedrock of East Asian security for some time to come. But unless the tensions inherent in the relationship are relieved in smart, pragmatic ways, it will become increasingly over-burdened and ineffective.
Providence Journal, 20 July 2006
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:48 PM to Asia
May 18, 2006
Important bases
The U.S. military is cleaning house. Existing bases are being retooled or eliminated, and new ones are popping up in some unexpected places. These are the overseas bases that are now vital to the U.S. military—and the new ones that will change its global footprint for years to come.
Andersen Air Force Base & Apra Harbor, Guam
The base: Andersen can handle aircraft ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles to long-range strategic bombers, and Apra Harbor can service everything from nuclear submarines to aircraft carriers. The naval base is also home to one of the three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons worldwide, which provides mobile, long-term storage of land-combat equipment and supplies near potential trouble spots.
Its importance: Located in the Pacific Ocean about 2,000 miles from Asia, Guam is close enough to the mainland to be vital in any conceivable conflict yet distant enough to preclude a surprise blow from an adversary. Andersen is one of the few locations with the necessary hanger facilities to protect the B-2’s sensitive, radar-evading skin, and strategic bombers regularly cycle through the base to project power toward mainland Asia. The best part: unlike other large bases in the region, Guam is U.S. territory.
Balad Air Base/Camp Anaconda, Iraq
The base: Most prominent of the “enduring bases” being constructed in Iraq, Balad is located just north of Baghdad. It is one of the busiest airfields in the country, accommodating both Air Force fighters as well as transport aircraft. Camp Anaconda, adjacent to the air base, serves as a main base and logistics center for U.S. troops serving throughout central Iraq.
Its importance: Balad’s facilities and location make it more than just an ideal base from which to fight insurgents in Iraq. It is also perfectly positioned to project U.S. power throughout the Middle East, and it will likely do so for many years to come. Although this convenience might serve wider U.S. interests, it doesn’t sit too well with Balad’s Iraqi neighbors—U.S. soldiers have nicknamed Camp Anaconda “Mortaritaville” after a common greeting they receive.
Bezmer Air Base, Bulgaria
The base: Bezmer reflects a broader trend toward lighter, more austere bases in Eastern Europe and away from the larger military complexes in Western and Central Europe. To keep a low profile in the host countries, the Pentagon is reluctant to even refer to Bezmer and its Eastern European equivalents as “bases,” and it stresses that the host countries retain full control of their facilities.
Its importance: Compared to U.S. bases in “old” Europe, Bezmer and its Eastern European equivalents are cheaper to operate and closer to potential hot spots in the Middle East and Central Asia. In times of conflict, the military will use these facilities to “surge” men and materiel toward the front lines. The hope is that former-Soviet bloc host countries will be more amenable to U.S. bases than other hosts in “old” Europe and be less likely to block their use in a time of conflict.
Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory
The base: Located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia served as a base for B-52s during the 1991 and 2003 wars with Iraq and during post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan. Its isolated anchorage is also home to both Army and Marine seaborne prepositioning squadrons for land-combat equipment and supplies.
Its importance: Isolation—and British sovereignty—make Diego Garcia a far more secure base for U.S. forces than any mainland base in Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia. Specialized shelters to protect the sensitive stealth equipment of visiting B-2s have recently been installed, and strategic bombers regularly rotate through the base. The atoll is also an important part of the U.S. Space Surveillance Network of telescopes, radars, and listening stations.
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba
The base: Originally intended as coaling station for the U.S. Navy, Guantánamo Bay (or “Gitmo”) remains an important logistical base for Navy units operating in the Caribbean. It also serves as a hub for counter-drug and migrant interdiction operations.
Its importance: Gitmo’s greatest strategic asset is its hazy legal status—it is U.S.-controlled, but it is not U.S. territory. Although it’s not the only place through which “enemy combatants” (neither POWs nor convicted criminals) could be processed, it is readily accessible from the U.S. mainland, and its staff and facilities have experience in detention operations from their time as host to Haitian and Cuban refugees. As a result, Gitmo is one of the most well-known and reviled U.S. bases worldwide. The Bush administration has repeatedly rejected high-profile calls to shut down the base.
Manas Air Base, Kirgizstan
The base: Manas was established at Bishkek’s international airport in the months following 9/11 as a hub for multinational operations in Afghanistan. It has since grown into a substantial base in the heart of Central Asia, playing host to combat aircraft, their supporting personnel, and associated facilities.
