Daniel Widome

December 05, 2009

New orientation

Between the lofty, untested principles of political candidacy and the urgent and unexpected realities of governance lies something of a middle ground, or an overall orientation that can guide a president's foreign policy and serve as a prism through which he or she can interpret global events. In the first year of his presidency, and especially in the past month, Obama's general foreign policy orientation has begun to emerge.

A convenient way of interpreting such orientations is through political and economic geography. During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was oriented toward the containment of Communist expansion. This orientation was global in scale, but its geographic emphasis was Europe. Historically, this made sense. Both world wars had erupted in Europe, and the United States had invested significant resources in rebuilding and securing the continent after World War II. The region held a cultural affinity for millions of Americans, and it maintained close economic ties with the United States. Looking forward, the orientation on Europe also made sense. It represented the vanguard of Soviet expansion, with hundreds of thousands of troops in East Germany and the prospect of nuclear conflict representing the most dangerous security challenge in the world. Following the Cold War, the orientation of U.S. foreign policy began to drift, until 2001, when the 9/11 attacks refocused attention on the suppression of global terrorism.

Under President Obama, the suppression of terrorism still remains a paramount objective. But in his tone and his actions, it seems clear that terrorism is not the prism through which he views the world. Likewise, Obama places great value on the U.S. relationship with Europe. He has already paid several visits to the continent, and he is quite popular there. But from the U.S. perspective, the relative importance of Europe has been waning. This reality became increasingly clear in November.

During Obama's first trip to Asia this month, the president paid visits to Japan, Singapore, China, and South Korea. At each stop, the importance of Asia as Obama's prevailing foreign policy orientation became increasingly clear. Of all of the countries on his itinerary, it is Japan's relationship with the United States that has most resembled the United States' relationship with Europe. Japan rebuilt itself after World War II under the protection of the United States and developed a political and economic system that was friendly to the United States' Cold War ideology. To this day, Japan houses thousands of U.S. soldiers, and disagreement over the relocation of important U.S. bases on Okinawa dominated much of Obama's discussion with Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. Obama also used Japan, as the oldest and most reliable U.S. ally on his itinerary, as the venue to deliver a wide-ranging speech on the importance of Asia. He emphasized the importance of long-standing U.S. treaty obligations in the region and the value of cultivating economic “spheres of cooperation, not competing spheres of influence.” Obama also announced that the United States would engage with the Trans Pacific Partnership, a regional Asia-Pacific free trade agreement that currently includes only four countries but could eventually form the basis for a much wider trade bloc.

In Singapore, Obama both reiterated a long-standing commitment in the region and began a new one. He participated in the meeting of leaders from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries, which U.S. presidents have made a habit of doing in recent years. But Obama also participated in a summit with leaders from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This was the first time a U.S. president had met with ASEAN leaders in a formal summit, and the act carried significant symbolic value. Paving the way for the joint summit was Obama's willingness to meet with a leader from Burma, an ASEAN member but also a notoriously repressive state. Obama's meeting with Prime Minister Thein Sein was the first time a U.S. president had directly interacted with a Burmese leader in over 40 years, and it was a reflection of his new strategy of trying to engage with the military regime there in the hope of encouraging reform. Obama's meeting yielded little in the way of specific concessions, but the fact that he valued deeper engagement in the region over a long-standing refusal to meet with Burmese leaders was an important shift in U.S. policy.

Obama's visit to China could be considered the heart of his trip to Asia. He held a town hall meeting with students in Shanghai and met with President Hu Jintao in Beiing. Critics have suggested that Obama left China with few concessions from the Communist regime. They note that he was unable to secure wider broadcast of his town hall meeting in Shanghai or convince the government to modify its currency policy or support a tougher approach toward Iran. On these points, the critics are correct. Whether that necessarily represents a failure, however, is not as clear. The reality is that the United States cannot dictate to China as it once could, or as it might wish to today. Not only is its economy large and growing, China also holds $800 billion in U.S. debt. It plays a significant role in financing the U.S. economy, and it has assumed a greater stake in a wider range of U.S. domestic policy than it ever has before. China has become increasingly concerned, for example, with the effect that health care reform legislation will have on the U.S. budget deficit. This is not to suggest that China can now dictate terms to the United States. But the economic and political realities have shifted such that the United States and China must now engage each other on more equal terms.

Obama's tour of Asia coincided with important developments on the other side of the United States, in Europe. In October, the European Union cleared the final hurdles toward ratifying the Lisbon Treaty (for more, see The Water's Edge, October 2009). Among the treaty's most important reforms was the creation of the posts of president of the European Council and of high representative for foreign and security policy (essentially an EU foreign minister). These positions could potentially strengthen the collective voice of the EU on the international stage. At a meeting of EU heads of government this month, Europe's leaders selected Belgian Prime Minister Herman Van Rompuy to be president of the European Council and EU Trade Commissioner Lady Ashton of the United Kingdom as the high representative for foreign and security policy. By all accounts, these were sound selections. But neither individual has the stature of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who was rumored to be in the running for the Council presidency. By selecting such obscure personalities to fill these new positions, the leaders of the EU's individual member states took a deliberately cautious approach. Instead of taking advantage of the Lisbon Treaty to create a stronger international presence for the EU, Europe's leaders sought to prolong the status quo, in which foreign policy is largely directed from the 27 national capitals of the separate EU member states. In other words, serious change was deferred.

That Obama's trip to Asia overlapped with the EU's selection of new leaders was purely coincidental. But it underscored the shifting orientation of U.S. foreign policy. Where Asia presented a series of genuine challenges to a once pre-eminent United States, Europe deferred action that would have seriously increased its global stature. This is not to say that Europe will become any less important to U.S. interests or to suggest that any other issue (such as terrorism) will fade from the U.S. agenda. Nor is the shift of attention entirely due to any conscious decision, by Obama or anyone else. Instead, geographical and political reality has coincided with the term of a new U.S. president who is eager to conduct foreign policy in a fundamentally different manner than his predecessor. Compared to the historical emphasis placed on Europe, the relative importance of Asia for both U.S. domestic and foreign policy is increasing at a dramatic rate. Meanwhile, during George Bush's presidency, many Asian leaders felt ignored by a United States preoccupied with foreign wars. During his tour of the region, Obama hoped to send the message that “the United States is back.” This is the clearest indication yet that U.S. foreign policy will become increasingly oriented toward Asia, during Obama's presidency and beyond.

Foreign Policy Association, 3 December 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:59 AM to Asia, Europe, Trans-geographical | TrackBack (0)

October 22, 2009

Euro vision

The U.S. president frequently finds himself at the center of global attention. This month was no different, as speculation mounted over Barack Obama's new strategy in Afghanistan and surprise erupted over the president's unexpected Nobel Peace Prize. Beneath these stories, however, was an event that helps to explain them and will likely have significant implications for Obama's foreign policy in the coming years. Ireland voted, for a second time, on the Treaty of Lisbon. This time it passed, paving the way for a reformed European Union that will have increased clout on the world stage.

The origins of the European Union (EU) date back to the 1950s, when France, West Germany, and the Benelux countries formed the European Coal and Steel Community to centralize control of these strategic industries in member states. The effort was in direct response to the ravages of the Second World War, and it was felt that greater European integration would limit the excesses of radical nationalism and encourage peace. In the decades that followed, the institution that is now known as the EU broadened by taking in new member states and deepened by assuming greater responsibility. This seemingly inexorable trend culminated earlier this decade with the European Constitution, which would have replaced multiple, existing treaties with a single document that bound the EU more tightly together. After great effort was expended in the creation of such a comprehensive document and passed without referendum by most EU states, the voters of France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitution in 2005, pushing EU policymakers back to the drawing board.

Despite the rejection of the Constitution, many of the institutional problems that it had hoped to address remained serious challenges for the Union. As the EU expanded to include more than 20 member states, the demand for unanimity and absolute equality in decision-making became cumbersome. The Union also suffered from a “democratic deficit” in which voters felt distant and detached from EU decision-making bodies, including the popularly elected European Parliament. After several years of reflection, the member states negotiated a modified and stripped-down collection of institutional reforms known as the Lisbon Treaty. As with the Constitution (and any other EU treaty), the Lisbon Treaty required ratification by all member states. But each state had different methods of ratification. Ireland was the only member that required a referendum to approve the Lisbon Treaty, but in a vote in June 2008, Irish voters rejected it, causing great consternation across Europe. This month, Ireland held another vote on the Lisbon Treaty, and this time, Irish voters approved it, paving the way for the Treaty's near-certain adoption.

Along with a host of modifications to the EU's institutions and decision-making structures, the Lisbon Treaty would make significant changes to how the Union conducts its foreign policy. As a body in international politics, the EU has always been a unique and singular creature. Due to its common market and the combined size and wealth of its member states, the EU possesses clear economic weight. It frequently negotiates with one voice on matters of international trade, and it has its own representation at global bodies such as the G20. But the EU also consists of 27 independent countries, each of which jealously guards its foreign policy prerogatives. This is particularly true in the case of security and defense policy. When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the EU was sharply split on the decision, with the United Kingdom and Poland supporting the action and France, Germany, and others strongly opposed. There have been efforts to create a more coherent EU foreign policy, primarily in the form of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but the results have been limited by the institutional realities of the Union. These realities have existed for decades, frustrating Europe's allies. Henry Kissinger famously asked, “Who do I call if I want to call Europe?”

Right now, the answer to that question could include, at a minimum, any of three people. The highest authority of the EU is the European Council, consisting of the heads of government of the various member states. The presidency of the Council rotates among member states every six months, and during a member's presidency, its prime minister or president can present the public face of the EU. The European Commission is the executive arm of the EU, implementing and enforcing EU policies and regulations. It, too, has a president—completely unrelated to the Council presidency—that carries the weight of international recognition. (There is also a member of the Commission explicitly charged with managing External Affairs, but put that aside for a moment). In addition, the CFSP is managed by its own High Representative, who may be best positioned to represent the EU in an international setting. In short, it is difficult for the world to know who to “call” in Europe, or indeed how many people it needs conference in.

The Lisbon Treaty tries valiantly to answer Kissinger's question. It would replace the rotating, state-based EU presidency with an individual President of the European Council, elected to a two-and-a-half year term. The treaty would also combine the positions of High Representative for the CFSP and the Commissioner for External Affairs into a single EU “foreign minister,” and it would empower that position with a new External Action Service, which would essentially be an EU diplomatic corps. Member states could assign specific tasks to the new High Representative, and he or she will be able to implement commonly agreed actions. Both the Council President and the new High Representative would be selected through something called Qualified Majority Voting (QMV), which means that no single country could veto an appointment to either position. The Lisbon Treaty also clarifies the existing, complicated legal standing of the EU. Once in place, the Treaty would empower the Union with a single legal personality, making it less cumbersome for the Union to sign treaties and international agreements.

These changes are explicitly structural in nature. The EU will be granted no new foreign policy-making powers, and indeed, those foreign policies that it can implement will more strictly defined on an intergovernmental (as opposed to a supranational) basis. Essentially, the Lisbon Treaty will simply allow the EU to operate more efficiently on the world stage. That alone, however, will constitute a marked change in EU foreign policy, and this change could have important effects on Obama's foreign policy. As Obama considers the next steps in his Afghanistan strategy, one of the most important questions is whether he will order more U.S. troops to that country. Upon taking office, there was some hope that Obama would be able to convince European allies to send more soldiers and resources to Afghanistan. Such hopes have largely diminished, and in any event, the request would have been made through NATO channels. But centralizing the EU's limited foreign policy authority also centralizes its nascent security abilities. The prospect of an EU-led mission in Afghanistan is remote, especially while the security situation there remains so unstable. But it is conceivable that an EU stabilization or humanitarian mission could be useful in Afghanistan in the future, and having a single number to “call” in Europe would prove very helpful if Obama needed to coordinate that.

The treaty's reforms also might serve to amplify the EU's greatest foreign policy strength, which has always been in the realm of “soft power.” The Union has long used the prospect of membership as a carrot to induce neighboring states to reform their political, economic, and legal systems, and in doing so, it has served as force for stability in post-Cold War Europe. Its unique model of regional integration also serves as an example for similar intergovernmental bodies in South America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Taken as a whole, the EU is the largest provider of global development funds on the world stage. Obama's recent Nobel Peace Prize was, in many ways, a reflection of the European preference for “soft power.” The award itself represents an intangible honor of immense reputational power but of limited practical import. And the justification for awarding it to Obama was, in part, his preference for the techniques of “soft power.” The citation for the prize lauded Obama's creation of a “new climate in international politics” and his capture of the “world's attention.” To be sure, the Peace Prize was granted in Norway, which is not an EU member. But pro-Obama sentiments appear to be widespread in Europe, and an empowered EU may prove to be a more useful partner for a U.S. president who speaks a language that Europeans understand and appreciate.

Despite Ireland's (second) vote, the Lisbon Treaty is not yet a reality. The sole remaining roadblock is the Czech Republic, where the parliament has approved the treaty but the strongly opposed president has deferred from signing it. The pressure on President Vaclav Klaus is intense, however, and it is unlikely that he will scuttle the treaty on his own. Once he signs the Lisbon Treaty, it will go into effect shortly thereafter, and the Council President and the High Representative can be selected. Until then, supporters of a more efficient EU—as well as a U.S. president eager for a coherent partner across the Atlantic—will need to wait a bit longer.

Foreign Policy Association, 22 October 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:44 PM to Europe, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

September 30, 2009

Missile base

Barack Obama staked his campaign for the presidency on the promise of change. The realities of governance are much different than the promises of campaigns, of course, and Obama has disappointed some supporters with the slowness or incompleteness of his “change.” This disappointment has applied even in the realm of foreign policy, where the president has much greater leeway to implement change than he does in the domestic sphere. But in many cases, Obama has broken unequivocally from the policies of his predecessor. His recent decision to cancel plans to build a missile defense system in Eastern Europe represents one of the clearest breaks from the policy of the Bush administration. Although Obama’s policy change in this case has much to recommend it, the move raises an entirely new set of risks and challenges.

Under President Bush, the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia, and the Pentagon accelerated development of ground-based, sea-based, and air-based missile defense systems. The ground-based system, consisting of missiles that can be launched to intercept incoming warheads, was deployed in Alaska in 2004 and soon afterward in California. These locations were suitable to contend with missiles launched toward the United States from North Korea. But to counter the potential threat of Iranian missiles, the Bush administration proposed deploying missile defense systems to Eastern Europe. Under the approved scheme, a radar would have been built in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles would have been based in Poland. In addition to defending the continental United States, this plan had two important side effects. It theoretically would have offered some degree of missile defense to NATO allies in Europe. And it would have greatly upset Russia.

