Daniel Widome

September 30, 2009

Missile base

Barack Obama staked his campaign for the presidency on the promise of change. The realities of governance are much different than the promises of campaigns, of course, and Obama has disappointed some supporters with the slowness or incompleteness of his “change.” This disappointment has applied even in the realm of foreign policy, where the president has much greater leeway to implement change than he does in the domestic sphere. But in many cases, Obama has broken unequivocally from the policies of his predecessor. His recent decision to cancel plans to build a missile defense system in Eastern Europe represents one of the clearest breaks from the policy of the Bush administration. Although Obama’s policy change in this case has much to recommend it, the move raises an entirely new set of risks and challenges.

Under President Bush, the United States withdrew from the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with Russia, and the Pentagon accelerated development of ground-based, sea-based, and air-based missile defense systems. The ground-based system, consisting of missiles that can be launched to intercept incoming warheads, was deployed in Alaska in 2004 and soon afterward in California. These locations were suitable to contend with missiles launched toward the United States from North Korea. But to counter the potential threat of Iranian missiles, the Bush administration proposed deploying missile defense systems to Eastern Europe. Under the approved scheme, a radar would have been built in the Czech Republic and interceptor missiles would have been based in Poland. In addition to defending the continental United States, this plan had two important side effects. It theoretically would have offered some degree of missile defense to NATO allies in Europe. And it would have greatly upset Russia.

Russia’s reaction to the proposed locations for the European missile defense system was impassioned and, to a degree, understandable. Ostensibly, it viewed the system as destabilizing and as a potential threat to its own security, despite assurances from the Bush administration to the contrary. In reality, the system envisioned by the Bush administration—with a total of 10 interceptor missiles, to be deployed by 2017—could not possibly have defended Europe (or the United States) from a determined Russian attack. Instead, Russia’s concerns focused on the geopolitical encroachment that the U.S. missile defense system represented. Although Poland and the Czech Republic have been NATO members for years, the positioning of such important and strategic U.S. military assets in what was once Russia’s sphere of influence represented a serious affront to the former superpower. Russia had opposed NATO expansion in the 1990s for similar reasons, but it lacked the leverage to halt it at the time. In recent years, under the centralizing leadership of Vladimir Putin and amid the global rise in energy prices, gas- and oil-rich Russia has gained greater influence. Its objections to the missile defense system could not be dismissed without consequence, although the Bush administration remained committed to the program to its final days.

Obama did not radically change Bush’s plans immediately upon taking office. Indeed, during his visit to Prague in April, he reaffirmed the fundamental purpose behind the European missile defense system: “As long as the threat from Iran persists, we will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven.” (for more, see The Water’s Edge, April 2009). His recent decision did not so much scrap the system as it aligned it to better meet his stated criteria of effectiveness. He will no longer move forward with the plan to deploy a ground-based system in Poland and the Czech Republic. Instead, he will implement a staged deployment of missile defenses centered on the sea-based AEGIS system. This alternative presents several advantages over the ground-based system. The sea-based system is less expensive than its ground-based counterpart, and it has a more successful testing record, as well. It can be deployed in stages, first on Navy destroyers and cruisers already equipped with the system, with the initial system of defenses becoming operational in 2011—far sooner than the ground-based system’s operational date of 2017. Obama’s alternative is also more suited to the predicted nature of the Iranian threat, in which an attack with large numbers of short-range missiles is more realistic than an attack with smaller numbers of long-range missiles. Tehran’s recent testing of just such a missile further antagonized those who view it as a threat to regional and global stability.

Perhaps the most significant implication of Obama’s policy change is its effect on several bilateral relationships of real importance to the United States. Russia, quite understandably, was pleased with Obama’s decision. From a technical standpoint, sea-based interceptors are less of a threat to Russia’s faster, longer-ranged ballistic missiles than ground-based interceptors. In the later stages of Obama’s plan, missiles and radars developed from the sea-based AEGIS system will be modified and deployed, on land, in Europe. But it is likely that those facilities could be placed in the Balkans or in Turkey, where they would pose less of a geopolitical threat to Russia. Russian parliamentarians praised Obama’s plan as “a victory for common sense,” while conservatives in the United States claimed that it smacked of weakness in the face of Russian assertiveness.

A key rationale behind Obama’s plan is an updated assessment of the threat posed by Iran. Indeed, if the assessment is correct, Obama’s plan will do more to neutralize an Iranian threat than Bush’s plan, and it will do so sooner. But many had suspected (or hoped) that Obama would use missile defense as leverage to compel Russia to take a harder line with Iran. Russia has sold weapons and nuclear technology to that country, and as a member of the UN Security Council, its cooperation with U.S. efforts to stifle Iran’s nuclear ambitions is vital. When Obama announced his decision, there was no public signal that Russia would offer more explicit support for U.S. diplomatic initiatives in return. It is possible, however, that a quiet deal was made. Several days before Obama announced the change in missile defense plans, the State Department accepted an Iranian offer for multilateral talks on a wide range of issues. Nuclear matters were not among the issues listed in the Iranian offer, but the dialogue is a promising sign. Any connection between the dialogue, the change in missile defense plans, and Russian leverage is unknown. But shortly after Obama’s announcement, at the opening of the UN General Assembly in New York, Russian President Dimitry Medvedev expressed a new-found openness to tougher sanctions on Iran. Given revelations of a secret Iranian nuclear facility that same week, Russia’s cooperation may become even more important in the coming months.

It would be logical for Poland and the Czech Republic to be unhappy with Obama’s decision. They had expended political capital in consenting to the placement of missile defense systems on their territory. But more importantly, they viewed the system as a way of further anchoring their security to the United States. Russia remains an intimidating force throughout Eastern Europe, which remains dependent on Russian energy supplies. By changing U.S. missile defense plans, Poland and the Czech Republic may feel somewhat abandoned in the face of an emboldened Russia. That the plan was announced on the 70th anniversary of the Russian invasion of Poland was inauspicious and unfortunate, to say the least.

The reaction from Polish and Czech leaders, however, did not betray significant disappointment. “I received President Obama’s words and declarations with great satisfaction,” said Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, after speaking with Obama about his decision. Czech President Vaclav Klaus declared that he was, “100 percent convinced that this decision of the American government does not signal a cooling of relations between the United States and the Czech Republic.” An important component of Obama’s plan is the placement of Patriot surface-to-air missiles in Poland and the Czech Republic. Although these will not be effective against long-range ballistic missiles, they can be effective against shorter ranged missiles. And unlike the interceptors of Bush’s ground-based anti-missile system, Patriot missiles can also be effective against attacking aircraft. In any event, the later stages of Obama’s plan call for the placement of more advanced missiles derived from the sea-based system on land, and Poland and the Czech Republic remain potential locations for those weapons.

Obama’s plan, then, clearly represents change. Aside from an effectiveness standpoint, his decision will have important effects on the United States’ bilateral relationships with Russia, Iran, and its Eastern European allies. But it may have a more important effect on an issue of even greater, more global concern. In the same speech in Prague in which Obama underscored his support for European missile defense, he called for a major effort toward nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. One of the first steps in that effort is the negotiation of a new arms control treaty with Russia. By addressing Russia’s concerns over European missile defense, Obama may have made such a treaty not only more realistic, but potentially more ambitious, as well. If that sparks a movement toward a global reduction of nuclear stockpiles, then Obama’s decision on missile defense may represent an even greater change than it first appeared.

Foreign Policy Association, 30 September 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:26 PM to Europe, Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

June 27, 2009

Subtle timing

In the past month, a quick succession of events has occurred that could significantly change the U.S. relationship with countries in the Middle East. Notable speeches by U.S. President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and important elections in Lebanon and Iran all occurred within a span of weeks. To a certain extent, the timing is coincidental, and the events largely unrelated. But they are connected, and the connection could have meaningful long-term consequences in the region.

During his election campaign, Barack Obama pledged to deliver a major speech on U.S. relations with the Islamic world from the capital of a Muslim country within the first 100 days of his administration. Although Obama's June 4 speech in Cairo missed his 100-day target (his April address to the Turkish parliament in Ankara apparently didn't count), it did not underwhelm in scope or ambition. Seeking a “new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect,” Obama stressed points of common interest between the United States and Islam. Although he reiterated his intention to pursue “violent extremism” and his view that the danger posed by al Qaeda is not an “opinion to be debated [but a] fact to be dealt with,” Obama also emphasized that the United States did not seek permanent military bases in Iraq or Afghanistan. He stressed the commonalty of themes such as democracy, women's rights, and economic development, and he sprinkled his speech with references to the Koran. The White House promoted the speech heavily and went to great lengths to ensure its translation and dissemination in languages and technologies widely used in the Muslim world. Reaction to Obama's speech was generally positive, with the main caveat that his conciliatory words needed to be translated into real action.

Just a few days after Obama's speech, on June 7, Lebanon held widely anticipated parliamentary elections. Long seen as a comparatively sophisticated and diverse corner of the Middle East, Lebanon has been wracked intermittently by civil war and outside intervention since the 1980s. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 led to a popular uprising that drove occupying Syrian forces from the country. In 2006, Israel waged a war against Hezbollah, a militant and political organization based in Lebanon that is popular among the country's Shia population and that receives significant support from Iran. Last year, a power-sharing crisis boiled over into open conflict between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government. The June 7 election was seen not only as an important opportunity for the Lebanese to cast their votes, but also as a proxy in a wider contest of popular opinion between Iran (which supported Hezbollah) and the United States (which preferred a coalition led by Rafik Hariri's son, Saad). Hariri's coalition won more seats than the Hezbollah-led coalition, representing at the very least a perceived setback for Iranian and Sryian influence in Lebanese politics.

Among the closest observers of Obama's speech in Cairo was Israel. Concern about the steadfastness of Obama's support for Israel predates even his election, and many Israelis wondered if Obama would sacrifice U.S. support for Israel in his address to the Muslim world. Obama made no such sacrifice, and he reiterated the United States' strong and “unbreakable” bond with Israel. He did, however, express his opposition to Israeli settlements in the West Bank. On June 14, Israel's newly elected prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, delivered his own notable speech, in which he endorsed the creation of a Palestinian state. This was the first public endorsement of its kind for Netanyahu, who had developed a hawkish reputation during his previous stint as prime minister and in his recent election campaign. Netanyahu's endorsement was far from complete, however. It was conditional on the demilitarization of the new Palestinian state and on the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, with Jerusalem as its capital. These conditions likely will not form the basis of an ultimate settlement. But the statement represented a notable shift in tone, if not necessarily in substance.

Potentially the most significant event in recent weeks is still ongoing. On June 12, Iranians went to the polls to elect a new president. In many ways, Iran lies at the heart of the U.S. relationship with the Middle East. Iran's nuclear program is of constant concern to the United States and its allies, and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has spoken openly of his desire to destroy Israel. Iran supports militant groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and it exerts influence in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also possesses significant quantities of oil, and it borders the strategic Straits of Hormuz. Most importantly, Iran has a long history of resentment toward the United States. The 1979 Islamic revolution was partly fueled by anger at the United States' long support of the Shah, and the revolution has served as inspiration for militant Islamic movements around the world. On June 12, Ahmadinejad faced off against an array of opponents, the most significant being Mir Hossein Mousavi, a conservative former prime minister who experienced a tremendous surge of support among reform-minded Iranians. The official tabulation showed Ahmadinejad winning with 63 percent of the vote—a far more lop-sided outcome than had been expected, and one that seemed rigged by the authorities. Since then, Iran has experienced its largest wave of protests since 1979. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's Supreme Leader, has been resolute in resisting calls for a new election and in upholding Ahmadinejad's declared victory. The outcome of the election and the protests remains uncertain, but one thing is clear: this episode has unequivocally changed the nature of Iranian politics.

Individually, each of these events would have been significant and noteworthy. And to a certain degree, their clustering within a few weeks was the result of chance—the elections in Lebanon and Iran, in particular, were not scheduled to coincide with each other. But the scheduling of speeches is much more flexible than the scheduling of elections. Netanyahu, for example, likely scheduled his speech to follow Obama's. The prime minister had already received pressure from Obama on the question of settlements in the West Bank. It was important for him to address this pressure, and politically, it was useful for him to present a conciliatory front, if only as a negotiating tactic or to throw his rivals off-balance. Before he could do so, however, Netanyahu needed to see what Obama would say in his much-anticipated Cairo speech.

Indeed, it was Obama's speech in Cairo—the first in this sequence of events—that was most amenable to strategic timing. Obama seems well-aware of the symbolic value of his own election, not only in the United States but around the world. In part, this value rests upon the fact that he is not George W. Bush. But it also comes from his unique background, and to the role that his background can play in challenging negative misconceptions of the United States. Obama's campaign pledge to give a major address in a Muslim capital recognized this. Any U.S. president can address a Muslim audience. But only Obama could do so as a president with an international background, a childhood spent in a majority-Muslim country, and a middle name like “Hussein.” Obama likely knew the impact his speech could have in the Middle East, and he surely knew when Lebanon and Iran were holding their elections. Although the administration denies it, the timing of Obama's speech on the eve of these elections may have been very deliberate.

This doesn't mean that Obama's speech in Cairo was responsible for the victory of Hariri's coalition in Lebanon, or for the upheaval and uncertainty following Iran's election. But even if it had no direct effect, Obama's speech may have indirectly helped to preclude a more negative outcome, from the U.S. perspective. The Bush administration was very unpopular in the Middle East, and although Obama's election was a hopeful sign, there was little concrete evidence that his approach would be much different. His speech in Cairo reiterated to voters throughout the Middle East that his administration would a much more willing partner with receptive regimes. In other words, the promises made by reform-minded candidates in Lebanon and Iran would be much more realistic and achievable with President Obama in office. Elections and speeches, however, are only the first steps toward successful policies. Until the situation in Iran stabilizes, it is far too soon to judge Obama's timing.

Foreign Policy Association, 25 June 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:40 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

March 27, 2009

Nuclear empathy

In his first months as president, Barack Obama's focus necessarily has been on the rapidly deteriorating economic situation. But while he grapples with unexpected and fast-moving domestic issues, certain timeless international challenges remain, Iran foremost among them. Although the danger posed by Iran's nuclear intentions is real and prone to unexpected developments, the fundamental parameters of the situation have remained the same for several years. Obama, then, faces a choice. He could base his policy on the unchanging, long-term fundamentals of the situation, or he could respond to the rapidly changing, short-term shifts in assessments and expectations. Obama has already hinted at which tack he prefers, but may find himself constrained by forces beyond his control.

George Bush famously included Iran in his “axis of evil” in 2002, and although the country's nuclear ambitions preceded that date, international interest in its nuclear program certainly increased afterward. Iran's long history of antagonism and resentment toward the United States—from the CIA's meddling in its internal politics in the 1950s, to the Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis in the 1970s, to the country's support of anti-U.S. and anti-Israel terrorist groups from the 1980s to today—mean that its nuclear intentions are certainly to be of great concern to any U.S. president. That Iranian leaders have regularly referred to the United States as “the Great Satan” and spoken hypothetically about the destruction of Israel has not done much to alleviate fears.

Intelligence about the real progress of the Iranian nuclear program, however, is far less certain. Iran clearly has a nuclear program, but it has consistently declared its ambitions to be peaceful in nature and fully within its rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 2007, a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) declared that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. But the Obama administration has made clear that it suspects Iran is still pursuing nuclear weapons. During his confirmation hearings, CIA Director Leon Panetta said that he had “no question that they are seeking [weapons] capability.” Obama himself has spoken of Iran's “development of a nuclear weapon.” Last month, an inspection report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concluded that Iran has acquired a sufficient amount of low-enriched uranium to produce a single, crude bomb. Understandably, this caused a great deal of anxiety, especially among those who have always been skeptical of Iranian intentions. But shocking headlines overwhelmed the nuance of the report. To produce a bomb, Iran would need to process its low-enriched uranium to make highly enriched uranium—something that would take several years and require the eviction of the IAEA inspectors already in place in Iran.

During the election campaign, Obama differentiated himself from his Democratic and Republican rivals by promoting a more open and transparent engagement of potential U.S. rivals. So far, he has largely kept that promise. This month, on the occasion of the Iranian New Year, he recorded a video message that was meant to directly address the Iranian people. In the message, Obama emphasized common traits that Americans and Iranians shared, in an empathetic tone very similar to many of his own campaign themes: “You will be celebrating your New Year in much the same way that we Americans mark our holidays—by gathering with friends and family, exchanging gifts and stories, and looking to the future with a renewed sense of hope.” He also spoke clearly about the approach he planned to pursue, noting that his “administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community.” Perhaps most notably, he expressed the U.S. desire for “the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations.” This was a remarkable gesture of respect because U.S. presidents traditionally have not formally or publicly acknowledged the Islamic government of Iran or referred to the country by its formal name.

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, responded to Obama's message in relatively short order. As might be expected, he did not embrace the president's gesture wholeheartedly. “They chant the slogan of change but no change is seen in practice,” Khamenei noted, perhaps mocking Obama's famous campaign theme. He cited specific changes that have yet to be made: “Has your hostility towards the Iranian nation changed? … Have you unblocked Iran's assets [frozen in US banks]? Have you lifted the oppressive sanctions? Have you stopped insulting us and making accusations against our great nation and its leaders? Have you stopped your unconditional support for Israel?” Such rhetoric, however, does not mean Obama's gesture was fruitless. Iran's leaders have their own domestic political concerns; although the United States is popular among many younger Iranians, the conservative, hard-line constituency is still vitally important to the reigning political and clerical establishment. Indeed, Khamenei did not entirely rebuff Obama's message. He noted that Iran has “no prior experience of the new president of the American republic and of the government, and therefore we shall make our judgment based on his actions.” In other words, Iran would respond to U.S. actions, and not just its words. This is an entirely reasonable response, and it is in the nature of diplomacy that “words” almost always precede meaningful “actions.” Obama's message, then, might not have been made in vain.

The United States, however, is not the only country with a serious interest in Iran's nuclear program. Literally and figuratively, Israel is far closer to the core issues surrounding Iran's nuclear program than the United States. It is the only Middle Eastern country that possesses a nuclear arsenal, and although it is clearly intended as a deterrent against attacks, Israel's Muslim neighbors view it in a far more offensive light. Iran's leaders have long spoken explicitly about their desire to destroy Israel, and the country actively supports anti-Israel militant groups such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. Whereas the United States may see a nuclear-armed Iran as a nuisance, Israel sees it as an existential threat. The respective thresholds of action for the United States and Israel, therefore, are very different. The Iranian nuclear program may well reach a point at which Israel sees preventative military action as necessary, while the United States perceives more room for diplomacy and sanctions. The conflicting interpretations of the latest IAEA report highlight the risks here: no one can say with any certainty how close Iran is to acquiring a nuclear weapon. And where some might see the potential for diplomacy and negotiation in such uncertainty, others (in Israel, in particular) see a mortal threat.

Obama, then, faces no easy choices. In Iran, he is presented with a country with a long history of antagonism toward the United States that might be close to acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Or, because the intelligence is often so ambiguous, it might not be so close. On top of that, his closest ally in the region threatens to upend his diplomatic initiatives due to very different perceptions of the same threat. He cannot disregard Israeli concerns, but at the same time, there is no scenario under which a preventative military strike against Iran would have a clearly positive outcome. Obama's tack, so far, appears sound. It is a tentative, flexible, but definitive break with the aggressive rhetoric of George Bush. He applied his potent skills of empathy by speaking directly to the Iranian people in a way that may be interpreted as more sincere than the words of his predecessor; if it has not yielded immediate results, it quite possibly has laid the groundwork for future progress. Obama would be well advised to expand his application of empathy beyond the Iranian people and toward the Iranian leadership. Consider their situation: Iran is surrounded by nuclear powers locally (Israel, Pakistan), regionally (India, Russia), and internationally (U.S. forces based in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf). It is a country with a long and proud history that has regularly been squeezed and exploited by outside powers. Essentially, the Iranian regime is insecure. But they are also smart. They witnessed what happened when a U.S. adversary did not possess nuclear weapons (the invasion of Iraq) and what happened when a U.S. adversary did possess such weapons (the acquiescence to the North Korean nuclear program).

If Obama applied his unique skills of empathy in this manner, what might he find? Clearly, fewer nuclear weapons are better than more. But he must define U.S. objectives in a rational manner. Does he seek to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons? Or does he seek to prevent Iran from acquiring the capacity to develop nuclear weapons? These are very different policy thresholds, and each demands a very different technical, diplomatic, and military approach. Obama, then, must not only apply his ample skills of empathy in dealing with Iran's leaders, but also a clear-headed assessment of what the U.S. interest really is, and how best to achieve it. In this sense, Iran is no different than any other foreign policy challenge. But of course, the stakes are much higher, and Obama's margin for error is that much slimmer.

Foreign Policy Association, 26 March 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:40 AM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

January 22, 2009

Strip mined

This month's fighting in the Gaza Strip has dashed any hopes—never realistic to begin with—that the Israel/Palestine conflict would prove any less vexing for President Obama than it has for previous U.S. presidents. The fighting has earned condemnation all around, for Hamas (for launching rockets into Israel), for Israel (for the number of civilians its attacks have killed), and for the United States (for the failure of the Bush administration to broker anything remotely resembling progress over the past eight years). During his campaign, Barack Obama promised dramatic change in the foreign policy of the Bush administration,. But as the Gaza conflict has demonstrated, a change of U.S. presidents may not be sufficient on its own to change the prospects for peace in Israel/Palestine.

Allocating blame or determining which party is more “justified” in its actions is nearly impossible in the Israel/Palestine conflict. Each provocation by Israel can be justified by an action by Hamas, which in turn can be justified by Israeli behavior, which is then rooted in something that Hamas has perpetuated, and so on, extending back decades (or even millennia) through history. But if arbitrary lines of causality can be drawn, the proximate source of the latest fighting was the collapse of an Israel-Hamas cease-fire in December 2008. Hamas increased its rocket fire into southern Israel, and Israel responded, first with an aerial and naval assault and later with a ground attack. So far, more than 1,100 Palestinians have been killed in the conflict, one third of whom have been children. Thirteen Israelis have been killed, including three civilians.

Even examining the recent conflict under the arbitrary constraints of the past few months, however, can reveal a deeper and more complex set of motivations. Hamas is a militant and political Palestinian organization that calls explicitly for the destruction of Israel. That it has maintained this stance throughout the Middle East peace process has left it frozen out of most serious negotiations. Hamas' rival party in Palestine, Fatah, was the powerbase for Yasir Arafat for decades. Fatah recognizes Israel's right to exist, and has thus been the main spokesman for the Palestinian cause and is the “preferred” Palestinian political party in Israel and the West. Hamas, however, has a strong following among many Palestinians, if not for its outright resistance to Israel than for the extensive social services it provides in the Palestinian Territories. Fatah, by contrast, is known more for corruption than for effective governance.