Its importance: In addition to its proximity to Afghanistan, Manas is located near the immense energy reserves of the Caspian Basin, as well as the Russian and Chinese frontiers. Kirgizstan has not threatened to follow Uzbekistan’s example and expel U.S. forces, which suggests that Manas could become a linchpin of the enduring U.S. presence in Central Asia. Recognizing its value, Kirgizstan is talking about raising the rent from $2 million to $207 million per year.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:43 PM to Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics
April 04, 2006
Dubious dialogue
On March 18, the foreign ministers of Australia, Japan, and the United States met in Sydney for a "Trilateral Strategic Dialogue." As usual, the United States was the primary driver of the agenda, and, invariably, the focus was on China. But instead of promoting regional unity, the "strategic dialogue" was an example of how the United States is driving the region apart. In the process, it is doing China a great favor.
To understand why, it helps to look at the relationships between each of the trilateral partners and China. Japan came into the meeting with the most strained relationship. Japan and China have long been the most important powers in East Asia, and tensions between them have only grown in recent years. On Monday, the Japanese foreign minister (and trilateral participant), Taro Aso, sharply lamented the growth in China's military spending: "It's not clear what China is using the money for [and it] creates a sense of threat for surrounding countries."
Australia, on the other hand, came into the dialogue with a decidedly different view of China. Australian Prime Minister John Howard has attempted to find a balance between aligning with Asia, on the one hand, and with the United States, on the other. He supported the U.S. invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq, but he also recently signed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Co-operation -- a move he had long resisted but ultimately approved for the sake of better relations with Australia's Asian neighbors. Perhaps more important, Australia's export market is becoming increasingly reliant on China's voracious economy.
The United States, for its part, viewed the dialogue as a way to augment its array of bilateral alliances in the region. But China could easily have viewed the dialogue as just the latest U.S. attempt to contain it. In Congress, vilifying China -- large, menacing, and conveniently Red -- has become a bipartisan pastime. Last year, politicians united in exploiting public fear to scuttle the purchase of U.S.-based Unocal by CNOOC, a state-owned Chinese oil firm. And in advance of the trilateral meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned that China could become a "negative force" in the region. In the trilateral partnership, the U.S. position is clearly more in line with Japan's than Australia's.
This alignment of interests was clear to all, and Australia sought to disavow any notion that the trilateral dialogue was designed to counter China. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer noted that "a policy of containment of China would be a very big mistake." But regardless of its true purpose, the dialogue was shrouded in speculation and opacity. The media consequently portrayed it as a nascent anti-China alliance -- so for all intents and purposes, that is what it was. The only mention of China in the joint statement emanating from the dialogue was an anodyne reference to its "constructive engagement in the region": a sure sign that the trilateral members had difficulty finding common ground.
China, for its part, has not been standing still while the United States attempts to bolster its regional alliances. In December, the inaugural East Asian Summit was held, in Kuala Lumpur. An outgrowth of ASEAN, the summit was inevitably dominated by China, through its sheer size; should this summit evolve into an organization, China's influence within it will only grow. The price for Australian participation in the summit, however, was its signature on the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation. For Howard, this was not an insignificant price to pay, for the treaty severely limits Australia's ability to assist in the Bush administration's "war on terror." Despite his conservative credentials, it is difficult to imagine Howard paying a similar price for the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue.
Indeed, Australia is keen to exploit and expand its relationship with China. On Monday, during a visit to Australia by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Downer signed an agreement to sell uranium to China. An official in the Australian foreign ministry noted that the United States was "hardly in a position" to criticize the agreement, given the Bush administration's recent deal to sell nuclear fuel to India. Wen, for his part, diplomatically made note of Australia's precarious positioning between the United States and China: "We believe that countries which are allied with the United States can also be China's friends, and Australia is one of them."
None of this should suggest that the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue is a wasted effort. Surely the United States, Japan and Australia have many common interests, and it is in each country's best interest to pursue continued cooperation with one another. Likewise, the sheer opacity of many aspects of China's growth is reason enough for caution.
But the United States must avoid sending mixed signals -- to allies, foes and everyone in between. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. position toward China is closer to Japan's than to Australia's. Because the United States and Japan are longstanding allies, this is understandable. But Australia is also an ally, and not the first -- or the only -- one to find itself needlessly torn between the United States and China.
There once was a time when a country, faced with such a choice, would clearly pick the United States. That time may be over.
Providence Journal, 5 April 2005
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:51 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, U. S. Politics
February 17, 2006
Yasukuni, Yomiuri, & Asahi
Fine summary of all things Yasukuni in the latest issue of the Economist. Nothing new or groundbraking, but this bit caught my attention:
... [O]pposition to a rising mood of nationalism is coming from an unlikely source from within the conservative establishment itself: the Yomiuri Shimbun, Japan's -- indeed the world's -- biggest-circulation newspaper. Under Tsuneo Watanabe, the group's 79-year-old chairman and an éminence grise within the political establishment, the Yomiuri came to be the flag-waver for a more assertive Japan, one that argued for a revision of the pacifist constitution foisted on Japan by General Douglas MacArthur in 1947, and that bristled at any foreign criticism of the Yasukuni shrine.