Russia’s reaction to the proposed locations for the European missile defense system was impassioned and, to a degree, understandable. Ostensibly, it viewed the system as destabilizing and as a potential threat to its own security, despite assurances from the Bush administration to the contrary. In reality, the system envisioned by the Bush administration—with a total of 10 interceptor missiles, to be deployed by 2017—could not possibly have defended Europe (or the United States) from a determined Russian attack. Instead, Russia’s concerns focused on the geopolitical encroachment that the U.S. missile defense system represented. Although Poland and the Czech Republic have been NATO members for years, the positioning of such important and strategic U.S. military assets in what was once Russia’s sphere of influence represented a serious affront to the former superpower. Russia had opposed NATO expansion in the 1990s for similar reasons, but it lacked the leverage to halt it at the time. In recent years, under the centralizing leadership of Vladimir Putin and amid the global rise in energy prices, gas- and oil-rich Russia has gained greater influence. Its objections to the missile defense system could not be dismissed without consequence, although the Bush administration remained committed to the program to its final days.

Obama did not radically change Bush’s plans immediately upon taking office. Indeed, during his visit to Prague in April, he reaffirmed the fundamental purpose behind the European missile defense system: “As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven.” (for more, see The Water’s Edge, April 2009). His recent decision did not so much scrap the system as it aligned it to better meet his stated criteria of effectiveness. He will no longer move forward with the plan to deploy a ground-based system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Instead, he will implement a staged deployment of missile defenses centered on the sea-based AEGIS system. This alternative presents several advantages over the ground-based system. The sea-based system is less expensive than its ground-based counterpart, and it has a more successful testing record, as well. It can be deployed in stages, first on Navy destroyers and cruisers already equipped with the system, with the initial system of defenses becoming operational in 2011—far sooner than the ground-based system’s operational date of 2017. Obama’s alternative is also more suited to the predicted nature of the Iranian threat, in which an attack with large numbers of short-range missiles is more realistic than an attack with smaller numbers of long-range missiles. Tehran’s recent testing of just such a missile further antagonized those who view it as a threat to regional and global stability.

Perhaps the most significant implication of Obama’s policy change is its effect on several bilateral relationships of real importance to the United States. Russia, quite understandably, was pleased with Obama’s decision. From a technical standpoint, sea-based interceptors are less of a threat to Russia’s faster, longer-ranged ballistic missiles than ground-based interceptors. In the later stages of Obama’s plan, missiles and radars developed from the sea-based AEGIS system will be modified and deployed, on land, in Europe. But it is likely that those facilities could be placed in the Balkans or in Turkey, where they would pose less of a geopolitical threat to Russia. Russian parliamentarians praised Obama’s plan as “a victory for common sense,” while conservatives in the United States claimed that it smacked of weakness in the face of Russian assertiveness.

A key rationale behind Obama’s plan is an updated assessment of the threat posed by Iran. Indeed, if the assessment is correct, Obama’s plan will do more to neutralize an Iranian threat than Bush’s plan, and it will do so sooner. But many had suspected (or hoped) that Obama would use missile defense as leverage to compel Russia to take a harder line with Iran. Russia has sold weapons and nuclear technology to that country, and as a member of the UN Security Council, its cooperation with U.S. efforts to stifle Iran’s nuclear ambitions is vital. When Obama announced his decision, there was no public signal that Russia would offer more explicit support for U.S. diplomatic initiatives in return. It is possible, however, that a quiet deal was made. Several days before Obama announced the change in missile defense plans, the State Department accepted an Iranian offer for multilateral talks on a wide range of issues. Nuclear matters were not among the issues listed in the Iranian offer, but the dialogue is a promising sign. Any connection between the dialogue, the change in missile defense plans, and Russian leverage is unknown. But shortly after Obama’s announcement, at the opening of the UN General Assembly in New York, Russian President Dimitry Medvedev expressed a new-found openness to tougher sanctions on Iran. Given revelations of a secret Iranian nuclear facility that same week, Russia’s cooperation may become even more important in the coming months.

It would be logical for Poland and the Czech Republic to be unhappy with Obama’s decision. They had expended political capital in consenting to the placement of missile defense systems on their territory. But more importantly, they viewed the system as a way of further anchoring their security to the United States. Russia remains an intimidating force throughout Eastern Europe, which remains dependent on Russian energy supplies. By changing U.S. missile defense plans, Poland and the Czech Republic may feel somewhat abandoned in the face of an emboldened Russia. That the plan was announced on the 70th anniversary of the Russian invasion of Poland was inauspicious and unfortunate, to say the least.

The reaction from Polish and Czech leaders, however, did not betray significant disappointment. “I received President Obama’s words and declarations with great satisfaction,” said Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, after speaking with Obama about his decision. Czech President Vaclav Klaus declared that he was, “100 percent convinced that this decision of the American government does not signal a cooling of relations between the United States and the Czech Republic.” An important component of Obama’s plan is the placement of Patriot surface-to-air missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. Although these will not be effective against long-range ballistic missiles, they can be effective against shorter ranged missiles. And unlike the interceptors of Bush’s ground-based anti-missile system, Patriot missiles can also be effective against attacking aircraft. In any event, the later stages of Obama’s plan call for the placement of more advanced missiles derived from the sea-based system on land, and Poland and the Czech Republic remain potential locations for those weapons.

Obama’s plan, then, clearly represents change. Aside from an effectiveness standpoint, his decision will have important effects on the United States’ bilateral relationships with Russia, Iran, and its Eastern European allies. But it may have a more important effect on an issue of even greater, more global concern. In the same speech in Prague in which Obama underscored his support for European missile defense, he called for a major effort toward nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. One of the first steps in that effort is the negotiation of a new arms control treaty with Russia. By addressing Russia’s concerns over European missile defense, Obama may have made such a treaty not only more realistic, but potentially more ambitious, as well. If that sparks a movement toward a global reduction of nuclear stockpiles, then Obama’s decision on missile defense may represent an even greater change than it first appeared.

Foreign Policy Association, 30 September 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:26 PM to Europe, Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

April 23, 2009

Zero nukes?

Barack Obama's recent trip to Europe and the Middle East was an important moment in his young presidency. Having spent much of his term so far focused on the deteriorating economy and other domestic concerns, Obama's trip to the G-20 summit in London, to a NATO meeting in France and Germany, to an EU meeting in Prague, and finally to Turkey and Iraq was the president's first intensive exposure to foreign policy. By most accounts, he met or exceeded expectations. Most notable, however, was Obama's public address in Prague, in which he declared the U.S. commitment to a “world without U.S. nuclear weapons.” Long after the world forgets about the rest of his European trip, it may be Obama's speech on nuclear weapons that endures.

At first glance, seeking a “world without nuclear weapons” may seem naïve, at best. Clearly, nuclear weapons are immensely destructive tools of state (or potentially, non-state) power. Having less of a destructive thing naturally would seem good. But nuclear weapons cannot simply be “wished” away. The fundamental principles underlying nuclear weapons are widely known, and the technology and expertise to develop nuclear technology has spread extensively over the past 60 years—such knowledge and technology cannot be “un-invented.” In addition, it is possible that nuclear weapons can provide a degree of strategic stability to the international system. Consider, for instance, the fact that no global conflict akin to the World Wars has taken place since nuclear weapons have been developed. Nuclear weapons may have raised the potential cost of war to such a degree that would-be aggressors thought twice about initiating hostilities. Although the Cold War was a period of intensive diplomatic and ideological struggle, the United States and the Soviet Union never engaged in a full-scale military conflict. If neither country had possessed nuclear weapons, the Cold War might have become much hotter.

If Obama's “zero nukes” posture was naïve to some, it was outright dangerous to others. For decades, the United States has negotiated arms reduction treaties with the Soviet Union and Russia. These treaties stipulated that both parties reduced their nuclear arsenals in a pre-determined, synchronized, and verifiable fashion. This was important for several reasons. As with any armament, the relative balance of forces between two rival states has a significant effect on the stability of their relationship. If two states are evenly matched, or if an imbalance in one category of armament is offset by an inverse imbalance in another category, neither state is likely to initiate hostilities with the other. But the consequences of an imbalance in nuclear forces are much greater than those of an imbalance in tanks or planes. If a country felt that the balance of nuclear forces had tilted in its favor, it might become more inclined to launch a first strike. For this reason, the United States and the Soviet Union always tried to reduce their arsenals in sync with each other, so that the relative nuclear balance was maintained even while the number of weapons was cut. As much as Obama may wish to rid the world of nuclear weapons, and as easily as he could cut the U.S. arsenal unilaterally, such an action would be ill advised. An uncoordinated and unilateral disarmament could radically destabilize the international system, and make the United States (and other countries) less safe.

Critics of Obama's Prague declaration, then, have a clear, logical argument. But that does not necessarily mean it is correct. Obama included a hefty dose of realism in his speech. He acknowledged that the objective of zero nuclear weapons “will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime.” He also matched his seemingly lofty goal with concrete steps to achieve it. Obama pledged to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy and to work with Russia on a new round of arms reduction negotiations. He also promised to push for Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the United States has signed but which a Republican-led Senate refused to ratify in 1999. Obama also advocated a treaty that would end the production of fissile material that could be used in nuclear weapons.

The steps Obama proposed were specific and pragmatic, but on their own, they were nothing new. In his first term as president, George Bush had agreed on disarmament objectives with then-Russian President Vladimir Putin. President Clinton signed the CTBT in the 1990s and the Senate debated the treaty extensively (and in a partisan manner) almost ten years ago. For years, disarmament experts have advocated a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) that would prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Beyond the apparent lack of novelty of Obama's proposals, it is unclear if they would make meaningful progress toward achieving his stated goal of a nuclear-free world. It is difficult to envision the United States and Russia reducing their arsenals to zero anytime soon, and a simple ban on nuclear testing would not eliminate the weapons that already exist. A verifiable FMCT would probably limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but like the CTBT, what would it do for the nuclear weapons that already exist?

These critiques may be valid, but they are equally shortsighted. The nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia are far larger than any other state's. Each country possess thousands of warheads, while the arsenals of the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea each number in the hundreds at the very most. For this reason, most of the major nuclear arms reduction treaties have been exclusively between the United States and Russia. But as these two countries reduce their arsenals, they may eventually count their warheads not in the thousands, but in the hundreds. At that point, they will have rough parity with the other nuclear states, and the arms reduction playing field will become more equitable. Instead of being bilateral affairs, arms reduction treaties could include more of the world's nuclear powers, if not all of them. This would make every nuclear warhead in existence eligible for a negotiated elimination.

Even U.S. action on multilateral treaties such as the CTBT and a potential FMCT could be very meaningful. For the past 40 years, the foundation of nuclear disarmament diplomacy has been the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT essentially splits the world into two camps: the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS), which include the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China; and the Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS), which includes everyone else. The treaty formalizes an implicit bargain: if the NNWS pledge not to seek nuclear weapons, the NWS will work towards global disarmament. As Iran and North Korea have pursued nuclear weapons, the great emphasis has been on the nonproliferation provisions of the NPT. Often overlooked, however, are the pledges of the NWS to work toward the disarmament of their nuclear arsenals. If the NWS, including the United States in particular, are seen to be shirking their disarmament obligations under the NPT, the NNWS may become less inclined to cooperate on international nonproliferation efforts. Even worse, they may decide that the NPT represents a hypocritical bargain and abandon the regime altogether. This is all to suggest that U.S. participation in, and leadership of, multilateral nonproliferation diplomacy can have ripple effects beyond the literal power of the treaty itself. By sheer power of example, the United States can nudge the world in the direction of gradual disarmament.

In a general sense, Obama's speech should been seen as much as a political speech as a policy one. By clearly signaling his policy preferences, he removed a great deal of ambiguity about U.S. national intentions. That ambiguity can only be eliminated through the direct, specific policy actions that Obama outlined. Even then, the world may not be free of nuclear weapons, as Obama readily acknowledged. But just because a goal is unattainable does not mean it should not be pursued. Even if the world cannot rid itself of nuclear weapons, surely it would be a better place with fewer of them, especially if the reductions came about in a verifiable, deliberate, and multilateral manner. In this sense, the goal of global disarmament is similar to the goal of “energy independence.” It is exceedingly unlikely that the United States could reduce its energy imports to zero, but if the goal serves as motivation and inspiration to pursue clean energy technologies, conservation, and efficiency, then it is a worthy political tool applied to desirable policy ends. And that, if nothing else, is what Obama's Prague speech may come to represent, long into the future.

Foreign Policy Association, 23 April 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:38 PM to Europe, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

August 29, 2008

Application received

In a month in which the Beijing Olympics, the impending party conventions, and vice presidential speculation should have been the main political news, an overseas war rudely interrupted. The conflict between Russia and Georgia, ostensibly over the breakaway Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, has reignited Cold War-era suspicions of an assertive, nuclear-armed Russia. These suspicions are greatest in places like Georgia, Ukraine, and the other countries once dominated by the Soviet Union. But they are also having an effect on the U.S. presidential race. Although the Russia-Georgia conflict has not unearthed any new insights into the campaigns of Barack Obama or John McCain, it has solidified the existing and substantial distinctions in their foreign policy thinking.

This conflagration is just the latest chapter in a long history of conflict in the Caucasus region. Located at a confluence of religions, ethnicities, and trade routes, Georgia and its neighbors are wedged between the perennial powers of Turkey (and before that, the Ottoman Empire), Iran (Persia), and Russia (the Soviet Union). Since achieving independence amid the fall of the Soviet Union nearly 20 years ago, Georgia has experienced a variety of secessionist movements, most notably in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although animosity between South Ossetians and Georgians is genuine, the situation has hardly been helped by Russia. In an attempt to maintain sway in its former territories and along its present-day periphery, Russia supported these secessionist movements by providing passports to South Ossetians and Abkhazians and by deploying its own “peacekeepers” in the area. Tensions have been building all year, and in early August, Georgian troops moved to capture the capital of South Ossetia. Russia responded, not only evicting Georgian forces from South Ossetia, but also from Abkhazia and from parts of Georgia itself.

The onset of the conflict caught Obama at the beginning of a weeklong vacation in Hawaii. Although his holiday prevented Obama from engaging the subject on the campaign trail, he did issue a statement that called on Georgia and Russia to show restraint and to “avoid an escalation to full scale war.” These relatively even-handed remarks were strengthened a few days later, after Russian forces had moved beyond South Ossetia, where the conflict had begun, into Abkhazia and Georgia proper: “No matter how this conflict started, Russia has escalated it well beyond the dispute over South Ossetia and invaded another country.” Most notably, he reiterated his desire to pursue NATO membership negotiations with Georgia. Obama has since sharpened his criticism of Russia for refusing to abide by cease-fire terms and for suggesting that it would formally recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

McCain, for his part, was not on vacation when the conflict began, and he seemed quite content to address the issue in unambiguous terms. His initial statement was far harsher toward Russia than Obama's, and it did not acknowledge any Georgian culpability in igniting the conflict: “Russia should immediately and unconditionally cease its military operations and withdraw all forces from sovereign Georgian territory.” He also called for NATO to “review measures [it] can take to contribute to stabilizing this very dangerous situation.” McCain later claimed that “Russian aggression against Georgia is both a matter of urgent moral and strategic importance to the United States of America,” and that “the fate of Georgia should be of grave concern to Americans and all people who welcomed the end of a divided of Europe.”

