February 28, 2008
All apologies
Earlier this month, Australia's parliament passed a resolution formally apologizing for one of the country's most egregious practices of institutionalized mistreatment of indigenous Australians. In issuing this apology, Australia is not alone. Apologies for past, state-sponsored misdeeds have become a burgeoning topic for many national legislatures, including the U.S. Congress. Although the direct impact of such apologies is often uncertain, they can have a clear effect on a country's foreign policy.
The apology introduced by Australia's new prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was unanimously approved by that country's parliament. Specifically, it recognized and apologized for the Australian government's formal role in the “Stolen Generations” The term applies to the government's forced removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families and placing them into state orphanages and other institutions. This state-sanctioned practice took place from the late 1800s until 1970, and it was designed to assimilate Aboriginal peoples into “white” Australian culture. Indeed, in a grotesquely paternalistic way, many viewed the practice as beneficial to those Aboriginal children removed from their families. Since the 1970s, as the government's role in creating the Stolen Generations has become more understood and less defensible, the momentum for a formal apology has grown. Rudd, fulfilling a campaign promise, issued the apology at the very opening of Australia's parliament: “We apologize especially for the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country. For the pain, suffering and hurt of these Stolen Generations, their descendants and for their families left behind, we say sorry.”
Many other countries face or have faced similar experiences of national shame that demand formal apologies. These experiences can be purely domestic, as in Australia's case. The United States formally apologized for its World War II detention of Japanese-Americans in 1988 and issued a similar apology for its nineteenth century overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1993. Without much fanfare, the Senate this month passed an Indian health care bill that contains an amendment apologizing to Native Americans for “official depredations, ill-conceived policies and the breaking of covenants.” Other situations demand apologies that cross international borders. Germany has issued many unambiguous apologies for its actions during World War II, and Japan has done the same, though in arguably more ambiguous terms.
There are several ways to evaluate these kinds of formal apologies. On the most immediate level, many are paired with direct, substantive action, such as reparation payments. Germany has paid billions of dollars to Holocaust survivors and the state of Israel since World War II. Other apologies may not include direct compensation for victims but create other structures or systems to provide tangible benefit to the aggrieved. Rudd ruled out reparations for members of the Stolen Generations in Australia, but his apology was matched by a pledge to create a “war cabinet” that would bridge partisan divides and work to address social and economic disparities between indigenous Australians and the rest of the country. He promised that the “war cabinet” would work to improve levels of education, health care, and housing for indigenous Australians within a five-year time frame.
The easiest apology, of course, is the one made with words alone. One reason the Senate's apology to Native Americans has not achieved greater attention is because it has been attached as an amendment to an otherwise routine bill. The United States has a long and disgraceful history of mistreatment of Native Americans, but because the apology neither appropriates new funds nor creates new programs, it can be issued as a legislative amendment with little fanfare. To be fair, these same characteristics make the apology much easier to offer in the first place. Even if an apology is paired with a change in policy, it can be perceived as insufficient. Although Rudd's apology to indigenous Australians was widely popular, there were some grumblings that his “war cabinet” was not enough. Aboriginal leader Aboriginal leader Patrick Dodson claimed that, “any group of people who have been treated badly under laws … deserve to pursue compensation judicially, legally, or politically, and they deserve our support.”
Less helpful are the apologies that appear ambiguous. Japan's first official “apology” for its actions during World War II came when it re-established diplomatic relations with China in 1972. In a Joint Communique with his Chinese counterpart, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka asserted that, “the Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.” Japanese Prime Ministers and governments since then have elaborated on this statement, but never in terms that were absolutely unequivocal. As a result, the culpability for Japan's actions during World War II remains uncertain for many people throughout East Asia—in China, Korea, and even in Japan itself. This historical ambiguity continues to sour regional relations to this day (for more, see The Water's Edge, October 2007).
The least helpful apologies are the ones that aren't made. For years, under former Prime Minister John Howard, Australia refused to apologize for the Stolen Generations. This was not only very unpopular among many Australians, but it created a very negative impression of the country abroad. The United States is burdened with the similar impression. No U.S. president or Congress has ever formally apologized for slavery in the United States. There are many arguments about what form an apology for slavery could take, if direct reparations to the descendants of slaves would be a part of such an apology, and how useful an apology itself would even be. But in an international environment in which many already see the United States as a unilateral, selfish, and reckless actor, a formal apology for slavery could send a message of humility that would be useful on a global stage. Acknowledgement and remorse for past misdeeds, even if state-sanctioned, is by no means a sign of present-day weakness. Indeed, such honesty and transparency can convey national confidence and strength
It is impossible to determine the precise value of these formal, state apologies for past misdeeds. They may simply be “feel-good” exercises with no present-day relevance. Or, alternatively, they could play a major role in reconciling divisions within a society and in improving perceptions of a country beyond its own borders. In Australia, Rudd has made clear that he views the recent apology not as the end of a tragic chapter in that country's history but as the beginning of a new, more hopeful one. As a symbolic statement alone, the apology will have lasting value. And in foreign policy, symbolism is often as valuable as substance. This is a lesson applicable to all countries, regardless of past misdeeds or contemporary apologies.