Recently, however, Mr Watanabe has ordered the Yomiuri Shimbun to change its tune. Yasukuni, he now says, is the source of all Japan's problems with its neighbours; the Yomiuri and its more liberal rival, the Asahi Shimbun, have joined forces to push for a state alternative to the shrine, where the war dead can be honoured with less controversy. The LDP, however, has turned this idea down.
In particular, Mr Watanabe reserves his bile for Mr Koizumi—partly, perhaps, out of personal pique that the prime minister does not hang on his every word, as predecessors did. Equating Tojo with Hitler, Mr Watanabe told the New York Times last week that “Mr Koizumi worships at a shrine that glorifies militarism. This person Koizumi doesn't know history or philosophy, doesn't study, doesn't have any culture. That's why he says stupid things, like, ‘what's wrong about worshipping at Yasukuni?' Or, ‘China and Korea are the only countries that criticise Yasukuni.' This stems from his ignorance.” The Yomiuri is now running a series of articles examining Japan's wartime record, and promises to come up with a “verdict” by August. It is unlikely, though, to lay the past to rest. [emphasis mine]
The notion that two of Japan's largest and most establishment-linked newspapers would attack Koizumi so aggressively over Yasukuni strikes me as peculiar. I'm inclined to agree with the Economist's correspondent here in that this is more of a spat among old-school Japanese elite, and that Watanabe is upset at Koizumi's success in challenging the conservative LDP way of doing things.
The idea of a state-sponsored alternative to Yasukuni is not new, however, nor is it a likely solution. National monuments cannot simply be replaced by government fiat and be expected to win widespread acceptance overnight. If the Bush administration created a new version of the Washington Monument and told everyone that it was just as good as the original, would tourists buy it?
No, the most interesting bit of the Economist's fine summary is this bit about the revolt of Japanese big media. While Watanabe's motives may be based more on personal insult than on genuine conviction, I think any effort to challange authority or to question conventional wisdom in Japan is a good thing. Oddly, it is such qualities that endear Koizumi to so many. If Watanabe really is repelled by Koizumi's threat to the old LDP order in Japan, he has an ironically Koizumi-esque way of showing it.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:12 AM to Asia
January 05, 2006
Asian mice
From the good folks at Kyodo, here's a nice round-up of Koizumi's latest news conference:
''China and South Korea should not close the doors for talks due to this one issue [visits to Yasukuni],'' Koizumi said when asked how he will try to mend fences with the neighboring countries.
''I suppose it is a question about the lack of summit exchanges due to the Yasukuni issue, but I think the issue of visiting Yasukuni Shrine should not be made into a diplomatic problem,'' Koizumi said, reiterating his stance of not budging over the contentious visits.
The China Daily, however, offers some extra information:
"I can't understand why foreign governments would intervene in a spiritual matter and try to turn it into a diplomatic problem," Mr. Koizumi said, adding that he visited the shrine to pray for peace, according to the [New York] Times.
"I've never once closed the door to negotiations with China and South Korea," he added.
The remarks drew immediate condemnation from Seoul, with Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon responding that Koizumi needed a "better understanding of history" and should earn the "trust and respect of other countries," the report said.
In what seems to be a recurring personality trait, Koizumi is being too cute for his own good. Most likely, he knows this, and he just doesn't care. Of course his visits to Yasukuni are, on the surface, a "personal" and a "spiritual" matter. Of course Korea and especially China are using them as a crutch for wont of real diplomacy.
But Yasukuni ain't no run of the mill shrine, and Koizumi knows it. Note that this press conference was "nationally televised." Koizumi's not playing to a Korean or a Chinese audience; he's playing to a Japanese one. And he's not alone -- it's the same game played by each leader in the region when it comes to relations with Japan. They are like mice scurrying about in their little wheels, knowing full well that no matter how fast they run, they'll never get anywhere.
The damndest thing, though, is that this suits each little mouse just fine. They earn nationalist points at home and forego any prospect of genuine diplomatic progress abroad. As long as that remains desirable (or at the very least, acceptable) to East Asian leaders, no one should be surprised at the absence of diplomacy or sanity in the region.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:45 AM to Asia
December 23, 2005
Peaceful development
A new white paper from the Chinese government represents its latest attempt to downplay fears of its rapid growth:
"To stick to the road of peaceful development is the inevitable way for China to attain national prosperity and strength and its people's happiness," said the document, which was issued by Premier Wen Jiabao's State Council, or cabinet. It added: "China's development will never be a threat to anyone."
[...]
"China's road of peaceful development is a brand-new one for mankind in pursuit of civilization and progress, the inevitable way for China to achieve modernization and a serious choice and solemn promise made by the Chinese government and the Chinese people," the paper said, drawing a distinction between China's rise and that of Japan a generation ago. "China did not seek hegemony in the past, nor does it now, and will not do so in the future when it gets stronger."