Neither Georgia nor Russia is blameless for this war. Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili acted recklessly in attacking his far larger neighbor; he may have assumed that the United States or NATO to come to his country's aid. Since taking office in 2003, Saakashvili has eagerly sought NATO membership for his country in an attempt to tie it more closely to the West. Given the history of Russian dominance in the Caucasus and its provocative actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (not to mention in Chechnya in the 1990s), it is only logical that Saakashvili sought such security assurances. Russia, however, had deliberately provoked Georgia by offering Russian citizenship to South Ossetians and Abkhazians and by placing “peacekeepers” in both regions. It reacted disproportionately when it invaded Georgia proper, blockaded its ports, and strongly hinted at its desire to depose Saakashvili.

As the conflict progressed, Russia's overreaction and aggressiveness became more obvious and Georgia's recklessness and presumptuousness receded into the background. Thus McCain's early, hawkish statements toward Russia seemed more prescient than Obama's even-handed approach. Indeed, McCain has taken an aggressive stance toward Russia throughout the presidential campaign. He has called for Russia to be kicked out of the G8 group of industrialized nations, and he is fond of describing his first meeting with Russia's current prime minister: “I looked into Mr. [Vladimir] Putin's eyes and I saw three things — a K and a G and a B.” At times, McCain's enthusiasm seemed to get the better of him. He declared at a campaign rally that he personally told Saakashvili that he spoke for every American in proclaiming, “we are all Georgians.” And without a trace of irony, he insisted that, “in the 21st century, nations don't invade other nations.”

Though he seemed to lack McCain's prescience about Russia's motivations and behavior, Obama became harsher towards Russia as the conflict unfolded. Broadly speaking, the reactions of McCain and Obama to the conflict confirm their emerging foreign policy identities. McCain is aggressive, assertive, and forceful in identifying clear adversaries and in speaking or acting against them. For him, the threats to U.S. security are always clear and discrete: Iraq, al Qaeda, Russia, etc. Obama is more deliberate, consultative, and cooperative in working to diffuse threats with a minimum of bluster or excessive rhetoric. In Obama's worldview, not all adversaries will be clearly defined. Correctly identifying the threat may be just as important (if not more so) than actually combating it. Even though the conflict in Georgia was far from straightforward, with plenty of culpability to go around, it could be handily portrayed as a big, scary, authoritarian Russia invading a small, brave, democratic Georgia. This is an easy construction to understand, with a clear “good guy” and “bad guy.” Such an issue is tailor-made for McCain's worldview.

Although this worldview may have its advantages, its blunt assertiveness can overshadow the important historical subtleties at the root of Russia's current behavior. After the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia became a weaker, more insecure country. But instead of disbanding or reorganizing itself, NATO—the alliance explicitly created to fight the Cold War and counter the Soviet threat—actually expanded, accepting as members countries in Eastern Europe that had once been under Soviet domination. As NATO moved closer to its border, and as the alliance flexed its muscles over Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, Russia's sense of its own insecurity grew deeper. But at the time, it was too weak to force a change in Western behavior, and many U.S. and NATO policy makers took Russia for granted.

Russia's immediate neighbors, however, did not. The countries of Eastern Europe understandably sought NATO membership, and more recently, so too did Ukraine and Georgia. For Russia, the encroachment of a “victorious” NATO toward its own borders represented not just a security threat, but an affront and an insult. If they had won the Cold War, why did NATO need to grow? Why did it even need to continue to exist? President Bush's unilateral behavior, such as his abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the invasion of Iraq, and the recognition of Kosovo, added insult to injury. But unlike in the 1990s, Russia's political power was consolidated under Vladimir Putin and its economic power was bolstered by a huge resource boom. Russia's invasion of Georgia had little to do with South Ossetia or Abkhazia. It was more about reasserting a long-dormant dominance over its impudent neighbors and reigniting a sense of national pride after nearly 20 years of perceived victimhood, disrespect, and insecurity.

In this context, it is Obama's more deliberative worldview that strikes upon an ironic kind of logic. For all of its real benefits, NATO's rapid expansion in the 1990s was a key contributor to Russia's sense of victimhood. Although the alliance has not yet begun formal membership negotiations with Georgia, the fact that its candidacy has been seriously considered—and strongly backed by the United States—has not gone unnoticed by Russia. But by launching its invasion, Russia has proven beyond any doubt that it poses a threat to Georgia. Its actions constitute the best case yet for Georgian membership in NATO. And Obama, counter-intuitively, seems to realize this. His response to the conflict lacked the aggressive bluster of McCain's, and he seemed to appreciate the complexities inherent in the conflict. Yet he simultaneously embraced the one policy—NATO expansion—perhaps most responsible for Russia's false sense of insecurity. But conditions change, and the policy makers that realize it are the ones that succeed.

Foreign Policy Association, 28 August 2008

Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:11 AM to Europe, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

July 24, 2008

Foreign process

Although the Iraq war has been a dominant foreign policy issue in the presidential election, it certainly is not the only conflict to demand the candidates' attention. The conflict in Afghanistan has gained increasing prominence in the campaigns of Republican John McCain and Democrat Barack Obama, who just paid his first visit to the country during his highly publicized overseas tour. This subtle shift of emphasis is due not only to increased levels of violence in Afghanistan, but also to the concurrent (and relative) decrease of violence in Iraq. U.S. policy in both countries is inextricably linked—it is impossible to sensibly discuss the policy for one war without considering the other. At the same time, the politics of the Afghanistan war are unique. They demonstrate that the right policy alone may not be enough to achieve the desired objectives.

The war in Afghanistan has always held a unique place in U.S. politics, especially compared to its more prominent counterpart in Iraq. It was, and is, the conflict most directly tied to the attacks of 9/11; the country had served as host to the al Qaeda leaders who planned the attacks and functioned as a training ground for the attackers themselves. In the days following 9/11, Congress overwhelmingly passed (with only a single dissenting vote in the House) the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, under which the war in Afghanistan has been waged. The initial invasion was very successful. The Bush administration assembled a broad international coalition, the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan was quickly overthrown, and a pluralistic political process was set in motion.

Since 2002, the war in Afghanistan has been somewhat overshadowed by the threat, real or perceived, from Iraq and the ensuing invasion and occupation of that country. But as the Iraq war maintained its grip on the headlines over the years, the conflict in Afghanistan remained persistently unresolved. Bin Laden not only remained free, but he and his lieutenants released communiques on a semi-regular basis. Remnants of al Qaeda's infrastructure seemed to have relocated and re-established themselves in Pakistan, just across the border from Afghanistan. The Taliban did not disintegrate, and in fact seemed to grow in size and capabilities over the years. In recent months, the level of violence in Afghanistan has increased notably. In May, coalition casualties in Afghanistan exceeded those in Iraq for the first time—a pattern that was repeated the next month. Since then, the Taliban has carried out a spate of spectacular attacks, including an assault on a Kandahar jail that freed hundreds of prisoners, a suicide bombing outside of the Indian embassy in Kabul that killed dozens, and a direct attack on a U.S. base in Kunar Province that killed nine soldiers.

As things have appeared to get worse in Afghanistan, the situation in Iraq has seemed to improve; hence the subtle shift of emphasis in the presidential campaign. Among all of the candidates, Obama has been uniquely positioned to frame the debate. Since the beginning of the nomination contests, he has been the only major candidate of either party who both supported the invasion of Afghanistan and opposed the initial invasion of Iraq. He made a point of this in the 2002 speech in which he announced his opposition to the forthcoming invasion of Iraq, specifically saying that he didn't oppose all wars, just “dumb wars.” Given the geopolitical realities at the time (al Qaeda had not been conclusively defeated in Afghanistan) and the facts that have since been confirmed (Iraq had neither weapons of mass destruction nor a meaningful relationship with al Qaeda or 9/11), it is remarkable that Obama was the only major candidate who could claim such an auspicious record.

In the campaign, Obama has taken advantage of his record and used it as evidence of superior judgment. His current position on Afghanistan is a natural evolution. He views the war in Iraq as a distraction from the continuing threat posed by al Qaeda. By withdrawing the majority of U.S. forces from that country, he would gain the flexibility to send at least two additional combat brigades Afghanistan. He proposes an extra $1 billion in non-military aid to Afghanistan, with an emphasis on rural development, drug eradication, and anti-corruption initiatives. He has also reiterated his commitment to both increase non-military aid to Pakistan and to strike at al Qaeda targets in that country, if Pakistan is unable or unwilling to do so itself (for more, see The Water’s Edge, November 2007).

McCain, for his part, has focused more on Iraq than on Afghanistan. Although he supported the invasion of Iraq, he shares with Obama a point of distinction on that conflict. He was a critic of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and was a vocal champion of the 2007 troop surge, which is partly responsible for the decreasing levels of violence in Iraq. McCain used these points to distinguish himself during the Republican primary, and he continues to emphasize them as evidence of his foreign policy acumen. Moving forward, McCain speaks often of the need to secure a “victory” in Iraq, and he dismisses any suggestion of significant troop withdrawals or timetables for departure (for more, see The Water’s Edge, June 2008).

All of this has a direct bearing on McCain's policy toward Afghanistan, which until recently was poorly defined. In a recent foreign policy address, McCain called for sending three additional combat brigades to Afghanistan and for U.S. forces there to adopt the counter-insurgency strategy that has produced the recent successes in Iraq: “What we need in Afghanistan is … a nationwide civil-military campaign plan that is focused on providing security for the population.” In terms of troop increases, at least, this position appears very similar to Obama's. But Afghanistan does not exist in isolation; tactics are not the same as strategy, and policy goals are useless without a plausible way to achieve them. Both Obama and McCain may want to send more combat brigades to Afghanistan. But given the severe strain that long-term, concurrent wars have placed on the armed forces, this will be hard for any president to do if troops are not redeployed from Iraq.

Even if the additional brigades could be sent, the few thousand soldiers they represent would not be sufficient to bring security to Afghanistan. Unlike in Iraq, many NATO allies operate alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Some countries—most notably the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada—permit their soldiers to engage in dangerous (and costly) counter-insurgency operations. But others, such as France and Germany, only allow their soldiers to operate in calmer portions of the country. This has generated understandable tensions in the alliance. Perhaps the greatest value of any additional U.S. troops in Afghanistan would be as force multipliers—as leverage to secure greater commitments from recalcitrant NATO allies or as confidence building measures for nascent Afghan governing institutions. It is perfectly reasonable and understandable that Obama and McCain would share the goal of a more secure Afghanistan. But the goals alone are not sufficient. Just as important is how policy makers align these goals with others (both allies and adversaries), rally support for their objectives, and build a sustainable basis for achieving them. In other words, diplomacy counts.

It is in this context that Obama made his overseas tour. To be sure, the trip was meant to bolster his image as a worldly figure, able to hold his own in the international arena. But a week long trip does not give a candidate foreign policy “experience.” Such experience can really only be gained through service in the executive branch—something that neither Obama nor McCain can claim. But after eight years of an administration widely perceived as being undiplomatic, and with global challenges far too great to solve unilaterally, Obama's trip was still more than just an electoral ploy. It was a way for him to demonstrate that his potential presidency would offer not just a substantive difference from Bush or McCain, but a stylistic one as well. A foreign policy is only as good as the process used to achieve it.

Foreign Policy Association, 24 July 2008

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:29 PM to Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

February 28, 2008

All apologies

Earlier this month, Australia's parliament passed a resolution formally apologizing for one of the country's most egregious practices of institutionalized mistreatment of indigenous Australians. In issuing this apology, Australia is not alone. Apologies for past, state-sponsored misdeeds have become a burgeoning topic for many national legislatures, including the U.S. Congress. Although the direct impact of such apologies is often uncertain, they can have a clear effect on a country's foreign policy.

The apology introduced by Australia's new prime minister, Kevin Rudd, was unanimously approved by that country's parliament. Specifically, it recognized and apologized for the Australian government's formal role in the “Stolen Generations” The term applies to the government's forced removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families and placing them into state orphanages and other institutions. This state-sanctioned practice took place from the late 1800s until 1970, and it was designed to assimilate Aboriginal peoples into “white” Australian culture. Indeed, in a grotesquely paternalistic way, many viewed the practice as beneficial to those Aboriginal children removed from their families. Since the 1970s, as the government's role in creating the Stolen Generations has become more understood and less defensible, the momentum for a formal apology has grown. Rudd, fulfilling a campaign promise, issued the apology at the very opening of Australia's parliament: “We apologize especially for the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country. For the pain, suffering and hurt of these Stolen Generations, their descendants and for their families left behind, we say sorry.”

Many other countries face or have faced similar experiences of national shame that demand formal apologies. These experiences can be purely domestic, as in Australia's case. The United States formally apologized for its World War II detention of Japanese-Americans in 1988 and issued a similar apology for its nineteenth century overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom in 1993. Without much fanfare, the Senate this month passed an Indian health care bill that contains an amendment apologizing to Native Americans for “official depredations, ill-conceived policies and the breaking of covenants.” Other situations demand apologies that cross international borders. Germany has issued many unambiguous apologies for its actions during World War II, and Japan has done the same, though in arguably more ambiguous terms.

There are several ways to evaluate these kinds of formal apologies. On the most immediate level, many are paired with direct, substantive action, such as reparation payments. Germany has paid billions of dollars to Holocaust survivors and the state of Israel since World War II. Other apologies may not include direct compensation for victims but create other structures or systems to provide tangible benefit to the aggrieved. Rudd ruled out reparations for members of the Stolen Generations in Australia, but his apology was matched by a pledge to create a “war cabinet” that would bridge partisan divides and work to address social and economic disparities between indigenous Australians and the rest of the country. He promised that the “war cabinet” would work to improve levels of education, health care, and housing for indigenous Australians within a five-year time frame.