Foreign Policy Association, 28 February 2008
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:30 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, Europe, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)
April 04, 2006
Dubious dialogue
On March 18, the foreign ministers of Australia, Japan, and the United States met in Sydney for a "Trilateral Strategic Dialogue." As usual, the United States was the primary driver of the agenda, and, invariably, the focus was on China. But instead of promoting regional unity, the "strategic dialogue" was an example of how the United States is driving the region apart. In the process, it is doing China a great favor.
To understand why, it helps to look at the relationships between each of the trilateral partners and China. Japan came into the meeting with the most strained relationship. Japan and China have long been the most important powers in East Asia, and tensions between them have only grown in recent years. On Monday, the Japanese foreign minister (and trilateral participant), Taro Aso, sharply lamented the growth in China's military spending: "It's not clear what China is using the money for [and it] creates a sense of threat for surrounding countries."
Australia, on the other hand, came into the dialogue with a decidedly different view of China. Australian Prime Minister John Howard has attempted to find a balance between aligning with Asia, on the one hand, and with the United States, on the other. He supported the U.S. invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq, but he also recently signed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Treaty of Amity and Co-operation -- a move he had long resisted but ultimately approved for the sake of better relations with Australia's Asian neighbors. Perhaps more important, Australia's export market is becoming increasingly reliant on China's voracious economy.
The United States, for its part, viewed the dialogue as a way to augment its array of bilateral alliances in the region. But China could easily have viewed the dialogue as just the latest U.S. attempt to contain it. In Congress, vilifying China -- large, menacing, and conveniently Red -- has become a bipartisan pastime. Last year, politicians united in exploiting public fear to scuttle the purchase of U.S.-based Unocal by CNOOC, a state-owned Chinese oil firm. And in advance of the trilateral meeting, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned that China could become a "negative force" in the region. In the trilateral partnership, the U.S. position is clearly more in line with Japan's than Australia's.
This alignment of interests was clear to all, and Australia sought to disavow any notion that the trilateral dialogue was designed to counter China. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer noted that "a policy of containment of China would be a very big mistake." But regardless of its true purpose, the dialogue was shrouded in speculation and opacity. The media consequently portrayed it as a nascent anti-China alliance -- so for all intents and purposes, that is what it was. The only mention of China in the joint statement emanating from the dialogue was an anodyne reference to its "constructive engagement in the region": a sure sign that the trilateral members had difficulty finding common ground.
China, for its part, has not been standing still while the United States attempts to bolster its regional alliances. In December, the inaugural East Asian Summit was held, in Kuala Lumpur. An outgrowth of ASEAN, the summit was inevitably dominated by China, through its sheer size; should this summit evolve into an organization, China's influence within it will only grow. The price for Australian participation in the summit, however, was its signature on the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation. For Howard, this was not an insignificant price to pay, for the treaty severely limits Australia's ability to assist in the Bush administration's "war on terror." Despite his conservative credentials, it is difficult to imagine Howard paying a similar price for the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue.
Indeed, Australia is keen to exploit and expand its relationship with China. On Monday, during a visit to Australia by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Downer signed an agreement to sell uranium to China. An official in the Australian foreign ministry noted that the United States was "hardly in a position" to criticize the agreement, given the Bush administration's recent deal to sell nuclear fuel to India. Wen, for his part, diplomatically made note of Australia's precarious positioning between the United States and China: "We believe that countries which are allied with the United States can also be China's friends, and Australia is one of them."
None of this should suggest that the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue is a wasted effort. Surely the United States, Japan and Australia have many common interests, and it is in each country's best interest to pursue continued cooperation with one another. Likewise, the sheer opacity of many aspects of China's growth is reason enough for caution.
But the United States must avoid sending mixed signals -- to allies, foes and everyone in between. Under the Bush administration, the U.S. position toward China is closer to Japan's than to Australia's. Because the United States and Japan are longstanding allies, this is understandable. But Australia is also an ally, and not the first -- or the only -- one to find itself needlessly torn between the United States and China.
There once was a time when a country, faced with such a choice, would clearly pick the United States. That time may be over.
