In recent weeks, passions have become inflamed over plans to build an Islamic community center and mosque a few blocks from the World Trade Center site in New York. Park51 is the brainchild of Imam Feisal Abdul Rauf, a religious leader with a long tradition as a moderate, conciliatory figure. A passionate group of supporters for the project has emerged, arguing that it will embody the constitutional right to freedom of religion and help preserve New York's culture of tolerance and diversity. But opposition to Park51 has been even more vocal. In many media depictions and reports, the center has been labeled “the Ground Zero mosque,” and it has been seen as insensitive or even offensive to the memory of the 9/11 attacks.

The recent uproar over Park51 is, in some respects, very peculiar. The project has received support from a local community board committee and from New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg. Abdul Rauf has been praised by Jewish leaders and the FBI, and he has even written a book entitled, “What's Right with Islam is What's Right with America.” But many of the project's opponents have amplified their views, and they have come to dominate the national conversation. Some, like Newt Gingrich, equate the project with a Nazi sign being posted near the Holocaust Museum or a Japanese “site” next to Pearl Harbor, and suggest that a synagogue should be built in Saudi Arabia before a “mosque” is built in Lower Manhattan. Others take a more moderate view that Park51 should simply be moved further away from the Ground Zero site or outside of Lower Manhattan.

The arguments against Park51 clearly have taken hold. A recent poll by the Economist found that 58 percent of Americans thought that an Islamic cultural center should not be built near the World Trade Center site, and 33 percent did not even think that Muslims had a constitutional right to build such a facility. Opposition to Park51 has spread beyond New York and has grown into wider, more public anti-Muslim sentiment. In Connecticut, Tennessee, and California, existing and planned mosques have become targets for vitriolic protests.

Park51's opponents imply—deliberately or otherwise—that Islam writ large is waging a war against the United States and the West. Ironically, this is the same notion that extremists such as Osama bin Laden seek to perpetuate. Their ideology rests upon the notion that the West, and the United States in particular, is fundamentally hostile to Islam, and that Islam must strike back violently. Without this extremist interpretation of a cultural and religious war, the logic of al Qaeda's violent agenda dissipates. But the intense, public opposition to Park51 and to mosques around the country only gives credence to al Qaeda's point of view. Even the more mild opponents of Park51—those who simply think that the center should be built elsewhere—may unwittingly be giving comfort to adherents of religious warfare. Declaring entire neighborhoods off-limits to places of worship could isolate, ostracize, or even radicalize religious minorities.

To be sure, the debate over Park51 is not one-sided. The fact that a debate is taking place, and that prominent figures like Bloomberg and even President Obama have expressed support for Park51, sets the United States apart from many other countries in which such open expression would be discouraged or even repressed. But in functional terms, such nuance may not matter. To succeed over the long-term, the U.S. effort to combat Islamic extremism must rely primarily on the power of ideas. Extremist ideologies must be exposed as corrupt and hopeless, and the notion of an existential struggle between Islam and the West must be undermined. In a certain sense, it almost doesn't matter if Park51 is built or not. The passion and anger that have fueled the Park51 debate will give ammunition to extremist propagandists for years to come. And that will make U.S. efforts to counter such propaganda more difficult, more costly, and more time-consuming.

Meanwhile, the issue of Iran's nuclear program has entered the public forum in a different and more direct kind way. In the September 2010 edition of The Atlantic, Jeffrey Goldberg writes about Israel's growing concern with Iran's nuclear ambitions. Gaining extensive access to Israeli political and military leaders, Goldberg concludes that there is a better than 50 percent chance that Israel will attack Iranian nuclear facilities by July 2011. Within days of the publication of Goldberg's article, The New Yorker featured an article by Jon Lee Anderson, for which he interviewed Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. As he is prone to do, Ahmadinejad spoke at great length about the hypocrisy of U.S. policy toward Iran and about Iran's right to nuclear technology. But the context of the interview, as reported by Anderson, sent a very different message: significantly, Ahmandinejad agreed to be interviewed by Anderson—a Western journalist—in Tehran.

Goldberg's and Anderson's articles each offer valuable glimpses into the minds of national policymakers. In a sense, the governments of Israel and Iran have entered the realm of public debate in a very deliberate kind of way. Both journalists are fully aware that their sources may have used them to advance a precisely constructed—and not necessarily honest—public message. But even if that was the case, the messages that Israel and Iran hoped to put forward still help to illuminate the motivations of each side. This is diplomacy-as-poker. Each player, or country, is endowed with a certain set of resources and a particular range of options for how to employ those resources. But the path from potential policy to actual policy is marked by bluffs and truths, with each move designed to manipulate, recruit, or deceive the other players.

In Goldberg's case, his sources may have advanced the idea that Israel was likely to attack Iran for any number of purposes. It could increase the pressure on the Obama administration to take a tougher line with the Iranian regime, or it could serve to remind Iran of Israel's resolve. It also could serve a domestic purpose, to reassure Israelis that their government is proactively engaged with the issue. But deliberate or not, Goldberg's sources seemed nearly unanimous on one point in particular: Israel views an Iranian nuclear weapon as more than just an abstract existential threat, but as something on equal terms with the Holocaust—as a clear echo of a specific historical episode. That key Iranian leaders have explicitly denied the very existence of the Holocaust makes this strain of the debate even more poignant. In the eyes of Israeli policymakers, Ahmadinejad's denial of the Holocaust is more than just the ranting of a leader playing to a domestic constituency. It reinforces their perceived connection between an actual calamity and a potential one.