The easiest apology, of course, is the one made with words alone. One reason the Senate's apology to Native Americans has not achieved greater attention is because it has been attached as an amendment to an otherwise routine bill. The United States has a long and disgraceful history of mistreatment of Native Americans, but because the apology neither appropriates new funds nor creates new programs, it can be issued as a legislative amendment with little fanfare. To be fair, these same characteristics make the apology much easier to offer in the first place. Even if an apology is paired with a change in policy, it can be perceived as insufficient. Although Rudd's apology to indigenous Australians was widely popular, there were some grumblings that his “war cabinet” was not enough. Aboriginal leader Aboriginal leader Patrick Dodson claimed that, “any group of people who have been treated badly under laws … deserve to pursue compensation judicially, legally, or politically, and they deserve our support.”

Less helpful are the apologies that appear ambiguous. Japan's first official “apology” for its actions during World War II came when it re-established diplomatic relations with China in 1972. In a Joint Communique with his Chinese counterpart, Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka asserted that, “the Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.” Japanese Prime Ministers and governments since then have elaborated on this statement, but never in terms that were absolutely unequivocal. As a result, the culpability for Japan's actions during World War II remains uncertain for many people throughout East Asia—in China, Korea, and even in Japan itself. This historical ambiguity continues to sour regional relations to this day (for more, see The Water's Edge, October 2007).

The least helpful apologies are the ones that aren't made. For years, under former Prime Minister John Howard, Australia refused to apologize for the Stolen Generations. This was not only very unpopular among many Australians, but it created a very negative impression of the country abroad. The United States is burdened with the similar impression. No U.S. president or Congress has ever formally apologized for slavery in the United States. There are many arguments about what form an apology for slavery could take, if direct reparations to the descendants of slaves would be a part of such an apology, and how useful an apology itself would even be. But in an international environment in which many already see the United States as a unilateral, selfish, and reckless actor, a formal apology for slavery could send a message of humility that would be useful on a global stage. Acknowledgement and remorse for past misdeeds, even if state-sanctioned, is by no means a sign of present-day weakness. Indeed, such honesty and transparency can convey national confidence and strength

It is impossible to determine the precise value of these formal, state apologies for past misdeeds. They may simply be “feel-good” exercises with no present-day relevance. Or, alternatively, they could play a major role in reconciling divisions within a society and in improving perceptions of a country beyond its own borders. In Australia, Rudd has made clear that he views the recent apology not as the end of a tragic chapter in that country's history but as the beginning of a new, more hopeful one. As a symbolic statement alone, the apology will have lasting value. And in foreign policy, symbolism is often as valuable as substance. This is a lesson applicable to all countries, regardless of past misdeeds or contemporary apologies.

Foreign Policy Association, 28 February 2008

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:30 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, Europe, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

July 28, 2007

Terror questions

As Congress engaged in another round of contentious debate over the Iraq war—this time, complete with a successful overnight filibuster by Republicans—the country was reminded of the nagging, perpetual fear of terrorism. A spate of attempted and botched terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom renewed the sense that the threat of religious-inspired violence remains real. A new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was released that painted a discouraging picture of the Bush administration's anti-terrorism campaign. As the death toll mounts in Iraq, and the prospects for a change in strategy grow dimmer, many in Congress and elsewhere are questioning with increasing intensity the connection between the war in Iraq and the "war on terror." Together, these various threads beg serious questions about the current U.S. anti-terror strategy and how Congress might move to address its deficiencies.

In recent weeks, the United Kingdom experienced a rapid spate of terrorist-related incidents. On June 29, British police discovered and disarmed two rudimentary car bombs in central London. The next day, two men rammed a jeep filled with propane cylinders into the main terminal at Glasgow Airport in Scotland. Although neither incident resulted in civilian loss of life, and the Glasgow Airport attack only caused minor damage, they prompted the United Kingdom to raise its terror alert status to its highest level. Because the foreign policy of the United Kingdom is so closely aligned with that of the United States, a threat in one country can justifiably raise fears in the other. Perhaps with such fears in mind, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff admitted to feeling some discomfort: "[I have] kind of a gut feeling that we are in a period of increased vulnerability."

A few weeks later, the Bush administration released a declassified version of its latest NIE. The report, billed as the U.S. intelligence community's "most authoritative written judgment on national security issues," notes that nearly six years after the 9/11 attacks, the group has "protected or regenerated key elements of its [h]omeland attack capability, including a safe haven in [Pakistan], operational lieutenants, and its top leadership." These assessments provided a great deal of ammunition for Bush administration critics in Congress, who suggested that the president's "war on terror" has been less than successful. "It is a travesty that Osama bin Laden remains at large nearly six years after the 9/11 attacks, and that the Bush administration and most congressional Republicans remain stubbornly wedded to a flawed strategy in Iraq," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV).

The release of the NIE, incidentally, occurred in the midst of Congress' latest debate on the Iraq war. Some suspected that such timing was no accident, and that the Bush administration thought that such a bleak assessment of the "war on terror" would encourage legislators to support his steadfast strategy in Iraq. The NIE explicitly notes that the central al Qaeda organization would "seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), its most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack the [h]omeland." Indeed, the president himself has often sought to link the "war on terror" with the Iraq war. In May, he declared that, "the enemy in Vietnam had neither the intent nor the capability to strike our homeland [but] the enemy in Iraq does."

The administration's approach, however, is fraught with risk. In addition to Iraq's purported weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration's original case for invasion rested on that country's affiliations with al Qaeda. It is now known that any such affiliations were tentative at best, and that al Qaeda-inspired militancy in Iraq is largely a by-product of the U.S. occupation. AQI—the organization cited in the NIE and a group that rose to bloody prominence under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—only came into being after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and it swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden after its precursor organizations had already established an independent reputation for sectarian violence. In other words, AQI was not involved in the 9/11 attacks. And even if it seeks to attack the United States directly, the organization's priorities clearly lie in Iraq, where it has ready access to U.S. targets. Democrats in Congress were quick to emphasize this point. "It is not true, categorically not true, that there was al Qaeda in Iraq before we invaded," said Representative Jane Harman (D-CA), chair of the Homeland Security subcommittee on intelligence.

Despite the pointed language, the debate in Congress failed again to produce a definitive change in Iraq war strategy. But the latest reminder of the intersection between the Iraq war and the "war on terror" provides an opportunity to re-evaluate U.S. prosecution of the latter. The term itself –"war on terror"—has always been somewhat controversial. Even among the vast majority of policy makers that agree that terrorism is a serious threat, many question whether an approach that emphasizes a military response is the best strategy. Rhetorically, the term "war on terror" evokes unfavorable comparisons with the "war on poverty" or the "war on drugs," not to mention its grammatical irregularity. Given these inconsistencies, some have suggested a radical revision of U.S. anti-terror strategy. In an article in the Atlantic Monthly last year, James Fallows suggested a straightforward approach: simply declare victory in the "war on terror" and transition to a more measured, less inflammatory anti-terror strategy. He notes that although al Qaeda itself does not constitute an existential threat to the United States, a poor U.S. response to al Qaeda provocation does. The initial U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 evicted the ruling Taliban and deprived the central al Qaeda organization of its safe haven; it was clearly a success. But Fallows cites the U.S. war in Iraq and its galvanizing effect on Islamic militants around the world as an example of how a solely military response to terrorism can be counter-productive. Of course, as the latest NIE points out, al Qaeda has re-established some degree of shelter in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. But as Fallows noted optimistically last year, "[al Qaeda's] destiny is no longer in its own hands." Perhaps time remains for Congress to push for a different strategy that takes advantage of this reality.

Even if Congress does not take up this challenge, it appears that others might. In the wake of the terrorist incidents in the United Kingdom, a number of foreign-born, Muslim physicians were arrested. One of the two men who rammed a vehicle into the Glasgow Airport terminal was Iraqi. Given such evidence, one could imagine how authorities might jump at the opportunity to link terrorism in Western countries with the war in Iraq—the need to fight them "there," before they attack us "here." As former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld remarked in 2005, "U.S. forces are in Iraq to … fight the terrorists there, so we don't have to fight them here in the United States." Instead of taking a similar approach, the newly installed British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, adopted a notably measured tone in addressing the incidents and the resulting arrests. He was more likely to define culprits as "criminals" rather than "terrorists," and he refrained from identifying them explicitly as "Muslim" or "Islamic." The rhetorical distinctions are subtle, but revealing. In using such language, Brown was attempting to deny the culprits the prestige of being soldiers in a war, and to decouple the religion from the crime.

Some in the United States are pushing for a new strategy more loudly than others. Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards has made a point of refuting the "war on terror" rhetoric, calling it "a slogan designed only for politics, not a strategy to make America safe." But the president is unlikely to change his rhetoric or his strategy before he leaves office, and if Congress cannot pass legislation to govern a conflict as discrete and unpopular as the war in Iraq, it is not likely to be able to do the same with a conflict as nebulous and important as the "war on terror" or its equivalent. The emerging British example under Brown may offer a glimmer of hope for a different approach to anti-terror strategy, but don't expect a change anytime soon.

Foriegn Policy Association, 26 July 2007

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:05 AM to Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

July 19, 2007

Election correction: Turkey and the EU

On Sunday, Turks will go to the polls to elect a new parliament. This earlier-than-expected election will be the latest chapter in the decades-long debate over secularism and democracy that has defined modern Turkey, as well as the culmination of months of political tension. In April, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development (AK) Party nominated Abdullah Gul, Turkey's foreign minister, to be the country's next president. But the nomination was stymied in parliament--the body charged with electing the country's largely ceremonial president--over concerns about Gul's religiosity and the AK Party's mildly Islamist roots. Even more ominously, the Turkish military registered its disapproval by suggesting that Gul's election would be part of a "growing threat" to the secular republic. Instead of nominating a less controversial figure that could have broken the political impasse, Erdogan decided instead to try and renew his popular mandate by calling for Sunday's early elections.

But the factors at play in this weekend's election extend beyond Turkey's borders. For decades, Turkey's tortured courtship of the European Union proceeded at a snail's pace. But after the AK Party won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and Erdogan became prime minister the following year, Turkey made remarkable progress in implementing the liberal reforms needed for eventual EU membership. In recent years, however, the vision of Turkish accession to the EU has grown dimmer, and the prospects for the continuation of much-needed reform in Turkey have dimmed with it. A victory for the AK Party on Sunday will leave the path to reform open. But, ultimately, the success of Turkey's reform movement rests not just with Erdogan, but with the EU itself.

***

Turkey's road to EU membership began in 1959, when it applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community, a predecessor of the EU. The next four decades were marked by ambiguity, setbacks, and half-victories in Turkey's quest. In recent years, however, significant progress toward accession has been made. The EU agreed to begin formal membership negotiations in 2004, and launched such talks the next year.

The greatest catalyst for progress, however, was the election of Erdogan and the AK Party. Historically, governing majorities in the Turkish parliament have relied upon fragile coalitions that were unable to implement bold policy changes. The AK Party, however, won an uncompromised majority in parliament, riding to victory on a uniquely Turkish combination of religiously inspired social conservatism, staunch adherence to the secular principles of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (the founder of modern Turkey), and fierce devotion to the goal of EU accession. Erdogan, in other words, had both the ability and the desire to work toward EU membership, and he did so with gusto. He has moved to distance the Turkish military from the political process and to expand political and social rights both for Turks and the country's minority Kurds, and he has overseen robust economic growth.

From the perspective of many Europeans, however, Turkish membership in the EU has always been unpopular. Concerns have typically centered on economic factors (how could developed EU countries deal with a flood of unskilled Turkish labor?) and cultural ones (does Muslim Turkey really belong in Christian Europe?). In recent years, as Turkish accession has become a more realistic prospect, such sentiment has increasingly seeped into formal EU policy. The French rejection of the EU constitution in 2005 was fueled largely--and somewhat misleadingly--by fears of eventual Turkish membership. Since then, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy have each ridden to election victories on platforms that prominently opposed full Turkish accession, favoring instead vague alternatives such as "privileged partnership." The accession of Cyprus in 2004--after that country's rejection of a comprehensive settlement with its Turkish-dominated and isolated northern half--introduced a strong anti-Turkish voice into the EU. Late last year, continued mutual intransigence over the divided island compelled the EU to suspend negotiations on eight of the 35 "chapters" needed to complete Turkey's accession process.

As with all symbiotic relationships, the health of one party is dependent on the health of the other--when one gets sick, the other usually follows suit. EU membership has long been a popular goal for Turks; many see it as the ultimate realization of Ataturk's dream of a modern, secular Turkey. But as European politicians eagerly campaign for votes at Turkey's expense, and as ancient rivalries seem to arbitrarily derail accession talks, Turks have begun to wonder whether EU membership is worth the hassle. Increasingly, they seem to think not. In a recent poll, only one in three Turks said that they definitely want their country to join the EU--about half the figure in similar polls only a few years ago. And as EU membership plummets in popularity, so too does the rationale for many of the tough political and social reforms required for accession, especially those that work toward unfinished goals such as cutting public corruption and expanding freedom of expression. Erdogan, for his part, remains resolute. He pledged late last year that the "reform process will continue with the same decisiveness," regardless of what the EU says or does. But it is clear that Erdogan's patience is also wearing thin.

The most pernicious result of the EU's vacillation is that the forces opposed to Erdogan have found it easier to array against him. The Turkish military, which has long fancied itself as the ultimate guardian of the secular state, has always been wary of the AK Party's Islamist roots, and it resents Erdogan's efforts to remove it from the political process. Turkish nationalists have also long been skeptical of Erdogan's religiosity, in addition to his relatively measured approach in dealing with Kurdish issues and his devotion to EU membership in general. Mainstream secular political parties, which represent the bulk of Erdogan's parliamentary opposition, are eager to capitalize on any failures they can attribute to Erdogan, even if they share his goal of EU membership.

Ironically, as these varied forces align against Erdogan, they also align against their own best interests. Urban, secular Turks--those who would find themselves most at home in Europe--protest Erdogan's religiosity, giving cover to the military's ominous and blatantly anti-democratic rhetoric in the process. Rural, socially conservative Turks--those who might gain the most from expanded trade and investment with Europe and who might best identify with the AK Party's roots--support nationalist political elements that would realign Turkey's domestic and foreign policies for the worse. If Erdogan's opponents succeed in derailing his reforms, they would return Turkey to a darker period of its own history--military-dominated politics, vitriolic nationalism, or ineffectual coalition governments.

To be sure, Erdogan's opponents would seek his defeat regardless of the EU's attitude toward Turkish accession. But deficiencies of political will, strategic foresight, and structural capacity have made the EU and its leaders complicit in the potential failure of Erdogan's reforms. Merkel and Sarkozy's predecessors faced similar degrees of domestic opposition to Turkish membership, yet they still remained steadfast in their own support for accession. But despite their strength of will, Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac were unable (or unwilling) to articulate to their constituents the geopolitical and cultural imperative of Turkish accession, not just for Turkey, but for the EU itself.