In 2006, Hamas won Palestinian parliamentary elections, presenting an unfortunate conundrum for the Bush administration's democracy promotion agenda in the Middle East: is democracy preferable if the “wrong” side wins the election? Meanwhile, Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas remained president of the Palestinian Authority. Then, in 2007, Fatah and Hamas forces fought for control of Gaza, with Hamas proving victorious and Fatah (and Israel, the United States, and others in the West) becoming embarrassed yet again. Instead of recognizing Hamas' electoral victory and its military successes, Israel attempted to dislodge Hamas from Gaza by imposing a blockade on the territory. Following Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, and presuming its continued unwillingness to negotiate with Hamas, a blockade seemed like the only way to place pressure on the organization. But instead of dislodging Hamas, the blockade reinforced its hold on power. Smuggling through tunnels to Egypt maintained its arsenal, while Gazan civilians suffered from a dire shortage of needed supplies.

Israel, for its part, faces the obvious and understandable desire for security. Hamas rocket fire from Gaza—no matter how sporadic or inaccurate—presents a clear threat that no Israeli government could be expected to tolerate indefinitely. But the current Israeli government under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has other interests that have colored its decision to attack Gaza. In 2006, Olmert presided over an Israeli attack on Hezbollah forces in Lebanon. The parallels to Gaza are striking. Both Hamas and Hezbollah are fiercely anti-Israel and have not participated in the formal peace process. Both organizations use territory immediately adjacent to Israel to launch rockets against Israeli towns—territory that Israel had unilaterally withdrawn from in recent years (Israel ended a decades-long occupation of southern Lebanon in 2000). Both organizations are deeply embedded in the domestic politics of their host territory, and both have wide popular support due to the extensive social services they provide. But in the case of Hezbollah and the Israeli attack in 2006, it was Hezbollah that was deemed the victor. It sustained significant losses, but so did the attacking Israeli forces. More importantly, Olmert and his generals had defined victory as the elimination of Hezbollah as a threat to Israel. That the organization not only survived but more than held its own against the Israeli military served as a great embarrassment for Olmert, and a resounding public relations victory for Hezbollah. In Gaza, Olmert wanted to excise the demons of Lebanon and restore Israel's reputation of military superiority.

Israel also faced domestic political considerations of its own. It will hold elections for the Knesset in February. Olmert, beset with corruption charges, will not be in the running to continue as prime minister. But two of the main candidates to succeed him are members of Olmert's own cabinet, each from different parties of his coalition government. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, of the Labor Party, was Prime Minister when Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000 and when the Camp David talks with Bill Clinton and Yasir Arafat fell apart. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, of Olmert's own Kadima Party, is known for her hawkish instincts and also hopes to become prime minister. Many observers detect subtle (or not-so-subtle) efforts by Barak and Livni to use the Gaza conflict as a way to demonstrate their pre-election resolve and to use their positions in Olmert's cabinet to jockey to become his successor.

The timing of the attack also seemed to take U.S. politics into account. Given Hamas' firm control of Gaza and its reliable track record of launching rockets into Israel, Olmert did not need to wait until the collapse of the cease-fire to launch his attack. The operation was clearly planned in advance and did not need require any specific provocation (aside from the existing geopolitical reality) to launch it. Beyond that, Olmert was well aware of the potential backlash in global public opinion that any attack into Gaza would likely provoke. But the only global public opinion that truly matters to Israel is U.S. public opinion. By launching the attack in December, after the U.S. presidential election, Israel avoided the charged political atmosphere of a U.S. campaign season. But by declaring a unilateral cease-fire only days before Barack Obama's inauguration, Israel contained its most controversial actions to the waning days of President' Bush's administration. President Bush is a known quantity in Israel; he would not do anything to limit Israel's freedom of action, much as he did little to shorten Israel's 2006 attacks in Lebanon. And as a lame duck president, there was little Bush could do to stop Israel even if he wanted to. Obama, on the other hand, does not have a long track record with Israel, and given his domestic constituency, he potentially could be less forgiving of aggressive Israeli actions.

More than most U.S. presidents, Barack Obama will find the Israel/Palestine conflict a vexing one. In a domestic political sense, he faced a great deal of skepticism from pro-Israel groups in the United States during his campaign. Part of this was due simply to the fact that he was a Democrat who had opposed the invasion of Iraq during a period of Republican dominance. But it was also partly due to racial reasons, and to the persistent rumor mongering that Obama was Muslim. In a more strictly policy sense, Obama has promised to change the “mindset that led” to war in Iraq, and this change presumably carries over to the Israel/Palestine conflict. It is likely that he is inclined to re-engage in the peace process more aggressively than President Bush, and certainly more deliberately and earlier in his term than his predecessor, who had been critical of Bill Clinton's very “hands-on” role late in his presidency. Prior to his inauguration, Obama remained cagey about how he would address the conflict in Gaza. He stressed the notion that the country only has “one president at a time” and that as president-elect, it was not his place to make foreign policy. To a certain degree, this reply helped to shirk his responsibility.

The ferocity of Israel's strikes in Gaza, however, may force Obama's hand sooner than he might otherwise have liked, and in a direction he may not have intended to go. The U.S.-Israel relationship will always remain exceptionally strong. But many analysts are suggesting that in the wake of Israel's Gaza attacks, the United States must take a much more balanced approach towards Israel. Instead of approaching the peace process as a stalwart and unambiguous ally of Israel, Obama may instead orient the United States as a more neutral broker. In order to be taken seriously in such a position, Obama would have to force concessions from Israel, especially over settlement construction in the West Bank and over the relative “proportionality” of its response to provocations by militant groups such as Hamas. Some might argue that such an approach would backfire, that only with complete and unquestioning U.S. support can Israel feel secure enough to engage in peace talks with its Palestinian neighbors. This, however, has been U.S. policy for the past several decades. It may be time to subtly but significantly reorient this policy, and President Obama may feel compelled to do so earlier than he would have otherwise preferred.

Foreign Policy Association, 22 January 2009

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:04 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

July 24, 2008

Foreign process

Although the Iraq war has been a dominant foreign policy issue in the presidential election, it certainly is not the only conflict to demand the candidates' attention. The conflict in Afghanistan has gained increasing prominence in the campaigns of Republican John McCain and Democrat Barack Obama, who just paid his first visit to the country during his highly publicized overseas tour. This subtle shift of emphasis is due not only to increased levels of violence in Afghanistan, but also to the concurrent (and relative) decrease of violence in Iraq. U.S. policy in both countries is inextricably linked—it is impossible to sensibly discuss the policy for one war without considering the other. At the same time, the politics of the Afghanistan war are unique. They demonstrate that the right policy alone may not be enough to achieve the desired objectives.

The war in Afghanistan has always held a unique place in U.S. politics, especially compared to its more prominent counterpart in Iraq. It was, and is, the conflict most directly tied to the attacks of 9/11; the country had served as host to the al Qaeda leaders who planned the attacks and functioned as a training ground for the attackers themselves. In the days following 9/11, Congress overwhelmingly passed (with only a single dissenting vote in the House) the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists, under which the war in Afghanistan has been waged. The initial invasion was very successful. The Bush administration assembled a broad international coalition, the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan was quickly overthrown, and a pluralistic political process was set in motion.

Since 2002, the war in Afghanistan has been somewhat overshadowed by the threat, real or perceived, from Iraq and the ensuing invasion and occupation of that country. But as the Iraq war maintained its grip on the headlines over the years, the conflict in Afghanistan remained persistently unresolved. Bin Laden not only remained free, but he and his lieutenants released communiques on a semi-regular basis. Remnants of al Qaeda's infrastructure seemed to have relocated and re-established themselves in Pakistan, just across the border from Afghanistan. The Taliban did not disintegrate, and in fact seemed to grow in size and capabilities over the years. In recent months, the level of violence in Afghanistan has increased notably. In May, coalition casualties in Afghanistan exceeded those in Iraq for the first time—a pattern that was repeated the next month. Since then, the Taliban has carried out a spate of spectacular attacks, including an assault on a Kandahar jail that freed hundreds of prisoners, a suicide bombing outside of the Indian embassy in Kabul that killed dozens, and a direct attack on a U.S. base in Kunar Province that killed nine soldiers.

As things have appeared to get worse in Afghanistan, the situation in Iraq has seemed to improve; hence the subtle shift of emphasis in the presidential campaign. Among all of the candidates, Obama has been uniquely positioned to frame the debate. Since the beginning of the nomination contests, he has been the only major candidate of either party who both supported the invasion of Afghanistan and opposed the initial invasion of Iraq. He made a point of this in the 2002 speech in which he announced his opposition to the forthcoming invasion of Iraq, specifically saying that he didn't oppose all wars, just “dumb wars.” Given the geopolitical realities at the time (al Qaeda had not been conclusively defeated in Afghanistan) and the facts that have since been confirmed (Iraq had neither weapons of mass destruction nor a meaningful relationship with al Qaeda or 9/11), it is remarkable that Obama was the only major candidate who could claim such an auspicious record.

In the campaign, Obama has taken advantage of his record and used it as evidence of superior judgment. His current position on Afghanistan is a natural evolution. He views the war in Iraq as a distraction from the continuing threat posed by al Qaeda. By withdrawing the majority of U.S. forces from that country, he would gain the flexibility to send at least two additional combat brigades Afghanistan. He proposes an extra $1 billion in non-military aid to Afghanistan, with an emphasis on rural development, drug eradication, and anti-corruption initiatives. He has also reiterated his commitment to both increase non-military aid to Pakistan and to strike at al Qaeda targets in that country, if Pakistan is unable or unwilling to do so itself (for more, see The Water’s Edge, November 2007).

McCain, for his part, has focused more on Iraq than on Afghanistan. Although he supported the invasion of Iraq, he shares with Obama a point of distinction on that conflict. He was a critic of former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and was a vocal champion of the 2007 troop surge, which is partly responsible for the decreasing levels of violence in Iraq. McCain used these points to distinguish himself during the Republican primary, and he continues to emphasize them as evidence of his foreign policy acumen. Moving forward, McCain speaks often of the need to secure a “victory” in Iraq, and he dismisses any suggestion of significant troop withdrawals or timetables for departure (for more, see The Water’s Edge, June 2008).

All of this has a direct bearing on McCain's policy toward Afghanistan, which until recently was poorly defined. In a recent foreign policy address, McCain called for sending three additional combat brigades to Afghanistan and for U.S. forces there to adopt the counter-insurgency strategy that has produced the recent successes in Iraq: “What we need in Afghanistan is … a nationwide civil-military campaign plan that is focused on providing security for the population.” In terms of troop increases, at least, this position appears very similar to Obama's. But Afghanistan does not exist in isolation; tactics are not the same as strategy, and policy goals are useless without a plausible way to achieve them. Both Obama and McCain may want to send more combat brigades to Afghanistan. But given the severe strain that long-term, concurrent wars have placed on the armed forces, this will be hard for any president to do if troops are not redeployed from Iraq.

Even if the additional brigades could be sent, the few thousand soldiers they represent would not be sufficient to bring security to Afghanistan. Unlike in Iraq, many NATO allies operate alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Some countries—most notably the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada—permit their soldiers to engage in dangerous (and costly) counter-insurgency operations. But others, such as France and Germany, only allow their soldiers to operate in calmer portions of the country. This has generated understandable tensions in the alliance. Perhaps the greatest value of any additional U.S. troops in Afghanistan would be as force multipliers—as leverage to secure greater commitments from recalcitrant NATO allies or as confidence building measures for nascent Afghan governing institutions. It is perfectly reasonable and understandable that Obama and McCain would share the goal of a more secure Afghanistan. But the goals alone are not sufficient. Just as important is how policy makers align these goals with others (both allies and adversaries), rally support for their objectives, and build a sustainable basis for achieving them. In other words, diplomacy counts.

It is in this context that Obama made his overseas tour. To be sure, the trip was meant to bolster his image as a worldly figure, able to hold his own in the international arena. But a week long trip does not give a candidate foreign policy “experience.” Such experience can really only be gained through service in the executive branch—something that neither Obama nor McCain can claim. But after eight years of an administration widely perceived as being undiplomatic, and with global challenges far too great to solve unilaterally, Obama's trip was still more than just an electoral ploy. It was a way for him to demonstrate that his potential presidency would offer not just a substantive difference from Bush or McCain, but a stylistic one as well. A foreign policy is only as good as the process used to achieve it.

Foreign Policy Association, 24 July 2008

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:29 PM to Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

June 26, 2008

Occupation justification

The war in Iraq is clearly one of the most important foreign policy issues in this year's presidential campaign. Arguably, it was the issue that single-handedly shaped the parties' nomination battles. The success of Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) rested in large part on his early (and then-unpopular) opposition to the Iraq invasion. Senator John McCain (R-IL) supported the invasion, but he staked his candidacy on his steady criticism of occupation policy and his steadfast (and politically risky) support for the 2007 troop surge. In the general election, the two candidates remain defined by their views on Iraq. As the presidential campaign unfolds, however, the situation in Iraq evolves as well, placing pressure on policy positions the candidates have barely changed over the past 18 months. But even as the candidates struggle to adapt to changing real-world conditions, their policy records will continue to define them.

Although Iraq has hardly become a stable or peaceful place, the good news in recent months is heartening. The rate of U.S. casualties has declined, the influence of foreign fighters and Sunni extremists has decreased, and the central government has had success in asserting its authority against Shiite militias in several parts of the country. These successes cannot be attributed to any single action or policy. The so-called “Sunni awakening,” in which Sunni tribal leaders have turned against the al Qaeda-inspired elements in their midst and allied with U.S. forces, has yielded positive results. The 2007 troop surge in Baghdad may partially account for the greater coherence and authority of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's central government. Although military and civilian casualties continue to mount, they are climbing at a slower rate than in recent years. Unquestionably, this is all very good.

As the situation in Iraq has evolved, however, the public positions of Obama and McCain have remained relatively static, especially since the primary campaign began in early 2007. Obama has called for a phased withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces from Iraq over a 16-month period, at a rate of one or two brigades per month. He would allow for residual forces to remain in Iraq and the region to protect the U.S. embassy, to fight al Qaeda elements, and—if Iraq makes political progress—to continue training Iraqi security forces. He renounces any claim to permanent U.S. bases in Iraq. McCain, for his part, is a strong advocate of continuing the current strategy as implemented by General David Petraeus. His objective is a stable, prosperous, democratic, and peaceful Iraq that poses no threat to its neighbors. He is opposed to any significant troop withdrawals until that objective is achieved.

But before they launched their campaigns, each senator approached the situation in Iraq differently. Obama opposed the initial invasion itself. But after Saddam Hussein had been deposed, he did not immediately call for a withdrawal of U.S. troops. As late as 2005, he stated that, “U.S. forces are still a part of the solution in Iraq.” He explicitly favored a reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq (not a full withdrawal), and he opposed a specific timetable for any withdrawal. By 2007, shortly before he announced his presidential candidacy, he had settled on his present position. McCain supported the original invasion but became sharply critical of the Bush administration's handling of the occupation. Specifically, he said on several occasions that he had “no confidence' in then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and he consistently advocated for a larger troop presence in Iraq. Since the 2007 troop surge began—and the presidential campaign kicked off—McCain has largely supported the Bush administration's policy in Iraq, and he pledges to continue it.

None of this history should condemn either candidate. Indeed, it is good that policy makers adjust their positions as the real-world situation changes. Unfortunately, electoral politics places a premium on consistency, so until the election, neither Obama nor McCain are likely to radically alter the positions they adopted 18 months ago. But this doesn't mean that their records cannot (or should not) illuminate their potential policies as president, especially on the central question of how long U.S. troops should remain in Iraq.

At the end of this year, the UN resolution that formally permits U.S. troops to operate in Iraq will expire. The Bush administration is keen to provide a continuing legal framework for the U.S. occupation and has been actively negotiating two separate agreements with the Iraqi government. A Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would codify the specific legal terms under which U.S. forces could operate in Iraq; the United States already has negotiated dozens of SOFAs with other countries that house U.S. troops. A “strategic framework agreement” likely would cover broader (and more contentious) issues such as the political, military, and economic relationship between the United States and Iraq and what functions U.S. troops could perform in Iraq. Reports have leaked that in negotiating these agreements, the Bush administration is seeking 58 permanent bases, control of Iraqi airspace, and immunity for troops and contractors.

Right now, neither Obama nor McCain would offer an absolute answer to the question, “how long will the United States stay in Iraq?” Obama would say that he would withdraw all combat troops in less than two years and he would disavow permanent bases, but he would remain vague about the size, location, and duration of the residual force he proposes. McCain is even more explicit in de-emphasizing the question. Earlier this year, he famously commented that he would not object to U.S forces remaining in Iraq for 100 years, and when questioned on that point in a recent interview, he noted that it is “not too important” when U.S. forces leave Iraq. The important thing, he said, was whether U.S. forces were suffering casualties. McCain highlighted the presence of U.S. troops in Japan, Korea, and Germany as examples of what he would consider acceptable analogues for Iraq.

Despite their respective ambiguity (or perhaps because of it), the policy records of Obama and McCain are particularly helpful in figuring out how they now interpret the role of U.S. forces in Iraq. In McCain's example, U.S. troops did not face insurgencies in Japan, Korea, or Germany like they do today in Iraq; by the time those occupations had begun in earnest, the wars that preceded them had largely concluded. Within a short period of time, each country had gained a stable and secure sovereign government. But even after the fighting had ended and stable governments had been formed, the fifty-year U.S. presence in those countries had a very specific purpose: to deter Communist aggression in the context of the Cold War. McCain's parallel, then, poses a very important question. Once the violence in Iraq is quelled, its government is stable, and U.S. troops are no longer taking casualties, what would be the objective of the remaining U.S. forces? Who would they be deterring, and in what context?

The answer to this question lies in the original rationale for the invasion itself, in the debate that raged in 2002 and early 2003. Supporters of the invasion used a variety of reasons to support their argument: Saddam Hussein was a tyrant and had to be toppled; he possessed weapons of mass destruction that presented a threat to others; he was allied with al Qaeda; a new, Arab democracy would be a beacon of change in the turbulent Middle East. None of these reasons, on their own, seemed to justify an invasion, and the Bush administration used them interchangeably.

Since then, many of the justifications for invasion have proven to be exaggerated or outright inaccurate. But one justification, alluded to in comments by policymakers since the invasion, was downplayed at the time: the geostrategic motivation. Iraq is in a very important corner of the globe, located near some of the United States' most valuable allies and some of its most distrusted adversaries. It also has a lot of oil. In other words, Iraq was a good place for the United States to plant its flag in the real-world game of Risk.

Sensible people may disagree about whether this geostrategic rationale was sufficient to justify the invasion of Iraq. But as it applies to the presidential candidacies of Obama and McCain, there is a clear difference. Obama opposed the introduction of U.S. forces into Iraq at the outset and has consistently renounced permanent bases there; nothing in his subsequent ambiguity about the specifics of occupation policy changes that. McCain supported the original invasion and is unabashed in his support for a continued U.S. presence in Iraq. Indeed, his “100 years” comment may be the most honest acknowledgment yet of the geostrategic rationale for invasion. In an electoral sense, this is a great thing. Beneath the candidates' superficial ambiguity, their positions are starkly different. In this election, on Iraq, the choice for voters is a real one.

Foreign Policy Association, 26 June 2008

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:22 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

May 22, 2008

Appeasement politics

Now that the Democratic nomination is all but settled, Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) is transitioning from the primary campaign to the general election. His Republican opponent, Senator John McCain (R-AZ), has been waiting for him there. But in recent days, the man they each hope to succeed has inserted himself into the emerging general election. By implicitly attacking Obama's approach to foreign policy during a speech before Israel's Knesset, President Bush prematurely initiated a debate among the presidential candidates on the role of diplomacy in dealing with U.S. adversaries. As with many other supposed fault-lines in this political season, the differences between Obama and McCain on foreign policy are real. But they are not the differences that they might appear to be.

Bush addressed the Knesset, Israel's parliament, on the occasion of that country's sixtieth anniversary. Apart from his requisite statements of solidarity and praise, Bush's implicit comments on the presidential race earned the most attention: “Some seem to believe that we should negotiate with the terrorists and radicals, as if some ingenious argument will persuade them they have been wrong all along … [w]e have an obligation to call this what it is—the false comfort of appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited by history.” Although he didn't mention him by name, it was widely assumed that the president was referring to Obama's professed willingness to conduct direct diplomacy with the leaders of unfriendly countries, specifically with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran (for more, see The Water’s Edge, August 2007). He further implied that Obama would be willing to negotiate with groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. Bush's comments were all the more notable because they violated the time-honored aphorism that U.S. domestic politics should stop “at the water's edge.”

The president's comments generated an understandable stir. “George Bush knows that I have never supported engagement with terrorists,” Obama said. “The president's extraordinary politicization of foreign policy and the politics of fear do nothing to secure the American people or our stalwart ally Israel.” Obama also used the occasion to reiterate his opposition to Bush's 2003 invasion of Iraq, which he said had actually strengthened Iranian influence in the region. McCain responded with similar vigor. Although he did not repeat Bush's charge of “appeasement,” he did advance the attack on Obama, suggesting that it was “reckless to suggest that unconditional meetings [with U.S. adversaries] will advance our interests.”

Politically, both campaigns seemed to welcome this fight. Obama enjoyed the attention he received as his party's presumptive nominee, and he was glad to link McCain with Bush's unpopular presidency. McCain has always believed one of his greatest strengths was on national security and foreign policy, and he welcomed the chance to debate Obama on ground that he found favorable. But the spat also engendered a fair amount of hyperbole. For all of the talk of the sacredness of the “water's edge” rule, it has always been selectively applied. It is impossible to completely separate domestic politics from foreign policy, especially given the nature of modern communications technologies and media practices. It certainly might have been in poor taste for Bush to make his comments where he did (in the parliament of a uniquely consequential U.S. ally) and when he did (on the anniversary of that ally's still-controversial creation). But it is likely that Obama was more pleased to exploit the political opening that Bush presented him than he was personally offended at the president's comments.

Bush's comments, and the debate they initiated, were full of hyperbole and misunderstanding on policy grounds, as well. The charge of “appeasement” has been a favorite political attack since World War II, most frequently used by conservatives but also by many politicians trying to justify aggressive (often military) action. It is rooted in the Munich Agreement of 1938, when British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain allowed Adolf Hitler to annex portions of Czechoslovakia in exchange for pledging to refrain from further aggression—a pledge that was quickly broken. Although based upon this historical episode, the political charge of “appeasement” has since evolved. It is now routinely applied to anyone who would rather negotiate with an adversary than confront them head-on. That the charge is rooted in the aggression of Adolf Hitler, the paragon of twentieth century evil, is also very convenient. Comparing any potential adversary to Hitler is a useful and graphic way to convince skeptics of the gravity of the threat at hand.