Providence Journal, 5 April 2005
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:51 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, U. S. Politics
July 27, 2005
Good on ya
In somewhat of a surprising move (to me, at least), Australia has decided to sign ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Co-operation. As such, the Aussies will be invited to the inaugural East Asian Summit in Malaysia this December:
Alexander Downer, the Australian foreign minister, yesterday hailed the country's accession to the peace pact and its invitation to the summit as “an enormous step forward for Australia in terms of our engagement with east Asia”.
The summit could play a “very important part in building an east Asia community”, Mr Downer said. Australia had previously resisted signing the regional treaty, citing the potential conflict with its cold war-era mutual defence pact with the US, which obliges the two countries to come to each others' aid in the event of a threat.
But the prospect of exclusion from a nascent economic block finally prompted Australia's capitulation, though political analysts said John Howard, the Australian prime minister, first received a green light from Washington, which it still considers the primary guarantor of Australia's security.
“He really does believe there should be a good relationship with Asia but it's a question of what price he is willing to pay,” Harold Crouch, a political scientist of Australian National University, said yesterday.
As I've noted before, Australia's John Howard has been courting Asia of late. In many ways, this cuts against the common perception of him as a PM who values Australia's alliance with the United States at the expense of relations with its more proximate neighbors in Asia. But as I've also noted, this perception is not entirely accurate. There is a great deal of evidence to support the assertion that Howard really doesn't view relations with the United States and Asia as a zero-sum game. This, as it happens, is the correct perspective.
Still, the big news with Australia's decision to sign the amity treaty is that it violates previously stated Australian policy. In effect, the treaty binds signatories to the peaceful resolution of interstate disputes. While hard to argue with the virtue of that premise, Australia found reason to squabble and delay its signing. That reason? Pre-emption. Demonstrating the highest of loyalty to the United States (or, one could argue, to Bush), Howard never quite renounced the right of Australia to launch unprovoked military action. Prompted by the Bali bombings in 2002 and encouraged by the maze of violent, uncertain, and extremist Islam in Indonesia and the Philippines, Howard reserved the right to take out terrorist targets that he deemed a threat to Australian citizens. There is certainly a fair and valid argument to be made for this, and my hunch was that Howard would stick with it.
But he hasn't. This proves a couple things. First, it further demonstrates that Howard is not the stark zero-sum theorist -- one who sides with the United States at the expense of Asia -- that many make him out to be. Australia can remain a staunch U.S. ally and still nurture relations with its Asian neighbors. Second, it proves that Howard views the upcoming East Asia Summit as vital to Australian interests. Don't misunderstand this: by signing the amity treaty, Howard is definitely limiting Australia's strategic and tactical flexibility. This, in turn, could make Australia appreciably less useful to the United States as an ally, or rather as its "deputy" in Asia. So while Australia's alliance with the United States is in no real danger (especially given Howard's recent commitment of more Aussie troops to Afghanistan), and while the FT piece hints that Australia got a U.S. green light to sign the amity treaty, Howard's decision was by no means a foregone conclusion.
So Howard changes existing Australian policy, threatening to annoy the United States in the process, in order to get a seat at the East Asian table. This is a wholly pragmatic decision. Not only must Australia give due emphasis to relations with its Asian neighbors, but signing the amity agreement -- especially after initially refusing to do so -- represents an important show of compromise and pragmatism on Australia's part. This, in turn, will give Australia greater leverage at the summit itself, which by all accounts could mark the start of something big. Already, states as far away as Pakistan and Russia are clamoring to be invited to the inaugural summit. I'll reserve judgment as to whether such enthusiasm is justified, but obviously, the neighborhood thinks it will be a big deal. That Australia does as well only proves that it, too, is part of that same Asian neighborhood. Good for Howard to not only recognize that, but to act on it.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:46 PM to Australia/NZ
July 07, 2005
Separate issues
It looks like the Aussies are being called back to another front in the "war on terror:"
The Afghan government had asked Australia, a close US ally, to send troops and the cabinet would most likely make a decision next week, Howard told a commercial radio station Thursday.
"There's been a standing request from the government of Afghanistan over quite a period of time to a lot of countries including Australia to send troops," he said.
"Now we are going to look at it. I don't want to pre-empt what cabinet might decide. But we are going to look at it and if we do take a decision it will be announced next week."
I would argue that a given military commitment to Afghanistan would do much more to mitigate violent Islamic extremism than a similar commitment to Iraq. Though the occupation of Iraq has caused a blossoming of Islamic terrorism in that country, Afghanistan was always the hub of al Qaeda's operations. Even today, it remains nothing more than a fragile success, still hosting and falling victim to Taliban and al Qaeda perturbations. Of course, this is all complicated by the fact that Iraq -- as a hub and training center for mujahideen, both local and foreign -- has become the new Afghanistan. Both places are a mess, but on principle, Afghanistan represents the struggle against Islamic terrorism in a purer and more effective sense.