Most importantly, the EU is structurally handicapped as a foreign policy actor, perpetually forced to contend with the divergent international agendas of its 27 member states. In other words, speed and clarity are not its strong suits. Where it can succeed on the international stage, however, is through its power of example. Over the past 15 years, the allure of EU membership encouraged and strengthened liberal reform in the former communist states of Eastern Europe, and these countries were ultimately rewarded with accession. A similar effect continues to extend east and south along the EU's periphery, but it requires the legitimate prospect of accession to achieve the same liberalizing results. Turkey could become the ultimate validation of this kind of indirect "foreign policy by example." It could also become its ultimate failure.

***

Fortunately for Turkey, the AK Party is likely to retain its parliamentary majority in Sunday's elections, although perhaps by a reduced margin. If it does, it will be due to Erdogan's distinctly Turkish brand of politics. His deft blending of social conservatism, institutional secularism, and political liberalism make him uniquely suited to enact the reforms that will secure EU membership and strengthen Turkish democracy. It is unclear if Erdogan will re-nominate Gul for the presidency, and if he does, how the military would respond--much depends on the ultimate size of the AK Party's majority. But a resounding victory by the AK Party would provide a needed boost for the prospects of genuine reform in Turkey. This, in turn, could nudge the EU in a more encouraging direction, ultimately leading to greater progress toward Turkish accession.

Such a course correction is sorely needed. The EU has unnecessarily and myopically gone out of its way to make things worse for Turkey's political and social reform, and at the worst possible time. In addition to its struggles with EU accession, Turkey finds itself surrounded and bedeviled by a multitude of challenges. The war in Iraq, the re-emergence of Kurdish militarism, an increasingly assertive Russia, and the omnipresent threat of genuine Islamic extremism will continue to place ever-greater strains on Turkey. In such a turbulent environment, Erdogan's electoral victory alone cannot ensure the long-term success of his liberal reforms. This makes the EU's continued (and promised) support for his efforts--and ultimately, for membership--that much more important.

The New Republic, 20 July 2007

Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:22 PM to Europe, Middle East | TrackBack (0)

May 18, 2006

Important bases

The U.S. military is cleaning house. Existing bases are being retooled or eliminated, and new ones are popping up in some unexpected places. These are the overseas bases that are now vital to the U.S. military—and the new ones that will change its global footprint for years to come.

Andersen Air Force Base & Apra Harbor, Guam
The base: Andersen can handle aircraft ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles to long-range strategic bombers, and Apra Harbor can service everything from nuclear submarines to aircraft carriers. The naval base is also home to one of the three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons worldwide, which provides mobile, long-term storage of land-combat equipment and supplies near potential trouble spots.
Its importance: Located in the Pacific Ocean about 2,000 miles from Asia, Guam is close enough to the mainland to be vital in any conceivable conflict yet distant enough to preclude a surprise blow from an adversary. Andersen is one of the few locations with the necessary hanger facilities to protect the B-2’s sensitive, radar-evading skin, and strategic bombers regularly cycle through the base to project power toward mainland Asia. The best part: unlike other large bases in the region, Guam is U.S. territory.

Balad Air Base/Camp Anaconda, Iraq
The base: Most prominent of the “enduring bases” being constructed in Iraq, Balad is located just north of Baghdad. It is one of the busiest airfields in the country, accommodating both Air Force fighters as well as transport aircraft. Camp Anaconda, adjacent to the air base, serves as a main base and logistics center for U.S. troops serving throughout central Iraq.
Its importance: Balad’s facilities and location make it more than just an ideal base from which to fight insurgents in Iraq. It is also perfectly positioned to project U.S. power throughout the Middle East, and it will likely do so for many years to come. Although this convenience might serve wider U.S. interests, it doesn’t sit too well with Balad’s Iraqi neighbors—U.S. soldiers have nicknamed Camp Anaconda “Mortaritaville” after a common greeting they receive.

Bezmer Air Base, Bulgaria
The base: Bezmer reflects a broader trend toward lighter, more austere bases in Eastern Europe and away from the larger military complexes in Western and Central Europe. To keep a low profile in the host countries, the Pentagon is reluctant to even refer to Bezmer and its Eastern European equivalents as “bases,” and it stresses that the host countries retain full control of their facilities.
Its importance: Compared to U.S. bases in “old” Europe, Bezmer and its Eastern European equivalents are cheaper to operate and closer to potential hot spots in the Middle East and Central Asia. In times of conflict, the military will use these facilities to “surge” men and materiel toward the front lines. The hope is that former-Soviet bloc host countries will be more amenable to U.S. bases than other hosts in “old” Europe and be less likely to block their use in a time of conflict.

Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory
The base: Located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia served as a base for B-52s during the 1991 and 2003 wars with Iraq and during post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan. Its isolated anchorage is also home to both Army and Marine seaborne prepositioning squadrons for land-combat equipment and supplies.
Its importance: Isolation—and British sovereignty—make Diego Garcia a far more secure base for U.S. forces than any mainland base in Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia. Specialized shelters to protect the sensitive stealth equipment of visiting B-2s have recently been installed, and strategic bombers regularly rotate through the base. The atoll is also an important part of the U.S. Space Surveillance Network of telescopes, radars, and listening stations.

Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba
The base: Originally intended as coaling station for the U.S. Navy, Guantánamo Bay (or “Gitmo”) remains an important logistical base for Navy units operating in the Caribbean. It also serves as a hub for counter-drug and migrant interdiction operations.
Its importance: Gitmo’s greatest strategic asset is its hazy legal status—it is U.S.-controlled, but it is not U.S. territory. Although it’s not the only place through which “enemy combatants” (neither POWs nor convicted criminals) could be processed, it is readily accessible from the U.S. mainland, and its staff and facilities have experience in detention operations from their time as host to Haitian and Cuban refugees. As a result, Gitmo is one of the most well-known and reviled U.S. bases worldwide. The Bush administration has repeatedly rejected high-profile calls to shut down the base.

Manas Air Base, Kirgizstan
The base: Manas was established at Bishkek’s international airport in the months following 9/11 as a hub for multinational operations in Afghanistan. It has since grown into a substantial base in the heart of Central Asia, playing host to combat aircraft, their supporting personnel, and associated facilities.
Its importance: In addition to its proximity to Afghanistan, Manas is located near the immense energy reserves of the Caspian Basin, as well as the Russian and Chinese frontiers. Kirgizstan has not threatened to follow Uzbekistan’s example and expel U.S. forces, which suggests that Manas could become a linchpin of the enduring U.S. presence in Central Asia. Recognizing its value, Kirgizstan is talking about raising the rent from $2 million to $207 million per year.

Foreign Policy, 15 May 2006

Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:43 PM to Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics

October 04, 2005

Close call

It appears that the EU and Turkey have stopped just short of the precipice:

After two days of dramatic negotiations, European foreign ministers agreed on terms for talks to start, overcoming Austria's insistence that the EU offer Turkey the possibility of a status less than full membership. By evening, after hours of discussion with Ankara, Turkey agreed to the framework proffered for what are expected to be tough talks over the next decade.

"Agreement has now been reached that negotiations on Turkey's accession to the European Union can and will begin in the very near future," said Jack Straw, the British foreign secretary, who was leading the talks.

Note also the reassuring role played by Condi Rice. Say what you will about the Bush administration, they've always been on the right side of Turkish accession to the EU.

While overcoming Austrian intransigence and initiating the talks are big steps, expect drama similar to this for the next 10-15 years -- Turkey's road to the EU will be paved with bricks of frustration and indigestion.

UPDATE: The negotiating framework itself, courtesy of the BBC. The money quote:

The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:07 AM to Europe

October 02, 2005

Not a privilege

It looks like Turkey's EU accession odyssey has reached an impasse, courtesy of Austria:

European Union foreign ministers have failed to end the stalemate over Turkey's bid to join the bloc.

Late-night talks in Luxembourg ended without agreement on a negotiating framework to open talks with Turkey, which were due to begin on Monday.

Austria wants the EU to consider giving Turkey "favoured nation" status, but holding off from full membership.

The IHT has a good piece looking at the genuine antipathy Austrians feel toward Turkish accession. On that level, one can't really fault the Austrian government's position -- it's representing the legitimate will of its people.

Erdogan, however is not happy, and justifiably so. Turkish accession has been decades in the making, and for it to be held up after so much recent progress over something like "favoured nation" status or "privileged partnership" is perhaps a monumental mistake on the EU's part. The Turkish PM has long noted that the recent legal and human rights reforms he's pushed through parliament are worthy in their own right, and not simply as a sop to EU demands. To be sure, even if the accession falls flat on its face, the reforms already enacted -- and those that we could trust Erdogan to continue to pursue -- would mark a success of EU foreign policy.

But if matters came to that, the ultimate harm -- in Europe, Turkey, and the world over -- would dwarf any good in Turkey alone. Harmful stereotypes of the EU as a Christian-only club would be confirmed, Turkish moderates would lose much of their rationale for recent reform, and the case that the West and Islam are incompatible would be much strengthened. The precise consequences of a collapse of the accession process beyond that are hard to predict, but imagining any good coming from it would be even harder.

As it is, the accessions negotiations would take no less than 10-15 years, giving plenty of time for hesitant countries such as Austria to reconcile their legitimate concerns with reality. More importantly, it enables today's politicians to pass the buck to tomorrow's. And to be sure, Austria is not alone in its wariness to Turkish entry. But to pitch "privileged partnership" today represents a blatant rebuff of Turkish good intentions that stretch back decades. It's hard to fathom how the Austrian government could even imagine that the option would be palatable to a politician as stubborn as Erdogan and a people as proud as the Turks.

There will likely be much movement on this front in the coming hours and days. Very possibly, a temporary solution will be reached that pleases no one but, more importantly, offends no one, either. But the language emanating from the Turkish government has been increasing definitive in recent months, and justifiably so. "Privileged partnership" may well represent the last straw.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:14 PM to Europe

September 21, 2005

Stating the obvious

A bit late, perhaps, but accurate nonetheless:

European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has acknowledged that the EU will not have a constitution for "at least two or three years".

He said that the text was unlikely to be ratified in the near future, after French and Dutch voters rejected it.

However, Mr Barroso said this should not mean paralysis in Europe.

As I've said before, the constitutional referendum process itself was a victory for the EU, regardless of it specific outcome. I would actually be much more pessimistic than Barroso about the near-term prospects for revitalizing a constitution, either the rejected one or an entirely new iteration; my guess is that the EU won't see a "constitution" inside of 10 years, at the very least.

While many Eurocrats and others may bemoan this, they need not fear for the EU itself -- it's not going anywhere. In the broader context of European history, we're still very early in the constitutional shaking-out period. Little remains certain about what will come next. But Barroso is right in suggesting that a period of existential reflection for the EU need not mean an end or a halt to its good work. Much remains to be done in the fields of eastward expansion, subsidy reform, legal coordination, and foreign policy synergy. While the constitution would have made many of these tasks easier to accomplish, the lack of one by no means prevents progress from being made on them. The pace will just be a little slower, a little messier, and a tad more frustrating.

That, if anything, is the message to take away from the French and Dutch referendums. Europeans like their governance democratic, and if that entails a slower, messier, and (hopefully) more responsive EU, then so be it. It's better for everyone that the EU has been forced to this realization now than if it had taken 5, 10, or 15 more years. While those opposed to the EU may be taking solace in the death of the constitution, their glee is necessarily of the short-term variety. In the long memory of history, the 2005 failure of the constitution will prove to be a defining moment for the EU, and a rather positive one, at that.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:31 PM to Europe

July 07, 2005

Textbook troubles

Looks like East Asia's not alone in its textbook troubles"

Angered by what it described as the "serious issue" of the existence of schoolbooks in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) which contain material implying claims on Greek territory, Athens yesterday called on the neighboring country to put an end to its "dangerous propaganda."

Well, to be honest, "FYROM" isn't exactly a national title that inspires much pride. It's not even a title -- it's an acronym. So maybe the Greeks should just let a little "dangerous propaganda" slide and focus on more important things, like preparing for a shadow invasion from Turkey.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:47 PM to Europe

June 29, 2005

Journeys and destinations

More details come to light regarding Turkey's pending EU accession talks:

Turkey will face the toughest test ever presented to a candidate for entry to the European Union and might have to settle for less than full membership, the European Commission said yesterday.

Setting out the Commission's proposals for negotiations with Ankara, Olli Rehn, enlargement Commissioner, said Turkey would face the "most rigorous" test of any EU candidate to date, while several of his colleagues called for a "privileged partnership" instead of membership.

"It certainly will be a long and difficult journey, but the journey is as important as the destination," Mr Rehn said, emphasising the reforms Turkey would need to carry out during the talks. [emphasis mine]

The FT goes on to note that Austria and Cyprus, in particular, are most likely to have issues with the Commission's proposals. Austria is said to want a more explicit reference to the "privileged partnership" option, and Cyprus' concerns are self-evident. Add to these concerns the EU's shaken confidence in the wake of the constitution's implosion, and Turkey's road to membership is certainly a rocky one.

Rehn is correct, however, in emphasizing the importance of the journey. EU membership, in and of itself, is only one benefit of accession (and some would argue it's not that much of a benefit). The process of meeting the EU's strict standards for free markets and liberal politics is perhaps an even greater benefit. That Turkey's accession will be the "most rigorous" is altogether fitting. Not only does the resistance to Turkish membership likely exceed that of all other aspiring member states, but Turkey itself has the longest way to go in meeting the EU's standards.

In the face of EU resistance, there are signs that Turkish patience is growing thin. But Erdogan, to his credit, is sticking to his guns:

The modern values and civilization process represented by the EU did not contradict the ideals of the republic, [Erdogan] said.

“Let no one doubt the fact that our objectives on democracy, justice, development and progress will be completed as soon as possible, no matter how fast or slow Turkey's accession process is. A strong Turkey is important for Europe and the world. The merging of different cultures under universal values, represented by Turkey's EU membership, will be a gain for the world,” he added.

One must hope that full membership eventually does come Turkey's way. But if and when it does, its value will be mostly symbolic. The true benefits to Turkey's politics, economics, and society will already have been realized.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:50 PM to Europe

June 16, 2005

Turkey and the constitution

While ostensibly separate issues, the EU constitution and Turkish accession to the EU have always been inextricably linked. In the recent French referendum, many in the non camp made no secret of their opposition to Turkish membership in the EU, to their opposition to Chirac's support of the same, and to their subsequent vote against the European charter. For Turkey's part, accession talks are set to begin later this year. But will a confidence-shaken EU be eager to set a firm date for such talks? With the constitution dead, will Eurocrats fear whether their existing institutions can accommodate any more members?