Anderson, for his part, reports very explicitly that Ahmadinejad and his handlers were trying to use him as a vehicle to deliver a particular message. Although Ahmadinejad spoke in familiar, hyperbolic terms, his media officials hinted very strongly that his interview should focus on the prospects for peace between Iran and the United States. Regardless of whether Anderson's article satisfied Ahmadinejad's handlers, it is notable that they wanted to use him to deliver this particular message. Given the outlet, it seems logical that Ahmadinejad wanted to communicate without the filter of diplomacy or politics, directly to Americans (or at least to New Yorker readers). But one point on which Ahmadinjad's officials seemed quite clear was that the nuclear issue should be disentangled from Israel. As reported by Anderson, it appeared that Iranian officials were open to negotiations with the United States but were much less conciliatory toward Israel. This may be part of an Iranian effort to drive a wedge between Israel and the United States, or it may represent a legitimate opening to resolve the nuclear issue. Either way, it contrasts strongly with Israel's own view (as reported by Goldberg) that Iran's nuclear program is aimed squarely in its direction.

Neither the Park51 controversy nor Iran's nuclear program will be resolved by these latest public debates alone. The U.S. campaign to combat Islamic extremism has many components and will not conclude anytime soon, and the governments of Israel, the United States, and Iran guard their true intentions with the utmost secrecy. But this recent activity in public forums is not merely academic. These open debates can be seen and heard (and are) by a much wider audience than intended. And as public debate can be an unpredictable, unruly thing, it is all too easy for passions to overrule reason, or for deliberately crafted messages to be misinterpreted or manipulated. None of this is to suggest that the debate should be stifled. Instead, it is simply incumbent upon everyone engaged in these public debates to realize that their voices carry, and that their effects may be unpredictable. More than mere glimpses into how the games of foreign policy are played, the public debates about Park51 and the Iranian nuclear program could have a direct and profound effect on their very outcomes.

Foreign Policy Association, 27 August 2010

The Government justified these changes in part through emphasising that "there are some families receiving £104,000 a year in housing benefit". However, they have been criticised for failing to consider the evidence relating to such statements:

The rates Osborne used show that prior to yesterday's reforms, anyone granted housing benefit on a five bedroom house in Kensington and Chelsea, one of London's most upmarket boroughs, would have got £2,000 a week.

"It is what the rate would be," said a spokeswoman for the Department for Work and Pensions [DWP]. "We don't have any figures on how many people are claiming that rate."

However, she added that a search of the Daily Mail and the Sun newspaper websites would throw up stories of people being paid the same if not more.

To follow up on this, I submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to the Treasury (George Osborne is Britain's Chancellor) asking how many households were known to claim over £104,000/year or £2,000 per week in housing benefit. I was told that the Treasury "does not hold the information that [I] requested". It was suggested that I contact the DWP; however, it was the DWP which referred a journalist to the tabloid press when asked for figures. This suggests that the Government did not have a strong grasp of (and perhaps had not even looked up) the statistics used to promote a key policy.

After these changes were announced, the Evening Standard reported that "Westminster council said it may have to house poor families outside central London." I therefore asked Westminster some questions under the Freedom of Information Act.

A first thing to note is that only 2 households in Westminster (out of 28,000 claiming LHA) were claiming £2,000/week of this benefit; 81 households were claiming £1,000/week or more. Westminster is one of the more expensive places in the UK to live. While other parts of the country may have more high-level claimants, these figures do suggest that rather few people may be claiming at the 'headline' levels which Osborne used when trying to justify his planned changes.

Worried by the Standard story, I also asked Westminster for any documents relating to the possibility that the Government's proposed housing benefit reforms will lead claimants to leave the borough or which discuss encouraging and/or assisting housing benefits claimants to leave the borough. However, Westminster informed me that "no such documents exist". Councillor Phillipa Roe (Westminster's cabinet for housing) told me that

Council policy is that all households are very welcome to find accommodation in the centre of London if they can find these within the housing benefit caps.
The intention has not been to force claimants from the borough but to support the reduction of the national housing benefit bill and restrain a system which was driving up and distorting private sector rents.
I was therefore commenting on what may occur in some cases as a result of the new caps. The local authority will be providing whatever support is possible to mitigate against this, but both tenants and private sector landlords will have to adjust their sights according to the new rates.
Until the detailed legislation is developed and accompanying regulations, it is however not possible to say exactly now many households will be affected.

These responses to my enquiries suggest that we may be facing some policy- and media-related problems. A benefit on which many of the most vulnerable members of our society depend is being cut. While particular statistics are used to promote policy changes, the Government does not appear to have researched these figures as well as one might have hoped. Some media representations of these policy changes have also been problematic: often (with honourable exceptions) adding to the spinning of these policy plans rather than effectively questioning the ideas and beliefs which may or may not underlie them. Osborne's use of statistics here appears to have been a rather unfortunate case of policy-based evidence; what is equally unfortunate is that many media outlets have uncritically reported this policy-based evidence or even managed to add to the confusion and to the (understandable) alarm which many feel about these changes. Assuming that these tactics will continue to be used, it is increasingly important to find ways to critically engage with Government ab/uses of research and statistics.

Please let us know if you have any feedback or suggestions for the site!