Howard strives to make the distinction between Iraq and Afghanistan, especially with regard to possible troop deployments:
Australia already has about 900 troops with the US-led coalition in Iraq, and Howard indicated that any decision on Afghanistan would not affect this commitment.
"The two issues are quite separate and if we were to decide on Afghanistan it would be taken in isolation to our commitment to Iraq, and that commitment will remain until the job is finished," he said. [emphasis mine]
I suppose that's better than rejecting the Afghan request out of hand, but it misses a great opportunity to send a symbolic and practical message that Iraq represents a colossal miscalculation in the West's post-9/11 response. Interestingly, and refreshingly, Labor is making the same distinction that Howard is ("the two issues are quite separate") but from a much more logical basis:
"At the moment Australia is caught in the Iraq quagmire," [Labor leader Kim] Beazley said. "Australia needs to get out of Iraq so that we can begin to prepare for involvement in Afghanistan to tackle terrorism."
Indeed, Iraq and Afghanistan are quite separate issues. Howard thinks they are separate because they represent different battlefields in the same war, while Beazley thinks they're separate because Iraq and Afghanistan represent different wars altogether. In this instance, I think Beazley's closer to the truth.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:16 PM to Australia/NZ, Middle East
May 13, 2005
Howard's way
Last week's Economist had a good (if amazingly positive) survey of Australia. If you skipped over it, I recommend you go back and check it out. Of particular note was the rather glowing piece on John Howard's foreign policy:
On two successive days in October 2003, Australia's two houses of Parliament met in joint session to hear first President George Bush and then President Hu Jintao of China. Though many Australians, and not just of the left, found it hard to decide whether it was the warmonger or the tyrant whose presence they found more objectionable, the visits proved one point: Australia has become a country of disproportionate consequence in world affairs. It has achieved the unlikely feat of close friendships with both the world's most powerful state and its most populous one, friendships that are being turned into hard cash. Last year Australia signed a free-trade agreement with America; in April it opened negotiations on one with China. These days, Alexander Downer, Australia's effective if prickly foreign minister, can plausibly say that “there is no need to trade off America against Asia”: Australia has managed to have both.
I'd add to the Economist's example of well-timed Aussie diplomacy the recent visits of Indonesian President Yudhoyono and Malaysian PM Badawi to Canberra in the span of a single week. Clearly, Australia is in a unique position in world affairs, if for no other reason than the fate that placed a Western culture on the edge of Eastern civilization. But despite Howard's avid support of the Iraq war (which I continue to find inexcusable), I've developed a new-found respect for his foreign policy direction.
As I've noted here before and as the Economist reiterates, a great tension in Australian foreign policy is between Asia and America, or rather, to which of the two Australia displays a greater affinity. Howard is commonly criticized for tilting too closely to the United States at the expense of Asia, having agreed with the assertion that Australia has acted as a "deputy sheriff" for the United States in its neck of the words. That was surely an unfortunate mistake on Howard's part, as not even the closest of U.S. allies wants to be identified as a "deputy" anything. But Iraq aside, what else has prompted this moniker?
These storm-clouds aside, one unsung success of the Howard years has been its willingness to take up the burden of the South Pacific, a collection of dysfunctional island nations that no one else wants to grapple with. The first instance was the Australian-led intervention in East Timor, in 1999: but that involved two dozen countries and was blessed with a full-scale UN Security Council resolution. More recently, Australia has found itself drawn into much smaller-scale operations with a big civilian component in the Solomon Islands, in Papua New Guinea and even in Nauru: all countries that became independent only in the late 1960s or 1970s, and have signally failed to prosper. Elsina Wainwright, an analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute who has written on Australia's “near abroad”, sees September 11th as instrumental: it helped to focus minds on the dangers of failing states.
The Solomons, a collection of 1,000 islands wracked by civil war and political and economic breakdown, marked a key departure for Australia. Little more than two years ago, the Australian government was still insisting that it could not “presume to fix the problems of the South Pacific countries”. But as the situation in the islands, a three-hour flight from Brisbane, continued to deteriorate, the government performed a complete U-turn. In July 2003, it established and led a multilateral, but overwhelmingly Australian, regional-assistance mission. The Australians are now training the Solomons' own police, and have brought in a team of civil servants to help rebuild the country's economy so that it will eventually be able to function on its own.
But what really spooks Australian planners is Papua New Guinea. It is far bigger than the Solomons (5.8m people rather than 500,000), very much closer, and was an Australian colony until 1975. It has an appalling AIDS problem, a history of attempted secession and abortive coups, and an economy that has stagnated since independence. In the hope of forestalling its collapse, Australia has long thrown money at it: now it is throwing people.