The linkages between the two issues, while real, have always been implicit. Turkish accession is not mentioned in the EU constitution, and it has been pursued by successive Turkish governments since long before the constitutional process began. At this week's meeting of the European Council -- the first since the French and Dutch referendums, and thus a rather important meeting -- Chirac used his country's referendum to cast a very ominous shadow on Turkish accession:

President Jacques Chirac of France, speaking as the European Union opened a summit meeting here in an atmosphere of crisis, also threw doubt on the future of European enlargement. Following the constitution’s rejection in France and the Netherlands, he said, the 25-member EU might not be able to cope with more members.

‘‘In this new situation,’’ Chirac asked, ‘‘can the Union continue to expand without the institutions capable of making this expanded Union function efficiently?’’ [emphasis mine]

While several countries are waiting in the membership wings, Chirac clearly is referring to Turkey. As a supporter of Turkish accession, such language from Chirac should be very worrisome to Turkish ears. Perhaps he was genuinely rattled by the non vote. Or perhaps he is just biding his time until the European waters calm a bit. Either way, Chirac's statement marks a shift, and it's probably not far from the Council's own consensus view.

What will the EU do? I don't think they can back away completely from the prospect of Turkish accession -- that hurdle has already been jumped, last year, amid much debate. But interminable delaying or postponing of the accession process has always been an explicit option for the EU. Indeed, it was a vital option whose incorporation was necessary to win the initial, broad European consensus for the setting of a start date for accession talks. It now looks like delay will be the name of the game.

As for the Turks, this is not what they have in mind. They have been waiting in the EU membership wings for decades, and under Erdogan, Turkey has made great strides in recent years in terms of reforming its justice system and in cleaning up human rights issues. The reward for such successes, many Turks feel, should be genuine movement toward EU accession. More delay and more debate, from the Turkish perspective, does not count as "genuine movement."

What does this all mean? To some extent, not all that much. Both the EU and Turkey have made too many commitments, too recently, toward accession that backing out now would be very difficult. But significant delay in the accession process will have a real effect on Turkish public opinion. Would accession really seem so important if the reforms most requested by the EU are met not by action but by delay? For the EU, there is a discomforting (and somewhat irrational) alignment between opposition to the constitution and opposition to Turkish accession. As one sentiment gains greater currency, so too will the other.

For both the EU and Turkey, then, time is working against Turkish accession. I don't think any hard deadlines must be set, nor do I think that the accession process will die if not completed by a certain date. But interminable delay would only serve opponents of Turkish accession, and given the current status of the EU constitution, delay certainly seems to be in the cards. Make no mistake: the clock for Turkish accession has been ticking much faster since the French and Dutch referendums.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:44 PM to Europe

June 10, 2005

Better

A couple days ago, the Greeks were on guard for Turkish military mischief in the wake of the French and Dutch referendums. Now, this:

Greece committed itself yesterday to helping Turkey fulfill one of the criteria it must meet before joining the EU — by agreeing to start training Turkish judges in European law before year’s end.

Justice Minister Anastassis Papaligouras and his Turkish counterpart Cemil Cisek signed an agreement in Athens yesterday by which Greek legal experts from the National College of Judges will pass on their knowledge of the implementation of EU law to Turkish justices. Cisek’s visit to Greece was the first by a Turkish justice minister in over 30 years, Papaligouras said.

Can't argue with that, and I'm willing to bet that judicial training will be of far greater benefit to Greeks and Turks alike than will military excercises.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:51 AM to Europe

June 07, 2005

Excuse for trouble

Ok, so first the French and then the Dutch reject the EU constitution. This has shaken things up in Europe, of course, and no one's really sure what will happen next. But where the hell does this come from?

Greece’s military is keeping a close eye on traditional rival Turkey after French and Dutch referendums on the EU Constitution raised questions over future EU enlargement, Defense Minister Spilios Spiliotopoulos said.

“Of course we are checking the behavior of Turkey in the Aegean Sea, and we will continue to do that,” Spiliotopoulos said yesterday while attending a one-day military exercise.

“Turkey’s response appears to have been neutral,” Spiliotopoulos told The Associated Press. He added that Greece was “closely monitoring” Aegean air space after voters in France and the Netherlands rejected the EU Constitution in separate referendums this week

Greece-Turkey relations have long been a pet fascination of mine, so such petty language among these nominal NATO allies isn't all that surprising. And it's true that a key motivation for the non/nee camps was opposition to Turkish membership in the EU (ignoring for the moment the fact that the constitution has nothing to do with Turkish membership and that such membership -- if it ever comes -- won't become reality for some time). But Spiliotopoulos here seems to be suggesting an expectation of increased Turkish military activity as a result of the French and Dutch votes. That, I have no hesitation in proclaiming, is simply ludicrous.

Sure, Erdogan has recently (and justifiably) stiffened in response to EU intransigence and hesitance regarding entry talks. Thin theories of ulterior motives by staunch Kemalist political opponents aside, there can be no doubting Erdogan's sincerity in pursuing EU membership. At the very least, he sees the process of seeking membership as having a beneficial effect on Turkey, be it the gradual improvement of minority rights in Turkey or the whittling away of the military's political influence.

If I were to think as a Greek politician, I suppose I might suspect Erdogan of wanting to rattle his sword in the wake of the French and Dutch referendums as a sign that Turkey isn't willing to put up with interminable delays in its membership quest -- a "don't forget about us/don't push us around"-type of display. But please. In this case, age-old animosities are getting in the way of reality. This scene does go to show, however, that Greece -- as a current EU member -- has the means and the will to make Turkey's accession as tough as it wants to make it.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:30 AM to Europe

May 30, 2005

Winners and losers

While he may call for "reflection", there can be no doubt that Tony Blair is thrilled by the results of this weekend's French referendum. In their infinite wisdom or lack thereof (depending on your perspective) and with very high turnout, the French rejected the EU constitution, 56% to 44%. The Dutch are likely to follow the French lead in a few days time, and many Eurocrats are ringing some very dire bells. But Tony? As I've noted here before, a huge weight has now been lifted from his shoulders. His promised British referendum will likely not come to pass, and thus will likely never be defeated soundly, as many have predicted it would be. So don't be fooled by Blair's reticence -- he's a very happy camper.

But what of the EU? The Council will meet on June 16 to debate whether the constitution has a future. But you needn't wait that long, or even longer, to find out what will happen. In some form or another, pieces of the constitution will ultimately be adopted by the EU member states. The method will be one of intergovernmental treaties or agreements, without pesky referenda mucking up the works. What are the pieces most likely to be salvaged? Probably the position of an EU foreign minister, and possibly that of a permanent EU president. Less likely, but still very possible, are the extension of qualified majority voting to more issue domains, an expansion of Parliament's competencies, and reform of the Commission. These are all tricky subjects, but that the member states could agree to them en masse for incorporation into the constitution means a lot. Plus, there will be a lot of pressure to demonstrate some forward movement or progress in the wake of the French referendum. Might take some time, and it won't be easy, but some pieces will be salvaged. That aside, though, the constitution itself is a dead letter.

Frankly, though, I'm bemused by the uproar of surprise and faux shock at this result. The final tally almost precisely matched what polls had been indicating for months. As I have pointed out, we've already known the more important victor in this referendum for some months now. As a matter of fact, we've known the victor from the very day that Chirac announced that he would be putting the constitution before his people. That victor? The EU.

Make no mistake -- the EU is in for some rough weeks, months, and years ahead. But it's not going anywhere. The EU will not vanish overnight, nor will it vanish in several years' time. But the EU was living on borrowed time. The past 15 years have seen an unprecedented deepening of the EU's powers and a broadening of its borders. Popular engagement, where applicable, had been a fudged or close-run affair. For all the good it has done and for all the burucrats it has employed, the EU remains nothing more than a big theory. It needed to face a genuine, honest popular reckoning with reality before it could truly advance. This reckoning was long overdue, and the longer it was put off, the more risky it became. But such a reckoning came on Sunday.

Opponents of the EU and of the constitution seem to revel in its defeat, and so they should. They won a close-fought, honest debate of the issues. But their mere participation in the debate gives the EU a popular legitimacy that it could never bestow upon itself. The French -- and indeed, all Europeans -- have been engaged in a monumental debate over the nature of the EU and over how they themselves can hope to benefit from it. That is a legitimation of the EU, and thus a victory for the institution. The constitution's defeat is but a mere detail -- a serious and problematic one, sure, but far from life-threatening. Likewise, had the French approved the constitution, many Eurocrats would've felt a bullet dodged. But the EU itself would not necessarily have been any better off. The constitution is a flawed compromise document, as the EU itself is a flawed compromise institution. But flawed compromises are the essential lifeblood of any consociational polity -- look at the United States and the United Nations. That their founding documents are imperfect and unpopular among some has in no way diminished the fundamental and profound value of either institution. And so too with the EU.

I have no idea what the next few months and years hold for the EU. But to those who cheer in celebration or cry in defeat, I say only this: settle down. This vote was decided many months ago, and the EU -- as a mere theory in dire need of popular legitimation and a reality check -- was the victor.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:09 PM to Europe

May 27, 2005

Helping out

As he did before, Schroeder is trying to help his European brethren in Paris. This weekend is the big test -- it'll be interesting to see who claims victory on Monday.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:32 PM to Europe

May 25, 2005

Open for business

As previously discussed here, the BTC pipeline has finally opened for business, to great fanfare:

The presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey pulled orange levers Wednesday to send the first flow of Caspian Sea crude into a $3.2 billion pipeline seen as key to reducing the West's reliance on Middle East oil.

By year's end, the 1,100-mile pipeline is to ship up to 1 million barrels a day to Turkey's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.

President Bush, whose administration is seeking to diversify energy sources, said in a letter read at the ceremony by Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman that the pipeline "opens a new era in the Caspian Basin's development."

There's a fair variety of coverage about this opening, including a snippy piece in the Independent and a nostalgic, Azeri-focused take in the Times. Of greatest interest to me, however, is a fine piece in the Christian Science Monitor focusing on what the BTC pipeline means for Turkey:

For Turkey, which has few energy supplies of its own, the pipeline is the initial step in its effort to become a major energy player, not as a producer but as a transit point. In an era when countries are increasingly looking to diversify their energy sources, Turkey hopes to establish itself as a kind of energy supermarket, betting that controlling oil routes will turn out to be as strategically valuable as producing the stuff.

"Geographically, Turkey is endowed with advantages, so we would like to use those advantages to give Turkey a role as a supplier of energy resources," says a senior Turkish foreign ministry official involved in energy issues. "It gives Turkey relevance." [emphasis mine]

I've long been fascinated by Turkey's unique geopolitical position, and the BTC pipeline is a classic example of Turkey utilizing that position to its advantage. That Turkey benefits from the BTC pipeline as an energy transit point is no surprise. Nor, for that matter, is the obvious Turkish desire to have seen the pipeline project through to its completion, and on the specific BTC routing. But I doubt Turkey alone could have swung the route to its advantage. No, it called upon its stalwart ally in the United States to twist some arms and provide some capital. And why? Because Turkey is the indispensable country, for so many others, in so many ways. Remember that the BTC project stretches back years. In its earlier phases, before any ground had been broken, Saddam Hussein still ruled Iraq. To keep him in his box -- the desired Iraq strategy during the 1990s -- Turkey was vital. No one had any way of knowing that the United States would seek and execute a pretext to occupy Iraq, nor could anyone know that Turkey would be under the strong but democratic rule of a mildly Islamist Prime Minister, nor could anyone know that the party led by that Prime Minister would deny U.S. troops access to Turkey as a staging ground for invasion. The only constant was Turkey's prime geopolitical position and, despite invasion rebuffs, its alliance with the United States. My point is that the two are inextricably linked, and Turkey consequently has much greater influence than any other country its size ordinarily should. And as times and priorities change, so does the nature and orientation of Turkey's influence. As the CSM concludes:

"It was originally a US strategic thing, to get around Iran and Russia," says Gareth Winrow, an energy and foreign policy expert at Istanbul Bilgi University. "Now there is the EU wanting to diversify its resources and build new pipelines.

"These things are coming together - US interests, EU interests, and Turkish interests, and it's something Turkish officials know they can play on."

Another benefit of the BTC pipeline to Turkey, of course, is the reduced specter of dangerous tanker traffic in the Bosporus. That congested waterway is already much too polluted, and the prospect of vastly greater petroleum traffic within meters of Istanbul pleased no one. So while the BTC pipeline may entrench an unpleasant Azeri government, and while oil companies may be profiting exorbitantly, and while locals may have been displaced in the pipeline's construction, and while the whole project just perpetuates an unhealthy petrochemical obsession, it saves the Bosporus from greater pollution. Say what you will in opposition to BTC, but I think millions of Istanbulis are at least somewhat grateful for it.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:41 PM to Asia, Europe, Middle East

May 22, 2005

One week left

Pretty good overview piece in the Washington Post on next weekend's constitutional referendum in France.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:58 PM to Europe

May 20, 2005

Big talk, foregone conclusion

So this is interesting:

European leaders raised the stakes in the battle for the new constitution on Friday when Jean-Claude Juncker, the prime minister of Luxembourg and the current European Union president, said the EU would not proceed with the new treaty if French voters rejected it in the referendum on May 29.

Officials in Brussels have suggested that if France were to reject the treaty, as opinion polls suggest, it could be renegotiated and put to a second referendum, but Juncker appears to have ruled this out.

Separately, EU foreign ministers are due to meet in Brussels on Sunday as the nations that pay most into the EU's coffers are seeking to scale back future contributions.

"If France votes no in a referendum on the European constitutional treaty, the European Union will lose 20 years. Treaties have never been renegotiated," Juncker said in an interview published Friday in the Belgian newspaper De Standaard. [emphasis mine]

Big talk from Juncker, but my guess is that it's just that: talk. The EU intelligentsia are rightfully scared by the prospects of a French rejection, and they're racking their brains about what would come from such a once-unthinkable scenario. But such speculation derives from a shortsighted conception of the French referendum and misses its wider significance. That France has even put the constitution to a vote -- a core EU country allowing its citizens to pass judgment on the most important EU document in 50 years -- already represents a victory for the EU. This is true regardless of the poll’s eventual outcome.

The EU has long been plagued by a “democratic deficit.” It has often seemed more relevant to bureaucrats in Brussels than to the average Europeans it is supposed to benefit. Over 20 years ago, the EU created a parliament to address, in part, this very same deficit. But despite its growth in authority over the years, the parliament’s power is limited, and the deficit remains. Its cause and effect are one and the same: the EU remains an abstract theory to many because its recent growth has not been matched by effective popular engagement. The French referendum is a big step toward fixing that dangerous shortfall.