Heffernan bemoans the fact that, she believes

Deconstructing science is a fool’s game. In the ’90s, literary critics used to try. They’d argue that science is a system of metaphors, complete with a style and an ideology, rather than the royal road to the truth. They were laughed at as cultural relativists, posers high on Gaul­oises and nut jobs who didn’t believe in gravity. Masha Krasnova-Shabaeva

Science writers play rough. They like hoaxes, humiliations and Oxbridge-style showdowns that let them use words like “claptrap” and “gibberish.” There’s a reason people don’t call themselves deconstructionists and pick fights with science anymore. The old battle is won: books called “The Science of X” fly off shelves, while “The Culture of” books are remaindered.

Heffernan's complains that the prominent science blogging network Science Blogs

has become preoccupied with trivia, name-calling and saber rattling. Maybe that’s why the ScienceBlogs ship started to sink...Clearly I’ve been out of some loop for too long, but does everyone take for granted now that science sites are where graduate students, researchers, doctors and the “skeptical community” go not to interpret data or review experiments but to chip off one-liners, promote their books and jeer at smokers, fat people and churchgoers? And can anyone who still enjoys this class-inflected bloodsport tell me why it has to happen under the banner of science?

Hammering away at an ideology, substituting stridency for contemplation, pummeling its enemies in absentia: ScienceBlogs has become Fox News for the religion-baiting, peak-oil crowd. Though Myers and other science bloggers boast that they can be jerky in the service of anti-charlatanism, that’s not what’s bothersome about them. What’s bothersome is that the site is misleading. It’s not science by scientists, not even remotely; it’s science blogging by science bloggers. And science blogging, apparently, is a form of redundant and effortfully incendiary rhetoric that draws bad-faith moral authority from the word “science” and from occasional invocations of “peer-reviewed” thises and thats.

I do have several concerns about Heffernan's piece. Firstly, I am not sure what her criticisms have to do with Derrida and/or deconstruction. She clearly objects to the tone, ethics and/or mores of a lot that takes place on ScienceBlogs - which is fine - but I do not see any need to invoke a 'Derridean cloak' in order to make such criticisms. While there is a lot of debate about what deconstruction may or may not be - Derrida argued that "All sentences of the type "deconstruction is X" or "deconstruction is not X" a priori miss the point, which is to say that they are at least false" - but I do fail to see what is Derridean or deconstructive about Heffernan's piece.

Secondly, it is unfortunate that - while Heffernan starts by discussing work on the culture of science - her own research into ScienceBlogs and science blogging more broadly seems so weak. Heffernan only quotes a handful of examples from ScienceBlogs (two of which are arguably quoted out of context). While complaining about the lack of discussion of science of ScienceBlogs, she fails to note that a lot of the science blogging on ScienceBlogs and more broadly does focus very much on scientific issues. It is unfortunate that Heffernan focussed on such a narrow range of material.

Heffernan subsequently noted that she regrets recommending the Watt's Up With That blog in the NYT piece, stating that

I’m a stranger to the debates on science blogs, so I frankly didn’t recognize the weatherspeak on the blog as “denialist”; I didn’t even know about denialism. I’m don’t endorse the views on the Watts blog, and I’m extremely sorry the recommendation seemed ideological.

I would argue that using the tools of the social sciences and humanities to research science is extremely important - I have a conflict of interest here, as I am doing some work around science blogging and would love to develop a couple of other projects on science and science communication if anyone is nice enough to fund me! However, such approaches rely on putting work into researching the topic: to write well about the culture of science (or science blogging) one needs to do some research into what is taking place in these fields. A 'Derridean cloak' is not an excuse to avoid doing basic research or learning about ones subject - instead, deconstructive approaches may open up highly productive ways of doing engaging with this.

Thirdly, Heffernan constructs a number of problematic divisions in the social and cultural terrains she is writing about. She introduces the piece with a discussion of a "science-culture battle" and argues that "battle is won: books called “The Science of X” fly off shelves, while “The Culture of” books are remaindered." Perhaps due to my own social and cultural position - part of the attraction of Geography is it's interdisciplinary nature - I don't see this as a straightforward battle with 'science' and 'culture' sides. This is not a zero-sum game and I am delighted if colleagues writing on topics such as climate change or hydrology are able to gain large audiences. I am also pleased, of course, when work on culture and society attracts large audiences - and sometimes it does, as in the case of geographers such as David Harvey - but I don't see any kind of battle here. It is important for those of us working in the humanities and social sciences to engage with science and scientists, but I don't see how metaphors of battle are helpful in building productive relationships here. Also - while people sometimes disagree with one another and sometimes do so in strong terms - discussion of 'battle' seems to both exaggerate what conflict there is and to pass over the many productive relationships that do exist.

Heffernan criticises ScienceBlogs as

not science by scientists, not even remotely; it’s science blogging by science bloggers

On the face of it, I would have expected to be rather more positive about Heffernan's article. She recommends the study of the culture and language of science - something which I would see as invaluable - and gestures towards theoretical approaches that I am sympathetic towards. However, the article is theoretically weak (I still fail to see a Derridean element to it), empirically poor (it displays inadequate knowledge about the ScienceBlogs and science blogging on which it focuses) and itself constructs problematic divisions and metaphors which would seem ripe for deconstruction and critique.

While Heffernan discusses relationships between scientists and other researchers in terms of a battle, I would argue that it is important to draw on and to develop effective and productive ways of working with and disagreeing with one another. Pieces such as Heffernan's are unhelpful for those of us doing social and cultural research: they give a poor impression of what we do (or try to do) and make it much too easy to dismiss a whole range of work as 'postmodernism'. Rather than re-entering or restarting perceived science-culture battles, poststucturalist approaches might be more useful insofar as they can pull apart some of the taken-for-granted beliefs which underly such 'battles' and open up new types of relationships.