The Post's piece goes on to note that some in the Communist Party assign negative connotations to the term "rise." The preferred nomenclature henceforth will be "peaceful development." I have to say I'm with the party on this one. The notion of "China's rise" has created a nice little cult of fear-mongering around it. But while "peaceful development" may be a tad more difficult to demonize, I'm sure it won't stop some from trying.
And among the first of those to try, perhaps, would be new Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso. He certainly has a different take on China's "peaceful development:"
A neighboring country has an atomic bomb and its military spending has been rising for 12 consecutive years. There is no transparency and I view that as a concern, a threat," Aso told a news conference.
But a Foreign Ministry spokesman said Tokyo's position was that it did not see the Chinese military as a "direct threat", meaning it did not expect an invasion by Chinese troops.
I'm glad Japan doesn't expect an invasion by Chinese troops, for that would be rather foolish. The important thing, however, is that Aso's statement really isn't far off-base. China does neighbor Japan, it does possess nuclear weaponry, and its military spending is anything but transparent. While labeling China as a "threat" does stretch reason a bit, labeling the country as a "concern" is perfectly legitimate and, I might suggest, rather accurate.
But for the Japanese Foreign Minister to speak so truthfully is to disregard any hope that the statement will be taken seriously, for the Japan-China relationship is anything if not dysfunctional. On cue, the Chinese Foreign Ministry shot down Aso's statement:
China pursues the road of peaceful development. China's development has made worldly recognized contribution to the peace and stability of the region and the world and presented enormous opportunities for the development of Asian countries, including Japan. This is a fact obvious to all. It is extremely irresponsible for a Japanese foreign minister to make such remarks. One can't help question the real motive of the Japanese Foreign Minister to foment a groundless argument of China's threat at such a moment.
Our friend Qin Gang at the Foreign Ministry is conveniently tying all the rhetorical threads together for us. First, there's absolutely no reference to a "rise" of any kind, but only to "peaceful development." The he notes the irreseponsibility of Aso's statements, not based on their merit, but rather on the nationality of who spoke them. Finally, we descend into the typical questioning of Japanese motives, etc.
All in all, nothing new in the tragic comedy that is Japan-China relations.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:45 PM to Asia
December 05, 2005
Enjoying the mandate
Koizumi has obviously been enjoying his recently renewed electoral mandate. A couple weeks ago, he announced proposed revisions to the Japanese constitution:
[Koizumi] urged Japan to match its weight as the world's second biggest economy by cooperating more with the international community, a reference to the LDP's planned overhaul of the Constitution. "We need to take up the challenges of strife and conflict that may face international society over the next 50 years," Koizumi said.
[...]
The proposed LDP revision keeps the clause banning war, but clearly stipulates Japan may keep a military force for self-defense and for participating in international peacekeeping efforts.
"In addition to activities needed for self defense ... the defense forces can take part in efforts to maintain international peace and security under international cooperation, as well as to keep fundamental public order in our country," the draft says.
No surprise, really. Not only is this perfectly consistent with Koizumi's reputation, but it's also quite logical. Japan has a long way to go to reconcile its own collective historical memory, but it's a mature nation with the second largest economy in the world. Even with the constitutional revisions, Japan will still possess the most pacifist constitution of any developed country.
But some details are less than optimal. First, he announced his proposed changes at an LDP rally celebrating the 50th anniversary of the party. Constitutional amendments are surely political to one degree or another, but the staging of his announcement appears to be a tad partisan. And second, some of the proposed changes are less than optimal:
The draft constitution also weakens provisions on the separation of church and state.
It says the public institutions may engage in religious activity "in cases within the boundary of social rituals and customary activities."
The present charter totally bans the state from religious activity.
[...]
The LDP's draft would also make it easier to amend the constitution, requiring only majorities in both houses of parliament to endorse a change instead of the current two-thirds.
That religious bit is clearly aimed at Yasukuni, and at clearly up any perceived impropriety of Koizumi's repeated visits to the shrine. As for the process bit, I tend to prefer my constitutions harder to amend.
On cue, the Chinese protested:
Given the current atmosphere and conditions, the 7th China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Leaders' Meeting is postponed to be held until an appropriate time. During this period, China will continue to perform its functions as a coordinator for the cooperation between the three parties. It is hoped that the cooperation between the three parties can develop steadily despite the various obstacles.
And again on cue, Koizumi responded with characteristic aplomb:
"China is the one who decided to postpone the talks. That is fine with me."
"Yasukuni isn't something that can be used as a diplomatic card. Even if China and South Korea try to use it as a diplomatic card, that won't work," [Koizumi] said.