Moreover, while acceptance of the constitution would presuppose support for the EU as a theory, rejection would by no means imply the opposite. Whereas many French view the constitution as too economically liberal, many Britons view it as not nearly liberal enough. While the constitution would give the EU a president and a foreign minister, it also reaffirms that the institution is subsidiary to member states. A French acceptance would not necessarily be good for the EU, and a rejection would not necessarily be bad. The two possible outcomes merely represent different realities deriving from the same theory.

The French referendum, then, has already proven to be a victory for the EU. It was a victory from the day France selected the referendum model of ratification, it is today as the constitutional debate rages in France and across Europe, and it will be on May 29, when the EU will face a genuine popular reckoning. The reality resulting from the poll’s fallout -- from either an acceptance or a rejection -- is entirely unpredictable, and that makes it scary.

But democracy, after all, is a little scary. Winston Churchill (no slouch of a European himself) called it the worst form of government except for all others. Europeans, and the French in particular, know this. But if it is to thrive into the future, the imperfect reality of democracy must test the perfect theory of the EU. For all the good it has done and for all the bureaucrats it has employed, the EU remains just that: a theory. So far, it is a theory that has passed every test with reality it has faced, and it likely will pass its next one on May 29. If the French accept the constitution, the test will pass without much consternation. If they reject the constitution, however, the reality faced by the EU will be one more bracing and genuine than it has ever known.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:43 PM to Europe

May 09, 2005

Show off

It's really remarkable how many foreign leaders Putin was able to gather in Moscow for the VE commemorations yesterday. It was a rather bizarre scene. The image of troops and tanks parading through Red Square is just straight out of the Cold War, and it really is a rather heavy-handed way for Russia to show the world that it still matters. That is, of course, if marching and goose-stepping count for international influence these days. At least they didn't make the foreign leaders review the festivities from atop Lenin's tomb, as was the custom for Politburo members in the good old days. That would just have been too rich.

But as a sign of how impressive Putin's RSVP list was, just look at some of the wide shots of the commemorations. You'll notice that positions usually reserved for staff or functionaries, in the wings or in the back rows, were populated by the likes of Berlusconi, Koizumi, and Schroeder. Oh, that's right -- they lost.

Incidentally, this happens to be my 100th post in the Watsonblogs community. Hopefully some of them had more of a point than this one.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:03 PM to Europe

May 08, 2005

Unnecessary bluntness

It looks like Bush is really living on the edge with his visit to Riga, and it's probably not an edge that Vladimir Putin much cares for:

Asked if Russia poses a threat to its smaller neighbors, Bush said, ''I certainly hope not.'' But he added that Latvia has little to fear if his hopes turn out to be false. ''We will stand with Latvia if a larger country tries to intimidate the people,'' he said. [emphasis mine]

Nothing subtle to that. Nothing subtle to this, either:

Second-guessing Franklin D. Roosevelt, President Bush said Saturday the United States played a role in Europe's painful division after World War II — a decision that helped cause "one of the greatest wrongs of history" when the Soviet Union imposed its harsh rule across Central and Eastern Europe.

Mr. Bush said the lessons of the past will not be forgotten as the United States tries to spread freedom in the Middle East.

"We will not repeat the mistakes of other generations, appeasing or excusing tyranny, and sacrificing freedom in the vain pursuit of stability," the president said. "We have learned our lesson; no one's liberty is expendable. In the long run, our security and true stability depend on the freedom of others."

I suppose I should be heartened that I live in a country where the President is free to criticize his lionized predecessors. And FDR certainly could've done better at Yalta. But Bush is being a tad heavy-handed here, don't you think? Putting aside for the moment the fact that the United States is currently "excusing tyranny ... in pursuit of stability" all over the world, I think FDR was keenly aware that the Soviets were an imperfect but absolutely vital ally at the time. This isn't to excuse any mistakes he may have made at Yalta. Rather, it's to make the vital but oft-forgotten point that diplomacy is not a game of absolutes. Imperfect trade-offs sometimes have to be given to imperfect partners to achieve imperfect results. Last time I checked, "imperfect" is still a whole lot better than "bad."

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:25 AM to Europe

May 07, 2005

Neverending war

As the 60th anniversary of V-E Day approaches, we're reminded that the haunting ghosts of World Wars II are not confined to East Asia. Steve Gilliard points out that Bush's stopover in the Baltics prior to attending the V-E commemorations in Moscow is loaded with all kinds of historical baggage. In essence, what the Americans and Russians perceive as a victory over Nazism the Balts perceive as the beginnings of Soviet occupation. Both points of view, of course, are completely correct, and that makes the issue so messy. Should the Russians be praised for rolling back Hitler's hordes or condemned for shackling the Baltic states for decades thereafter? Should the Balts be honored for resisting the Soviet (re)invaders or castigated for enthusiastically aiding and abetting Nazi handiwork?

I'm not as concerned with Steve's final conclusion, that Bush's itinerary is driven by domestic, interest group politics. It's not that I doubt it -- as a matter of fact, he's probably on to something. Rather, I'm more generally struck by history's ability to reach beyond the grave, even in the most unexpected places and ways. The Japanese, for their part, are deservedly notorious for their maddening historical ambiguity. But in Europe, Germany has been portrayed as a paragon of contrition. I continue to be amazed that to this day, expressions of Nazi symbology and sympathy are criminalized in Germany -- can illiberal means truly serve liberal ends? Either way, Germany today finds itself much less constrained and criticized than Japan does. It still has its issues with historical reconciliation, but Germany's genuine contrition has won it a subtle yet perceptibly greater level of historical rehabilitation than Japan.

The issue with Balts, moreover, shows that even the "enemies" of World War II inhabit an ambiguous historical space. Who can honestly say that the Soviets represented any kind of good greater than that of Germany? This moral conflict was present at the time, but the fundamental distinction, of course, was that the Soviets were on our side. But today, 60 years after the Nazi surrender, must we still choose sides?

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:38 PM to Europe

May 02, 2005

Koizumi in Europe

Good account of Koizumi's meetings in Luxembourg with EU leaders, including interesting bits about the jockeying over the EU arms embargo on China as well as on the EU's apparent support for Japan's Security Council bid.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:19 PM to Asia, Europe

May 01, 2005

French stakes

In last week's Economist (which I've just gotten around to reading), Charlemagne explores the hypothetical futures following an increasingly likely French rejection of the EU constitution:

In Brussels, the gloomy talk is of a “period of stagnation”, after a French no. That is the most plausible outcome, and few EU citizens would notice the difference. But there is a worse possibility: that the EU might begin to break down. National governments, many of them in serious economic difficulty, might be tempted to seize on the unpopularity of the EU and ignore inconvenient edicts from Brussels. This process is well established for the euro. Germany and France have persistently breached the rules on budget deficits; deficits in Greece, Italy and Portugal are all soaring. This unraveling of EU discipline over the euro might spread to other areas.

True believers might bemoan this trend, but they may have only themselves to blame. Eurosceptics have long predicted that deeper integration based on shallow popular support would spark a backlash. And not just Eurosceptics. A year before the constitutional convention met, Frits Bolkestein, then a European commissioner, commented that “it would be a risky business to work towards a federal Europe, since there is a good chance of failure and Europe might then end up on the road to disintegration as a kind of reaction.” Perhaps the French should have listened to Mr Bolkestein, after all. [emphasis mine]

I agree with this assessment. Not only is Germany's future riding on the French referendum, as I previously supposed, but so is that of the entire EU. Yet despite the undeniable benefits the the EU has brought to Europe, and despite its great potential for the future, I can't help but think that this is an entirely appropriate situation to be in. The EU's democratic deficit has to be reckoned with at some point, and one could argue that the earlier that hurdle is crossed, the better, and the easier it is to be dealt with. The constitution is certainly an imperfect document, as proven by the strong opposition it generates among Eurosceptics and Eurofederalists alike. If the French reject it, the reality then faced by the EU will be one more genuine than it has ever known.

Are these stakes sufficient to advocate for French acceptance? I'm not sure. It would be tragic if the EU disintegrated ingloriously. But as the Economist notes, this dire scenario is but one possible result of a French rejection, and a particularly extreme and implausible one at that. Too many countries and too many people have sacrificed too much to allow the EU to disappear quietly into the light. Oddly, one of the prime pieces of evidence in arguing the EU's democratic deficit -- the vast, seemingly unaccountable Euro-bureaucracy that has taken root in Brussels -- might serve to brake the institution's fall following a French rejection. A rejection, then, might be the splash of water that the EU needs if it is to persist and grow in the twenty-first century.

So, again, should EU-fans (-sceptics and -federalists alike) root counterintuitively for a French rejection? Probably not, if for no other reason than that it would create some very strange bed-fellows with little additional prospect for a French acceptance. No, the lines between supporters and opponents of the constitution are clearly drawn, and as it should be, French citizens themselves will make the final determination of their country's future. It's their call, and any outside advocacy on either side is just noise that risks offending the sovereignty of the French people and their institutions of democracy. All of this certainly makes for exciting political drama and an exciting couple of weeks coming up. But a little contingency planning on the side -- for either outcome -- sure doesn't hurt.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:56 PM to Europe

April 30, 2005

True Islam

Ran into this interesting bit from the ANZAC Day observances earlier this week:

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a correction to the expression "moderate Islam" of his Australian counterpart John Howard whom he met on Tuesday, April 26.

According to information received, Howard spoke at a dinner held in his honor where he said, "One of the factors that will block the path of terrorism is the formation of democracy in moderate Islamic countries like Indonesia and Turkey." Upon this, Erdogan taking the floor corrected: "After the September 11 attacks, the expression, 'moderate Islam' that is widely being used is leading to different interpretations. There is no need to put a different adjective before or after the word 'Islam'. Islam means peace. It rejects all kinds of excessiveness." Howard then noted that he had meant "true Islam". [emphasis mine]

Coming from Erdogan -- an avowedly observant Muslim politician who also preaches the importance of a secular state and is aggressively pursuing Turkey's goal of EU membership -- such commentary is of particular interest. This is not to ascribe positive or negative value to it, but just simply to point it out. Indeed, the irony that Erdogan and his AK Party (with its roots in Islamist politics) have pursued EU membership so aggressively -- and, compared to previous Turkish PMs, so successfully thus far -- is often noted. But I have also found references to the fears held by some ardent Kemalists in Turkey, who also happen to be Erdogan's political enemies. In their view, Erodgan is pursuing EU membership aggressively in order to reduce the influence of the military in Turkish politics, to bring Turkey in line with EU norms. Once the military is put in its place, Erdogan will sweep away secularism and Kemalism and create an Islamic state, in the Iranian mold.

That's the fear, anyway. I don't buy it. Erdogan isn't perfect, but there's something very appropriate about an Islamic prime minister leading Turkey into the EU. If nothing else, it demonstrates that piety, politics, and secularism are not necessarily contradictory values. If Turkey does gain EU membership, I don't think Ataturk himself would much criticize Erdogan's means.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:32 PM to Australia/NZ, Europe

April 26, 2005

Lending a hand

The Germans are joining their fellow Euro-brethren in their nervousness:

"To vote Yes is to make a choice for a more socially-oriented, more independent, more powerful Europe, in which the weight of France will be significantly increased," Mr Chirac said at a joint press conference with Gerhard Schröder, Germany's chancellor, in Paris.

"To vote Yes is to reinforce France, to defend French interests, to remain faithful to the vocation and ambition of our country on the domestic scene and the international stage," he said.

Mr Schröder also pitched into the French domestic debate, urging voters to remain faithful to their European vision. "The idea of a unified Europe comes from France," he said, adding that a No vote would weaken the collective power of all Europeans. [emphasis mine]

Rather bold language on Chirac's part, given Schroeder's presence at the press conference with him, and nationalistic, too, given that it concerned a very supra-nationalistic EU constitution. But Chirac is justifiably scared about the prospects for success in the upcoming constitutional referendum, and as with any politician facing a tough domestic battle, he will use the language it takes to get him the votes. The outcome of the French referendum will have very real and very serious consequences for Germany, so it should be little surprise that Schroeder is doing what he can to help out Chirac.

This scene certainly is a fascinating sign of how far the EU has come. By breaking down national boundaries, the supra-national EU has forced the German chancellor into a position of near accountablity to the citizens of France. Constitution or not, that's saying quite a lot.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:16 PM to Europe

April 25, 2005

ANZAC Day

Today was ANZAC Day, which commemorates an event that inextricably linked two countries a world apart -- Australia and Turkey (and New Zealand, as well). It marks the date in 1915 when British, French, and ANZAC (Australia and New Zealand Army Corps) soldiers landed at Gallipoli in an attempt to force the Dardanelles, open a sea route to Russian Crimea, and knock Ottoman Turkey out of World War I. The invasion was ultimately unsuccessful -- but only after months of horrifying trench combat that yielded little gain. Out of those trenches, however, two countries were born. Though Australia had gained formal independence from the United Kingdom 15 years earlier and the Turkish Republic would not emerge from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire for another 8 years, the national psyches of both countries were forged at Gallipoli. While the two countries met in combat 90 years ago, they have been closely bound ever since by their shared legacy of colonial manipulation and tragic sacrifice.

It is traditional that along with the prime ministers of Turkey, Australia, and New Zealand, thousands of backpackers from each country descend on Gallipoli each year on ANZAC Day. Today's 90th anniversary of the invasion was no exception. From the Sydney Morning Herald:

At Gallipoli, [New Zealand defence chief Vice-Marshal Bruce Ferguson said] "We learnt to shake off the shackles of colonial dependency - we learnt we must stand for what we believe in."

The New Zealand defence chief said that even now armies heeded the lesson of the Dardanelles campaign. "No commander today will risk young lives so needlessly."

"None of us can ever conceive what a hell on earth this place was for eight months." He said we must never forget that the Turks, "who were defending their homeland", lost 87,000 lives.

Vice-Marshal Ferguson's speech underlined the remarkable nature of Anzac Day: 17,000 people, most of them young Australians, gathered at Gallipoli yesterday to remember not a triumph, but a defeat. [emphasis mine]

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:28 PM to Australia/NZ, Europe

April 21, 2005

Greek ratification

Greece has overwhelmingly ratified the EU constitution, opting for the easier legislative route over the less predictable referendum one.

This ratification wasn't a surprise, however. It just raises the stakes for the constitution's first big test in a few weeks. The French go to the polls on May 29, with opposition to the constitution there currently running at 58%.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 04:06 PM to Europe

April 14, 2005

Headline placement

I'm sorry, but Xinhua is just sometimes too good to be true. On Thursday afternoon, the prominent headline in the upper right corner of their page reads, "China supports Germany to play greater role in UN." Score one jab against Japan's bid for a Security Council seat and three jabs for the other aspiring seat-holders (Brazil and India rounding out the foursome). Also credit China with some technical points for its goody-goody politicking of a key EU member state.