But as is often the case, political rhetoric has corroded the historical record. “Appeasement” is to “placate someone by acceding to their demands.” Chamberlain certainly did that in 1938. But it is a rare politician who today openly advocates acceding to the demands of their country's adversaries, and surely it is the rare adversary that matches the danger presented by Hitler in the late 1930s. Today, “appeasement” has become conflated with “negotiation,” when in fact the two are completely different things. In some cases, this may be due to deliberate obfuscation of the facts; in others, it may be due to historical ignorance.

In either event, the charge of “appeasement” is a particularly useless one. No matter how aggressive or nationalistic a country's leader may be, it is practically impossible to exist in the international system without relying to some degree on negotiation. President Bush certainly knows this and has regularly negotiated with U.S. adversaries, such as Libya and North Korea. Senator McCain, who in certain cases may be more open to diplomacy and negotiation than President Bush, surely knows this as well. On the other hand, Obama himself has been at pains to emphasize that he would not negotiate directly with non-state actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah; he certainly has not indicated that he would “appease” anybody.

Political hyperbole aside, real differences do exist between Obama and McCain on foreign policy. The differences, however, may rest more in their respective means than in their ends. In the case of Iran, for example, Obama and McCain would want many of the same things. They each would want that country to stop pursuing nuclear weapons technology, to withdraw its support for Hezbollah and recognize the state of Israel, and to play a more productive role in Iraq. Neither candidate, through their records or their rhetoric, has placed themselves too far outside of the existing, bipartisan, foreign policy mainstream—Obama would be unlikely to rely on face-to-face negotiation alone, and McCain would be unlikely (not to mention unable) to deal with Iran in a purely military fashion. And in a political season, neither candidate's campaign pronouncements should be read too literally as final policy statements.

The real differences between Obama and McCain on foreign policy largely concern public perceptions, including those explicitly promoted by the candidates themselves and those implicitly assigned by voters and foreign actors alike. Obama pitches himself as an agent of change and as a keen internationalist, both in terms of personal identity and political inclination. He is more likely to pursue different and more creative approaches to solving international problems than have been the norm under President Bush. His opposition to the invasion of Iraq—and his support for a greater investment of resources into the conflict in Afghanistan—indicates how a President Obama may apply military force. McCain, for his part, identifies as a war hero and a staunch advocate of not just U.S. power, but in many cases of U.S. primacy. There is reason to suspect that a President McCain would engage in a more assertive and unilateral foreign policy than Obama, though perhaps not to as great an extent as President Bush. His aggressive rhetoric on the threat posed by “radical Islamic extremism” hints at the way McCain thinks about matters of national security.

In a presidential campaign, many issues are vulnerable to hyperbole and distortion. Removed from the day-to-day concerns of many voters, foreign policy is particularly susceptible to such obfuscation. In many cases, a candidate's own words can fail to provide a clear picture of his or her foreign policy priorities. This is why it's often difficult to divine a candidate's specific policy on individual issue areas. But by looking at the breadth of their rhetoric and the depth of their records, voters can construct broad impressions of how each candidate thinks about foreign policy. Until then, it's safe to assume that no politician supports a policy of “appeasement,” regardless of what their opponents may say.

Foreign Policy Association, 22 May 2008

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:49 AM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

March 27, 2008

Five years

The fifth anniversary of the invasion of Iraq generated a good deal of reflection on the course of the war so far. Unsurprisingly, much of this commentary emanated from the presidential candidates. Each one underscored the distinctions on Iraq and on foreign policy that have been inherent throughout their respective campaigns. But more than simply rehashing their plans for how to deal with the ongoing war, the candidates also reminded voters—subtly or not—of their positions on the original invasion itself, five years ago. It is these archival positions, perhaps more so than the candidates' current and future plans for Iraq, that provide a meaningful glimpse into how each one would conduct foreign policy as president.

Senator Barack Obama (D-IL) delivered two major speeches on the Iraq war on the occasion of the anniversary. The first addressed the conflict from a military and foreign policy perspective, in which he suggested that ending the occupation would, “allow us to more effectively confront other threats in the world.” These lingering threats included violent extremism, nuclear proliferation, global poverty, climate change, and economic competitiveness. The second speech examined the opportunity costs of the Iraq war on domestic policy. Obama argued that the costs of the war could be better spent on health care, infrastructure, education, and other domestic priorities. His underlying points differed little from what he has argued throughout his campaign. Obama was the only candidate to oppose the invasion from the beginning, and although he would “end” the war by gradually withdrawing most U.S. troops from Iraq, he would allow some to remain to protect diplomats and for counter-terrorism operations.

Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) also delivered a speech to commemorate the anniversary of the invasion. In many ways, it was broadly similar to Obama's speeches. Clinton advocates a gradual withdrawal of most U.S. troops from Iraq, but like Obama, she would allow for some forces to remain for counter-terrorism and other missions. Unlike Obama, however, she supported the initial invasion, and she voted for the 2002 authorization to use military force against Iraq. Much of her argument was based on credibility: “I believe what matters in this campaign is not just the promises we've made to end the war; what matters is what we've actually done when it came time to match words with action.” Clinton also echoed themes her campaign had been promoting in recent weeks, asserting that she had gained valuable foreign policy experience during her husband's administration in Bosnia and in Northern Ireland and implying that only she could be trusted to handle early morning phone calls on national security emergencies.

Senator John McCain (R-AZ) found himself in a somewhat different position. He had already secured the Republican nomination for president, so while his potential Democratic rivals continued their intramural campaigning in the United States, he led a congressional delegation to the Middle East and Europe. The trip offered an opportunity for McCain to bolster his image as a trusted foreign policy hand. Although he did not deliver a formal speech commemorating the invasion anniversary, his visit to Baghdad highlighted the success of last year's troop surge, which McCain strongly supported. Indeed, although McCain supported the initial invasion of Iraq, he was very critical of the manner in which former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld managed the aftermath. McCain's foreign trip made its greatest headlines, however, when he mistakenly asserted that, “al-Qaeda is going back into Iran and receiving training and are coming back into Iraq from Iran.” In fact, it is Shiite extremists who have received support from Iran, not al Qaeda fighters.

Clearly, there are many differences between the ways the candidates approached the invasion anniversary. Among the Democrats, Obama wanted to amplify his differences with Clinton, specifically on the topic of his opposition to the initial invasion. Clinton, on the other hand, wanted to diminish these differences, pointing to the similarity of their Senate voting records since 2005. The problem with this construction, however, is that the “Iraq war” is not a static policy. In many ways, the original invasion and the subsequent occupation of Iraq are very different issues. Although Clinton is correct in noting that she and Obama have each voted to fund the war, this has no bearing on the fact that Obama opposed the invasion before it happened while Clinton supported it. Indeed, this is perhaps the most relevant issue, because the decision to invade Iraq was the one from which all of the subsequent tough choices and tragic losses sprang.

The candidates' positions on the initial invasion also raise a larger question of strategy. Essentially, it differentiates those who thought the war has simply been mismanaged from those who thought it was a fundamentally flawed concept from the start. Obama, Clinton, and McCain would all agree that the war was has been grossly mismanaged, at least at certain points over the last five years. But having supported the initial invasion, one might assume that Clinton and McCain believe in the strategy that was used to justify the war in the first place. Such a strategy, pioneered by the infamous “neoconservatives” in the Bush administration, amplifies the role of the military in deterring potential threats and promoting democratic reform abroad. It is a strategy that risks conflating state-based threats with non-state actors, and it shapes U.S. public diplomacy in an unyielding way.

The candidates' positions on the initial invasion might also speak to their underlying judgment and political courage. The congressional vote on the Iraq war resolution in October 2002 was deliberately stage-managed by war advocates within the Bush administration. It was held in an environment of lingering post-9/11 fear, immediately prior to a mid-term election. Polls at the time suggested that many people were generally supportive of military action against Iraq. In such an environment, and regardless of a senator or congressman's honest position, it was politically very difficult to oppose the war resolution. In retrospect, however, it may also have been very prescient.

Any differences among the Democrats pales in comparison to the differences between them and the Republicans. Although Obama and Clinton speak of the need to “end” the war, McCain is unabashed in his support for continuing it. Such support is indicative of his broader foreign policy thinking. Since he ran for president in 2000, McCain has been a strong advocate for an assertive and aggressive foreign policy. He has spoken of maintaining U.S. military supremacy around the world and of confronting threats before they become too dangerous. In this context, McCain's arguments for continuing the war in Iraq are actually quite valid. If U.S. troops were to withdraw from Iraq, the country could descend into a level of violence far greater than what it has already experienced. An unstable Iraq could serve as a base for al Qaeda or other terrorist groups, and the country could be highly susceptible to the influence of an assertive, hostile Iran. Indeed, many Democrats' calls for an immediate U.S. withdrawal from Iraq fail to adequately address these concerns.

But McCain's misstatement in Jordan, about the non-existent connection between al Qaeda and Iran, is eerily reminiscent of one of the greatest mistakes made by invasion advocates five years ago: the conflation of disparate and unique threats into single, undifferentiated menace. Al Qaeda and Iran are not allies, much like Al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein were not allies. As a Defense Department review of over 600,000 Iraqi documents determined just this month, there was no “direct operational link” between Saddam Hussein's Iraq and al Qaeda. If McCain's foreign policy is premised on an aggressive assertion of U.S. power, a vital pre-condition for such a policy would be an accurate understanding about the threats facing the country and valid intelligence as to its whereabouts. It might be easy, and perhaps tempting, to dismiss McCain's misstatement as a simple, inadvertent slip of the tongue. But given his promise of an assertive foreign policy, McCain's misstatement could raise questions about what lessons he has learned about the events set into motion five years ago.

None of this is to suggest that similarities on Iraq do not exist among the presidential candidates. All of them acknowledge that troops will remain Iraq for some time, albeit in different numbers and for different reasons. For Democrats, in particular, this could come as an unpleasant shock. But it reflects the bureaucratic and geopolitical reality. Strategically, Iraq is simply a good place to plant the U.S. flag, and if the bases are already there, it will be exceedingly difficult for any politician—of any party—to fight the bureaucratic and political inertia of just staying put. This is yet another reminder of why the single, most important decision of the entire war was the one made five years ago: the original decision to invade Iraq. Fortunately, on that basis if on no others, there is a clear distinction among the candidates.

Foreign Policy Association, 27 March 2008

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:07 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

October 25, 2007

Inferiority complex

In recent weeks, the House of Representatives has dipped its toe into a pool of international and historical animosity. The partial success of a resolution condemning the 1915 mass killings and deportations of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire—it passed a House committee but has not yet been considered by the full House—took many by surprise. In reality, the furor surrounding this resolution was simply the latest episode in the long story of Congressional involvement with overseas historical controversies, particularly by the House. But in its repeated attempts to prove relevant and meet narrow constituent demands, the House of Representatives inadvertently risks becoming a detrimental force in U.S. foreign policy.

On October 10, the House Foreign Affairs Committee passed House Resolution 106 by a vote of 27 to 21. The resolution did not mandate any specific action, but it offered official condemnation of the mass killings and deportations of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Support from Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and dozens of co-sponsors suggested that the resolution might make it to the House floor, where it very likely would win passage. On a factual basis, the resolution stood on solid ground. Scholars and experts agree that the Ottoman Turks deported and killed anywhere from a few hundred thousand to several million ethnic Armenians during World War I—actions that may fairly be described as genocide. Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA), Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, noted that, “one of the problems we have diplomatically globally is that we have lost our moral authority which we used to have in great abundance.”

On a political basis, however, the resolution generated enormous controversy. Modern Turkey—the geographic successor to the Ottoman Empire—has always been extremely (if not irrationally) sensitive about this period in its history. Turkey briefly recalled its ambassador to the United States, and its top general, Yasar Buyukanit, proclaimed, “if this resolution passed in the committee passes the House as well, our military ties with the U.S. will never be the same again.” All eight living former U.S. secretaries of state signed a joint letter to Pelosi warning that the resolution “would endanger our national security interests.” In the face of these attacks, as well as opposition from the Bush administration and from military leaders who noted Turkey's logistical importance in supporting the war in Iraq, Pelosi has backtracked from her early willingness to move the resolution to the House floor: “Whether it will come up for a floor vote or not, what the action will be remains to be seen.” For now, the resolution lies in limbo.

This wasn't the first time the House has inserted itself into a matter of historical controversy abroad. In July, it passed a resolution calling on Japan to formally acknowledge its coercion of women from China, Korea, and other occupied countries into sexual slavery as “comfort women” during World War II. Although wartime abuses by the Japanese military are firmly established as historical fact, the question of how contemporary Japanese governments acknowledge such abuses is very much a contentious issue. Japan's ambassador to the United States, Ryozo Kato, said passage of the resolution, “will almost certainly have lasting and harmful effects on the deep friendship, close trust and wide-ranging cooperation our two nations now enjoy.” Unlike the Armenian genocide resolution, the comfort women resolution ultimately passed both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the full House. But the two resolutions shared many similarities. Each was non-binding, each dealt directly with important U.S. allies overseas, and each unearthed old historical controversies.

Perhaps the most important similarity between the Armenian genocide resolution and the comfort women resolution is their shared functional origin: the House of Representatives. Under the Constitution, the House is clearly designated as the lower chamber of the legislature. Although all revenue bills must originate there, it is the Senate that must approve executive appointees and ratify international treaties. To be sure, the legislature is inherently limited in the foreign policy role it can play. But by design and by tradition, the Senate has always been the pre-eminent chamber of Congress in terms of foreign policy. This has stuck the House with something of an inferiority complex. Passing non-binding resolutions on seemingly obscure, historical issues often seems like a good way for an internationally-handicapped House to have a voice in foreign policy.

The House's foreign policy inferiority complex is magnified by structural factors. The House has always been the “people's chamber.” Senators serve six-year terms, represent entire states, and have only been directly elected for less than 100 years. Representatives, on the other hand, serve two-year terms, represent much smaller and more homogenous districts, and have been directly elected throughout U.S. history. The distinctions between the two chambers are very much by design. The Senate was to be a sober, deliberative body somewhat insulated from rapid swings of public opinion, while the House was to be more directly responsive to the immediate, localized interests of the electorate. To a remarkable degree, the structure works as intended. The main sponsor of the Armenian genocide resolution is Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA), whose district is home to approximately 75,000 Armenian-Americans—one of the largest concentrations of ethnic Armenians in the United States. The main sponsor of the comfort women resolution was Representative Mike Honda (D-CA), who represents a district that is nearly 30% Asian—a figure that includes many Chinese- and Korean-Americans.

The fact that House members are particularly responsive to their constituents' interests (and money) is perhaps a good thing—it's how representative democracy is supposed to work. But the House is doubly limited in its influence on U.S. foreign policy. Not only does it face the functional limitations inherent to the legislative branch, the House must also cope with the structural handicap that comes from being the lower chamber of Congress. This means that its forays into foreign policy often carry the unfortunate distinction of being both toothless and shortsighted. Neither the Armenian genocide resolution nor the comfort women resolution mandated any change in U.S. policy. But by digging up far-away historical controversies in order to prove relevant and meet narrow constituent demands, the House risks overlooking vital contemporary context.

Although measures condemning the Armenian genocide have been introduced in Congress in the past, the timing of this most recent resolution is uniquely counterproductive. In recent years, Turkey has become increasingly wary of the West, in general, and the United States, in particular. Turks overwhelmingly opposed the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, and since then, Turkish popular perception of the United States has only worsened. According to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, just 9% of Turks had a favorable impression of the United States this year, down from 52% in 2000. Shortly after the House Foreign Affairs committee passed the Armenian genocide resolution, the Turkish parliament authorized its government to strike PKK strongholds in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq—a move motivated, in part, by perceived U.S. inaction toward recent attacks by that group in southeastern Turkey. As a secular, democratic, and predominantly Muslim state located in a strategic corner of the globe, Turkey is an indispensable U.S. ally. Although modern Turkey is far too sensitive about abuses committed by its imperial predecessor, measures such as the Armenian genocide resolution threaten to embolden vitriolic and nationalist elements in Turkey that could turn the country away from the West. However real the Armenian genocide may have been, it serves no one's interests to endanger the U.S.-Turkey relationship for reasons of limited contemporary value and zero substantive consequence.

The effects of the comfort women resolution were somewhat less severe, but they were equally unhelpful, and equally unintended. For many reasons, East Asian politics continue to be shaped by World War II and by the region's conflicting interpretations of wartime history. Japan has never truly grappled with or acknowledged its wartime responsibility, and Japan's neighbors frequently use this fact to inhibit current relations. There is no doubt that the Japanese military forced women from occupied countries into sexual slavery during the war. But when presented with the House resolution, nationalistic Japanese politicians felt compelled to respond. “It is extremely regrettable that the resolution is definitely not based on facts,” noted Taro Aso, then Japanese Foreign Minister. This comment and others like it had little direct effect on U.S.-Japan relations. But in the hypersensitive diplomatic world of East Asia, where historical slights can inflame contemporary problems, such comments do not help Japan’s relations with China, Korea, or any other formerly occupied country.

None of this is to suggest that members of the House of Representatives should remain silent on issues of foreign policy. It is their responsibility as elected officials to represent their constituents and to shape public policy. Indeed, in a democracy, it is absolutely vital that citizens are engaged in the foreign policy-making process, and the House facilitates this function. But in its attempts to simultaneously prove relevant on the international stage and meet narrow constituent demands, the House of Representatives risks being counterproductive, if not outright harmful. As it continues to delve into contentious issues of history and foreign policy, the House would be well advised to temper its passion with a dose of much-needed context.

Foreign Policy Association, 25 October 2007

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September 03, 2007

Bleak comparison

Parallels between the war in Iraq and the war in Vietnam practically draw themselves. Many have long since noted the most obvious similarities: In each conflict, the United States struggled to defeat an unconventional enemy, using unorthodox tactics, in an unforgiving environment.

Recently, President Bush drew his own parallel: “Then as now, people argued the real problem was America’s presence and that if we would just withdraw, the killing would end.” Of course, any comparison between the wars in Vietnam and Iraq is bound to be nearly as controversial as the conflicts themselves. But beyond the hyperbole, relevant comparisons are there to be made. And as the momentum to exit Iraq gathers steam, the lessons from Vietnam can be particularly illuminating.

During the U.S. war in Vietnam, roughly from 1965 to 1973, troop levels varied greatly, climbing to a peak of over 500,000 in early 1969. The withdrawal of combat troops, however, actually began in earnest that very same year, as President Nixon tried to implement his “Vietnamization” policy of shifting the burden of the fight to the South Vietnamese. Troop levels dropped gradually over the coming years, as South Vietnam shouldered a greater combat burden and as negotiations with North Vietnam progressed in fits and starts. Withdrawal of combat troops from Vietnam was completed in 1972 (although “advisers” remained behind), and the Paris Peace Accords — which formally ended U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War — were signed in early 1973. From the U.S. perspective, these accords provided an expedient cover for the military withdrawal, or a “peace with honor,” as Nixon described it. Of course, neither the United States nor its South Vietnamese allies saw much of either. The Paris accords ultimately fell apart, and South Vietnam fell to the North in 1975.

By contrast, U.S. troop levels in Iraq have remained fairly consistent through the war — 100,000-200,000 since the invasion, in 2003. This has remained true both through Bush’s own strategy of “Vietnamization” (when the emphasis was on training Iraqis to assume security responsibilities from the United States) as well as his latest “surge” strategy (emphasizing the security of Baghdad with U.S. troops).

Moving forward, the comparison with Vietnam falls apart even more. The various Iraqi resistance groups lack a formal state sponsor with which the U.S. could negotiate a withdrawal; despite its clear influence, Iran cannot play the role of North Vietnam today. A regional diplomatic dialogue may emerge alongside the withdrawal process, and the U.S. will surely try to coordinate its departure with the Iraqi government. But the eventual U.S. withdrawal will probably not be accompanied by the same kind of political or diplomatic cover that the Paris Accords offered in Vietnam. As unsuccessful as the Paris Accords were, though, it isn’t clear that such cover is really that valuable.

Despite these differences, one important lesson can be gleaned: Withdrawal does not occur for withdrawal’s sake alone. The U.S. departure from Vietnam did not occur in isolation, and the eventual U.S. withdrawal from Iraq won’t, either. In each case, the military departure will be part of a broader political and military strategy with goals beyond the simple extrication of U.S. forces. Given its global standing, the United States does not have the luxury of simply leaving devastated, chaotic countries in its military’s wake. Rather, any military withdrawal from Iraq will be but one component of a broader strategy designed to ensure stability and security in that country. This is not to say that such a strategy will be successful; it certainly wasn’t so in Vietnam, and the prospects are dim for anything better in Iraq. But it does suggest that the withdrawal from Iraq will not be quick, and it will not be easy. This is a reality that will confront Democrats and Republicans alike.

Another interesting parallel between Vietnam and Iraq does present itself. Throughout the prolonged, gradual withdrawal from Vietnam, the United States continued to suffer casualties. It also remained very engaged in combat operations, specifically in the form of the aerial bombardment of North Vietnam. From the perspective of many on both sides of the conflict, then, the U.S. withdrawal process was somewhat illusory — the troops may have been leaving, but the war was still on. The same will probably be true in Iraq. The United States has invested so much in its military infrastructure in Iraq that a complete, 100 percent withdrawal remains unlikely for the foreseeable future. And even as the troops begin to leave, their air cover will remain in place, based from carriers in the Persian Gulf and from other bases throughout the region.

Compared with Vietnam, the bombers over Iraq may be faster and their bombs smarter. But as in Southeast Asia, it’s unlikely that the Iraq war will end when the last U.S. soldier leaves the battlefield.

Providence Journal, 4 September 2007

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July 28, 2007

Terror questions

As Congress engaged in another round of contentious debate over the Iraq war—this time, complete with a successful overnight filibuster by Republicans—the country was reminded of the nagging, perpetual fear of terrorism. A spate of attempted and botched terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom renewed the sense that the threat of religious-inspired violence remains real. A new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was released that painted a discouraging picture of the Bush administration's anti-terrorism campaign. As the death toll mounts in Iraq, and the prospects for a change in strategy grow dimmer, many in Congress and elsewhere are questioning with increasing intensity the connection between the war in Iraq and the "war on terror." Together, these various threads beg serious questions about the current U.S. anti-terror strategy and how Congress might move to address its deficiencies.