In an exercise modelled on the Solomons intervention, but without the military component, Australia in December 2003 launched its “enhanced co-operation programme” for Papua New Guinea, sending Australian police officers and civil servants to work there. Something similar, but on a much smaller scale, is happening in Nauru. The jury is still out on the new doctrine of “co-operative intervention”, but at least the Australians are trying.
If Australia would not have taken the lead in East Timor, the Solomons, and Papua New Guinea, who would have? The United States certainly has the means, but would it have had the inclination? Especially in the case of its mission in East Timor -- when Australia atoned for its historical sin of condoning Indonesia's original invasion and seriously chilled relations with its populous, Muslim, northern neighbor in the process -- Australia demonstrated the bold behavior not often associated with deputies. There are certainly valid critiques to be made of Australia's recent interventions in the South Pacific. But above all, it took the initiative and set the agenda, and under circumstances that by no means guaranteed success.
The survey also discusses Howard's artful diplomacy vis a vis China. Economically, Australia provides an ample supply of raw materials to meet China's even greater demand for them. The two countries find themselves currently negotiating a free-trade agreement, which is remarkable, as the Economist notes, because Australia already has such an agreement with the United States. The likely tipping point in Australia's delicate balance between China and the United States, of course, is Taiwan, which so often seems to be a disruptive factor in Pacific politics. I cannot envision a situation whereby Australia would break on China's side if the Taiwan situation ever came to blows. Does this represent a fault in Howard's balancing? Hardly. While it's important to maintain positive relationships and to nurture constructive diplomacy, a foreign policy that condones military invasion is not worthy of the name -- principle must always have a place in any responsible state's foreign policy. It's just a shame Howard didn't have that in mind when Bush came calling about Iraq.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:31 PM to Australia/NZ
April 30, 2005
True Islam
Ran into this interesting bit from the ANZAC Day observances earlier this week:
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a correction to the expression "moderate Islam" of his Australian counterpart John Howard whom he met on Tuesday, April 26.
According to information received, Howard spoke at a dinner held in his honor where he said, "One of the factors that will block the path of terrorism is the formation of democracy in moderate Islamic countries like Indonesia and Turkey." Upon this, Erdogan taking the floor corrected: "After the September 11 attacks, the expression, 'moderate Islam' that is widely being used is leading to different interpretations. There is no need to put a different adjective before or after the word 'Islam'. Islam means peace. It rejects all kinds of excessiveness." Howard then noted that he had meant "true Islam". [emphasis mine]
Coming from Erdogan -- an avowedly observant Muslim politician who also preaches the importance of a secular state and is aggressively pursuing Turkey's goal of EU membership -- such commentary is of particular interest. This is not to ascribe positive or negative value to it, but just simply to point it out. Indeed, the irony that Erdogan and his AK Party (with its roots in Islamist politics) have pursued EU membership so aggressively -- and, compared to previous Turkish PMs, so successfully thus far -- is often noted. But I have also found references to the fears held by some ardent Kemalists in Turkey, who also happen to be Erdogan's political enemies. In their view, Erodgan is pursuing EU membership aggressively in order to reduce the influence of the military in Turkish politics, to bring Turkey in line with EU norms. Once the military is put in its place, Erdogan will sweep away secularism and Kemalism and create an Islamic state, in the Iranian mold.
That's the fear, anyway. I don't buy it. Erdogan isn't perfect, but there's something very appropriate about an Islamic prime minister leading Turkey into the EU. If nothing else, it demonstrates that piety, politics, and secularism are not necessarily contradictory values. If Turkey does gain EU membership, I don't think Ataturk himself would much criticize Erdogan's means.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:32 PM to Australia/NZ, Europe
April 25, 2005
ANZAC Day
Today was ANZAC Day, which commemorates an event that inextricably linked two countries a world apart -- Australia and Turkey (and New Zealand, as well). It marks the date in 1915 when British, French, and ANZAC (Australia and New Zealand Army Corps) soldiers landed at Gallipoli in an attempt to force the Dardanelles, open a sea route to Russian Crimea, and knock Ottoman Turkey out of World War I. The invasion was ultimately unsuccessful -- but only after months of horrifying trench combat that yielded little gain. Out of those trenches, however, two countries were born. Though Australia had gained formal independence from the United Kingdom 15 years earlier and the Turkish Republic would not emerge from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire for another 8 years, the national psyches of both countries were forged at Gallipoli. While the two countries met in combat 90 years ago, they have been closely bound ever since by their shared legacy of colonial manipulation and tragic sacrifice.