Heffernan announced the NYT piece with a tweet saying that "Science blogs are very strange". Social research can help us to understand the diverse ways in which scientists, science bloggers, journalists and even geographers are strange - and thus, perhaps, to find new and creative ways to work with and around our strangeness.

The Obama administration originally wanted to negotiate a follow-on to the original Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by the end of last year, when the treaty expired. Failing that, Obama and Russian President Medvedev ultimately signed a follow-on agreement (nicknamed “New START”) in April. New START sets three principal restrictions on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, limiting each country to: 1) 1550 active nuclear warheads; 2) 800 total launchers, which include long-range missiles and bombers; and 3) 700 deployed launchers, which refers to delivery vehicles that are considered operational. This represents a 30 percent reduction in the number of deployed nuclear weapons that had been permitted under prior international agreements. Perhaps even more important than the reductions themselves are the extension and modernization of the provisions by which the United States and Russia monitor each other's nuclear arsenals. These provisions build trust, increase transparency, and limit the potential for unpleasant surprises.

To win ratification in the Senate, New START must secure a two-thirds majority. Despite the Democrats' majority in that chamber, acquiring the 67 votes needed for ratification is a tall order. In an election year, and amid an atmosphere of extreme partisanship, the challenge is even greater. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee began holding hearings on New START ratification in June, and a vote by the full Senate on final ratification could take place before the end of this month. But as the pace of ratification has quickened, so too has the intensity and coordination of its opposition. Former Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney—a Republican presidential candidate in 2008 and potential 2012 contender—published an op-ed that crystallized the emerging conservative argument against ratification. Romney argued that New START constrains the development of a missile defense system and noted the omission from the treaty text of various weapons types, such as rail-based and air-launched ballistic missiles. He also suggested that the treaty greatly favors Russia because it addresses only long-range, high-yield strategic nuclear weapons and not the shorter-ranged and smaller—but potentially more destabilizing—tactical variety; Russia is thought to rely more heavily on tactical weapons than the United States.

Although Romney surely intended the op-ed to burnish his foreign policy credentials in advance of another presidential run, it has served as something a rallying point for opposition to New START. Conservative activists and some Republican senators have taken up many of the points that Romney articulated. But on their merits, many of Romney's arguments fall short. The preamble of New START notes the relationship between offensive strategic arms (nuclear weapons) and defensive strategic arms (missile defenses). But the preamble is not legally binding, and it does not constrain efforts to construct missile defenses by either party. It further notes that currently deployed missile defenses do not undermine the viability of either U.S. or Russian nuclear weapons. This is a rather significant concession by Russia, which had long argued that plans for a U.S. missile defense system in Europe posed a threat to the viability of its nuclear forces, and not simply to Iran's nascent missile capability. As for the rail-based and air-launched ballistic missiles that Romney highlights, a plain reading of the treaty text would seem to cover such weapons—if they were still viable. Although both the United States and Russia have experimented with launching ballistic missiles by railcar and by airplane, neither method has proven to be particularly useful, and neither one represents any kind of serious threat.

To be fair, much of the Republican foreign policy establishment has downplayed or outright rejected many of Romney's arguments. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN)—the ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and something of a foreign policy mentor for Obama during his time in the Senate—called Romney's op-ed “hyperbolic” and full of “discredited objections.” Even Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), who is seen as an important source of potential opposition in the Senate, responded to Romney's arguments by calling New START “relatively benign.” Indeed, Romney's specific points of opposition were so roundly rejected by experts from across the political spectrum that they can almost be dismissed outright.

The underlying thrust of Romney's critique, however, is quite serious. It represents just the latest incarnation of a strain of U.S. foreign policy thinking that rejects “foreign entanglements” of all kinds. The term, as popularized in George Washington's farewell address, was intended as a warning for future Americans to avoid being pulled into conflicts that were not their own. But in some conservative quarters, that strain of thinking has evolved over the centuries into an aversion to any kind of international cooperation that could be interpreted as limiting not just U.S. freedom of action, but U.S. power and influence. Compelling arguments can be made that New START does exactly the opposite and actually enhances U.S power—the United States has such superiority in conventional weaponry that any global reduction of the role of nuclear weapons would, by definition, increase the relative power of the United States. But for many politicians, it is far too easy to associate a binding arms-control agreement with a weaker United States. This argument has a certain superficial traction (especially in the hyper-partisan environment of an election year), but it is not supported by reality, and its advocates do a disservice to responsible, popular policy discourse

One of Romney's specific critiques, however, is particularly valid. New START only addresses the active, strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia. It does not address the thousands of nuclear weapons in reserve or the shorter-ranged, tactical weapons maintained by both countries. Many of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons pose no direct threat to the United States. They are either intended to deter an attack from China or are dedicated to air defense or naval purposes. Omitting them from New START does not upset the strategic balance between the United States and Russia. But it does leave out an entire class of nuclear weaponry, one that may be less secure than strategic weapons and potentially more amenable to actual use. The omission of tactical weapons does nothing to undermine a treaty that was never designed to include them. But this does not mean that they should go unaddressed. New START also does not include the arsenals of other nuclear powers, such as France and China. Although these countries have far fewer weapons than the United States or Russia, every nuclear weapon—in any country's arsenal—is a dangerous, potentially destabilizing tool.