In recent weeks, the United Kingdom experienced a rapid spate of terrorist-related incidents. On June 29, British police discovered and disarmed two rudimentary car bombs in central London. The next day, two men rammed a jeep filled with propane cylinders into the main terminal at Glasgow Airport in Scotland. Although neither incident resulted in civilian loss of life, and the Glasgow Airport attack only caused minor damage, they prompted the United Kingdom to raise its terror alert status to its highest level. Because the foreign policy of the United Kingdom is so closely aligned with that of the United States, a threat in one country can justifiably raise fears in the other. Perhaps with such fears in mind, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff admitted to feeling some discomfort: "[I have] kind of a gut feeling that we are in a period of increased vulnerability."

A few weeks later, the Bush administration released a declassified version of its latest NIE. The report, billed as the U.S. intelligence community's "most authoritative written judgment on national security issues," notes that nearly six years after the 9/11 attacks, the group has "protected or regenerated key elements of its [h]omeland attack capability, including a safe haven in [Pakistan], operational lieutenants, and its top leadership." These assessments provided a great deal of ammunition for Bush administration critics in Congress, who suggested that the president's "war on terror" has been less than successful. "It is a travesty that Osama bin Laden remains at large nearly six years after the 9/11 attacks, and that the Bush administration and most congressional Republicans remain stubbornly wedded to a flawed strategy in Iraq," said Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV).

The release of the NIE, incidentally, occurred in the midst of Congress' latest debate on the Iraq war. Some suspected that such timing was no accident, and that the Bush administration thought that such a bleak assessment of the "war on terror" would encourage legislators to support his steadfast strategy in Iraq. The NIE explicitly notes that the central al Qaeda organization would "seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), its most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack the [h]omeland." Indeed, the president himself has often sought to link the "war on terror" with the Iraq war. In May, he declared that, "the enemy in Vietnam had neither the intent nor the capability to strike our homeland [but] the enemy in Iraq does."

The administration's approach, however, is fraught with risk. In addition to Iraq's purported weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration's original case for invasion rested on that country's affiliations with al Qaeda. It is now known that any such affiliations were tentative at best, and that al Qaeda-inspired militancy in Iraq is largely a by-product of the U.S. occupation. AQI—the organization cited in the NIE and a group that rose to bloody prominence under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—only came into being after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and it swore allegiance to Osama bin Laden after its precursor organizations had already established an independent reputation for sectarian violence. In other words, AQI was not involved in the 9/11 attacks. And even if it seeks to attack the United States directly, the organization's priorities clearly lie in Iraq, where it has ready access to U.S. targets. Democrats in Congress were quick to emphasize this point. "It is not true, categorically not true, that there was al Qaeda in Iraq before we invaded," said Representative Jane Harman (D-CA), chair of the Homeland Security subcommittee on intelligence.

Despite the pointed language, the debate in Congress failed again to produce a definitive change in Iraq war strategy. But the latest reminder of the intersection between the Iraq war and the "war on terror" provides an opportunity to re-evaluate U.S. prosecution of the latter. The term itself –"war on terror"—has always been somewhat controversial. Even among the vast majority of policy makers that agree that terrorism is a serious threat, many question whether an approach that emphasizes a military response is the best strategy. Rhetorically, the term "war on terror" evokes unfavorable comparisons with the "war on poverty" or the "war on drugs," not to mention its grammatical irregularity. Given these inconsistencies, some have suggested a radical revision of U.S. anti-terror strategy. In an article in the Atlantic Monthly last year, James Fallows suggested a straightforward approach: simply declare victory in the "war on terror" and transition to a more measured, less inflammatory anti-terror strategy. He notes that although al Qaeda itself does not constitute an existential threat to the United States, a poor U.S. response to al Qaeda provocation does. The initial U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 evicted the ruling Taliban and deprived the central al Qaeda organization of its safe haven; it was clearly a success. But Fallows cites the U.S. war in Iraq and its galvanizing effect on Islamic militants around the world as an example of how a solely military response to terrorism can be counter-productive. Of course, as the latest NIE points out, al Qaeda has re-established some degree of shelter in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan. But as Fallows noted optimistically last year, "[al Qaeda's] destiny is no longer in its own hands." Perhaps time remains for Congress to push for a different strategy that takes advantage of this reality.

Even if Congress does not take up this challenge, it appears that others might. In the wake of the terrorist incidents in the United Kingdom, a number of foreign-born, Muslim physicians were arrested. One of the two men who rammed a vehicle into the Glasgow Airport terminal was Iraqi. Given such evidence, one could imagine how authorities might jump at the opportunity to link terrorism in Western countries with the war in Iraq—the need to fight them "there," before they attack us "here." As former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld remarked in 2005, "U.S. forces are in Iraq to … fight the terrorists there, so we don't have to fight them here in the United States." Instead of taking a similar approach, the newly installed British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, adopted a notably measured tone in addressing the incidents and the resulting arrests. He was more likely to define culprits as "criminals" rather than "terrorists," and he refrained from identifying them explicitly as "Muslim" or "Islamic." The rhetorical distinctions are subtle, but revealing. In using such language, Brown was attempting to deny the culprits the prestige of being soldiers in a war, and to decouple the religion from the crime.

Some in the United States are pushing for a new strategy more loudly than others. Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards has made a point of refuting the "war on terror" rhetoric, calling it "a slogan designed only for politics, not a strategy to make America safe." But the president is unlikely to change his rhetoric or his strategy before he leaves office, and if Congress cannot pass legislation to govern a conflict as discrete and unpopular as the war in Iraq, it is not likely to be able to do the same with a conflict as nebulous and important as the "war on terror" or its equivalent. The emerging British example under Brown may offer a glimmer of hope for a different approach to anti-terror strategy, but don't expect a change anytime soon.

Foriegn Policy Association, 26 July 2007

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:05 AM to Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

July 19, 2007

Election correction: Turkey and the EU

On Sunday, Turks will go to the polls to elect a new parliament. This earlier-than-expected election will be the latest chapter in the decades-long debate over secularism and democracy that has defined modern Turkey, as well as the culmination of months of political tension. In April, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development (AK) Party nominated Abdullah Gul, Turkey's foreign minister, to be the country's next president. But the nomination was stymied in parliament--the body charged with electing the country's largely ceremonial president--over concerns about Gul's religiosity and the AK Party's mildly Islamist roots. Even more ominously, the Turkish military registered its disapproval by suggesting that Gul's election would be part of a "growing threat" to the secular republic. Instead of nominating a less controversial figure that could have broken the political impasse, Erdogan decided instead to try and renew his popular mandate by calling for Sunday's early elections.

But the factors at play in this weekend's election extend beyond Turkey's borders. For decades, Turkey's tortured courtship of the European Union proceeded at a snail's pace. But after the AK Party won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and Erdogan became prime minister the following year, Turkey made remarkable progress in implementing the liberal reforms needed for eventual EU membership. In recent years, however, the vision of Turkish accession to the EU has grown dimmer, and the prospects for the continuation of much-needed reform in Turkey have dimmed with it. A victory for the AK Party on Sunday will leave the path to reform open. But, ultimately, the success of Turkey's reform movement rests not just with Erdogan, but with the EU itself.

***

Turkey's road to EU membership began in 1959, when it applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community, a predecessor of the EU. The next four decades were marked by ambiguity, setbacks, and half-victories in Turkey's quest. In recent years, however, significant progress toward accession has been made. The EU agreed to begin formal membership negotiations in 2004, and launched such talks the next year.

The greatest catalyst for progress, however, was the election of Erdogan and the AK Party. Historically, governing majorities in the Turkish parliament have relied upon fragile coalitions that were unable to implement bold policy changes. The AK Party, however, won an uncompromised majority in parliament, riding to victory on a uniquely Turkish combination of religiously inspired social conservatism, staunch adherence to the secular principles of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (the founder of modern Turkey), and fierce devotion to the goal of EU accession. Erdogan, in other words, had both the ability and the desire to work toward EU membership, and he did so with gusto. He has moved to distance the Turkish military from the political process and to expand political and social rights both for Turks and the country's minority Kurds, and he has overseen robust economic growth.

From the perspective of many Europeans, however, Turkish membership in the EU has always been unpopular. Concerns have typically centered on economic factors (how could developed EU countries deal with a flood of unskilled Turkish labor?) and cultural ones (does Muslim Turkey really belong in Christian Europe?). In recent years, as Turkish accession has become a more realistic prospect, such sentiment has increasingly seeped into formal EU policy. The French rejection of the EU constitution in 2005 was fueled largely--and somewhat misleadingly--by fears of eventual Turkish membership. Since then, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy have each ridden to election victories on platforms that prominently opposed full Turkish accession, favoring instead vague alternatives such as "privileged partnership." The accession of Cyprus in 2004--after that country's rejection of a comprehensive settlement with its Turkish-dominated and isolated northern half--introduced a strong anti-Turkish voice into the EU. Late last year, continued mutual intransigence over the divided island compelled the EU to suspend negotiations on eight of the 35 "chapters" needed to complete Turkey's accession process.

As with all symbiotic relationships, the health of one party is dependent on the health of the other--when one gets sick, the other usually follows suit. EU membership has long been a popular goal for Turks; many see it as the ultimate realization of Ataturk's dream of a modern, secular Turkey. But as European politicians eagerly campaign for votes at Turkey's expense, and as ancient rivalries seem to arbitrarily derail accession talks, Turks have begun to wonder whether EU membership is worth the hassle. Increasingly, they seem to think not. In a recent poll, only one in three Turks said that they definitely want their country to join the EU--about half the figure in similar polls only a few years ago. And as EU membership plummets in popularity, so too does the rationale for many of the tough political and social reforms required for accession, especially those that work toward unfinished goals such as cutting public corruption and expanding freedom of expression. Erdogan, for his part, remains resolute. He pledged late last year that the "reform process will continue with the same decisiveness," regardless of what the EU says or does. But it is clear that Erdogan's patience is also wearing thin.

The most pernicious result of the EU's vacillation is that the forces opposed to Erdogan have found it easier to array against him. The Turkish military, which has long fancied itself as the ultimate guardian of the secular state, has always been wary of the AK Party's Islamist roots, and it resents Erdogan's efforts to remove it from the political process. Turkish nationalists have also long been skeptical of Erdogan's religiosity, in addition to his relatively measured approach in dealing with Kurdish issues and his devotion to EU membership in general. Mainstream secular political parties, which represent the bulk of Erdogan's parliamentary opposition, are eager to capitalize on any failures they can attribute to Erdogan, even if they share his goal of EU membership.

Ironically, as these varied forces align against Erdogan, they also align against their own best interests. Urban, secular Turks--those who would find themselves most at home in Europe--protest Erdogan's religiosity, giving cover to the military's ominous and blatantly anti-democratic rhetoric in the process. Rural, socially conservative Turks--those who might gain the most from expanded trade and investment with Europe and who might best identify with the AK Party's roots--support nationalist political elements that would realign Turkey's domestic and foreign policies for the worse. If Erdogan's opponents succeed in derailing his reforms, they would return Turkey to a darker period of its own history--military-dominated politics, vitriolic nationalism, or ineffectual coalition governments.

To be sure, Erdogan's opponents would seek his defeat regardless of the EU's attitude toward Turkish accession. But deficiencies of political will, strategic foresight, and structural capacity have made the EU and its leaders complicit in the potential failure of Erdogan's reforms. Merkel and Sarkozy's predecessors faced similar degrees of domestic opposition to Turkish membership, yet they still remained steadfast in their own support for accession. But despite their strength of will, Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques Chirac were unable (or unwilling) to articulate to their constituents the geopolitical and cultural imperative of Turkish accession, not just for Turkey, but for the EU itself.

Most importantly, the EU is structurally handicapped as a foreign policy actor, perpetually forced to contend with the divergent international agendas of its 27 member states. In other words, speed and clarity are not its strong suits. Where it can succeed on the international stage, however, is through its power of example. Over the past 15 years, the allure of EU membership encouraged and strengthened liberal reform in the former communist states of Eastern Europe, and these countries were ultimately rewarded with accession. A similar effect continues to extend east and south along the EU's periphery, but it requires the legitimate prospect of accession to achieve the same liberalizing results. Turkey could become the ultimate validation of this kind of indirect "foreign policy by example." It could also become its ultimate failure.

***

Fortunately for Turkey, the AK Party is likely to retain its parliamentary majority in Sunday's elections, although perhaps by a reduced margin. If it does, it will be due to Erdogan's distinctly Turkish brand of politics. His deft blending of social conservatism, institutional secularism, and political liberalism make him uniquely suited to enact the reforms that will secure EU membership and strengthen Turkish democracy. It is unclear if Erdogan will re-nominate Gul for the presidency, and if he does, how the military would respond--much depends on the ultimate size of the AK Party's majority. But a resounding victory by the AK Party would provide a needed boost for the prospects of genuine reform in Turkey. This, in turn, could nudge the EU in a more encouraging direction, ultimately leading to greater progress toward Turkish accession.

Such a course correction is sorely needed. The EU has unnecessarily and myopically gone out of its way to make things worse for Turkey's political and social reform, and at the worst possible time. In addition to its struggles with EU accession, Turkey finds itself surrounded and bedeviled by a multitude of challenges. The war in Iraq, the re-emergence of Kurdish militarism, an increasingly assertive Russia, and the omnipresent threat of genuine Islamic extremism will continue to place ever-greater strains on Turkey. In such a turbulent environment, Erdogan's electoral victory alone cannot ensure the long-term success of his liberal reforms. This makes the EU's continued (and promised) support for his efforts--and ultimately, for membership--that much more important.

The New Republic, 20 July 2007

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April 26, 2007

Iraq pushback

In the past few months, the Congressional debate over the Iraq war has come into much greater focus. In January, Democrats in the House and Senate—freshly installed as the majority party in each chamber—generated a raft of proposals to rein in President Bush’s conduct of the Iraq war (for more, see Capitol Watch, January 2007)). Now, after weeks of steadily amplifying rhetoric, words will soon be translated into political action. Congress has staked its position, and the president his, but the resulting confrontation is unlikely to dramatically change the situation in Iraq.

In March, the House approved a $109 billion supplemental spending bill to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The vote—largely along partisan lines—was 218-212. Unlike previous supplementals, however, this bill placed conditions on the president’s use of the appropriated funds. It required that U.S. troops meet certain readiness standards before deploying to Iraq, and it set benchmarks for the Iraqi government to meet as conditions for continued U.S. support. If such benchmarks are not met, U.S. troops could begin withdrawing from Iraq as early as July 1. Even if conditions improved in Iraq, U.S. forces would need to begin leaving in March 2008, with most combat forces out of the country by August 31, 2008. Anticipating a close vote, Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) successfully motivated her caucus prior to the roll call: “The American people do not support the war without end and neither should this Congress.”

The very next week, the Senate approved a companion $122 billion supplemental spending bill. It, too, passed the chamber with a largely partisan vote (51-47). The Senate bill required the president to begin withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq within four months and set a goal of ending combat operations by March 31, 2008. Although this non-binding “goal” for complete withdrawal differed in both force and date from the House bill’s “deadline,” the Senate vote was in some ways a greater jolt to the administration. The Senate has always been considered the more deliberative chamber of Congress, where the perpetual threat of a filibuster makes controversial bills more difficult to pass than in the House. The Senate has also traditionally held greater sway in the realm of foreign policy. Most importantly, as a follow-up to the House’s action, the Senate vote marked the first time that the full Congress had rebuked the president’s Iraq war policy with binding legislation. “The Senate and the House have held together and done what we’ve done,” Senate Majority Leader Harry M. Reid (D-NV) said. “It’s now in [the president’s] corner to do what he wants to do.”

The House and Senate have just reconciled their respective bills, and the resulting compromise—which keeps the House’s readiness standards for U.S. troops but adopts the Senate’s non-binding date for complete withdrawal—will be sent to the president in the coming days. In doing so, Congress will speak in a rare, unified, and assertive manner. The war of words already has ascended to match this new level of earnestness. President Bush has made clear his intent to veto any bill containing timetables or deadlines. “When we've got a troop in harm's way, we expect that troop to be fully funded," he said. “We expect there to be no strings on our commanders.” Among the candidates in the 2008 presidential race (who are increasingly assuming the mantle as their respective parties’ most visible spokespersons), opinions largely fell along partisan lines, with some notable wrinkles. “[Nobody] wants to play chicken with our troops,” Sen. Barack Obama (D-IL) said, causing a minor stir that was quickly seized upon by one of his Democratic rivals. “This is not a game of chicken,” sniped former senator John Edwards. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) didn’t want to miss the chance to score political points, either. “I hope Democrats in Congress will heed the advice of … Senator Obama, and immediately pass a new bill to provide support to our troops,” he politely opined.

Beneath the electoral posturing, the war of words primarily is about responsibility. The argument is governed by two facts: The war in Iraq requires funding that only Congress can provide, but Congress cannot muster the super-majorities needed to override a presidential veto. So if the president vetoes the supplemental spending bill passed by Congress, will he be responsible for cutting off funding to troops in Iraq? Or will Congress be culpable for not passing a “clean” bill, free of restrictions or deadlines on combat operations? The president and his allies argue that the troops in Iraq are in urgent need of additional funding for weapons, body armor, and materiel. Democrats in Congress, on the other hand, dismiss this stance as overly dramatic and misleading, suggesting that troops in Iraq are not in danger of going hungry or unarmed.

To a certain extent, both sides of the argument have been exaggerated and abstracted. According to instructions recently issued to military commanders by Army Comptroller Nelson Ford, the Pentagon is taking “prudent [accounting] measures” to ensure that it has enough money to fund the Iraq war through June. In other words, troops in Iraq will not be cut off. And regardless of the political outcome, manipulating appropriations is inherently a blunt, imprecise, and imperfect way to affect the details of war policy. This is clear in the Constitution, which effectively grants Congress an “on/off switch” for war but reserves the “dimmer switch” for the president.

Nonetheless, the tactical implications of these rhetorical fireworks are very relevant and entirely clear. There is, in fact, a game of chicken afoot, and one side—the legislature or the executive—will have to blink. For institutional reasons, Congress is likely to compromise first, for the simple reason that the legislature must contend with the agendas of 535 ambitious individuals while the executive must only deal with the agenda of one. So when the president receives the final bill from Congress, he almost certainly will fulfill his promise to veto it.

Even then, Congress still will have several ways to constrain the president’s war policy. One likely option would have Congress pass a funding bill without restrictions or deadlines, but with a limited duration. Once the funding expired (after, say, three months), the president would need to request additional money from Congress, which could then pass another funding bill of limited duration, and so on. As each funding deadline passes, the political pressure on the president will ratchet ever higher, conceivably forcing a change in war policy or winning a veto-proof majority in Congress.

For those opposed to the war, however, such a tactic is not without risk. The original House and Senate bills passed by very slim margins, and even those majorities contained legislators whose support was only grudging. Even those who oppose the Iraq war and are inclined to manipulate appropriations to change its course may not be comfortable with the prospect of keeping the president on such a short leash. This much is clear: Whatever its course of action, Congress’ margin for error is much slimmer than the president’s.

In the end, none of this may matter. The House-Senate compromise bill that will be sent to the president in the coming days sets a 2008 withdrawal date from Iraq. Given the president’s likely veto and Congress’ likely response, any movement of this target withdrawal date—either in legislation or in principle—will be toward the future, thus inching into the term of the next president. That may be the first real opportunity to change Iraq policy (for more, see Capitol Watch, August 2006).

But even then, the path of Iraq war policy remains uncertain. The leading Democratic candidates for president—all of whom use anti-war rhetoric and advocate aggressive plans for redeployment from Iraq—leave allowances for residual forces in the country. Senator Hillary Clinton (D-NY) has noted that, “we have remaining vital national security interests in Iraq … I think we [will] have a remaining military as well as political mission.” And for the leading Republican candidates, any kind of pro-withdrawal stance would be politically untenable, regardless of the popular support for such a position.

The passage of binding legislation on the Iraq war by both the Senate and the House is a remarkable achievement, one that would have been unthinkable even a few months ago. But however the rhetorical war plays out, the overall political and institutional climate continues to bode poorly for a significant change in war policy in the near future.

Foreign Policy Association, 26 April 2007

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:44 AM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

January 30, 2007

Missing the point

Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) is a smart guy, and it was totally in character for him to hold these hearings today on the extent of Congress' war powers. It appears he's planning to follow-up on them:

Tomorrow, I will introduce legislation that will prohibit the use of funds to continue the deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq six months after enactment. By prohibiting funds after a specific deadline, Congress can force the President to bring our forces out of Iraq and out of harm’s way.

I've noted elsewhere my thoughts on how successful such efforts ultimately will be. But Feingold's bold pronouncement isn't the most telling passage in his statement:

This legislation will allow the President adequate time to redeploy our troops safely from Iraq, and it will make specific exceptions for a limited number of U.S. troops who must remain in Iraq to conduct targeted counter-terrorism and training missions and protect U.S. personnel. (emphasis mine)

This seemingly secondary declaration highlights a fundamental but overlooked truth of the Iraq adventure -- upon invading Iraq, the United States never had any intention of leaving. As valid and necessary as the debates over withdrawal timetables surely are, they merely fiddle on the margins of the issue. Even Feingold's comparatively bold legislation includes an allowance for a permanent U.S. military presence in Iraq. To be sure, his bill is a big step in the right direction; hopefully it will move the debate closer to grappling with the underlying issues at play here. But as smart and principled as Feingold is, even he cannot easily escape the straight-jacket that Iraq has placed on generations of U.S. foreign policy.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:40 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

January 25, 2007

Surge protection

On January 10, President Bush announced plans to send a “surge” of 21,500 additional troops to Iraq. By most accounts, this was a bold move on his part. In November, the Democrats won control of Congress due largely to the growing unpopularity of the Iraq war. In December, the bipartisan Iraq Study Group issued its report, which broadly called for a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and expanded diplomatic efforts in the region. It was in such a context that opposition to the president's “surge” emanated from Congress, from Democrats and Republicans alike. But so far, this opposition has only been rhetorical. Many questions remain regarding Congress' ability and intent to force a change in the president's new Iraq plan. But one thing is clear: despite the intensity demonstrated over the past year, congressional opposition to the Iraq war has yet to peak.

Since the opening of the Democratic-controlled Congress on January 4, a plethora of proposals to counter the president's “surge” have been introduced or announced. Senators Joe Biden (D-DE), Chuck Hagel (R-NE), and Carl Levin (D-MI) introduced a non-binding resolution that would express disapproval of the president's plan. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) and Congressman Ed Markey (D-MA) introduced similar bills that will prohibit the president from sending additional troops to Iraq or spending additional money on such a plan without congressional approval. Senators Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and Hilary Clinton (D-NY)—both contenders for the Democratic presidential nomination—have each offered proposals that would cap the total number of U.S. troops in Iraq. Congresswomen Barbara Lee (D-CA), Maxine Waters (D-CA) and Lynn Woolsey (D-CA) introduced legislation that would establish a 6-month timeframe for withdrawal for all U.S. military forces from Iraq.