Saying it won't make it so, Junichiro, no matter how much you wish it to be.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:51 PM to Asia
November 18, 2005
Cautious approach
In advance of Bush's visit to China, the Christian Science Monitor has run a great little series on China's military modernization and the threat it represents. The first article looks at China's emerging "army within an army," a modern nub of a fighting force emerging out of what remains a large, low-tech military. The second examines the U.S. response to Chinese military modernization from the vantage point of Guam, strategically placed in the Western Pacific.
What's best about the series is that it absolutely refuses to be taken in by irrational fear-mongering. In the emerging boom market of Chinese scare literature, passages of realism like this are refreshing:
While China may be able to bloody the US Navy if it comes close to China's shores, the US Navy no longer employs this tactic in a Taiwan scenario, analysts say. One active Japanese army general who has war-gamed Taiwan many times says that China has only bad outcomes at present. If China tries to sink US ships with waves of aircraft, it will probably lose much of its Air Force, he states: "As a military planner you have to live to fight another day.... I have done the gaming many times from the Chinese side, and I've never won. My worst nightmare job is to be the Chinese operational planner for a Taiwan invasion. I have questioned whether China would sink a single US ship."
Putting aside the irony of a Japanese general playing China in a war game, I don't mean to suggest that China should be dismissed as a threat. Rather, the CSM series represents an increasingly rare, rational look at what China's military modernization really means and how much uncertainty is involved in trying to gauge the real challange it poses.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:43 AM to Asia
November 09, 2005
Interceptions
The pace of aerial training in East Asia has evidently picked up in recent months:
Japanese fighter jets have been scrambled 30 times to turn away Chinese planes approaching Japan's airspace in the last seven months, more than twice the 13 times in the same period last year, officials said Wednesday.
The interesting thing isn't so much that these intercepts are taking place but that their rate has increased in conjunction with the rising political tensions. Still, that itself won't have too much of an effect on the diplomatic side of things. Through the Cold War, NATO and Warsaw Pact aircraft played an intricate game of cat-and-mouse. The only points at which it got interesting were when the intercepts translated (intentionally or otherwise) into actual shoot-downs. Events in recent years have only demonstrated that such a risk remains a current one.
Where this news of increased aerial intercepts could have an effect is on the domestic Japanese political front. More nationalist elements could use it as further evidence that Article 9 of the constitution should be amended, or at least revisted. The tensions could also serve as fodder for calls for increased defense spending. In the late 1990s, when North Korea tested a missile by lobbing it over Honshu, Japan responded by launching its very first spy satellites. The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force is already quite capable, but I don't think any armed service -- be it an "Air Force" or a "Self-Defense Force" -- would pass up the chance to lobby for more resources.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:43 PM to Asia
October 18, 2005
Serious condemnation
Predictable feedback from the neighbors over Koizumi's recent trip to Yasukuni. First, from China:
The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a statement on Monday to condemn Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine, a place where World War II criminals were honored.
Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing urgently summoned Japanese Ambassador to China Koreshige Anami and seriously read the statement, expressing strong condemnation for Koizumi's visit.
Well, at least the Foreign Minister didn't read the statement casually. Of course, the Koreans aren't to be outdone:
Apparently in response [to Koizumi's visit], Cheong Wa Dae [the office of the ROK president] said Monday it is scrapping a bilateral summit scheduled for the end of the year. Since 2003, the two countries’ leaders have held annual "shuttle summits" in each others’ countries. Koizumi made the trip to Korea in June. There are now calls in the ruling party to stop the summits.
“Until now there had been discussion of the president’s visit to Japan, but as of today, we can no longer say that we are looking into the possibility,” Choeng Wa Dae spokesman Kim Man-soo told reporters. “That means there may be a change in the president's schedule.”
And just to make sure their neighbors got the right message, almost 200 Japanese MPs visited Yasukuni the day after Koizumi did so himself.
I wish I could say something insightful or creative here, but unfortunately, this charade is already so well-worn that I've already said it. I suppose all I can add now is that the Japanese cannot reasonably claim any degree of surprise or separation from their PM's behavior. They have long known Koizumi's stance on (and fondness for) Yasukuni, and while last month's elections may have focused on postal reform, Japan's regional relationships were an important point of electoral contention. The Japanese gave Koizumi a resounding victory, and they knew what they were getting.
In the same vein, Koizumi's most recent trip to Yasukuni could carry greater weight abroad than his previous visits. Following so closely after his election victory, Koizumi's visit and the sentiment it represents can be seen as one and the same as those of the Japanese people. This is no rebellious PM following his own instincts at the expense of popular will; this is a resoundingly popular PM, fresh from a political reaffirmation, doing something he knows will be noticed (and criticized) far and wide.
Say what you will about Koizumi and his Yasukuni visits (and I have -- they're foolish, but so too is the response to them), but he knows exactly what he's doing. It's such brashness that sets Koizumi apart from the stale mold that typically defines Japanese politicians, and which directly contributed to his recent electoral victory. So maybe he just can't help himself.