This is where New START's greatest value may lie. Not only does it continue the tradition of transparency and verifiability between the United States and Russia, but it advances the overall cause of arms control diplomacy. If New START is ratified, it will reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals and bring them closer in number to the more limited stockpiles of the world's other nuclear powers. When nuclear arsenals are measured in the hundreds and not the thousands, then every nuclear weapon in the world—and not just those of the United States and Russia—will become eligible for a negotiated reduction. The fate of this process likely will be determined in the coming days and weeks, in the chamber of the U.S. Senate.

Foreign Policy Association, 22 July 2010

Writing a paper on the topic has been interesting in part because of the degree of self-reflection in this community. As noted in the interview, bloggers have very much engaged with ideas around - for example - whether blogging is distinct from the mainstream media. It was also a nice surprise to get home from presenting the paper and talking about related topics in the pub to find that the paper had been tweeted (a worryingly good and very brief summary of the key points - I may have to start drafting papers in 140 character chunks); I have also now signed up for a Twitter account, in part in order to follow such debates.

I now find myself writing a blog post about Alice's blog post about Hauke and my research on science blogging; I will tweet the link to this post after publishing. Much new media discussion can seem like a kind of echo chamber and this type of reflection on reflection on reflection might appear to be an example of that issue. However, what makes the type of science blogging Hauke and I have been researching especially interesting is the focus on activism: the virtual realities of new media are used (with some notable successes) to impact upon our social and political realities. It has been interesting to see how ideas around science blogging (from many more interesting discussants than myself) have been reverberating around in virtual spaces. What will also be important, though, is the wider impact that these ideas are having and will have in future.

Turkey, in particular, has exerted its influence in highly visible ways in recent months. In May, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil announced a deal to reprocess Iranian nuclear fuel (for more, see The Water's Edge, May 2010). This deal was harshly criticized by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who claimed that the Iranians had taken advantage of Turkey and Brazil and that the deal would undermine efforts to contain Iran's nuclear ambitions. The UN Security Council ultimately approved new, tougher sanctions on Iran, over the dissenting votes of Turkey and Brazil.

A few weeks later, Israeli security forces killed nine Turkish civilians while attempting to stop an aid convoy from breaching Israeli's blockade of the Gaza Strip. The convoy originated in Turkey and was sponsored by a Turkish NGO. The global reaction to the Israeli action was understandably harsh, but it paled in comparison to the Turkish reaction. “Israel stands to lose its closest ally in the Middle East if it does not change its mentality,” Erdogan warned. Turkey and Israel do have a history of close relations, but under Erdogan's premiership, the relationship had cooled considerably. Erdogan has been particularly harsh in his criticism of Israeli behavior in Gaza, and the deaths of Turkish citizens only intensified Turkish attitudes. Although the Turkish government did not officially sanction the aid convoy, Erdogan certainly was sympathetic to its mission

Historically, Turkey's importance has been defined by its geography. During the Cold War, the United States perceived Turkey as on the fringes of more important regions—it was far from the flashpoints of Central Europe, too far north of Israel and the oil in the Middle East, and not quite amid the client state chess match in Africa. After the Soviet Union fell, the notion of Turkey as a “bridge”—between Europe and Asia, between Islam and democracy, between the West and the East—became more popular. But in the past 10 years, attitudes within Turkey have changed. Erdogan came to power in 2002 with a clear mandate and a strong parliamentary majority, riding the popularity of his mildly-Islamist AK Party. Progress toward joining the European Union—long a dream of Turkish secularists hoping to anchor Turkey firmly in the West—stalled, due primarily not to a lack of reform in Turkey but to intransigence and opposition in Europe. All the while, Turkey has experienced robust economic growth and increasing demand for its exports in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia.

All of these factors have led to a remarkable increase in Turkey's influence in its region. If earlier observers (both Turkish and foreign) had thought of Turkey as a bridge between two worlds, or as a conduit through which others' ideas and influence could pass, Turkey now sees itself as a hub from which its own influence now radiates. Fueled by a sense of historical nationalism that is shared by Islamists and secularists alike, Turkey is now pursuing what it calls a “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy. The Iranian nuclear deal is an example of the open, conciliatory approach that this policy entails. Turkey's close relationship with Israel—unique in the Muslim world—also could be seen within the context of this policy. Israel's military action in Gaza in January 2009, however, precipitated a strong negative reaction from Turkey. Erdogan's visible opposition to Israel has made him something of a leader in the Arab street—which, of course, only improves the prospects of Turkish exports to the region. But recent events have shown that seeking greater influence is not always compatible with a “zero problems” foreign policy, especially in a region as volatile as the Middle East. Regardless of Erdogan's diplomatic skills, maintaining close relations with both Iran and Israel at the same time is unlikely to result in “zero problems.”

On the other side of the world, Japan also has found its interests increasingly coming into conflict with those of the United States. This tension recently manifested itself with the resignation of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. Last year, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—which had ruled Japan nearly uninterrupted for 55 years—was defeated in parliamentary elections by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), under the leadership of Hatoyama. This represented a monumental change in a political system that had grown ossified, stale, and increasingly beholden to an unaccountable and entrenched bureaucracy. Hatoyama primarily ran on a campaign that pledged to up-root this governing system and introduce a “politician-led” government; after years of economic and political stagnation, this was a popular platform, and the DPJ won handily.