It is traditional that along with the prime ministers of Turkey, Australia, and New Zealand, thousands of backpackers from each country descend on Gallipoli each year on ANZAC Day. Today's 90th anniversary of the invasion was no exception. From the Sydney Morning Herald:
At Gallipoli, [New Zealand defence chief Vice-Marshal Bruce Ferguson said] "We learnt to shake off the shackles of colonial dependency - we learnt we must stand for what we believe in."
The New Zealand defence chief said that even now armies heeded the lesson of the Dardanelles campaign. "No commander today will risk young lives so needlessly."
"None of us can ever conceive what a hell on earth this place was for eight months." He said we must never forget that the Turks, "who were defending their homeland", lost 87,000 lives.
Vice-Marshal Ferguson's speech underlined the remarkable nature of Anzac Day: 17,000 people, most of them young Australians, gathered at Gallipoli yesterday to remember not a triumph, but a defeat. [emphasis mine]
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:28 PM to Australia/NZ, Europe
April 20, 2005
Friends when you need them
Some tentative chit-chat over an Australia-Japan free trade deal during Australian PM John Howard's visit to Tokyo. From the Sydney Morning Herald:
Before the talks with Mr Koizumi, John Howard played down the significance of securing a free trade agreement with Japan to the overall relationship between the two countries. "We are not talking here about inaugurating a free trade negotiation," he said. "We're talking about an examination, a scoping study, a feasibility study -- whatever way you want to describe it." The relationship would stay strong even if nothing eventuated, he said.
Australia's two-way trade with Japan last year was valued at $44.3 billion and could be expected to grow, mostly in Australia's favour, if there was a free trade deal. The biggest beneficiaries would be the farming and services sector, analysts said.
The Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, visited Tokyo last month to pave the way for negotiations on a deal. But Australia has been unable to overcome the fierce opposition of Japan's agriculture officials and the farming sector.
But regardless of any delay in a trade deal, the two countries have been particularly chummy of late, a state of affairs which has manifested itself half a world away. I'm sure the Japanese loved the timing of Howard's visit -- it's nice to be reminded of friends in the region (though that's somewhat in dispute) when the big kid on the block is causing such headaches.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:57 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ
April 07, 2005
Neighborly relations, Round 2
There's been some conflicting reports about Malaysian PM Abdullah Badawi's recent visit to Canberra. The IHT casts a rather positive light on things:
A decade ago, a prominent Malaysian politician had sharp words about Australia's relationship with East Asia: "If I look at a map, I believe that it says that Australia is not part of Asia," he said.
On Thursday, that same politician, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, now Malaysia's prime minister, was in Canberra exchanging warm compliments with Prime Minister John Howard and announcing that the two countries were starting talks on a free-trade agreement.
When a reporter asked Abdullah whether Australia would be invited to a summit of East Asian leaders in Kuala Lumpur later this year, the prime minister said, "My policy has been one of inclusiveness and not excluding anyone." [emphasis mine]
But other sources paint a much more pessimistic picture. The Sydney Morning Herald cuts right to the chase:
The Malaysian Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, declined to invite Australia to the East Asian summit it will host later this year during his talks with the Prime Minister, John Howard, in Canberra yesterday, though the two leaders agreed to begin negotiations on a free trade pact.
The failure of the Federal Government to secure an invitation prompted accusations from Labor that Mr Howard's refusal to sign ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, a non-aggression pact already signed by China, Japan and South Korea, had jeopardised Australia's chances of inclusion in the new regional economic community.
Earlier in the week, the Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, threw his support behind Australia's inclusion in the East Asian summit, which would provide a crucial economic and strategic opportunity for Canberra. [emphasis mine]
Of course, both accounts could be true, and agreeing to begin negotiations on a free trade pact is a promising outcome. But the discrepancies in tone stand in stark contrast to the generally positive coverage of John Howard's meeting with Indonesian President Yudhoyono earlier this week. Yudhoyono, for instance, had indicated his support for Australia's inclusion in the upcoming East Asia Summit, which Badawi declined to second.
And what of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation to which the SMH refers? It's true that in his characteristic style -- one which helps fuel criticism that he is too close to President Bush and U.S. foreign policy -- John Howard declined to sign the non-aggression treaty, primarily because he wanted to retain the freedom to strike at threatening terrorist targets in neighboring states, if the need arose. Howard's snubbing of the treaty was made all the more insulting given that took place during a special ASEAN-Australia "commemorative summit" in Laos last year. But that didn't seem to bother Yudhoyono too much, at least with regard to an invitation to the upcoming East Asia summit, nor does it seem to bother Japan (which, admittedly, is not a member of ASEAN nor is a primary sponsor of the upcoming summit).