Senators and congressmen who wish to register their opposition to the Iraq war, then, clearly have a wide menu of legislative options to choose from. And given the current national mood, it is likely that at least one option will pass both houses of Congress. But congressional passage is just a single measure of success, and it is by no means the ultimate one. Consider the resolution sponsored by Biden, Levin, and Hagel. As a concurrent resolution, it will require only simple majorities in each chamber of Congress to pass, and it will not be submitted to the president for his signature. As such, it will not have the force of law—hence its description as “non-binding.” For those wishing to send a loud message of opposition to the president, this could be a good thing. Legislators who disapprove of the course of the Iraq war but are reluctant to restrain the president's freedom of action (Republicans, mostly) could readily support this resolution.

But the resolution's sponsors have attempted to make the case that their proposal is not merely a symbolic one. Biden has indicated that the resolution is akin to a vote of no confidence, and that, “if this were a parliamentary system … it would bring the government down.” This is, in part, political posturing—Biden recently announced his own presidential intentions. But his comments also raise an important constitutional issue. In parliamentary systems of government, both executive and legislative functions are performed by the legislative body, or parliament. If the opposition party passes a no confidence measure, the executive falls and new elections are held. In the presidential system of the United States, however, executive and legislative functions are explicitly separate; short of impeachment in the Senate and prosecution in the House, Congress cannot remove the president from office. For some time, Congress attempted to exercise a “legislative veto,” whereby majorities in both houses of Congress could override or reject actions by the executive. But in INS v. Chadha (1983), the Supreme Court ruled that legislative vetoes violated the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Accordingly, Bush would be fully within his constitutional rights to ignore Biden's concurrent resolution.

Those proposals that would actually constrain the president's actions pose challenges of their own. Putting aside the constitutional questions as to whether Congress can actually cap troop levels in Iraq, cut off funding for additional troops, or mandate the withdrawal of those forces already there, the president is unlikely to sign any such bill emanating from the legislature. Any proposal along these lines, then, would most likely be attached as an amendment to a separate measure, one that is consequential and would otherwise garner wide support, such as an appropriations bill. Assuming the amended bill passes both houses of Congress, the president will be forced to make a difficult decision. But given his past determination on Iraq, it seems likely that the president would veto any bill—no matter how important its non-Iraq elements—that constrained his freedom of action in pursuing the war. And although the mood of Congress has turned clearly against the Iraq war, it is doubtful that a veto-proof, two-thirds majority in either chamber would vote for a binding measure against the president.

A third alternative exists that blends the potential risks and rewards of the various binding and non-binding legislative options. In passing the original Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (AUMF) in October 2002, Congress declared that the measure fulfilled the requirements outlined in the War Powers Resolution (for more, see Capitol Watch, August 2006). The AUMF cited Iraq's purported weapons of mass destruction and links to the 9/11 attacks as justification for military action. Clearly, the U.S. military purpose in Iraq is very different today. To reflect this changed mission, Senator John Warner (R-VA) suggested a different course of action by Congress last summer: “I think we have to examine very carefully what Congress authorized the president to do in the context of the situation if we are faced with an all-out civil war. And whether [we] have to come back to Congress to get further indication of support.”

Warner has not publicly reiterated this sentiment, opting instead to co-sponsor a non-binding resolution similar in content but less strident in tone to the one proposed by Biden et al. But the War Powers Resolution nonetheless remains a valuable tool in Congress's arsenal. Although every president since Nixon has denied its constitutionality, each one has abided by its requirements, and it has not yet been challenged in the judiciary. Instead of bothering with non-binding and symbolic measures, or with indirect and improbable methods for changing war policy, Congress could address the issue head-on by using its ability under the War Powers Resolution to re-evaluate and re-authorize the Iraq war. Such a direct and unambiguous action would surely be opposed by the Bush administration, on both substantive and constitutional grounds, but it would be far more difficult to ignore out-of-hand than some of the other proposals that have been floated. Already, there are early indications that Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) may pursue such a course, as well as Biden himself: “I've drafted … I'm not going to introduce it right now … an authorization for the use of force that renders the last one null and void.”

Regardless of the success of Bush's “surge” policy and of congressional efforts to thwart it, the national mood on the Iraq war clearly has changed. By last summer, the war already had become widely unpopular; antiwar candidates such as Ned Lamont were able to defeat pro-war incumbents like Joe Lieberman (I-CT) in their party primaries. But in the few brief months since, the popularity of the Iraq war has sunk even lower. What were once hypothetical, long shot ideas to impede the president's prosecution of the war have become realistic and widely supported proposals. On Iraq, the question now is not whether Congress will assert itself. It's how far it is willing to go.

Foreign Policy Association, 25 January 2007

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:30 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics | TrackBack (0)

September 29, 2006

There to stay

As the midterm elections rapidly approach, the calls for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq have grown louder and more consistent. In some cases, they have even come in a bipartisan flavor. Such sentiment is only natural. The bloodshed in Iraq is increasing at a gruesome rate, and the U.S. mission there has haphazardly meandered into something seemingly intended to save the country from its own internal divisions.

Some suggest that the very presence of U.S. troops in Iraq is responsible for the violence and instability there. Others counter by suggesting that U.S. forces are the only thing standing in the way of genocide. Both arguments have merit, but they both miss the point. The debate over the length of the U.S. occupation of Iraq was settled before the initial attack was even launched in 2003. Its resolution lies squarely with the very rationales for the invasion itself.

From September 2001 to March 2003, the Bush administration offered a slew of reasons to invade Iraq -- WMDs, regime change, links to al Qaeda and more. But the logic behind each rationale seemed tenuous and forced, and the constantly shifting emphasis diluted the strength of each one. Most damning, however, was the post-invasion evidence that the administration may have exaggerated its arguments to get the war it wanted. If the ostensible reasons to invade were exaggerated, then, a key question remains: Why did the Bush administration really want to invade Iraq?

This is best answered by imagining a traditional Russian nesting doll, in which each visible invasion rationale can be peeled away to reveal another, less presentable one. The most exterior argument, and the one that could bear not only public scrutiny but also that of the United Nations, was Iraqi possession of illicit WMDs. Insufficiently proven to justify invasion on its own (in part because Iraq did not possess any WMDs at the time), this exterior layer of rationalization must be peeled away to reveal more nested pro-invasion arguments.

One such argument was based on regime change. This rationale could be used publicly, but not at the United Nations, for Saddam Hussein -- like every other dictator in the world -- violated no U.N. Security Council resolution just by being an odious leader. In a similar vein, if the administration originally intended to promote democracy in Iraq, its initial post-invasion plans would have included more than a simple reliance on Ahmed Chalabi. Even at its best moments, the Bush administration could prove nothing more than weak and circumstantial links between Iraq and al Qaeda. It had absolutely no convincing argument linking Hussein to 9/11.

Peeling away these various layers of rationalization ultimately reveals the nub of the pro-invasion argument: pure geopolitics. This argument, unlike the others, could not be made publicly to justify a war of choice. It was based on a long-held belief by many in the Bush administration that the United States must remain in a position of global supremacy, and that force should be used to deter or defeat any potential challenges to such supremacy. That this belief coincided neatly with the country's post-9/11 paranoia and with neoconservative dreams of democratizing the world was, to put it mildly, exquisitely convenient.

Invading Iraq put U.S. power in a vitally important part of the world, positioned neatly over abundant energy reserves and between Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Iraq was a perfect place to plant the U.S. flag; everything else was ancillary to this central cause. Practically speaking, this geopolitical argument translates into permanent basing rights. Although U.S. troop levels may well fluctuate in the coming months and years, the Pentagon has constructed at least four so-called "enduring bases" in Iraq. These facilities -- fortified and cordoned off from their Iraqi neighbors and served by such staples of U.S. culture as Burger King and Subway -- are designed to house U.S. forces for an extended period of time. Perhaps this is why Iraqis have never received a definitive indication that U.S. forces will ever completely leave their country.

The debate over withdrawal timetables is thus almost ludicrous. Fundamentally, the United States invaded Iraq to stay in Iraq; upon arrival, the Bush administration never had any intention of leaving. U.S. forces will remain, based at Hussein's former military bases, ready to deter challenges to U.S. supremacy and to project power in a chronically unstable corner of the globe.

This brings us to today, where the debate over invasion rationales can illuminate the one over occupation dilemmas. The United States must refute its root cause for invasion and disavow any intention of permanent or "enduring" bases in Iraq. Various administration officials have muttered words loosely to this effect before, but never to an Iraqi audience and never while addressing the apparent contradiction of the "enduring" military facilities that have been established. To be effective, a genuine disavowal must be backed by genuine intent. Such a disavowal would not solve Iraq's problems overnight -- the current violence and instability are far too deeply rooted for that. But it would be an important first step. It would place any timetable for eventual withdrawal firmly in Iraqis' collective hands, truly contingent upon their own political and security development. Withdrawal would become something desired by the United States, not something deferred.

More importantly, such a disavowal could raise the level of trust between the United States and the international community. Just as Americans questioned the administration's invasion rationales, so too did the world, and so too do Iraqis today. Coming to grips with the real reasons behind the invasion could pay long-term dividends. That little bit of honesty would help not only Iraq, but also the United States' own sagging international reputation.

Alas, no disavowal will ever come. The Bush administration will never renounce permanent bases in Iraq, for doing so would undermine its root rationale for invasion. One could expect no better from the other party, either. Thus far, congressional Democrats have been reluctant to question the Pentagon's construction of the "enduring" bases in Iraq, for doing so might leave them vulnerable to the charge that they do not support safe, comfortable facilities for the U.S. troops there. More important, the geopolitical appeal of ready-made bases in Iraq is hard to resist. It is simply a bipartisan truism that Iraq is a perfect location from which to project U.S. power.

This is where the debate over the U.S. presence in Iraq ultimately returns, back to the decision to invade and to the fundamental nature of political and military power. It just so happens that when you're the one wielding the power, it doesn't seem so bad after all.

San Francisco Chronicle, 29 September 2006

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August 25, 2006

Limited powers

Although the culmination of this election year will not arrive until November, political battles are already being won and lost. In Connecticut, challenger Ned Lamont defeated incumbent Joseph Lieberman in the Democratic primary for U.S. Senate. Many suspect that Lieberman's steadfast support for President Bush's Iraq policy was responsible for his defeat, and it is certainly true that the persistent violence and instability in that country has fed domestic discontent with the war for some time. But Lamont's primary victory suggests that such discontent has moved beyond the editorial pages; it may have reached a critical mass where it could actually affect electoral politics. If that discontent really does reshape Congress in November, however, the legislature may not be able to do much to affect U.S. policy in Iraq.

The Constitution explicitly gives Congress the power to declare wars and to raise and support the armed forces. It also makes the president the "commander in chief" of those same armed forces. This tension between the executive and the legislative branches over the country's war making powers is long and storied. Through much of U.S. history, a very rough rule applied: major military conflicts between the United States and another state were marked by a war declaration from Congress, while smaller military engagements could be managed by the executive without a formal war declaration. There have been only five declared wars in U.S. history. The number of overseas U.S. military engagements, however, far exceeds that number.

In the past 60 years, formal war declarations by Congress have fallen out of favor as the speed of international politics and military strategy have advanced. The Vietnam War represented for many a prime example of how the war powers had shifted too far in favor of the executive. In response, Congress adopted the War Powers Resolution in 1973. Passed over President Nixon's veto, the Resolution mandated that the president consult with Congress prior to the start of any military action and formally notify Congress that such action has commenced within 48 hours of it having done so. If Congress does not declare war or otherwise authorize the use of force within 60 days, the President would be obligated to remove U.S. forces from the hostilities.

On the surface, the Resolution seems to give great leeway to the executive to engage in military actions. But by formally codifying what previously had been an informal custom, the Resolution actually serves to constrain the executive. Accordingly, each president since Nixon has challenged the Resolution's constitutionality, although the courts have never ruled definitively on the matter. Yet despite this habitual opposition from the executive, each president has abided by the Resolution's requirements in every major military engagement since the 1970s.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq was no exception. In October 2002, Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (AUMF), which granted President Bush the authority to use military force to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq." It cited a laundry list of offenses as part of this "continuing threat," including Iraq's efforts to thwart UN weapons inspectors, its repression of its citizens, and its supposed links to terrorists associated with the 9/11 attacks. The AUMF also specifically declared that its passage fulfilled the authorization requirements of the War Powers Resolution.  Such authorization from Congress was more valuable to the administration than any similar statement from the United Nations, and so with its passage, its most significant hurdle to military action against Iraq had been cleared.

As subsequent events have proven, however, the assumptions made in the October 2002 AUMF were flawed. Iraq was not in possession of any weapons of mass destruction, and its links to al Qaeda under Saddam Hussein were circumstantial at best. Accordingly, U.S. forces in Iraq have found their mission evolve as their occupation continues. First their mission was to depose Saddam Hussein; then it was to prepare for a return to power by Iraqi exile groups; then it was to rebuild the country and establish democratic institutions; then it was to suppress various indigenous and foreign-led insurgencies. In recent months, many have suggested that U.S. forces in Iraq are now attempting to ward off a Sunni-Shia civil war. A close reading of the original AUMF will find scant mention of any such mission.

This, at least, is the sense of some members of Congress. A recent hearing by the Senate Armed Services Committee elicited some revealing responses from members of the military leadership. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted that the recent violence in Iraq could possibly "[devolve] to a civil war." When asked by Senator John McCain (R-AZ) whether he anticipated this situation one year ago, Pace paused for several seconds before somberly replying "no, sir." In response to this gloomy assessment by Pace and concurring testimony from General John Abizaid and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Senator John Warner (R-VA) suggested a new course of action by Congress: "I think we have to examine very carefully what Congress authorized the president to do in the context of the situation if we are faced with an all-out civil war. And whether [we] have to come back to Congress to get further indication of support."

Although this is a remarkable suggestion, there are any number of reasons why a new authorization measure will not be debated in Congress. It would give the president's political opponents an ideal stage upon which to attack his Iraq policy; one can be certain that he accordingly will use his influence to prevent any resolution from being introduced. Any public debate on the mission of U.S. military forces could easily be construed as "not supporting the troops" and have damaging political effects on whomever that accusation were leveled. And politics aside, the executive--including the military leadership at the Pentagon--is the "commander in chief" of the armed forces. If Congress passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, the president would be on firm political ground to interpret that request loosely, based on the demands of military expedience as well as on the "facts on the ground."

Even if popular discontent with the president's Iraq policy results in a major electoral shift in November, Congress' ability to force a change in that policy may be limited. It could apply its "power of the purse" and threaten to withhold funding to support operations in Iraq. But senators and congressmen have tried this tactic before, to little effect. And so far, both Congress and the president have abided by the requirements of the War Powers Resolution.

The most likely effect of an electoral shift on Iraq policy would be one of perception. If Democrats secure a majority in one or both houses of Congress, they will gain leadership of congressional committees and the subpoena power that comes with it. They could hold hearings and conduct investigations that would draw even greater attention to the pitfalls of current Iraq policy. That, in turn, could further focus public opinion, which ultimately is the most important determinant for any kind of policy adjustment. The legislature can focus and reflect public opinion, but only the executive can truly change military policy. And for that, the country may have to wait two more years.

Foreign Policy Association, 24 August 2006

Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:26 AM to Middle East, U. S. Politics

June 26, 2006

Prisons and policy

The vast network of overseas U.S. military bases has long been a source of international discontent. Most bases generate this ill will by taking up valuable local real estate, through the misbehavior of U.S. servicemen based abroad, or by use of the facilities for unpopular combat operations. But arguably the most contentious U.S. base fits none of these criteria and is notorious for a completely different reason. And despite widespread outcry and the efforts of several Senators and Congressmen, the legislative branch can do little to rectify the situation.

Guantanamo Bay Naval Base has always been an anomalous base. A relic of the United States' first imperial forays in the early twentieth century, Guantanamo has existed in a unique legal limbo since Fidel Castro seized power over 40 years ago. The treaty governing the U.S. lease can only be broken with the consent of both parties, which the United States has yet to provide. In protest, Cuba has refused to accept the annual rental dues paid by the U.S. government.

Guantanamo's hazy legal status--it is U.S. controlled, but it is not technically U.S. territory, nor is it the territory of a sensitive U.S. ally--has contributed to the base's negative image. Since early 2002, Guantanamo has been used as a detention facility for "enemy combatants" captured in the so-called war on terror. The term "enemy combatants" deliberately situates the detainees somewhere between POW status (with which they would be entitled protection under the Geneva Convention) and criminal status (with which they would have to be formally charged and tried for a crime).

The legal limbo in which Guantanamo detainees are held, as well as the reportedly poor conditions at the facility, have understandably elicited outrage from the Muslim world. But many western governments and human rights groups have also attacked Guantanamo. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan have called for its closure, as did a recent report by the UN Committee Against Torture. Amnesty International has referred to Guantanamo as the "gulag of our times."  The pressure to close the facility began shortly after its creation in 2002 and has only increased since.

In recent weeks, however, several events have given this chorus of condemnation new focus. In May, the U.S. military reported the most serious prisoner revolt yet at the base, when several inmates staged a suicide attempt to draw guards into a room, at which point other prisoners attacked the guards with makeshift weapons. More recently, guards discovered three inmates who had succeeded in killing themselves. Although there had been many unsuccessful suicide attempts by Guantanamo detainees since 2002, these were the first to succeed. Rear Admiral Harry Harris, commander of Joint Task Force-Guantanamo, described the suicides not as  "[acts] of desperation, but [as acts] of asymmetric warfare committed against us,"  and Colleen Graffy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, described them as a "good PR move to draw attention."

The widespread opposition to Guantanamo, both domestically and internationally, has not escaped Congress' attention. Late last year, Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) succeeded in adding an amendment to a defense appropriations bill that read, in part: "No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment."  McCain's amendment, while not specifically limited to the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo, was certainly motivated by the international criticism of the facility and the reports of mistreatment there, in addition to his own experiences as a POW in Vietnam. The Bush administration threatened to veto any bill containing McCain's amendment, with particular resistance coming from Vice President Dick Cheney. Ultimately, faced with mounting public pressure, the president consented to McCain's amendment.

Along with his signature, however, Bush also issued a "signing statement." This statement was neither generated by Congress nor reviewed by that body prior to presidential signature. It presented the administration's interpretation of the new law, noting that, "the executive branch shall construe [the law] in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President ... as Commander in Chief."  Some legal scholars interpreted this as evidence that the administration would only abide by the restrictions laid out in McCain's amendment at its own discretion.

Despite the legislature's difficulty in affecting change at Guantanamo, the judicial branch has had some success in influencing events there. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), the Supreme Court found that U.S. citizens designated as enemy combatants by the executive branch had the right to challenge their detainment. In Rasul v. Bush (2004), the Court determined that the U.S. court system had the authority to decide whether foreign nationals held at Guantanamo were rightfully imprisoned. And in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), for which a decision is forthcoming, the Court will rule on the legality of the military commissions established by the Hamdi case and on the refusal to classify Guantanamo detainees as prisoners of war.

The string of legal challenges surrounding the Guantanamo detainees has succeeded in shedding some light on the conditions there and in providing the detainees with a modicum of legal recourse. But progress has been slow and inconsistent. The Pentagon, as part of the executive branch, clearly favors continued and unfettered operation of the Guantanamo facility. Journalists have been strictly limited in their coverage of Guantanamo, and several reporters who had been sent to cover the recent suicides were expelled from the base shortly after their arrival. This behavior is perfectly consistent on the Pentagon's part, as recent decades have witnessed an ever-greater centralization of war powers in the executive branch of government. Since 9/11, this trend has only accelerated.

In addressing the issue of the Guantanamo detention facility, then, two of the three branches of government are fundamentally handicapped. As is the case with most aspects of military policy, the executive branch is preeminent--change must come from the top. But to the surprise of many, such policy change is looking increasingly possible. "I'd like to close Guantanamo," President Bush said recently, while also indicating his interest in the Supreme Court's forthcoming ruling in Hamdan.   Bush reiterated that statement this week in Austria, addressing the issue before what was expected to be a barrage of criticism during meetings with European leaders.

Although the Pentagon has not let UN human rights experts inspect the Guantanamo facilities, it has granted access to the International Committee of the Red Cross. And even congressional critics of the detention facilities, such as Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX), have noted improvement in the conditions there. During a recent visit, she noted that, "the Guantanamo we saw today is not the Guantanamo we heard about a few years ago ... what we've seen here is evidence that we've made progress."

Despite assertions from administration critics to the contrary, however, the Guantanamo detention facility cannot simply be closed overnight. The administration would be unlikely to release every detainee, because several probably represent genuine security threats. It is unlikely that each detainee's host country would agree to assume custody of them either, for even the hint of collusion with Guantanamo would be poisonous for many governments around the world. And if the administration were to look for alternative locations to house the detainees, it would find that all arrows point right back to Guantanamo. By virtue of its unique history, the base is tailor-made for legally ambiguous operations--that's why the detainees were sent there in the first place. For these reasons and others, the administration clearly is in no hurry to close the detention facilities.

Nevertheless, policy change on the question of Guantanamo is no longer inconceivable. Opposition to the detention facilities there--from foreign leaders, Congress, the courts, U.S. citizens, and current and former Guantanamo detainees themselves--has been the necessary prerequisite for the shift of tone coming from the executive branch. That fact alone shows that time and public pressure can sometimes be more effective in changing policy than any judicial ruling or Congressional amendment.

Foreign Policy Association, 22 June 2006

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:26 AM to Americas, Middle East, U. S. Politics

May 18, 2006

Important bases

The U.S. military is cleaning house. Existing bases are being retooled or eliminated, and new ones are popping up in some unexpected places. These are the overseas bases that are now vital to the U.S. military—and the new ones that will change its global footprint for years to come.

Andersen Air Force Base & Apra Harbor, Guam
The base: Andersen can handle aircraft ranging from unmanned aerial vehicles to long-range strategic bombers, and Apra Harbor can service everything from nuclear submarines to aircraft carriers. The naval base is also home to one of the three Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons worldwide, which provides mobile, long-term storage of land-combat equipment and supplies near potential trouble spots.
Its importance: Located in the Pacific Ocean about 2,000 miles from Asia, Guam is close enough to the mainland to be vital in any conceivable conflict yet distant enough to preclude a surprise blow from an adversary. Andersen is one of the few locations with the necessary hanger facilities to protect the B-2’s sensitive, radar-evading skin, and strategic bombers regularly cycle through the base to project power toward mainland Asia. The best part: unlike other large bases in the region, Guam is U.S. territory.