But Hatoyama also ran on a subtle redefinition of Japan's alliance with the United States. While pledging that the U.S. alliance was of vital importance to Japan, Hatoyama stressed that the relationship should exist more on a more equal basis, implying that Japan would not blindly accede to U.S. wishes. This language proved especially popular in Okinawa, which is home to a disproportionate number of U.S. military bases. These bases have long been a source of tension, due to their persistent noise and commotion as well as to several episodes of off-duty U.S. soldiers assaulting Okinawan civilians. In 2006, the Bush administration negotiated a deal with the LDP government at the time to move a significant portion of the U.S. troops on Okinawa to Guam and to relocate one of the major bases on Okinawa to a more sparsely populated location on the island. The deal was intended to address civilian concerns on Okinawa, but because it did not entirely remove the U.S. bases, it was an incomplete solution at best. As part of his platform of redefining the U.S. alliance, Hatoyama pledged to renegotiate the deal to remove U.S. bases from Okinawa entirely.

In many ways, the U.S. response to Hatoyama's stance was predictable. It had negotiated a difficult deal in good faith with Hatoyama's predecessor, and the Defense Department had already begun to make long-term planning decisions based on that deal. Nevertheless, upon taking office, Hatoyama continued to insist to his domestic constituency that the deal would be renegotiated, while appearing to send different signals altogether to the United States. U.S. policymakers, from Obama downward, grew colder and more rigid toward Hatoyama's mixed messages, until the prime minister relented in May and agreed to implement the deal as negotiated in 2006. This unpopular decision broke one of Hatoyama's most prominent campaign pledges, and it led to his resignation earlier this month—giving Japan its fifth new leader in just four years.

The nature of the U.S. alliance with Japan is similar in some respects to its alliance with Turkey. As with Turkey, Japan's unique geography suited U.S. interests during the Cold War. It served almost as seal on Soviet ambitions in the Pacific, and it was strategically located to contain North Korea and support U.S. troops in South Korea. In recent decades, it has served U.S. interests as a useful check on the growing influence of China. Economically, the U.S. and Japan are very tightly linked. Through their alliance, the U.S. has effectively underwritten Japan's defense, allowing Japan to become the world's second-largest economy and a major exporter to the United States. In recent years, however, unease with a relationship has grown, on both sides. Many U.S. officials feel that Japan should carry a greater burden in international affairs and that Washington no longer needs to subsidize Japan's defense. In Japan, some conservative elements view the U.S.-written constitution that forbids offensive military forces as insulting and outdated. Witnessing the growth of China firsthand, some Japanese wonder if the country would be better served by re-orienting its foreign policy accordingly, away from the United States.

In the case of both Turkey and Japan, the interests of the United States are increasingly (and more vocally) coming into conflict with those of its ally. In part, this is due to the relative decline of U.S. influence and to the rise of other global and regional powers. But it is also due to a decades-long tradition of short-term thinking about how the U.S. manages its international alliances. If these are alliances worth maintaining, they must be premised on a set of shared principles and long-term objectives that benefit both partners. Once these principles are established, the U.S. should avoid the temptation of geopolitical myopia. If Turkey shows its independence from the U.S. on issues like Iran's nuclear program or Israel's behavior in Gaza, its credibility among its Muslim neighbors increases. If Japan can redefine its alliance with the U.S. on its own terms, stability may return to its tumultuous politics, allowing it to address serious economic and demographic challenges. The U.S. benefits under both scenarios, as its long-term interests neatly coincide with those of its ally.

Turkey and Japan may have short-term goals that seem to be at odds with U.S. objectives, and in the fast-moving world of diplomacy, this apparent gap may appear significant and worrisome. But each country exists within its own political, economic, and social universe, over which the United States cannot—and should not—hope to exert complete control. As long as the U.S. trusts the fundamental long-term objectives of its allies, it should be more understanding of their short-term policy fluctuations and simply take their louder and discordant voices in stride.

Foreign Policy Association, 25 June 2010

In more interesting news, we're putting together our project itinerary, ie that time/space schema of which stations we'll visit, on which days, and in what order. Thanks to the help of several local radio professionals and radio NGO workers, who circulated our application for three-day production workshops to small community stations throughout the country, we have a substantial list of candidates. Interested radios were asked to describe their programming and how it relates to and serves their communities, and these answers bely the incredible diversity of grassroots, independent radio programming in Kenya. Some are more general service-type radios: they have music, news, local news, etc. Others focus more closely on one subject or area of need: one radio is entirely female-run, and reports on womens' issues; one is a sort of meteorology-cum-media center, and their sole concern is weather reporting for local farmers. Obviously, these quirks and variations will make our project just THAT much more interesting, as we hope to learn social, political, economic (and perhaps agricultural) lessons from our radio hosts as we work with them on recording and editing techniques.

I'm pleased about how the article turned out and very happy with how efficiently the Times dealt with its publication. As I'm just at the end of a year of teaching, it seems appropriate to pull out a paragraph of the article which reminds me why it's such a privilege to be helping students to learn about research:

Part of the joy of doing research - and of speaking, writing and reading about research - is that it offers us new ways to understand, engage with and change the world. PR-based research, though, just aims to package up parts of the world and sell them to us. Learning about research can help us to work better, play better and do a better job of holding businesses, researchers and Government to account. These skills can't be bought and can't be sold but -- once learnt -- are valuable tools for dealing with the advertisers, PR agencies and governments who try to fob us off with shiny yakawow campaigns instead of offering any more meaningful engagement.