UPDATE: This Guardian piece contains two interesting tidbits about Koizumi's visit. The first:
In an apparent attempt to placate Japan's Asian neighbours, who regard Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo as a symbol of Japanese militarism, Mr Koizumi wore a business suit rather than ceremonial dress and did not enter the revered inner shrine, choosing instead to pray and make a token monetary offering at the outer shrine.
And:
An unrepentant Mr Koizumi insisted he had paid his respects at Yasukuni as a private citizen and had done so to demonstrate his commitment to peace, not to celebrate Japanese militarism. In a swipe at Beijing and Seoul, he added: "A foreign government should not take issue with the way the Japanese express condolences to the Japanese war dead, as well as to the world's war dead."
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:22 AM to Asia
October 17, 2005
Electoral license
I suppose when you gamble in calling a snap election, win that election, and then push through a rather bold reform of the postal system, a prime minister is entitled to a little mischief. Nothing too unexpected in Koizumi's latest visit to Yasukuni, I suppose, but I have to say I am disappointed. This is of most interest:
The visit, Koizumi's fifth since taking office in April 2001, will also be highly controversial as it comes just about two weeks after the Osaka High Court ruled his previous visits violated the constitutional separation of religion and state. [emphasis mine]
I hadn't heard about this court decision -- been a bit occupied of late. Hopefully, I'll be able to check it out in greater detail shortly.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:32 AM to Asia
September 14, 2005
Koizumi konquers
Haven't written nearly as much as I would've liked on Sunday's election in Japan, but I'm not sure there's much I would add to the already abundant coverage. While I disagree with Koizumi's dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq and with his disconcertingly frequent visits to Yasukuni, the guy's a rebel. Japanese politics have long been marked by stasis, cronyism, and predictability. Koizumi threw a wrench into that system by calling the snap election several weeks ago, and his boldness -- unique among Japanese politicians, along with his hair -- won Koizumi a victory. Postal reform, which was the impetus for this recent spate of political drama, will (and should) be pushed through Diet successfully this time around. Apparently, even some LDP rebels now support it.
Koizumi's accomplishment is made all the more remarkable when you remember that he's the leader of the LDP, which has ruled Japan virtually uninterrupted since occupation. It's tough to be seen a genuine reformer when your party has been in charge for so long. Yet Koizumi did it, and he did so in the face of a relatively well-organized opposition party, the DPJ. If Japan needs something as much as it needs structural reform, it's a legitimate, stable, and loyal political opposition. The DPJ could very likely represent such healthy opposition, though it did get fairly well drubbed on Sunday. As the Economist mentioned recently, when a Koizumi victory already appeared likely, the optimal outcome of the election would have been a permanent defeat of the old-guard LDP rebels who opposed postal privatization while only temporarily hurting the DPJ. My guess is that the LDP old guard is severely hurt, but those stale, old politicians are canny -- they're not done for good, at least not yet, even if postal privitization passes the Diet.
As for the DPJ, they took quite a beating, and the party's president, Katsuya Okada, has stepped down in the face of defeat. One can only hope that the party remains intact and able to perform in the role of loyal opposition; already, there are calls for the DPJ to select a more media-savvy, Koizumi-esque president. The outcome is further ironic when you consider that in terms of actual "reform", the DPJ platform probably had Koizumi's beat. Had they won, the DPJ most likely would have taken a more sensible policy with regard to Japan's Asian neighbors, and they would have withdrawn SDF troops from Iraq. These would have been good things, along with the obvious benefit of solidifying the DPJ's role as a legitimate alternative to the LDP and in moving Japan's politics in a more honest, tranparent, and competitive direction. But Koizumi's a politician unlike many others in Japan, and his version of retail politics -- however subjective it may be -- marks a big step forward for Japanese democracy. Koizumi's victory was well-deserved, based on his courage and personaility alone. While the DPJ's platform may have been a better one for Japan, succeeding in a world of competitive democracy requires more than just a sound platform. Warts and all, it's a world toward which Japanese politics must continue to move.
MainichI has an interesting piece on regional reaction to Koizumi's victory. Noteworthy is John Howard's effusive and genuine congratulations, which makes sense given Australia's recent friendliness with Japan. The piece also notes the dry, unenthusiastic congratulations from South Korea, while observing that China "did not immediately react to Koizumi's win." Can't find anything on Xinhua or the Foreign Ministry's sites to that effect myself. I wonder what they think of Koizumi's victory?
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:36 PM to Asia
No more secrets
Is the veil lifting over Communist China?
China said on Monday that it would no longer treat the death toll in natural disasters as a state secret, a step that could lead to greater transparency in a country that has a long history of providing partial or misleading data about diseases, accidents, and state-directed atrocities.