Balad Air Base/Camp Anaconda, Iraq
The base: Most prominent of the “enduring bases” being constructed in Iraq, Balad is located just north of Baghdad. It is one of the busiest airfields in the country, accommodating both Air Force fighters as well as transport aircraft. Camp Anaconda, adjacent to the air base, serves as a main base and logistics center for U.S. troops serving throughout central Iraq.
Its importance: Balad’s facilities and location make it more than just an ideal base from which to fight insurgents in Iraq. It is also perfectly positioned to project U.S. power throughout the Middle East, and it will likely do so for many years to come. Although this convenience might serve wider U.S. interests, it doesn’t sit too well with Balad’s Iraqi neighbors—U.S. soldiers have nicknamed Camp Anaconda “Mortaritaville” after a common greeting they receive.

Bezmer Air Base, Bulgaria
The base: Bezmer reflects a broader trend toward lighter, more austere bases in Eastern Europe and away from the larger military complexes in Western and Central Europe. To keep a low profile in the host countries, the Pentagon is reluctant to even refer to Bezmer and its Eastern European equivalents as “bases,” and it stresses that the host countries retain full control of their facilities.
Its importance: Compared to U.S. bases in “old” Europe, Bezmer and its Eastern European equivalents are cheaper to operate and closer to potential hot spots in the Middle East and Central Asia. In times of conflict, the military will use these facilities to “surge” men and materiel toward the front lines. The hope is that former-Soviet bloc host countries will be more amenable to U.S. bases than other hosts in “old” Europe and be less likely to block their use in a time of conflict.

Diego Garcia, British Indian Ocean Territory
The base: Located in the middle of the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia served as a base for B-52s during the 1991 and 2003 wars with Iraq and during post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan. Its isolated anchorage is also home to both Army and Marine seaborne prepositioning squadrons for land-combat equipment and supplies.
Its importance: Isolation—and British sovereignty—make Diego Garcia a far more secure base for U.S. forces than any mainland base in Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia. Specialized shelters to protect the sensitive stealth equipment of visiting B-2s have recently been installed, and strategic bombers regularly rotate through the base. The atoll is also an important part of the U.S. Space Surveillance Network of telescopes, radars, and listening stations.

Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba
The base: Originally intended as coaling station for the U.S. Navy, Guantánamo Bay (or “Gitmo”) remains an important logistical base for Navy units operating in the Caribbean. It also serves as a hub for counter-drug and migrant interdiction operations.
Its importance: Gitmo’s greatest strategic asset is its hazy legal status—it is U.S.-controlled, but it is not U.S. territory. Although it’s not the only place through which “enemy combatants” (neither POWs nor convicted criminals) could be processed, it is readily accessible from the U.S. mainland, and its staff and facilities have experience in detention operations from their time as host to Haitian and Cuban refugees. As a result, Gitmo is one of the most well-known and reviled U.S. bases worldwide. The Bush administration has repeatedly rejected high-profile calls to shut down the base.

Manas Air Base, Kirgizstan
The base: Manas was established at Bishkek’s international airport in the months following 9/11 as a hub for multinational operations in Afghanistan. It has since grown into a substantial base in the heart of Central Asia, playing host to combat aircraft, their supporting personnel, and associated facilities.
Its importance: In addition to its proximity to Afghanistan, Manas is located near the immense energy reserves of the Caspian Basin, as well as the Russian and Chinese frontiers. Kirgizstan has not threatened to follow Uzbekistan’s example and expel U.S. forces, which suggests that Manas could become a linchpin of the enduring U.S. presence in Central Asia. Recognizing its value, Kirgizstan is talking about raising the rent from $2 million to $207 million per year.

Foreign Policy, 15 May 2006

Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:43 PM to Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics

January 12, 2006

Insurgent insurgents

Interesting piece in the NYTimes today about divisions among the collective Iraqi insurgency:

In October, the two insurgents said in interviews, a group of local fighters from the Islamic Army gathered for an open-air meeting on a street corner in Taji, a city north of Baghdad.

Across from the Iraqis stood the men from Al Qaeda, mostly Arabs from outside Iraq. Some of them wore suicide belts. The men from the Islamic Army accused the Qaeda fighters of murdering their comrades.

"Al Qaeda killed two people from our group," said an Islamic Army fighter who uses the nom de guerre Abu Lil and who claimed that he attended the meeting. "They repeatedly kill our people."

The encounter ended angrily. A few days later, the insurgents said, Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and the Islamic Army fought a bloody battle on the outskirts of town.

I have long been intrigued with the varied composition of the Iraqi insurgency. That the insurgency consists of multiple, distinct, and overlapping constituencies -- each with their own agenda -- is becoming widely accepted. Even the President himself has come around to this conclusion.

As time passes and casualties mount -- on all sides -- the tensions between the various insurgent groups in Iraq seem to be coming to the fore. Or alternatively, the media is beginning to cover them. Either way, such tensions are inevitable. The various insurgent groups are bound together by only a single purpose: opposition to the U.S. occupation. While that may seem a wide-ranging and stable basis for cooperation, it's actually quite frail. In this sense, Bush may be right: time is working against both the United States as well as the Iraqi insurgency. Fundamental tensions resist continued combat operations for both sides, and the tensions only grow as time passes. In this sense, "victory" in Iraq is merely a matter of waiting out the bad guys.

Whether that is a sound strategy for the United States, or whether it is actually a strategy at all, is open to question. Likewise is the fine, undefined, but crucial distinction between "victory" in Iraq and "success." Regardless of all this, tensions among the various Iraqi insurgent groups can only be seen as a good thing. On a purely intellectual level, it's fascinating to witness the emergence, success, and potential collapse of such an unlikely insugent alliance. On a practical level, it may mean the coming of hope to Iraq.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:33 AM to Middle East

August 14, 2005

Community defense

This is interesting:

The leaders of four of Iraq's Sunni tribes had rallied their fighters in response to warnings posted in mosques by followers of Zarqawi. The postings ordered Ramadi's roughly 3,000 Shiites to leave the city of more than 200,000 in the area called the Sunni Triangle. The order to leave within 48 hours came in retaliation for alleged expulsions by Shiite militias of Sunnis living in predominantly Shiite southern Iraq.

"We have had enough of his nonsense," said Sheik Ahmad Khanjar, leader of the Albu Ali clan, referring to Zarqawi. "We don't accept that a non-Iraqi should try to enforce his control over Iraqis, regardless of their sect -- whether Sunnis, Shiites, Arabs or Kurds.'' [emphasis mine]

I think Juan Cole is probably right in assuming that this probably isn't indicative of a nascent split among the various Iraqi insurgent groups or their supporters. When push comes to shove, all of the groups hate the U.S. occupation, and they have long since proven capable of putting aside their differences in the pursuit of their insurgency.

Nevertheless, the Post's piece is very enlightening. It's one of the few accounts I've seen of the differences between the various Iraqi insurgent groups breaking out so publicly. If it wasn't clear before, it should be now that the foreign jihadists/Islamic extremists personified by Zarqawi are distinct from the indigenous Sunnis/former Baathists that see political marginalization (or worse) from a majority Kurd and Shia Iraq. This particular case also highlights a certain degree pan-Iraqi nationalism; the image of Sunnis coming to the defense of their Shia neighbors is a powerful and hopeful one. It betrays a genuine sense of Iraqi identity, manifested under the most logical of conditions: when faced with what they perceive to be foreign oppressors, Iraqis (or at least these particular Sunni and their Shia neighbors) will come together. On one day, the oppressors are American. On the next, they're Zarqawi's band.

Two glaring questions arise from this. First, how (and when) will Iraqis expel the unwanted foreigners in their midst? And two, after (and if) they do so, will they still see themselves as Iraqis?

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:58 PM to Middle East

August 09, 2005

Diamond's view

Larry Diamond -- Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, former CPA advisor, and friend of the Watson Institute -- drops some wisdom (via Kevin Drum):

One of the issues that most baffles me in a way is the question of long-term military bases in Iraq. It’s now pretty clear that the ambition to establish long-term American military bases in Iraq, in order to secure the Persian Gulf region, contain Iranian expansion, and enable us to draw down or withdraw altogether our forces in Saudi Arabia, was an important motivation for going to war. When we pressed so vigorously and relentlessly in the drafting of the interim constitution for the easiest possible means of ratifying a treaty, it became clear to me that we were looking to smooth the way for an eventual treaty with Iraq giving us long-term basing rights.

At the same time, we know from a variety of sources, private as well as public, that intense opposition to US plans to establish long-term military bases in Iraq is one of the most passionate motivations behind the insurgency. There are many different strands to the violent resistance that plagues Iraq: Islamist and secular, Sunni and Shiite, Baathist and non-Baathist, Iraqi and foreign. The one thing that unites these disparate elements is Iraqi (or broader pan-Arab) nationalism—resistance to what they see as a long-term project for imperial domination by the United States. Neutralizing this anti-imperial passion—by clearly stating that we do not intend to remain in Iraq indefinitely—is essential to winding down the insurgency.

This conforms nicely to my own view of the administration's underlying motivation in Iraq: we went there to stay there, plain and simple. Check out the rest of Larry's stuff at TPMCafe. Not only does he write clearly and eloquently from ample experience -- both academic and practical -- but his blogging is generating a great discussion over there.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:39 PM to Middle East

July 24, 2005

Relevant question

There is another piece in the NYT today about the increasing effectiveness and continuing mystery that is the Iraqi insurgency. Looking at the recent trend of attacks against Arab diplomats and Iraqi Shia, the piece shrewdly identifies a new insurgent strategy: isolate the Iraqi government from its immediate neighbors and increase levels of sectarian tension. Insurgents have also targeted moderate Sunnis who had been involved in the constitutional process, which conveniently serves both goals.

It's a fine piece, and I recommend you check it out. But I have to say that in terms of its content as well as its mere presence, the piece is not all that surprising. That in itself is the remarkable thing. Over the past 2+ years, we've been fed a steady diet of evidence, communiqués, and reportage that highlight two things: the effectiveness of the Iraqi insurgency and its compositional mystery. And while serving both goals, each new media tidbit has generally advanced one and not the other. We are increasingly aware of the insurgents' strategic effectiveness, to the point that we take it for granted. As for the insurgency's composition, however, we're almost as much in the dark now as we were months and years ago.

This dual trend is a sad testament to the status quo in Iraq. As the insurgency becomes bloodier, the mystery in which it is shrouded grows only more opaque. The composition of the insurgency remains a deeply fascinating question, but perhaps now, its importance can be overstated. Would knowledge of its organization and composition really reverse the trend of violence? Maybe, and I think certainly, had the question been asked and answered much earlier. But now, I fear the question may be increasingly an academic one.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:54 AM to Middle East

July 18, 2005

Radicalization

Interesting piece in the Boston Globe this weekend, highlighting two separate studies that each found that most of the "foreign fighters" in Iraq are not longstanding terrorists but rather were radicalized by the U.S. occupation:

[I]nterrogations of nearly 300 Saudis captured while trying to sneak into Iraq and case studies of more than three dozen others who blew themselves up in suicide attacks show that most were heeding the calls from clerics and activists to drive infidels out of Arab land, according to a study by Saudi investigator Nawaf Obaid, a US-trained analyst who was commissioned by the Saudi government and given access to Saudi officials and intelligence.

A separate Israeli analysis of 154 foreign fighters compiled by a leading terrorism researcher found that despite the presence of some senior Al Qaeda operatives who are organizing the volunteers, "the vast majority of [non-Iraqi] Arabs killed in Iraq have never taken part in any terrorist activity prior to their arrival in Iraq." [emphasis mine]

This isn't particularly surprising, nor does it in any way simplify our understanding of the complex composition of the insurgency itself. But it is always useful to collect data and to confirm hypotheses. The trick, of course, is whether the policy will change to reflect such confirmations. I doubt it, and so does Peter Bergen, rather succinctly:

"To say we must fight them in Baghdad so we don't have to fight them in Boston implies there is a finite number of people, and if you pen them up in Iraq you can kill them all," said Bergen. "The truth is we increased the pool by what we did in Iraq."

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:01 PM to Middle East

July 07, 2005

Separate issues

It looks like the Aussies are being called back to another front in the "war on terror:"

The Afghan government had asked Australia, a close US ally, to send troops and the cabinet would most likely make a decision next week, Howard told a commercial radio station Thursday.

"There's been a standing request from the government of Afghanistan over quite a period of time to a lot of countries including Australia to send troops," he said.

"Now we are going to look at it. I don't want to pre-empt what cabinet might decide. But we are going to look at it and if we do take a decision it will be announced next week."

I would argue that a given military commitment to Afghanistan would do much more to mitigate violent Islamic extremism than a similar commitment to Iraq. Though the occupation of Iraq has caused a blossoming of Islamic terrorism in that country, Afghanistan was always the hub of al Qaeda's operations. Even today, it remains nothing more than a fragile success, still hosting and falling victim to Taliban and al Qaeda perturbations. Of course, this is all complicated by the fact that Iraq -- as a hub and training center for mujahideen, both local and foreign -- has become the new Afghanistan. Both places are a mess, but on principle, Afghanistan represents the struggle against Islamic terrorism in a purer and more effective sense.

Howard strives to make the distinction between Iraq and Afghanistan, especially with regard to possible troop deployments:

Australia already has about 900 troops with the US-led coalition in Iraq, and Howard indicated that any decision on Afghanistan would not affect this commitment.

"The two issues are quite separate and if we were to decide on Afghanistan it would be taken in isolation to our commitment to Iraq, and that commitment will remain until the job is finished," he said. [emphasis mine]

I suppose that's better than rejecting the Afghan request out of hand, but it misses a great opportunity to send a symbolic and practical message that Iraq represents a colossal miscalculation in the West's post-9/11 response. Interestingly, and refreshingly, Labor is making the same distinction that Howard is ("the two issues are quite separate") but from a much more logical basis:

"At the moment Australia is caught in the Iraq quagmire," [Labor leader Kim] Beazley said. "Australia needs to get out of Iraq so that we can begin to prepare for involvement in Afghanistan to tackle terrorism."

Indeed, Iraq and Afghanistan are quite separate issues. Howard thinks they are separate because they represent different battlefields in the same war, while Beazley thinks they're separate because Iraq and Afghanistan represent different wars altogether. In this instance, I think Beazley's closer to the truth.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:16 PM to Australia/NZ, Middle East

June 28, 2005

Nothing new

I wasn't going to touch Bush's speech tonight, largely because it's being blogged ably, abundantly, and probably more originally elsewhere. But I just can't let this slide:

The troops here and across the world are fighting a global war on terror. This war reached our shores on September 11, 2001.

No. This war reaches our shores in the billions of dollars lost annually, the images of violence we see nightly, and the flag-drapped caskets we receive daily. The war begun on September 11 has absolutely and verifiably no connection with that currently being waged in Iraq -- Bush himself has admitted as much. Tying the two together is crass, manipulative, and irresponsible. Even today, three years after the drumbeat to war picked up pace, Bush continues to pick and choose among invasion rationales, trying to see which will stick. Regime change, al Qaeda, WMD -- each sound nice as a reason to invade, none are correct as represented by the administration. It hasn't been clearer than it is now: we went into Iraq to stay in Iraq.

To conflate September 11 and the invasion of Iraq is outright criminal. In doing so, Bush has condemned generations of Americans to a struggle that is not their own.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 09:06 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics

June 27, 2005

Contradiction corrected

This seems to represent an interesting bit of progress:

Israel and the US have reportedly agreed to defuse a row over Israel's arms sales to countries such as China.

The two are to sign a deal promising each will take the other's concerns into account when selling weapons, Israel's Haaretz newspaper says

As I've noted before, there has seemed to be a contradiction in Bush administration policy between its loyalty to Israel and its fear of China. With this new agreement, it seems that fear of China has won out. Haaretz provides some context:

The memorandum [outlining the arms agreement], which is to put an end an export crisis with the U.S., will state that the U.S. and Israel are "strategic partners" and that each country will be considerate of the other's concerns about military technology being transferred to other countries. The countries "arousing concern" will be specified separately.

The dispute erupted at the end of last year following Washington's demand that Israel not return to China spare parts of Harpy UAVs (drones). The Israeli-manufactured UAVs had been sold to China and were sent here for repairs. This conflict is one of the gravest ever to erupt between the two countries in recent years.

Under the agreement, to be termed "Declaration of Understanding on Technology Exports," both countries will undertake to maintain transparency regarding weapons sales to countries considered worrisome. The U.S. will explicitly pledge not to ban defense deals on commercial grounds, thereby allaying Israeli defense establishment concerns that the Americans would try to hurt Israeli defense businesses and push them out of the international market."

So there appears to be plenty of soft, gentle language here to hide the fact that the Bush administration is pulling rank on the Israelis. And I have to admit, I'm surprised that they came down on Sharon decisively. Maintaining illogical and unsustainable policy contradictions has seemed to be par for the course for the Bush administration, so I have to give them credit for coming down on one side of the issue. Whether erring on the side of Chinese fear over Israeli loyalty was the right call isn't the issue; that the Bush administration actually made a tough choice is.

The Chinese, for their part, are a bit peeved:

Accusing the Bush administration of "carping" and "outside interference," China issued a sharp complaint Monday after Israel cancelled a controversial Israeli-Chinese arms deal under pressure from the United States.

The Israeli decision halted the sale of drone aircraft capable of seeking out radar installations. It was the result of a U.S. campaign to block China from obtaining advanced military technology that could be used against Taiwan and U.S. forces supporting the island in any confrontation.

Well, ok. One should remember that China really had no choice but to complain. I'm sure they'd like to give Israel their business in order to repair their radar-seeking drones, but in the big picture, they're just drones. This deal won't in any serious way crimp China's military modernization. Indeed, its relevance isn't on the Chinese side of the equation; it's on the U.S.-Israeli side. China can take care of itself.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:08 PM to Asia, Middle East, U. S. Politics

June 26, 2005

Known knowns

There was a time when the U.S. Defense Secretary was praised for his refreshing forthrightness. That time has long since passed, but even still, Donald Rumsfeld came through today with a somewhat surprising display of honesty:

Rumsfeld, addressing a question about whether U.S. troops levels are adequate to vanquish the increasingly violent resistance, said, "We're not going to win against the insurgency. The Iraqi people are going to win against the insurgency. That insurgency could go on for any number of years. Insurgencies tend to go on five, six, eight, 10, 12 years. [emphasis mine]

I don't know how long this particular insurgency will last. But the time frame so often bandied about with regard to the U.S. occupation has been of the 2-5 year variety. This is used to think about when U.S forces might leave Iraq, or when a stable government might take hold there, or even when the insurgency might sputter out. But now, Rumsfeld himself has broken the magic 10 year barrier.

It's refreshing, really. While I think the time frame he's introducing is still well short of reality, it is a step in a more honest direction.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:36 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics

June 20, 2005

Saddam's favorites

This just makes too much sense:

Saddam Hussein likes Doritos, washes his hands compulsively and thinks fondly of the late U.S. President Ronald Reagan, according to American soldiers who guarded him and tell their story in the July issue of GQ magazine.

The jailed former Iraqi leader described how Reagan, who was president during the time of Iraq's 1980-88 war with Iran, sold him planes and helicopters. "Reagan and me, good,'" Saddam said, according to the article by Lisa DePaulo in the July issue that goes on sale June 28.

"He said, 'I wish things were like when Ronald Reagan was still president,'" said one of the soldiers who guarded him. [emphasis mine]

I'm sure he does.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:16 PM to Middle East

June 16, 2005

Futility

So I see that a bipartisan group of congressmen is pushing the administration for a plan to withdraw U.S. trrops from Iraq by October 2006. While noble, I wonder if the congressmen realize how truly futile their efforts are. Aside from the fact that the last thing the Bush administration would allow would be submission to a motley group of congressmen (Dennis Kucinich included), a more fundamental truth is in play here: the United States will never leave Iraq.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:27 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics

May 25, 2005

Open for business

As previously discussed here, the BTC pipeline has finally opened for business, to great fanfare:

The presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey pulled orange levers Wednesday to send the first flow of Caspian Sea crude into a $3.2 billion pipeline seen as key to reducing the West's reliance on Middle East oil.

By year's end, the 1,100-mile pipeline is to ship up to 1 million barrels a day to Turkey's Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.

President Bush, whose administration is seeking to diversify energy sources, said in a letter read at the ceremony by Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman that the pipeline "opens a new era in the Caspian Basin's development."

There's a fair variety of coverage about this opening, including a snippy piece in the Independent and a nostalgic, Azeri-focused take in the Times. Of greatest interest to me, however, is a fine piece in the Christian Science Monitor focusing on what the BTC pipeline means for Turkey:

For Turkey, which has few energy supplies of its own, the pipeline is the initial step in its effort to become a major energy player, not as a producer but as a transit point. In an era when countries are increasingly looking to diversify their energy sources, Turkey hopes to establish itself as a kind of energy supermarket, betting that controlling oil routes will turn out to be as strategically valuable as producing the stuff.

"Geographically, Turkey is endowed with advantages, so we would like to use those advantages to give Turkey a role as a supplier of energy resources," says a senior Turkish foreign ministry official involved in energy issues. "It gives Turkey relevance." [emphasis mine]

I've long been fascinated by Turkey's unique geopolitical position, and the BTC pipeline is a classic example of Turkey utilizing that position to its advantage. That Turkey benefits from the BTC pipeline as an energy transit point is no surprise. Nor, for that matter, is the obvious Turkish desire to have seen the pipeline project through to its completion, and on the specific BTC routing. But I doubt Turkey alone could have swung the route to its advantage. No, it called upon its stalwart ally in the United States to twist some arms and provide some capital. And why? Because Turkey is the indispensable country, for so many others, in so many ways. Remember that the BTC project stretches back years. In its earlier phases, before any ground had been broken, Saddam Hussein still ruled Iraq. To keep him in his box -- the desired Iraq strategy during the 1990s -- Turkey was vital. No one had any way of knowing that the United States would seek and execute a pretext to occupy Iraq, nor could anyone know that Turkey would be under the strong but democratic rule of a mildly Islamist Prime Minister, nor could anyone know that the party led by that Prime Minister would deny U.S. troops access to Turkey as a staging ground for invasion. The only constant was Turkey's prime geopolitical position and, despite invasion rebuffs, its alliance with the United States. My point is that the two are inextricably linked, and Turkey consequently has much greater influence than any other country its size ordinarily should. And as times and priorities change, so does the nature and orientation of Turkey's influence. As the CSM concludes:

"It was originally a US strategic thing, to get around Iran and Russia," says Gareth Winrow, an energy and foreign policy expert at Istanbul Bilgi University. "Now there is the EU wanting to diversify its resources and build new pipelines.

"These things are coming together - US interests, EU interests, and Turkish interests, and it's something Turkish officials know they can play on."