Events surrounding Iran's nuclear aspirations have become somewhat predictable in recent years. Despite repeated assertions that it does not seek nuclear weapons, Iran has flouted NPT requirements and maintained secret nuclear facilities that have been off-limits to international inspectors. But unlike fellow scofflaw North Korea, Iran has technically remained a party to the NPT. Although it does not currently possess nuclear weapons, and its claims for not desiring them may be legitimate, it seems clear that at the very least Iran seeks to master the nuclear fuel cycle. This would give Iran “breakout” capacity—it wouldn't have nuclear weapons, but it would have the ability to build them on short notice.

The response of Iran's neighbors both near and far has followed a similar pattern. Given the aggressive statements of Iran's leaders and the country's long-standing support of Hezbollah and Hamas, Israel views the potential of Iranian nuclear weapons as an existential threat. It is consistently at the vanguard of those advocating a strong response to Iran's NPT transgressions. But Israel's unacknowledged nuclear arsenal lies at the core of Iran's public defense of its own nuclear program: How can Israel, a non-NPT state, be allowed to possess nuclear weapons while Iran, which has remained within the NPT, cannot simply pursue nuclear technology? This argument carries a great deal of weight within the region, but others weigh just as heavily. Saudi Arabia and Egypt, for example, share Iran's view about the hypocrisy of Israel's nuclear arsenal. But they view Shia Iran as a challenger to their own Sunni pre-eminence in the Middle East and in the Muslim world. Despite protestations about Israeli nuclear hypocrisy, there is no country in the Middle East that would welcome a nuclear-armed Iran.

Further afield, the UN Security Council has been a key forum for airing claims about Iranian noncompliance and for levying sanctions. The five permanent members plus Germany (known as the “P 5+1”) have represented the principal negotiating team. Although U.S. policy may seem to have changed dramatically when Barack Obama succeeded George Bush, both presidents have followed a relatively consistent course that refuses to condone Iranian nuclear weapons and pushes for escalating sanctions in the face of increasing Iranian noncompliance, while stopping short (so far) of direct military action.

In the past, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany have made their own overtures (as a group) toward Iran, but especially since Obama's election, they have generally followed U.S. policy. China and Russia, on the other hand, have consistently been the greatest hurdles for tougher sanctions on Iran. Russia has provided assistance to Iran's nuclear program in the past and continues to equip Iran's armed forces, and China is a major importer of Iranian oil. Beyond their immediate concerns (or lack thereof) with Iran's nuclear program, both China and Russia view a Western-dominated world order with trepidation. Resistance to tougher sanctions on Iran has been an important way for China and Russia to flex their independent muscles.

But in recent weeks, amid the ongoing NPT review conference, some new players have entered the Iranian nuclear game. With great fanfare, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced a breakthrough deal with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Under the terms of the deal, Iran would ship some of its low enriched uranium to Turkey, which would hold the material until it could be reprocessed to a level of enrichment suitable for civilian use but not for weaponization. The reprocessed uranium then would be returned to Iran for civilian use.

For the United States and its allies, this proposal would remove from Iran some of the material that it could use to develop nuclear weapons. For Iran, the proposal would allow it access to the nuclear material it claims it needs for civilian purposes. The deal is reminiscent of a proposal that fell apart last October that would have had Iran ship some of its low enriched uranium to Russia and France for reprocessing for civilian nuclear use. The quantity to be shipped out of Iran under the Brazilian/Turkish proposal is the same as in the deal of a few months ago. Iran's total stock of uranium, however, has increased significantly since then. Whereas the October deal would have deprived Iran of sufficient uranium to produce a bomb, the Brazilian/Turkish deal would leave Iran with enough material to do just that.

Naturally, the United States and its allies on the Security Council were skeptical of the Brazilian/Turkish proposal. Not only did it seem like a weaker rehashing of their own earlier deal, it seemed to undermine the growing momentum for a new round of tougher sanctions against Iran. As it happens, both Brazil and Turkey currently hold rotating seats on the Security Council. But any effort to undermine the perception of unanimity among the international community—regardless of Security Council votes—could be seen as a boon to the Iranian regime's efforts to stymie Western restrictions on its nuclear program. Indeed, shortly after the Brazilian/Turkish deal was announced, the United States announced a broad agreement (including Russia and China) on a new round of sanctions against Iran. The Security Council could vote on the sanctions in the next month.

Regardless of whether the Brazilian/Turkish deal will trump a new round of sanctions, one thing is particularly noteworthy about this month's spate of diplomacy: Where did Brazil and Turkey come from, and why do they care about the Iranian nuclear program?

The answer is a bit clearer with Turkey, as an immediate neighbor of Iran. Since taking office, Erdogan has earnestly pursued a “zero problems with neighbors” foreign policy. The country has long held a unique strategic position, but a strong government and a growing economy have given Turkey greater clout in the region, and it has attempted to use this clout to resolve regional issues. Relations with Greece, Syria, and Armenia are all remarkably strong, and although Turkey's relations with Israel have become a bit tenser, this is a natural consequence of being more sensitive to regional concerns. Brazil, for its part, is finally realizing its longstanding potential as a global power. Under the successful and dynamic leadership of Lula, Brazil has leveraged its significant economic weight more aggressively on the world stage. Although its appearance in the forum of nuclear diplomacy took some by surprise, what is perhaps more surprising is that it has taken Brazil so long to make its presence felt. It is the ninth largest economy in the world, and many feel it is time it started acting as such.