That's nice. I wonder if details of their military budget will be next.
Also, be sure to note in the article the name of the agency that oversees state secrets. It's a priceless example of authoritarian brashness and simplicity.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:27 PM to Asia
August 31, 2005
Patriot's game
Concerned about graphic violence and historical inaccuracy in your video games? Fear not:
PowerNet Technology, a Chinese online gaming firm, has developed a new online game in cooperation with the China Communist Youth League (CCYL) named "Anti-Japan War Online," which will begin commercial operation by the end of 2005, Interfax reported Wednesday.
"The game will allow players, especially younger players, to learn from history. They will get a patriotic feeling when fighting invaders to safeguard their motherland," Interfax reported, citing a PowerNet Project Manager, surnamed Liu.
I guess "motherland" is a relative term ...
Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:41 PM to Asia
August 28, 2005
Dispute resolution
From time to time in this space, we've taken a look at the passions that small, uninhabited islands can evoke in otherwise mature, reasonable states. One of the first cases we examined at was that of Takeshima/Tokto, which has tormented Japan and South Korea for some time now.
On Friday, South Korea released several decades-worth of diplomatic documents that record the evolution of the dispute over the islands. Perhaps most noteworthy is that back in the 1960s, Japan proposed settling the dispute in the International Court of Justice, while South Korea advocated third-party (read: U.S.) mediation. What's most bizarre, if not necessarily noteworthy, is what the chief of the Asian Bureau of Japan's Foreign Ministry is recorded as saying about the islands:
It's only about the size of Hibiya Park [in Tokyo]. The problem could be solved by blowing it up.
Sure, this statement is several decades old. But the dispute over Takeshima/Tokto remains a live one, and it's things like this that make it hard for many in Asia to forgive Japan for its past militarism. It's also just a funny thing for a diplomat to have said.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:29 PM to Asia
August 16, 2005
Remembrance addendum
More on Japan's 60th anniversary observances yesterday from the New York Times:
In the first apology delivered on Aug. 15 by a prime minister since the 50th anniversary of the war's end, Mr. Koizumi said: "Our country has caused tremendous damage and pain to the peoples of many countries, especially Asian countries, through colonial rule and invasion. Humbly acknowledging such facts of history, I once again reflect most deeply and offer apologies from my heart."
He added, "I would like to forge a future-oriented relationship of cooperation based on mutual understanding and confidence with Asian countries by squarely facing up to the past and correctly understanding history."
Interesting bits here are that Koizumi's was the first August 15 apology delivered by a Japanese PM in ten years, and that he explicitly redirected his statement of historical contrition toward the future. The key phrase is "correctly understanding history." It's odd that Kyodo didn't cite that line directly, but regardless, it wasn't enough for the Chinese. Xinhua conveys both the cold response:
China yesterday urged Tokyo to fully match its words of remorse over Japan's aggressive history with concrete actions.
"We've noted Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's statement," Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said.
Taking a serious and responsible attitude towards its militaristic aggressive history serves Japan's long-term and fundamental interests, he added.
... and the hot one:
The result of a survey conducted by a well read weekly "China Newsweek" via the Sina news portal shows that nearly 98 percent of all the 76,000 respondents equate the phrase "militarism and right wing force" with Japan in their mind.
When asked whether Japan should be forgiven for its criminal past, more than half of the polled said no - even if the Japanese would repent on their knees just as the Germans did.
As for the direction of the future Sino-Japanese relation, a percentage of 59.64 gave a dim outlook, foreseeing a future war between the two powerhouse nations over energy resources.
That Xinhua's wrath is wrapped in the guise of a third-party survey actually represents journalistic integrity, for them.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:59 AM to Asia
August 15, 2005
Limiting offense
Koizumi marked the 60th anniversary of Japan's surrender today with predictably remorseful words:
"We will do our utmost to further develop friendly relations with the rest of the world and gain more trust from the world as a nation that cherishes peace."
But of course, it wouldn't be a proper Japanese remembrance ceremony without a modicum of ambiguity:
A one-minute silent prayer was offered at noon after the Japanese national anthem was played and Koizumi delivered his address. At noon on Aug 15, 1945, then Emperor Hirohito made a historic radio address announcing Japan's surrender.
Following a moment of silence, Emperor Akihito voiced strong hope that Japan will never again wage war, saying, "Looking back on history, I ardently hope that the horrors of war will never be repeated."
A moment of silence preceded by the Japanese national anthem, and the son of Hirohito offering not a specific apology but a rather anodyne and generic condemnation of conflict in general -- there's nothing wrong here, but it's not quite right, either. It's as if the Japanese leadership walks to the brink of complete contrition and then stops, wondering why anyone has a problem with going 99% of the way. Kyodo's report inadvertently elaborates on this further:
Representing the bereaved families in the ceremony, 75-year-old Takao Yorimitsu vowed to carry on the will of the people who have died in the war.