Another benefit of the BTC pipeline to Turkey, of course, is the reduced specter of dangerous tanker traffic in the Bosporus. That congested waterway is already much too polluted, and the prospect of vastly greater petroleum traffic within meters of Istanbul pleased no one. So while the BTC pipeline may entrench an unpleasant Azeri government, and while oil companies may be profiting exorbitantly, and while locals may have been displaced in the pipeline's construction, and while the whole project just perpetuates an unhealthy petrochemical obsession, it saves the Bosporus from greater pollution. Say what you will in opposition to BTC, but I think millions of Istanbulis are at least somewhat grateful for it.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:41 PM to Asia, Europe, Middle East

May 17, 2005

Muddled righteousness

It seems that Christopher Hitchens and I have different takes on James Bennet's Iraq piece from this weekend's New York Times:

A doozy classic led the "Week in Review" section on Sunday. Portentously headed "The Mystery of the Insurgency," the article rubbed its eyes at the sheer lunacy and sadism of the Iraqi car bombers and random murderers. At a time when new mass graves are being filled, and old ones are still being dug up, writer James Bennet practically pleaded with the authors of both to come up with an intelligible (or defensible?) reason for his paper to go on calling them "insurgents."

[...]

In my ears, "insurgent" is a bit like "rebel" or even "revolutionary." There's nothing axiomatically pejorative about it, and some passages of history have made it a term of honor. At a minimum, though, it must mean "rising up." These fascists and hirelings are not rising up, they are stamping back down. It's time for respectable outlets to drop the word, to call things by their right names (Baathist or Bin Ladenist or jihadist would all do in this case), and to stop inventing mysteries where none exist.

Hitchens is so breathless he almost forgets to be incomprehensible. But in true form, he pulls through in the end. Well done, chap.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:02 PM to Middle East

May 15, 2005

No precedent

Fine piece in today's New York Times about the Iraqi insurgency:

The insurgents in Iraq are showing little interest in winning hearts and minds among the majority of Iraqis, in building international legitimacy, or in articulating a governing program or even a unified ideology or cause beyond expelling the Americans. They have put forward no single charismatic leader, developed no alternative government or political wing, displayed no intention of amassing territory to govern now.

Rather than employing the classic rebel tactic of provoking the foreign forces to use clumsy and excessive force and kill civilians, they are cutting out the middleman and killing civilians indiscriminately themselves, in addition to more predictable targets like officials of the new government. Bombings have escalated in the last two weeks, and on Thursday a bomb went off in heavy traffic in Baghdad, killing 21 people.

This surge in the killing of civilians reflects how mysterious the long-term strategy remains - and how the rebels' seeming indifference to the past patterns of insurgency is not necessarily good news for anyone.

A friend currently serving Iraq confirms that a big reason the insurgents have gone after civilians and Iraqi recruits is the ease by which they can. While sophisticated and coordinated in their own way, the insurgents are wary of directly attacking against U.S. forces. And the lack of apparent strategy could very easily be explained by the varied composition of the insurgency itself. But it could not have persisted as long as it has by simply being a disorganized and uncoordinated assemblage of fighters. So what to make of the insurgency?

The common denominator, clearly, is the presence of U.S. troops in Iraq. Whether an insurgent is an ex-Baathist, and Iraqi nationalist, or a foreign jihadist, they would not have taken up arms if the United States had not invaded Iraq. Attacking civilians and Iraqi recruits, then, might logically be an attempt to sow distrust of U.S. authority. But as the NYT piece points out, Iraq is now nominally sovereign, governed by elected leaders -- the argument that the Iraqi government consists of U.S. stooges has grown increasingly difficult to prove. And no matter what the circumstances, attacking civilians does not go far in gaining the insurgency additional popular support.

But this assumes rational behavior on the part of the insurgency, or at least rational behavior as defined by historical precedent. Perhaps, in its own way, chaos is seen as a sufficient end in itself by the insurgency. It could reduce confidence in the Iraqi government and increase resentment of the U.S. occupation. That such chaos doesn't necessarily represent a cohesive message or a governing philosophy might be irrelevant. While the various components of the insurgency may have different ends in mind, they may be putting off such differences and settling on common means for the time being.

I had earlier suggested that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would not necessarily quell the insurgency. I may have been too simplistic in that assessment. A U.S. withdrawal, instead of representing a victory for the insurgency, might actually just fracture it. The nationalists among them would probably consider their goals met and the ex-Baathists might see their violent struggle evolve into a more directly political one. But would the jihadists and foreign fighters just give up and/or go home? I couldn't see that happening. As long as a semblance of representative government persists in Iraq, it will -- in some small way -- represent a success for U.S. policy and liberal political values. While the number of Iraqis who would fight just to oppose such values would be much less than the number who would fight foreign occupation, there would still be some who would. In an environment of such instability, it would be very easy for such disaffected Iraqis to continue their struggle through violent means.

Political values aside, it is inconceivable that any Iraqi government in the near future would take an actively anti-U.S. stance. That alone would be sufficient rationale for unrest and bloodshed, albeit at perhaps reduced levels than it is at present. Think Saudi Arabia -- the pro-U.S. government there certainly generates its fair share of violent opposition. But if the NYT piece proves nothing else, it's that history doesn't serve as a reliable guide to understanding the Iraqi insurgency. Predicting its strategy, then, is next to impossible, and the ultimate outcome of the insurgency is anyone's guess. Perhaps more disturbingly, it's becoming increasingly apparent that the United States is the reactive component in the Iraqi equation. We are not setting the agenda, we are responding to events as they develop, and we don't know enough to throw the insurgency off balance. All in all, not a very hopeful scene.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:16 AM to Middle East

May 12, 2005

Worthy adversary

I've been meaning to refer to this very good piece in the Washington Post from earlier this week:

According to Hurley and others who recounted the fighting that followed, Lima Company's Marines searched each house they passed. They turned up weapons cache after weapons cache: bombs made to be dropped from airplanes, a bicycle with a seat made of explosives and an antenna for remote-control triggering, a vest rigged with explosives, a car rigged with bombs, mortar tubes, rocket launchers with new backpacks full of rockets, artillery shells.

The costly equipment, as well as body armor later recovered from the bodies of dead insurgents, suggested that the fighters were foreigners, the military said. Though the level of foreigners' involvement in the insurgency has been disputed for nearly two years, Muslim men have come to Iraq from neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia and from as far away as Chechnya and Indonesia to fight the United States and its allies.

The Marines also found Soviet-designed PKM machine guns and belts of armor-piercing ammunition. In contrast, Lima Company was armed with M-16 assault rifles and carried nothing comparable -- nothing that could penetrate walls and floors and still pack enough force to kill.

I have long been intrigued by nature and origin of the Iraqi insurgency. While the WaPo piece does touch on that -- hinting that foreign fighters now represent the most challenging elements of the insurgency -- I'm convinced that the insurgency's composition remains complex. U.S. policy options, consequently, are limited. The fact that recent attacks have predominantly targeted Iraqi military officials and recruits -- by no means a new insurgent strategy -- suggest that a simple U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would not quell the insurgency on its own (not that such a withdrawal would ever happen). Despite the remarkably successful elections in January, organs and representations of the Iraqi government remain the prime targets of the insurgency, with civilians appearing to be a close second. Why? Was the delay in forming a government to blame? Do foreign fighters resent the newly formed government as much as disenfranchised Sunnis or short-changed Shia and Kurds? Or are Iraqi recruits and civilians simply easier to kill than U.S. soldiers?

I don't know the answer, obviously, but I have no doubt that the targeting decisions are deliberate and rational in their own macabre way. Underestimating the insurgency has been a common mistake -- it has not been lacking in strategic sophistication, despite its complex composition. What strikes me most about the WaPo piece, aside from its hints about the insurgency’s composition, is the stunning detail in which it outlines the insurgents' sophistication in the tactical realm. Just as their targeting decisions are deliberate and strategic, the insurgents’ means in carrying out such attacks are frighteningly sophisticated. They are well-equipped, highly-motivated, and tightly-organized. This is nothing new, of course. But it is important to be reminded that in over 2 years of post-invasion occupation, the United States has not conclusively pacified Iraq. Indeed, the trend lines of progress or failure must constantly be scrutinized. Just because Iraqis have voted does not mean that the insurgency is diminished. The goalposts for success in Iraq are constantly moving and maddeningly uncertain, and the insurgents know this. Indeed, it is they who are moving the posts, forcing the United States to react as desired.

As a wise character once opined about a different enemy in a different war, the insurgents -- whoever they may be, whatever their objectives – surely are a "worthy fucking adversary." This doesn’t mean they can’t be beat. It just means that doing so won’t be easy.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:44 PM to Middle East

May 06, 2005

Real exit strategy

Like many other countries before it (but very much unlike the United States in the future), it seems that Japan plans to withdraw its troops from Iraq. I can't say I'm terribly surprised by this. Koizumi already demonstrated his loyalty to the United States by contributing troops in the first place, which was no easy thing for him to do. And now that a popularly-elected government has been formed, the rationale for U.S. allies to keep their forces in Iraq is becoming weaker by the day. I don't think it's a coincidence that the Diet-imposed mandate for SDF operations in Iraq expires on December 14. Formal Iraqi elections, based on a fresh constitution, are due on December 15.

Another question: what will the Aussie soldiers who are protecting the SDF troops do once the Japanese leave?

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:25 PM to Asia, Middle East

May 05, 2005

Chalabi the cat

Good Lord, it's amazing how Ahmad Chalabi always manages to land on his feet. First he helped bamboozle the gullible into invading Iraq. When the country wasn't delivered to him on a silver platter, he got uppity and started passing along U.S. intelligence to his old clerical pals in Iran. His other pals in the U.S. Defense Department didn't much like that, plus they realized they could no longer deny that his pre-war intelligence on Iraqi WMD had been shady if not flat-out wrong. So they cut off his allowance, busted up his house, and had him charged with counterfeiting and his nephew with murder. While the legal charges were later dropped, one might assume that Chalabi had been put in his place.

But like the slippery, resourceful feline he is, Chalabi now finds himself Deputy Prime Minister in the Iraqi cabinet. Sure, it's not the top job, but I'd call it a remarkable comeback nonetheless. And Condi, of all people, was among the first to congratulate him. The irony here is that it was the DOD that was always the chummiest with Chalabi, while State was dispensing some pesky, rational skepticism. No matter -- it's not like Chalabi is in a position to cause any more trouble, right?

Posted by Daniel Widome at 01:09 PM to Middle East

April 21, 2005

U.S.-Israel-China and arms

I humbly point to my latest Providence Journal piece, which I also include -- in its unedited, pre-publication, no-registration-required format -- in the extended copy of this post. It expands upon the U.S.-Israel-China arms triangle I first mentioned here.

Daniel Widome: Arms sales -- Liking Israel more than fearing China

Upon taking office, many Bush administration neo-conservatives saw China as this country’s main strategic rival. Officer cadets at West Point were taught that war with China was not a question of if but of when. Though 9/11 dramatically shifted everyone’s focus, one still cannot go a day without seeing headlines on China’s growing demand for energy, its active diplomacy in previously neglected corners of the world, or its rapidly modernizing military. In short, China is still there, still growing, and it still keeps neo-cons up at night.

Accordingly, you would think that the Bush administration would do everything it could to check China’s growing power, especially its military power. If you thought so, you would be right—in part. For sometimes allies listen to you, and sometimes they don’t. Other times, however, you don’t even mean what you tell them.

Following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the European Union imposed an arms embargo on China. Recently, however, the EU has moved to lift that embargo. For China, it is an embarrassing reminder of a long-ago incident; for the EU, the embargo stands in the way of the respect (and trade opportunities) that an emerging China deserves.

President Bush made very clear his opposition to lifting the arms embargo during his recent tour of Europe. Even prior to the neo-con fetishization of China as strategic rival, successive U.S. presidents have pledged to defend Taiwan against military attack from the mainland. While any conflict with nuclear-armed China would be a risky proposition, the prospect of facing advanced, European-made, Chinese-aimed weapons is even more disconcerting for U.S. commanders. Due to NATO co-development, many such weapons would actually be based on U.S. technology. Needless to say, these are not the kinds of weapons that West Point cadets were trained to face.

Bush’s European diplomacy, in a pleasant exception to the prevailing pattern, has seemed to pay off. The EU is now backtracking from a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo. More hopefully, and perhaps more realistically, the talk coming from Brussels now hints that any future lifting of the embargo would be predicated on verifiable and specific improvements in China’s human rights record.

Another U.S. ally, however, is not listening to President Bush. An upcoming Pentagon report highlights Israel’s longstanding transfer of arms technology to China and its role in China's military modernization. It notes that China is about to launch the J-10 fighter, which will represent a significant leap in its air force’s capabilities—and which bears an uncanny resemblance to the Lavi, a prototype fighter that Israel developed from the U.S. F-16. The Bush administration has cried foul and registered its concerns with Israel. But the Israeli response? Nothing.

What explains the difference between the EU’s response to U.S. pressure and Israel’s? Is the Bush administration exerting the same level of pressure on Israel as it is on the EU? Or is Israel simply more stubborn than the EU member states? If China truly represents this country’s greatest strategic rival, why allow any ally to supply it with arms technology?

The answers to these questions might be perfectly innocent and simply indicate an Israeli stubbornness. The U.S. relationship with Israel is, after all, fraught with sensitivities and complexities. But President Bush has, if nothing else, proven himself to be a strong supporter of Israel and a close confidante of Ariel Sharon. Such support yields influence, the kind that can be used when the stakes are high. I have no doubt that if Bush truly wanted Israel to cease its arms technology transfers to China, he could find a way to make it happen. Israel, for its part, would not be happy to be denied further access to Chinese markets and yuan. But if the United States said so, it would happen. Yet it has not.

Either the Bush administration’s neo-cons suddenly see China as an emerging partner and not as a future adversary, or they are so friendly with Israel that their diplomatic carrots overrule every conceivable stick at each turn. I am inclined to believe the latter. Regardless, this U.S.-Israel-China triangle represents a fundamental hypocrisy in the Bush administration’s foreign policy. It begs an unnecessary and impossible question: Which extreme view is paramount, devotion to Israel or fear of China?

Such a policy construction endangers those West Point-trained officers who may one day have to face the Chinese in battle, the Taiwanese who face daily intimidation from the mainland, and ordinary Chinese—whose conditions may improve, incidentally, with the Europeans’ wise use of diplomatic carrots and sticks. For all of their sakes, let us be glad that the EU is an ally that listens.

Daniel Widome, based at Brown University's Watson Institute for International Studies, is a former editor in chief of the Brown Journal of World Affairs and is author and editor of Natural Selection (http://watsonblogs.org/dwidome).

Posted by Daniel Widome at 02:59 AM to Asia, Middle East, U. S. Politics

April 19, 2005

Pipeline extension

It seems that the BTC pipeline (previously discussed here) will grow a tad longer, across the Caspian to the shores of Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, the United States has generously offered to assist Azerbaijan with Caspian security:

The so-called Caspian Guard will reportedly be headquartered in Baku and comprised of American troops trained for rapid response missions for regional crises. The guard is part of Rumsfeld’s overall strategy to re-craft America’s overseas military units from bulky Cold War bases to more deployable units flexible enough to put together different force packages for different operations. While specific information on the unit is hard to obtain, a recent report in the Wall Street Journal quoted Chief of U.S. European Command, General James Jones addressing the U.S. Congress about the guard. Jones said the U.S. plans to allocate some $100 million to cover the guard’s first 10 years of activities.

Awfully kind of Rumsfeld to lend a hand. I'm sure the support was offered solely out of the goodness of his heart.

UPDATE: Some more info here.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:49 PM to Asia, Middle East

April 14, 2005

Predictive pronouncement

In an update to the inspiring yet ultimately buried nugget I used here, Hamid Karzai has come out for a "strategic security relationship" with the United States. He never quite uttered the words "permanent bases," but that's all right -- the Bush administration can utter them for him.

Expect something similar to emanate from Baghdad within the next couple of months or years.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:17 PM to Middle East

April 10, 2005

Friend to foe

Laura Rozen (via Matt Yglesias) points out a Boston Globe piece on an upcoming report that highlights the Israeli transfer of arms technology to China and its role in China's ongoing military modernization. Laura and Matt, quite wisely, further explore how and why such a pessimistic assessment could be used to justify particular expenditures in the U.S. defense budget. As has been noted here, there remains a strong constituency in U.S. policymaking and military circles that considers China to be this country's primary strategic adversary in the medium- to long-term. It is clearly within their interest to highlight China's growing military and geostrategic capacity, which has also been noted here.

In such a context, then, it's clear why the United States is pushing the EU so hard to retain its arms embargo on China. But why not a similar kind of pressure on Israel, whose technology transfers to China are nothing new? To be sure, the United States has known about such transfers for some time, and the Bush administration has registered its displeasure. But such complaints do not seem to have shut off the technology spigot from Israel to China. Why? Is the Bush administration exerting the same level of pressure on Israel as it is on the EU? Is Israel particularly more stubborn than the EU member states? If the Bush administration truly wanted Israel to cease its technology transfers to China, couldn't it find the right pressure points on which to squeeze Israel? I honestly don't know. But I'm inclined to think that there is more here than meets the eye.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:55 PM to Asia, Middle East, U. S. Politics

Silly timeframes

More talk of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, in this case within a two year timeframe. How naive.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:19 PM to Middle East

April 09, 2005

Perfect protest

Important news from Iraq today is the large protest held against the U.S. occupation:

Chanting "No, no to the occupiers," men loyal to cleric Moqtada al-Sadr streamed from the poor Shi'ite district of Sadr City to Firdos Square in central Baghdad where Saddam's statue was torn down two years ago, in a peaceful show of strength.

The square and side streets were quickly packed with crowds waving Iraqi flags and brandishing effigies of Saddam, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Bush.

"No America! No Saddam! Yes to Islam!" many chanted. One group of demonstrators burned an American flag.

As far as I can tell, this is terrific news for a whole host of reasons. First, while it may be a cliche to note that such free assembly is exactly why the Bush administration chose to invade Iraq, it's very true. Nothing like the protest today would have been tolerated under Saddam's regime.

Second, there is a nice irony to the selection of the protest date (the two year anniversary of the fall of Baghdad) and location (Firdos Square), as the Reuters report notes. Not only was Firdos Square the scene of the famous "toppling statue" footage from the invasion, but the "crowd" at that famous toppling was much sparser and less spontaneous than originally portrayed. Today's protest, in contrast, was much larger and seemingly more genuine.

Third, it's nice to see Moqtada al-Sadr channel his energy into a non-violent means of expression. Over much of the past year, this was not the case.

Fourth, and perhaps the most promising detail of this news, is the equal opportunity opposition espoused by the protesters. Saddam was brandished in effigy beside Blair and Bush -- no one can claim that these protesters are "dead-enders" or ex-Baathists, nor can they reasonably claim that they were coerced into demonstrating by "foreign terrorists" or insurgents.

This protest appears to have been genuine, heartfelt, and peaceful. This was why (or rather, should have been why, sort of, maybe) Bush invaded Iraq. But what of its anti-U.S. message? This is quite a little conundrum for the Bush administration -- they have no intention of leaving Iraq, yet it is the freedom they have bestowed upon the Iraqis that represents the greatest threat to continued U.S. occupation/basing. It would be funny if it weren't so tragic.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 07:56 PM to Middle East

April 02, 2005

Pearly Pakistani port

Returning briefly to the topic of China's geopolitical coming-of-age, I noticed this interesting piece that I had missed when originally published a month ago. It highlights Chinese assistance in developing a deepwater port at Gwadar, in Pakistan. The Chinese and Pakistanis have a long history of close, strategic cooperation, and this particular case seems to be a win-win deal for both countries. The reason? Location, location, location. Pakistan gets the investment boost it needs to complete a long-dormant intrastructural improvement. But Gwadar also happens to be in the far southwest of Pakistan, giving it additional strategic flexibility vis-a-vis India by having a deepwater alternative to Karachi that is further from Indian territory.

For China, this location is also beneficial. Gwadar is right on the Strait of Hormuz, through which all seaborne Persian Gulf oil must pass. One can safely assume that in return for investment, Pakistan will give China a fair number of privileges at its new port. Gwadar seems to be one of China's "string of pearls," as they've been called: a network of strategically located seaports and naval bases that allow China to project power in the places it needs to but physically cannot from its own territory. Come to think of it, the concept of estabilishing bases in strategic corners of the world is a time-honored tradition among great powers. If that's what China hopes to become, it sure is following from the right playbook.

I note this story not out of some irrational fear that China will necessarily become the next great menace to the United States (though it surely ain't perfect). Rather, I'm intrigued in it more as a case study of how a country becomes a power in the 21st century, considering the end of the Cold War, the advent of globalization, the "war on terror," and everything else. I think this process is eminently fascinating, and China currently provides the best example of how a modern-day geopolitical butterfly will emerge from its increasingly confined cocoon.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:30 PM to Asia, Middle East

April 01, 2005

Culture Smart Card

Around the Institute, James Der Derian has been showing off a neat, laminated "Iraq Culture Smart Card" that he picked up while out with the Marines in California a few weeks ago. It's an interesting little device, packed quite densely with information. But it's also a bit ludicrous -- can an entire culture really be reduced to the equivalent of a fold-out pocket map, especially for a 19 year old Marine recruit? Well, for those of you who don't have the pleasure of working a few doors down from James (or the responsibility of carrying the card as part of your employment/deployment), the "culture card" (or at least one very similar to James') is also on the web for your viewing pleasure.

And to put in a related plug for the Institute, James and Keith Brown have been doing some great work of late on cultural sensitivity training in the military.

UPDATE: Jai picks up this point and carries it further. I agree that the card is better than nothing. Heck, I learned a lot from it.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:01 AM to Middle East, Trans-geographical

March 31, 2005

Baku-ed up

First, the Commander of the Turkish Navy visits Azerbaijan and pledges assistance to ensure the security of its Caspian oil fields. Then, we learn that the Turkish Land Forces Commander will visit Baku in April to discuss joint Turkish-Azeri military exercises. Why all the chumminess?

In the 1990s, much ink was spilled about Turkey's foreign policy ambitions in Central Asia. The break-up of the Soviet Union had produced a bevy of newly independent, ethnically Turkic states in Central Asia in need of recognition and assistance. The fall of the Soviet empire had also produced a power vacuum, into which new, outside influence could be exerted. Turkey, it was felt, was the state that would most logically take advantage of these new circumstances. And to some extent, it did. But shifting governments, economic difficulties, European obsessions, and natural disasters continually directed Turkish attention away from Central Asia. Following 11 September 2001, Central Asia took on a whole new level of geopolitical significance, and the Turkish window of opportunity closed.