As with many international relations challenges, Iran's nuclear program is can be viewed through multiple lenses. Regionally, it poses a security risk to Israel, while simultaneously drawing attention to that country's own clandestine nuclear program. It also threatens to escalate the centuries-old duel between Persians and Arabs for pre-eminence in the Muslim world. Globally, Iran's nuclear program presents a major challenge to the nonproliferation regime embodied by the NPT. If nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are worthy goals (and Obama certainly thinks they are), then Iran's nuclear program must not be allowed to remain opaque and unaccountable. Iran's program represents a profound threat not only to the NPT, but also to the notion that international regimes can define and enforce global norms and address multilateral problems.

But aside from the direct security challenges that Iran's nuclear program presents to its neighbors and the indirect challenges it poses to the effectiveness of global regimes, it also has served to illuminate the shifting balance of power among states in the international system. For the past decade, at least, the issue has served a vehicle for Russia and China to exert their growing and evolving influence on world affairs, primarily due to their permanent membership on the Security Council and to their growing economic clout. But more recently, global upstarts like Brazil and Turkey have inserted themselves into the process. Their motivations are multiple, and are surely self-serving, in part. Regardless of its merits, the Brazilian/Turkish proposal is a serious one, and it demonstrates the emerging “democratization” of the global balance of power. Whether or not this is a good thing is as yet unclear, and so too are the potential winners and losers from a world in which emerging powers exert greater influence. What is clear, however, is that the balance is inexorably shifting, and both the current and emerging powers must quickly learn to operate in this new reality.

Foreign Policy Association, 28 May 2010

Participatory Budgeting in the US: Public Control Over Public Money
June 25, 2010 - 10am-12pm
Cobo Hall: W2-58

Sponsoring Organizations:
The Participatory Budgeting Project, Community Voices Heard (New York), Toronto Community Housing, Office of Alderman Joe Moore (49th Ward Chicago), Rogers Park Community Council (Chicago), Liberty Tree Foundation

Description:
This session introduces participatory budgeting and explores how it has been used and could be used in North America. Participatory budgeting is a democratic process in which community members directly decide how to spend part of a public budget. Since 1990, it has spread from the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre to over 1000 cities around the world, including several in Canada and the US. It has helped communities gain democratic control over spending and policy decisions in municipalities, public housing, schools, and organizations. This has led to more informed and equitable spending, more accountability and transparency, and more active and organized communities.

After a brief introduction, presenters will share their experiences through a roundtable discussion. Representatives from Community Voices Heard will discuss why community control over budgeting matters and how they are organizing around budget participation in New York. Representatives from Toronto Community Housing and Chicago’s 49th Ward will present their experiences with participatory budgeting. The session will then break up into facilitated small groups, to discuss key question, challenges, and opportunities for participatory budgeting in the US.

If you like the video, register on the website and vote for it in the contest!

Duncan Smith drew on the Neuroscientist Bruce Perry's work in order to argue that neuroscientific research suggests

that children who "witness a lot of abuse", or whose mothers have "different, multiple partners" will have brains that develop at a "quite different" rate from other children.

For Duncan Smith

"We now know that we can pretty much figure out where an 18-year-old will be at the time that they are two and a half or three years old. Signs are there. There are of course physical signs, including the scale and size and capacity of their brains to be able to deal with challenges. But it is also in their behaviour."

He added the inability of a child to have "imbibed the concept of empathy" from their parent could have profound impacts on their later life.

However, Duncan Smith's position is made harder to maintain because Perry has challenged his interpretation of his research: Perry states that

Smith's comments were an "oversimplification" that "greatly misrepresents the way we would explain the impact of neglect or trauma on the developing brain". He added: "to oversimplify this way is, essentially, to distort".

"I do believe that overstating and misunderstanding the neurobiology can lead to confusion, anger, distortion and potentially to bad policy," he said, adding that the claims appeared to be "a terrible distraction from the important issues related to the need to create family friendly, and developmentally informed policy that is aware and informed about the importance of early childhood and brain development".

denied he had misrepresented Dr Perry's work, whom he acknowledged as the source of his claims about brain development.

He said the focus of his policy work was on early intervention in the crucial early years of childhood, and his references to brain size related to "absolute extreme neglect and abuse".

"I haven't misrepresented his findings. I don't talk about every single child," he said. "The brain size is an example of what happens at the extreme end of that neglect and abuse, which is something I know that he has written about."

There was no need for Duncan Smith to draw on and misrepresent neuroscience in order to argue against abusing and neglecting children - there is widespread agreement in Britain that this is bad and damaging (and one could also, for example, look at psychological research on abuse and neglect - even if nothing were to show up on brain scans). However, Duncan Smith used a misrepresentation of neuroscientific research in order to make particular political and moral claims. It is unfortunate that a senior politician in a major political party feels the need to speak out against mothers (not fathers?!) who have more than one partner: there is no good reason to think that non-conventional family structures are in any way inherently harmful, and if someone becomes a single parent while their baby is young then it seems rather harsh to expect them to have only one partner over the next 18 years. However, if one were to want to argue that this is immoral then this should be done on moral grounds instead of trying to lean on the authority attributed to neuroscience.

It was good to see that both Perry and the Guardian challenged Duncan Smith's claims. Hopefully, during and after this election campaign it will become increasingly hard for politicians to misuse and misrepresent research.