So what to make of Badawi's reluctance to invite Australia? Who knows. Badawi will be the host of the summit, so he is justifiably more sensitive to the guest list than any other Asian leader. And to be sure, the Australian relationship with Malaysia goes back a long way and remains strong. Perhaps the variable and somewhat conflicting coverage of the Howard-Badawi meeting, then, has more to do with the vagaries of the media than with the any actual troubles in the relationship between Australia and Malaysia.
UPDATE: Nice recap of Australia's "Asia week" from the BBC.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:44 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ
April 04, 2005
Neighborly relations
Opponents of Australian PM John Howard's foreign policy like to point out what they see as his overemphasis on relations with the United States to the detriment of those with Australia's Asian neighbors. This criticism has been several years in the making, and it usually consists of a few key points. First, relations with Indonesia, Australia's most populous (and most proximate) neighbor and the country with the world's largest Muslim population, have been somewhat strained ever since the Australian-led UN mission in East Timor in 1999. Second, Howard has simultaneously brought Australian foreign policy closer to that of the United States, most notably by fully participating in the U.S. mission in Iraq. Taken together, Howard's critics argue, such actions and others represent a fundamental foreign policy shift away from Asia and too close to the United States.
But is this critique wholly justified? Peter Hartcher of the Syndey Morning Herald thinks not:
The whole framework for Australian political discussion about foreign affairs has been a false and fruitless one for decades. This is the idea that there are only two options -- Asia or "the West", which, in Australian politicalspeak, means the US -- and there is some sort of trade-off for a government in emphasising one over the other.
[...]
An exporter wants markets to grow everywhere, and wants a government that will open the way wherever it might be blocked. And the woolgrower knows that it is no use to sell to China if the US is in trouble, because the US is the key market for China's textile exports. And so on. The exporter needs America and Asia.
Likewise, in diplomacy a country's influence is increased if it has weight with a larger number of other countries. To achieve an agreement on arms proliferation or fisheries practices or just about anything, a government needs influence in Washington and Asia, and, of course, elsewhere too.
Such an assessment is quite timely. This week, the heads of government of both Indonesia and Malaysia will visit Canberra. Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's visit has already concluded. His country's relationship with Australia has been driven by sacrifice and emotion in recent months and years, through shared terrorist bombings and through Indonesia's recent natural disasters. In the context of the latter, Australia has offered nearly US$1 billion for tsunami relief, and nine Australian servicemen have recently died in the provision of that aid. In his address at Parliament House, Yudhoyono emphasized these connections. He also vowed to promote Australia as an integral part of Asia, and he pledged to begin cooperation with Australia on a new security pact.
Such a successful visit, it would seem, by such an important Asian neighbor should go a long way in silencing critics of Howard's "unbalanced" foreign policy. It seems that much of Australian public opinion would support Howard's recent diplomacy, as well. If the visit by Malaysian PM Abdullah Badawi later this week is only half as successful as Yudhoyono's -- an outcome which is far from guaranteed -- Howard's critics may be left with even less to say.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:15 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ
March 28, 2005
Aussie attitudes
The Lowy Institute in Australia has a new poll out -- "the most comprehensive single survey ever taken of Australian public opinion on international policy" -- that yields some interesting results. Some highlights, with my thoughts embedded:
- 57% of Australians are "very worried" or "fairly worried" about Islamic fundamentalism as a potential threat -- the same number that are worried about U.S. foreign policies. One caveat is that nuclear proliferation and international terrorism were each polled as different and separate threats, and each polled higher than Islamic fundamentalism and U.S. foreign policy. But still, it's a rather startling equivalency.
- China's growing power worries only 35% of Australians, and while only 34% favor the free trade agreement with the United States, 51% favor a similar agreement with China. Proximity clearly seems to matter to Australians.
- The same percentage of Australians -- 75% -- think improving the global environment is as important a foreign policy goal as is strengthening the Australian economy and protecting the jobs of Australian workers. This is similar to U.S. public opinion inasmuch as economic interests rank high, but it differs in the strong Australian emphasis on environmental concerns.
- 51% of Australians oppose their country's continuing military involvement in Iraq -- a majority, but not a resounding one. Australians, somewhat to my surprise, seem about as torn over Iraq as Americans.
- 94% of Australians have positive feelings toward New Zealand, 86% toward the United Kingdom, 84% toward Japan, 69% toward China, 58% toward the United States, and 52% toward Indonesia. The friendliness toward Kiwis is understandable, but it is notable that Australians are almost as positive toward Japan (a former territorial threat) as they are toward the United Kingdom (with which Australia shares a head of state). The U.S. ranking is notably low, but the hesitancy with Indonesia -- populous, Muslim, and close -- is understandable.