But Turkey still had its foot in the door, most significantly in the form of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. This pipeline, long a dream of Turkish and U.S. geostrategists, will take oil from Azerbaijan's Caspian fields directly to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. While costlier than a shorter pipeline-tanker combination favored by the Russians -- look at any map of the Black Sea region to see why -- the BTC pipeline will save the narrow and already overcrowded Bosporus and Dardanelles passages (and the adjacent millions in Istanbul and its environs) from vastly increased tanker traffic. Through port fees, of course, the BTC option also favors Turkey economically. After years of deliberation, construction, and delays, the BTC pipeline is finally scheduled to open later this year. The Turks already control the petroleum terminus at Ceyhan -- can it be any wonder that they want to help secure its origin at Baku? In the process, Turkey may inch its way back to a position of influence in Central Asia.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:18 AM to Asia, Europe, Middle East

WMD.gov

In what (hopefully) will be the big news of the day, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction has released its final report, and it has reserved a killer URL, to boot. Its conclusions?

On the brink of war, and in front of the whole world, the United States government asserted that Saddam Hussein had reconstituted his nuclear weapons program, had biological weapons and mobile biological weapon production facilities, and had stockpiled and was producing chemical weapons. All of this was based on the assessments of the U.S. Intelligence Community. And not one bit of it could be confirmed when the war was over.

While the intelligence services of many other nations also thought that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, in the end it was the United States that put its credibility on the line, making this one of the most public -- and most damaging -- intelligence failures in recent American history. [emphasis mine]

This is just a teaser from the introduction, and I'm sure the rest is plenty juicy. I'm highly suspicious, however, that the report will lay the bulk of the blame for the Iraq invasion on the intelligence community. To be sure, mistakes were made at CIA, NSA, military intelligence, and others. But to assign all or even the bulk of blame there would be an all too easy and much too convenient way to shift culpability from the Bush administration. It was they, after all, that argued the public case and made the explicit decision to invade Iraq.

We'll see what the rest of the report looks like. I'll have much more to say about it in the coming days.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:17 AM to Middle East, U. S. Politics

March 29, 2005

Hamas/PLO

Is this for real?

Resistance group Hamas has reiterated its readiness to join the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which groups together all the major Palestinian factions.

Mahmud Zahar, one of the main leaders of the resistance group, said on Monday that disagreements over the PLO charter and the size of Hamas' representation in the council had delayed its incorporation.

"Our decision to participate in the PLO is not new. It is a longstanding and clear decision," Zahar said after a meeting with Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas in the Gaza City.[emphasis mine]

I'm no expert on Palestinean politics, but if legit, this would strike me as a rather big deal. As for the obvious stumbling block -- Hamas rejecting the existence of Israel, the PLO accepting it -- Zahar said, "we are renouncing not one iota of Palestinian land but we can reach a temporary compromise with other factions."

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:38 PM to Middle East

March 23, 2005

Downer, up from down under

In an update to the earlier noted deployment of additional Australian soliders to Iraq to defend Japanese troops, it seems that Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer paid a visit to Tokyo earlier this week:

In a wide-ranging speech to the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) following his meeting with Koizumi, Downer said the deployment of an additional 450 Australian troops to maintain security in Muthanna Province and protect GSDF troops there underlined Australia's commitment to its cooperative relationship with Japan.

"We know that the initial decision to deploy defense forces to Iraq was a complex one for Japan, but it was the right decision to make and we're very pleased to be working with Japan, and with other coalition partners, to help Iraq build a better future," he said.

Asked if Australian casualties while guarding Japanese forces would affect the relationship, Downer said, "We'll live with the consequences as Australians of our own decisions and not pass the blame to Japan if that happened."

It's nice to hear Downer say that Australian casualties in Iraq wouldn't affect relations with Japan. Of course, Downer is at an advantage in knowing that Muthanna is one of the safer provinces in Iraq. If, however, Australians were to die in Iraq -- they have yet to lose a soldier in combat, despite being one of the few countries involved in the Iraq war since the initial invasion -- it would cause a stir. The recent deployment of additional troops isn't very popular in Australia, nor is the Japanese deployment in general overwhelmingly popular in that country. If Aussie deaths were linked in the public consciousness to the defense of armed but impotent Japanese soldiers, it very well might have an effect on Australian mass perceptions of Japan and on the relationship between the two countries. So if all of Downer's stoicism is put to a tragic test by unfortunate news from Iraq, public opinion may leave him behind.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:16 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, Middle East

March 21, 2005

Concurrent basing

I'm glad to see that Kevin, Chris, and Matt are in agreement with me on the issue of permanent U.S. basing in Iraq. It would be hard to be in better company than that.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:44 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics

Talking Turkey

On the topic of ticking off U.S. allies, Don Rumsfeld lamented Turkish democracy over the weekend. In response to a question about whether he had any regrets about his execution of the Iraq war, Rumsfeld notes:

Well, given the level of the insurgency today, two years later, clearly if we had been able to get the 4th Infantry Division in from the north through Turkey, more of the Iraqi Saddam Hussein Baathist regime would have been captured or killed. The insurgency today would be less.

What happened was we had to come in from the south, our 4th Infantry Division was blocked in the north.

As a result, by the time Baghdad was taken, the large fraction of the Iraqi military and intelligence services just dissipated into the communities. And they're still, in a number of instances, still active. [emphasis mine]

In fairness to Rumsfeld, he didn't outright condemn Turkey's decision to refuse access to the 4th ID -- he very clearly was speaking in hypotheticals. But of all the things that Rumsfeld could regret about his execution of the Iraq war, he chooses Turkey's refusal of a northern front. Not only is such a selection breathtaking in its boneheadedness, but it is also the one for which Rumsfeld himself is least responsible. Turkish PM Erdogan supported the idea hosting U.S. troops -- but he couldn't get his parliament in line. The State Department could have exercised greater diplomatic suasion -- but it didn't. Is Rumsfeld intellectually aware of this? If he is, then his comments might be intended as more than just a simple statement of remorse. They might have contemporary policy implications.

The Turks, for their part, are definitely feeling some cold winds blowing from Washington. Indeed, as Rumsfeld's comments demonstrate, folks in the Bush administration aren't very willing to forgive and forget Turkey's disloyalty in early 2003. As Turkey remains the indispensible nation in so many contexts, this probably isn't a wise trend.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 10:41 AM to Europe, Middle East, U. S. Politics

March 17, 2005

The Most Nested Doll

As I hinted a few weeks ago, I feel the need to dredge up an old and possibly dead issue: the real motivation for the invasion of Iraq. In the eerie, slow-motion car crash that was the year leading up to the March 2003 invasion, the Bush administration offered a slew of reasons to invade Iraq: regime change, human rights explanations, connections to al Qaeda and other militant Islamist groups, WMD, etc. One day, regime change seemed hot and was plugged by every administration mouthpiece. The next day, WMD was the ticket and was spouted in front of every microphone in DC. There seemed to be little connection between each reason, and the constant shifting diluted the weight of each individual rationale. It was if the administration was throwing mud at a wall, just to see what would stick. Indeed, the presumptive head of the World Bank basically admitted that this was the strategy -- after the invasion. It was such a bizarre period, made possible only by an unprecedented confluence of factors: the direct attacks on the United States of 11 September and the elective nature of the Iraq war. Without the shock and awe of 11 September, it is improbable that Bush would have been able to mobilize any kind of support for an outright invasion of Iraq. He manipulated the genuine feelings of vulnerability felt by Americans after the attack, leading many to believe (and never correcting any of them) that Iraq was responsible for the attacks. This was supposed then, and is known as nearly a certainty now, to be patently false. And by all accounts -- and indeed, by Bush's subsequent admission that Iraq really wasn't involved in the 11 September attacks -- Bush knew what he was doing.

Consequently, and regardless of intent, the supposition that Saddam was behind the 11 September attacks and/or was harboring al Qaeda was suffused throughout the whole pre-war rationalization process. Such accusations, while widely believed, were pure bunk, and most people of power and information knew this. But where did the plethora of other reasons fit into the broader pro-invasion argument? One of the most insightful analyses of this came from a lecture I attended by Anne-Marie Slaughter. She portrayed the administration's argument for war as a series of nested rationales, in a manner I like to visualize as not too different from Russian matryoshka dolls. The most-exterior argument, the one that could bear not only public scrutiny but also that of the United Nations and the international community, was WMD. Indeed, Saddam Hussein was in violation of a number of Security Council resolutions, and the endgame to invasion played out largely on the east side of Manhattan. But such an argument only went so far; Bush couldn't get UN backing for his invasion. Remove that exterior layer, and one would find another argument for invasion: human rights/regime change. Saddam was a nasty guy who did nasty things to his people. This argument could be, and was, made very publicly, and it garnered a fair number of adherents. In many ways, this was the quintessential neoconservative argument: use American power to restore human rights and to spread democracy. It's a very tough case to challenge, but despite that, it was not one that could be made at the UN. No one on the Security Council (well, probably no one) actually liked Saddam or thought he was a good guy. But there was no UN resolution compelling him to be a nice guy. So this second argument could be made publicly, just not at the UN.

One must peel away another layer of rationalization, the analogy continues, to reach the nub of the pro-invasion argument: pure geopolitics. This argument, due to its archaic and nearly unjustifiable nature and in marked contrast to the two preceding arguments, could not be made publicly. Through the 1990s, neoconservative scholars and out-of-work policymakers spoke often that the United States' post-Cold War foreign policy should focus on retaining global supremacy and deterring or defeating challenges to such supremacy. They were organized most notably as the Project for the New American Century, and they declared their aims in PNAC's statement of principles:

• we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future;

• we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values;

• we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad;

• we need to accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.

In addition to its general principles, PNAC was particularly interested in regime change in Iraq. When George Bush was elected in 2000, many PNAC luminaries -- Cheney, Rumsfeld, Bolton, Perle, and others -- quickly formed the administrative and policymaking core of his administration. Not long after, some people began to make the connection.

So what does this mean? I've always thought that Wesley Clark put it best in an interview during his ill-fated presidential campaign:

But, in the odd kind of geopolitical chess board game this administration seemed to want to play, they seemed to assume that you could get your forces into Iraq, and, like a game of checkers, you could skip across the Middle East -- plop, plop, plop -- as though in some metaphysical sense, it was easier to come ashore up through the Euphrates and Tigris valleys into the heart of the Middle East and southwest Asia, and then cross into the mountains of Iraq -- excuse me, of Iran -- or pivot and go towards Syria. It was analytically, geometrically satisfying, even though those of us who understood the situation at the time said it made little sense. It was old-think. It was 19th century geostrategy -- [emphasis mine]

And if you don't believe a Democratic presidential candidate, why not take it from the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy itself:

The presence of American forces overseas is one of the most profound symbols of the U.S. commitments to allies and friends. Through our willingness to use force in our own defense and in defense of others, the United States demonstrates its resolve to maintain a balance of power that favors freedom. To contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces. [emphasis mine]

Fundamentally, I believe the Bush administration invaded Iraq for the sake of invading Iraq. It put U.S. power in a vitally important part of the world. Everything else -- links to al-Qaeda, WMD, human rights, etc -- was ancillary to this central cause. Again, this is not to say that Saddam Hussein wasn't a bad person who did horrible things, nor to suggest that he didn't have a documented history of WMD production, use, and obfuscation, nor to say that such matters didn’t genuinely concern people in the Bush administration. Rather, in my mind, the only consistent, logical explanation for Bush's rationale to invade was geopolitics -- we wanted to be in Iraq because we thought it was necessary to preserve our position of global supremacy. This is why I am always amused when politicians and pundits alike talk about an "exit strategy" from Iraq -- will we be out in 6 months? 2 years? 5 years? It's ludicrous, because we went into Iraq to stay in Iraq. U.S. forces, God-willing, will be drawn-down substantially and will face less danger as time passes. But we will never completely leave, not in the near-term, at least. It's funny, in a way. Many pro-war pundits looked to Germany and Japan as examples of how post-war reconstruction could be done right. As it happened, we bungled the Iraqi reconstruction. The Germany and Japan models, however, can still apply, in a very different way -- 60 years on, and U.S. forces are still there.

So why bring all of this up now? The invasion of Iraq was preceded by the attack on Afghanistan, an altogether more justified and transparently rationalized war. Yet it was still directed by the same folks -- PNAC alums and Bush administration stalwarts -- who brainstormed the Iraq operation. So when something like this comes along, I have a hard time feeling surprised. Indeed, it's probably a harbinger of things to come in Iraq.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 06:16 PM to Middle East, U. S. Politics

March 13, 2005

Propaganda, sanctioned and otherwise

This weekend, the national newspaper of record inadvertently reminded readers why it is impossible to limit the "record" to a single source. In a major front page piece, the New York Times alerts readers to a wave of government-produced television segments, airing and masquerading as local news stories around the country. While Bush-administration pay-outs to Armstrong Williams and other commentators to promote specific policies have been known for some months, it appears that the government is also in the local news business. For producer and distributor alike, it's a good deal. The Bush administration gets a great way to cut through the filter of national media (a goal during last year's campaign, as well), and local affiliates get much-desired content. That such content consists of little more than gussied-up, one-sided advertisements is, perhaps, marginally inconvenient.

In the same paper, on the same day, we learn that Iraqi insurgents' web presence -- previously discussed in this space -- has taken a sophisticated, perhaps more defensive turn in recent weeks. Citing the very helpful SITE Institute, the Times notes that recent pronouncements from Zarqawi-linked groups complain that insurgent successes are being under-reported and attempt to paint insurgents as defenders of Muslims. That the internet offers insurgents an inexpensive and effective means for disseminating their propaganda is not new. But over time, the insurgents develop a record of their web-based communiques, a pattern of sorts, enabling us to detect trends and to attempt to divine their current status and future intent.

While the modes and means may differ, the Bush administration and Iraqi insurgents are after the same thing -- converting minds. Both rely on misdirection, selective reporting, and biased analysis. In other words, both are propaganda. But if you think about it, what media isn't? As was noted here earlier, governments are always faced with challenges from the media, and they rarely hesitate to enter the fray on their own in an attempt to even the scales. The more one looks into the overlapping webs of media ownership, affiliations, connections, and funders, the less hope one has that there is any reliable way of getting accurate, impartial information. In a developed country, this is undeniably a problem. But at least the traditions and customs of civil society in such states act as a brake for all but the most egregious of media excesses. In much of the world, however, such robust traditions do not exist, and the potential hazards of propaganda/media manipulation are less predictable and much greater.

The solution? There is no single one, of course. And in that, incidentally, lies a potential response. If no single media source can be trusted, then multiple sources must be consulted, regularly, rigorously, and responsibly. None will be completely accurate, and all will have biases and agendas, overt and subtle. But distillation from variety offers the best chance for gleaning something of value from the media storm, and technology (thankfully) is offering new and easier ways to do this all the time. The catch? Even with the advent of blogs, RSS feeds, and web-based accessibility, such a distillation takes time, energy, commitment, and above all, patience on the part of the media recipient. That the media industry is essentially a service one -- important inasmuch as it seeks to keep its customers happy (and, by extension, lazy) -- places the burden squarely on the consumer. This, of course, presumes an interest for accurate information (and an awareness that such a commodity may be lacking) among a citizenry -- why take up all the time and energy consulting multiple newspapers, websites, or cable channels when one seems to do just fine? It's a tough argument to refute, and autocrats the world over, of all stripes, are content not to try.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:47 PM to Middle East, Trans-geographical, U. S. Politics

March 12, 2005

How to shake a Bush

If you're the leader of a Latin American country these days, it's not hard to get on the United States' bad side. First, it's helpful to have a history of working against the grain of U.S.-Latin American relations. Second, welcome the leader of an "evil" country for a state visit. Third, sign a number of cooperation agreements with said "evil" country, defend such country's nuclear ambitions, and proclaim solidarity with it in the face of U.S. aggression. And finally, it doesn't hurt to buy some weapons from Russia at the same time. Rejecting increased oil production in the face of rising prices can be helpful, too.

By the way, does anyone else find it interesting that one of the seven languages available on the IRNA website is Serbian? That's intriguing for any number of reasons.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:33 AM to Americas, Middle East

March 09, 2005

The Levant Shuffle

For anyone trying to get their bearings on the recent goings-on in the Levant, TNR provides a nice who's-who in Lebanese politics, and the BBC does the same for Syria. While such information may already be somewhat out-of-date -- the recently deposed, pro-Syrian PM of Lebanon looks likely to regain his old post, just as Syrian troops begin to relocate -- it's nice to see politics being conducted there by rival demonstrations rather than by rival violence.

UPDATE: More good stuff on Lebanon from the Guardian, suggesting that with a deeper understanding of the country's politics and history, the recent demonstrations there may be less profound than the media leads us to believe.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 05:18 PM to Middle East

March 03, 2005

Arbitrary benchmarks

The U.S. occupation in Iraq reached an unpleasant milestone on 2 March, when the 1500th, 1501st, and 1502nd American soldiers to die since the invasion of Iraq were killed in separate IED attacks. This has drawn some media attention -- more than any other arbitrary benchmark would, less than the equally arbitrary 1000th death did last year. But does it mean anything? Technically, no. Each death is tragic, be it American, British, Ukrainian, or Iraqi. In the sense that the 1500 benchmark does matter, however, its true effect is unclear. By simply drawing wider media scrutiny, one might reasonably assume that the 1500th death would draw attention to the human cost of the occupation, raise questions about the original rationale for the invasion of Iraq, and highlight the lack of a clear strategy for extrication from that country. Raising these points, one might further conjecture, could even result in an epiphany of accountability, a demand for explanation, strategy, and solution. Will it? I am skeptical. As the president once giddily observed, the United States has already had its "accountability moment," and the death total then was no less tragic than the 1502 is today.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 08:23 PM to Middle East

February 22, 2005

Pacific politics, Iraqi desert

When faced with charges of "unilateralism," supporters of the war in Iraq often counter with the fact that many countries comprise the "coalition of the willing," with forces currently serving in-country. While certainly true, the forces offered by many states amount to little more than token contributions, with the United Kingdom, South Korea, Italy, and Poland leading the way with the most substantial contigents. Over the past 24 months, furthermore, several countries have withdrawn their garrisons, most notably Spain last year. But back in March 2003, when a fair number of countries supported the invasion of Iraq in principle, only one country besides the United States and the United Kingdom supported it with troops: Australia. Now, with the Dutch on their way out, the Aussies have taken a somewhat unexpected step: they will send more troops to Iraq.

The 450 new troops will be in addition to Australia's current 800-odd troops serving in and around Iraq, and to be sure, Prime Minister John Howard's decision to deploy them faces serious questions from the opposition Labor Party back home. Fortunately for the new arrivals, they will be stationed in the relatively quiet southern sector of the country. And their primary charge? To protect other troops. To be sure, the "other troops" in question are no ordinary troops. They are members of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces, constitutionally-prohibited from using any more than a bare minimum of force, and then only in strictly-defined situations of self-defense. Performing humanitarian and construction duties primarily, their mere presense in Iraq is significant in the context of Japan's evolving foreign and defense policies, as discussed recently in this space. Some do, of course, suppose [free registration required to view] the Japanese presence in Iraq is more complicated than any mere obligation to its alliance with the United States.

Regardless, the deployment of additional Australian troops to Iraq to defend Japanese soldiers contains an intriguing sub-plot outside the realms of Iraq, the Islamic world, and U.S. foreign policy. It offers a unique insight into the relationship between Australia and Japan. Both countries have long been staunch allies of the United States and have been steadfast in their support of the Bush adminstration's "war on terror." But they are also each important actors in East Asia, who recently worked closely together to provide and coordinate tsunami relief in the Indian Ocean. They also represent the most important, firmly "Western" states in East Asia, defined in terms of free market economics and representative politics if not in terms of history and culture. And perhaps related to this fact, they each face very proximate, very populous neighbors -- Indonesia for Australia and China for Japan. As also discussed here previously, the strategic jockeying that these geopolitical realities represent and instigate is already well underway. If Junichiro Koizumi and John Howard can strengthen their respective positions at home by cooperating in the far-abroad (and by pleasing the United States in the process), so be it.

Meanwhile, back in Iraq, some have noted the peculiar irony of Australian soldiers watching over Japanese as the latter build roads and bridges in a wartime environment. While this particular World War II reference may fall short of outright relevance, it does make one realize that historical ironies need not be relevant in order to be profound. Times do, indeed, change.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 11:29 PM to Asia, Australia/NZ, Middle East

Insurgent "siege" of Baghdad

While yesterday we heard that Iraqi insurgent groups might be reaching new levels of collaboraton at the bargaining table, we learn today that at least some of those groups haven't gotten rusty on the battlefield. With the good, the bad ...

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:10 PM to Middle East

February 21, 2005

"Back-channels" with Iraqi insurgents

In what appears to be a very hopeful revelation, tentative back-channel negotiations have taken place between Iraqi insurgents and the U.S. military, according to Michael Ware, Time magazine's exceptionally well-connected man in Baghdad. The Iraqi insurgency has long been an elusive foe, not only tactically but also strategically. It seems to be comprised of a wide variety of individuals and groups, ranging from former Baathists to wanna-be Islamic theocrats to anti-Western terrorists, only united (in agenda if rarely in practice) by nothing more than opposition to the U.S. occupation. (The best breakdown of the insurgency I've seen is here.) So the prospect of "negotiations" with the insurgents, however tentative or back-channel they may be, is tantalizing for any number of reasons, not only for the peace prospects they may represent but also for the compositional glimpse they may offer into the insurgency itself. As Ware notes, these negotiations may also be useful in driving a wedge between the hardcore jihadi insurgents and the more generally nationalistic ones -- a wedge the recent, (relatively) successful elections may have helped to pry open.

Most striking, and perhaps most dubious, is what Ware reports as the insurgent negotiators' demands. He notes that they would support the notion of a secular democracy in Iraq, an assertion which is not only vague almost to the point of irrelevance but which also would be clearly and presumably off-putting to substantial segments of the insurgency. Ware also suggests that some insurgents would be open to the prospect of continued U.S. military basing in Iraq, a la post-war Germany and Japan. This flatly contradicts what has heretofore been the only known certainty about the "insurgency" and its objectives. It also very conveniently matches what I believe to be the Bush administration's most fundamental root objective in invading Iraq in 2003 (more on that later).

Regardless of intent or near-term prospects, however, one can only interpret negotiations of any kind as a good thing, especially if they come in place of bloodshed. But as this recent English-language insurgent video makes abundently clear, the sophistication and ability of the anti-U.S. forces in Iraq -- if only in terms of media savvy and propaganda construction, if nothing else -- is formidable. While the "Islamic Jihad Army" is predictably not one of the insurgent groups represented in the recent negotiations, it appears that at least some of its comrades-in-arms are. And as the recent elections demonstrated, the steps toward success in Iraq (however defined) need not be perfect in order to be promising.

Posted by Daniel Widome at 12:57 AM to Middle East