Move a couple headlines down the column on Xinhua's front page to see more news from Germany: "Schroeder to Japan: be 'self-critical' over history". Score another jab against Japan's collective wartime memory. Actually, this last jab might have to be waved off as a low blow.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 03:15 PM to Asia, Europe

April 13, 2005

Euro-Sino update

I'm glad to see that the Europeans are starting to take my advice. While the IHT piece suggests that the EU arms embargo on China will eventually be lifted, it won't come cost-free for the Chinese:

Cristina Gallach, spokeswoman for Javier Solana, the EU's chief diplomat, said: "The timeline that we had in mind [for lifting the embargo] has bumped into several difficulties. The most important is the anti-secession law, and also relations between China and Japan."

[...]

[Javier Solana's personal representative on nonproliferation] Gianella said: "Nobody has said we are going to lift our embargo for free. It would require an important concrete step to be taken by the Chinese."

[...]

Asked whether the EU now planned to make the lifting of the embargo conditional on a gesture by China on human rights, [a French diplomat] said: "This link is indeed beginning to emerge in the discussion."

This can only be seen as a good thing. While an outright lifting of the embargo probably isn't called for, diplomacy is nothing without carrots and sticks. It seems that U.S. prodding has really made the EU realize that it's the party holding the chips in this equation, and incidentally, such prodding seems to be more effective than that dished out to other Chinese arms providers. The suasion the EU applies to entice European states to meet their club's membership criteria -- liberal economics, political freedoms, and more -- can be adapted to deal with the Chinese, with whom EU membership is clearly not an issue. Whether the embargo is eventually lifted, then, depends on what concessions the EU can reasonably extract from China. Determining the point at which the benefits of such Chinese concessions outweigh the very serious consequences of lifting the arms embargo will be very tricky. But no one ever said being a global player would be easy.

Elsewhere in the IHT, we have a very nice piece on the "strategic triangle" between the United States, the EU, and China:

"The United States sees China as a rising power and looks more at its hard power, while the EU sees it more as a society in transition," said David Shambaugh, an expert on China at George Washington University in Washington. "So while the EU's style is conciliatory, consensual, behind-the-scenes, the United States is more confrontational and focused on security issues."

Nothing original about the "strategic triangle" concept here -- everyone acknowledges that when one of these three entities moves, the others feel the reverberations. But the piece not-so-implicitly recognizes the EU as a genuine strategic force in foreign policy. Such force doesn't come from institutions or personalities or military might. Rather, it comes from this power of suasion that the EU is so uniquely configured to wield. Almost inadvertently, and by sort of backing into it, the EU is slowing finding its footing on the world stage.

UPDATE: Some more details here.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:13 PM to Asia, Europe

April 07, 2005

Italian approval

The Italian parliament ratified the EU constitution today, which is noteworthy for two reasons. First, and most obviously, the Italians chose the simpler legislative method of ratification over the messier popular method. Second, Italy's ratification marks the first from among the six founding EU members (of which France, Germany, and the Benelux countries form the remainder). Symbolically, that's a nice milestone for the constitution.

So good news, if not unexpected, for Eurofederalists. We'll soon see how the French react -- their constitutional referendum is less than two months away.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:09 PM to Europe

March 31, 2005

Baku-ed up

First, the Commander of the Turkish Navy visits Azerbaijan and pledges assistance to ensure the security of its Caspian oil fields. Then, we learn that the Turkish Land Forces Commander will visit Baku in April to discuss joint Turkish-Azeri military exercises. Why all the chumminess?

In the 1990s, much ink was spilled about Turkey's foreign policy ambitions in Central Asia. The break-up of the Soviet Union had produced a bevy of newly independent, ethnically Turkic states in Central Asia in need of recognition and assistance. The fall of the Soviet empire had also produced a power vacuum, into which new, outside influence could be exerted. Turkey, it was felt, was the state that would most logically take advantage of these new circumstances. And to some extent, it did. But shifting governments, economic difficulties, European obsessions, and natural disasters continually directed Turkish attention away from Central Asia. Following 11 September 2001, Central Asia took on a whole new level of geopolitical significance, and the Turkish window of opportunity closed.

But Turkey still had its foot in the door, most significantly in the form of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. This pipeline, long a dream of Turkish and U.S. geostrategists, will take oil from Azerbaijan's Caspian fields directly to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. While costlier than a shorter pipeline-tanker combination favored by the Russians -- look at any map of the Black Sea region to see why -- the BTC pipeline will save the narrow and already overcrowded Bosporus and Dardanelles passages (and the adjacent millions in Istanbul and its environs) from vastly increased tanker traffic. Through port fees, of course, the BTC option also favors Turkey economically. After years of deliberation, construction, and delays, the BTC pipeline is finally scheduled to open later this year. The Turks already control the petroleum terminus at Ceyhan -- can it be any wonder that they want to help secure its origin at Baku? In the process, Turkey may inch its way back to a position of influence in Central Asia.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:18 AM to Asia, Europe, Middle East

March 30, 2005

Just another week

This week, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez bought military equipment from Spain ...

In Spain's biggest arms deal for many years, its arms factories will supply 10 C-295 transport planes, four coastal patrol corvettes and four smaller coastguard patrol boats to Mr Chavez's army. [Spanish PM] Zapatero said the vehicles would be used to monitor coastlines, combat terrorism and drug traffickers, and mount rescue operations during natural disasters. The deal was announced by the Spanish Prime Minister during a visit to Venezuela yesterday when he also met fellow left-wing leaders from Colombia and Brazil. [emphasis mine]

... and called for a "new geopolitical map … to counterbalance the global dominance of the United States:"

"This meeting has the objective of evaluating the situation of our countries and looking for solutions to accelerate the South American integration project as a geopolitical component that we are driving forward with our souls, because it is the only path that we have: the Latin American Union," affirmed Chávez. [emphasis mine]

All in all, a fairly unexceptional week for Chavez.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:02 PM to Americas, Europe

March 25, 2005

French fried?

In ominous news for Eurofederalists, it seems the French are increasingly wary about the proposed EU constitution. Chirac, in somewhat of a bold move, has scheduled a referendum on the document for May 29. Each EU member must ratify the constitution, but the method of ratification is not specified. The Lithuanians and Slovenians have already cleanly ratified the document in their respective parliaments, but the Spanish took the flashier and riskier referendum course, which was ultimately successful. Blair has already caused a stir by pledging to hold a referendum in the United Kingdom on the constitution, one whose prospects for success are very far from certain. The BBC sums up the continent-wide ratification picture very nicely.

But the French? They are arch-Europeans, federalists to the core, aspiring to see the EU as a "counterweight" to the United States in world affairs. How could they be skeptical of a document that codifies the European experiment to an unprecedented degree? Actually, it's not the first time they've been skittish -- the French just barely voted in favor of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Indeed, the current document -- in classic constitutional fashion -- is the epitome of a compromise, satisfying neither Eurofederalists nor Euroskeptics completely and offending them both equally. It is lengthy, dense, and imperfect -- much of European public opinion about the document is based not on an actual familiary with the constitution, but on distillations and interpretations provided by lobbyists for and against ratification. In effect, one could interpret the sheer complexity of the constitution as a reason for taking the parliamentary road to ratification. Perhaps only professional politicians have the time and experience to make a rational judgement, representing (of course) the will of the people in the process?

Of course not. The constitution's very length and inaccessiblity are key criteria in assessing it. The public debate on its ratifiation -- in each country that intends to hold referenda -- will be long, messy, and healthy. To be sure, if the French reject the constitution, its fate will be all but sealed, and the EU will find itself tested as never before. But again, perhaps such a test would be healthy. The EU suffers from an acute democratic deficit. Its institutions are seen as distant and ineffectual, and most Europeans feel a much stronger national identity than a continental one. But who would love most to see a French rejection? Tony Blair, of course, who has staked much on pulling a reluctant Britain closer to the EU. The significance of Britain's referendum next year rests squarely on what the French do. He will go to bed on May 29 in one of two moods. If the French ratify the constitution, he'll have a headache. If they don't, he'll have a party.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:11 PM to Europe

March 22, 2005

Wise wavering

I saw in the FT and the Washington Post today that the EU appears to be wavering in its earlier consensus to lift its arms embargo on China. This is a welcome development on several levels.

First, just on the merits of the news, one has to be pleased by the EU's recent hesitation. As firm a believer as I am in free trade, certain commodities -- such as arms -- are better left uncommon, untraded, and unused. Furthermore, China has shown itself willing and able to boost its military expenditures even without overt European assistance. And despite its torrid economic growth, the People's Republic remains a repressive and authoritarian state, wholly unworthy of being rewarded with additional access to modern weaponry. Indeed, the EU's wavering can largely be attributed to the anti-secession bill recently rubber-stamped by China's National People's Congress and targeted explicitly at Taiwan. This bill, suffice to say, does not inspire confidence in China's ostensibly peaceful intentions.

Second, and important in a broader European context, the FT and Washington Post articles both mention that resistance to lifting the embargo is coming from Britain and Germany, with France holding out. It seems Chirac is still holding on to the notion that the EU can represent a "counterweight" to the United States in world affairs and that building stronger ties to China is a means to accomplish this. While on some matters, such as trade and immigration, the EU can act effectively as a single entity, the prospects for any kind of a more developed EU global footprint (the CFSP notwithstanding) are slim to none. The French position not only represents a futile goal, then, but it is also indicative of an old-think, twentieth century system of pole-based geopolitics. While the United States might possess overwhelming superiority in the rudiments of state power, recent events have only proven that state power is neither invincible nor infallible. Europe's comparative advantage vis a vis the United States, then, is not in the traditional modes of state power, such as force and raw power, but rather in the more post-modern modes of influence, such as suasion and norm-setting (over-popularized and -simplified as "soft power"). By simply setting an example of stability, democratic governance, and liberal economics -- and without the threat or use of coercive force -- the EU has had a great effect on Central and Eastern European states hoping to meet EU membership criteria on the path to eventual admission. While China clearly is not a prospective EU member, the general strategies and principles used to affect change in Europe can certainly be applied to misbehaving states further afield. So if Chirac aspires for the EU to act as a "counterweight" to the United States, there are ways to do this, as long as he thinks creatively and becomes unbound from a narrow version of history based solely upon classical balance of power notions. In this regard, lifting the arms embargo on China would not be a step in the right direction.

And third, in terms of U.S. policy, the recent EU wavering could signify a welcome success in the Bush administration's diplomatic playbook. Despite the ongoing "war on terror," Bush administration officials hold on to their opinion of China as an emerging strategic competitor to the United States. Such geopolitical geniuses, then, clearly view U.S. national interests as being served by the EU's retention of its arms embargo on China. Bush's recent visit to Europe -- during which he surely gave Blair, Schroeder, and Chirac an earful about the retaining the embargo -- has been matched by firm and extensive diplomatic lobbying. Thus far at least, such lobbying seems not to have been paired with improper accusations or outright deceit. When the Bush team has resorted to such tricks in the past, results have been decidedly mixed. Perhaps this recent turn of events will convince the administration that a little honest diplomacy among friends can actually get the job done.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:48 PM to Asia, Europe, U. S. Politics

March 21, 2005

Talking Turkey

On the topic of ticking off U.S. allies, Don Rumsfeld lamented Turkish democracy over the weekend. In response to a question about whether he had any regrets about his execution of the Iraq war, Rumsfeld notes:

Well, given the level of the insurgency today, two years later, clearly if we had been able to get the 4th Infantry Division in from the north through Turkey, more of the Iraqi Saddam Hussein Baathist regime would have been captured or killed. The insurgency today would be less.

What happened was we had to come in from the south, our 4th Infantry Division was blocked in the north.

As a result, by the time Baghdad was taken, the large fraction of the Iraqi military and intelligence services just dissipated into the communities. And they're still, in a number of instances, still active. [emphasis mine]

In fairness to Rumsfeld, he didn't outright condemn Turkey's decision to refuse access to the 4th ID -- he very clearly was speaking in hypotheticals. But of all the things that Rumsfeld could regret about his execution of the Iraq war, he chooses Turkey's refusal of a northern front. Not only is such a selection breathtaking in its boneheadedness, but it is also the one for which Rumsfeld himself is least responsible. Turkish PM Erdogan supported the idea hosting U.S. troops -- but he couldn't get his parliament in line. The State Department could have exercised greater diplomatic suasion -- but it didn't. Is Rumsfeld intellectually aware of this? If he is, then his comments might be intended as more than just a simple statement of remorse. They might have contemporary policy implications.

The Turks, for their part, are definitely feeling some cold winds blowing from Washington. Indeed, as Rumsfeld's comments demonstrate, folks in the Bush administration aren't very willing to forgive and forget Turkey's disloyalty in early 2003. As Turkey remains the indispensible nation in so many contexts, this probably isn't a wise trend.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:41 AM to Europe, Middle East, U. S. Politics

March 18, 2005

Nordic chills

In Norway -- that odd Scandinavian country left unshaded in maps of the EU -- there seems to be some political stirrings over another potential referendum on EU membership. In contrast to non-EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, Norway's lack of membership has nothing to do with instability or underdevelopment. Indeed, the country does have a relationship of sorts with the EU, short of outright membership, and it has a history of dancing to the brink of membership and back. Blessed by being a stable and nonviolent dynamic, it will be interesting to follow this often-overlooked Nordic front of EU expansion.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:13 AM to Europe

March 07, 2005

Separatist foxes

Ever wonder what happens when Kemalism meets zoology? If so, you're in luck. Under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (with its convenient and somewhat uncommon parliamentary majority), Turkey has made great strides in its quest to gain membership in the European Union, obtaining a formal invitation to begin accession negotiations last November. A big reason Erdogan has had such success is that he's used his parliamentary majority to push through important human rights legislation, most notably to reduce various restrictions on Turkey's Kurdish (and occasionally separatist) minority.

Apparently, such legislation has left some fauna behind. While the insurgency in the Kurdish southeast has largely subsided since the 1990s, the Turkish Environment and Forestry Ministry has recently determined a new separatist threat to Ataturk's vision: the red fox and the wild sheep. More precisely,Vulpes vulpes kurdistanicum (aka, red fox) and Ovis armeniana (aka, wild sheep) were deemed to have been so named specifically in order to threaten Turkey's unitary state. The non-threatening, Ministry-sanctioned alternatives? Vulpes vulpes and Ovis orien anatolicus -- or, in the easier-to-remember shorthand, "red fox" and "wild sheep." The UNDP, meanwhile, impetuously claims that the Environment and Forestry Ministry of the Republic of Turkey is not the final arbiter of zoological nomenclature. Will this attempted species reclassification affect Turkey's EU accession negotiations? Probably not -- at least not for Turkey's native Homo sapiens sapiens.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:47 PM to Europe