"With a renewed determination, we vow that each and every citizen will protect the peace and freedom that you had wished for more than anything else," Yorimitsu, a resident of Kochi Prefecture, said in a message to those who died in the war.
Not to besmirch Mr. Yorimitsu or even Japanese veterans of the war, but I question whether Japan of the 1930s and 1940s wished for peace and freedom "more than anything else."
Meanwhile, Koizumi avoided Yasukuni on Monday, which was wise on his part. That didn't stop members of his cabinet from visiting the shrine, however. Though this probably isn't the most politically sensitive thing for these ministers to do, it's perfectly within their rights to do so. And as the Kyodo piece points out, these ministers made very clear that they were visiting the shrine for personal rather than political reasons. For his part, Koizumi visited a relatively uncontroversial tomb for unknown war dead.
What does all this mean? Not much, really. There wasn't enough contrition to please the Chinese, Koreans, and others who are most offended by Japan's behavior, and I doubt there will ever be enough to please everyone. The day's observances in Japan were imbued with an utterly unsurprising level of ambiguity. But most of the ambiguity came from people around the prime minister and not from Koizumi himself. This may be due to Japan's upcoming elections and the resulting need to more finely tune political imagery, or it may not. Either way, I think Koizumi was in a bit of a bind. The best he could do was offer the requisite apology, offending those who were already offended and offending no one else any further. In that, he seems to have succeeded.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:25 PM to Asia
August 12, 2005
Historical issues
In this season of disquieting anniversaries and rocky politics (more on that later), the Japanese Foreign Ministry is doing its part to smooth the waters:
The Foreign Ministry on Friday posted on its website information about Japan's positions on history with regard to other Asian nations before and during World War II and postwar compensation.
The information has been posted only in Japanese so far, which in itself is very interesting. The most virulent critics of Japan's post-war recollection are those foreign states once occupied by Japan but with the impudence to have rejected adoption of the Japanese language. And the Japanese Foreign Ministry is not an understaffed, underfunded, backroom ministry that lack the capacity to produce material in multiple languages. So perhaps the Foreign Ministry is targetting a domestic audience, first and foremost, with this information. That's not entirely unreasonable, but it still doesn't explain the absence of English and Chinese translations, at the very least.
My guess is that this is just one of many examples of the eccentricity and ambiguity of Japnese society. Think of the dance often performed by the Japanese: matching effusive apologies for wartime misdeeds with simultaneous government visits to Yasukuni, modest diplomatic gestures with the simultaneous approval of revisionist textbooks, and conciliatory words with aggressive gestures along disputed maritime boundaries. Who knows how the government -- or even society as a whole -- feels about questions of wartime recollection. It is so quitessentially Japanese to be profoundly proper yet frustratingly opaque at the same time.
In any event, with the material in Japanese only, it's not of great use to me. The Foreign Ministry does, however, have an entire section of their website devoted to "Historical Issues." Until the Ministry produces their new material in English -- maybe a month or so away, we're told -- this section will have to suffice
Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:35 PM to Asia
August 11, 2005
Council membership
Jai may think it's lame to cite a piece from Foreign Policy's website, but thankfully I face no such constraints:
But these same qualifications [for a Japanese seat on the UN Security Council] raise an important question: Has Japan truly conducted a foreign policy worthy of a world leader? What difference does it make if Japan frequently serves as a rotating member of the Security Council if its diplomats are seen as wallflowers? When has Japan introduced bold new initiatives or helped build coalitions to lead an international effort? How much stronger would Japan’s bid for membership be if Tokyo had led a global effort to address the crisis in Darfur? How many times has Japan’s foreign ministry offered to help broker a peace between disputing parties? Critics are mistaken to assume that a pacifist nation has no place on the Security Council. (You could argue that Japan’s modern incarnation is one of the most in keeping with the United Nations’ mission.) But it’s also true that Japan cannot use its “peace constitution” as an excuse for its own diplomatic inaction or lack of imagination.
Read the whole piece; it's not long, and it's largely correct. I would only disagree, in my estimation of the depth of China's opposition to a Japanese seat on the Council. Even if Japan had taken a more consistent foreign policy leadership role over the years, absolutely nothing would dissuade the Chinese in their opposition to Japanese membership on the Council. No amount of post-war contrition from the Japanese, I feel, will ever be enough for China. Or rather, the contrition that China wants will never come from a government freely elected by the Japanese people. It's one of the pesky things about a democracy ...
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:17 AM to Asia
August 07, 2005
Anniversary celebrations
This weekend marked the 60th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing. As if to remind us how far Japan has come since then, and to highlight the uncertainties of its future, the past week has brought a bevy of impo