Take a look at the survey itself for some more good stuff. Also check out the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations for U.S. public opinion surveys on international issues and the Pew Global Attitudes Project for surveys of other countries. The Program on International Policy Attitudes has a little of both. It's important to note that these surveys are just snapshots in time, and that public opinion doesn't make diplomacy. But the information these surveys offer is valuable nonetheless, especially in comparative terms, and ideally, they serve to inform those who actually make policy.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:45 PM to Australia/NZ
March 23, 2005
Downer, up from down under
In an update to the earlier noted deployment of additional Australian soliders to Iraq to defend Japanese troops, it seems that Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer paid a visit to Tokyo earlier this week:
In a wide-ranging speech to the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) following his meeting with Koizumi, Downer said the deployment of an additional 450 Australian troops to maintain security in Muthanna Province and protect GSDF troops there underlined Australia's commitment to its cooperative relationship with Japan.
"We know that the initial decision to deploy defense forces to Iraq was a complex one for Japan, but it was the right decision to make and we're very pleased to be working with Japan, and with other coalition partners, to help Iraq build a better future," he said.
Asked if Australian casualties while guarding Japanese forces would affect the relationship, Downer said, "We'll live with the consequences as Australians of our own decisions and not pass the blame to Japan if that happened."
It's nice to hear Downer say that Australian casualties in Iraq wouldn't affect relations with Japan. Of course, Downer is at an advantage in knowing that Muthanna is one of the safer provinces in Iraq. If, however, Australians were to die in Iraq -- they have yet to lose a soldier in combat, despite being one of the few countries involved in the Iraq war since the initial invasion -- it would cause a stir. The recent deployment of additional troops isn't very popular in Australia, nor is the Japanese deployment in general overwhelmingly popular in that country. If Aussie deaths were linked in the public consciousness to the defense of armed but impotent Japanese soldiers, it very well might have an effect on Australian mass perceptions of Japan and on the relationship between the two countries. So if all of Downer's stoicism is put to a tragic test by unfortunate news from Iraq, public opinion may leave him behind.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:16 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, Middle East
February 22, 2005
Pacific politics, Iraqi desert
When faced with charges of "unilateralism," supporters of the war in Iraq often counter with the fact that many countries comprise the "coalition of the willing," with forces currently serving in-country. While certainly true, the forces offered by many states amount to little more than token contributions, with the United Kingdom, South Korea, Italy, and Poland leading the way with the most substantial contigents. Over the past 24 months, furthermore, several countries have withdrawn their garrisons, most notably Spain last year. But back in March 2003, when a fair number of countries supported the invasion of Iraq in principle, only one country besides the United States and the United Kingdom supported it with troops: Australia. Now, with the Dutch on their way out, the Aussies have taken a somewhat unexpected step: they will send more troops to Iraq.
The 450 new troops will be in addition to Australia's current 800-odd troops serving in and around Iraq, and to be sure, Prime Minister John Howard's decision to deploy them faces serious questions from the opposition Labor Party back home. Fortunately for the new arrivals, they will be stationed in the relatively quiet southern sector of the country. And their primary charge? To protect other troops. To be sure, the "other troops" in question are no ordinary troops. They are members of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces, constitutionally-prohibited from using any more than a bare minimum of force, and then only in strictly-defined situations of self-defense. Performing humanitarian and construction duties primarily, their mere presense in Iraq is significant in the context of Japan's evolving foreign and defense policies, as discussed recently in this space. Some do, of course, suppose [free registration required to view] the Japanese presence in Iraq is more complicated than any mere obligation to its alliance with the United States.
Regardless, the deployment of additional Australian troops to Iraq to defend Japanese soldiers contains an intriguing sub-plot outside the realms of Iraq, the Islamic world, and U.S. foreign policy. It offers a unique insight into the relationship between Australia and Japan. Both countries have long been staunch allies of the United States and have been steadfast in their support of the Bush adminstration's "war on terror." But they are also each important actors in East Asia, who recently worked closely together to provide and coordinate tsunami relief in the Indian Ocean. They also represent the most important, firmly "Western" states in East Asia, defined in terms of free market economics and representative politics if not in terms of history and culture. And perhaps related to this fact, they each face very proximate, very populous neighbors -- Indonesia for Australia and China for Japan. As also discussed here previously, the strategic jockeying that these geopolitical realities represent and instigate is already well underway. If Junichiro Koizumi and John Howard can strengthen their respective positions at home by cooperating in the far-abroad (and by pleasing the United States in the process), so be it.
Meanwhile, back in Iraq, some have noted the peculiar irony of Australian soldiers watching over Japanese as the latter build roads and bridges in a wartime environment. While this particular World War II reference may fall short of outright relevance, it does make one realize that historical ironies need not be relevant in order to be profound. Times do, indeed, change.
Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:29 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, Middle East
