Israel--Demography's bottom line
(from Stuart Schoenfeld)
Subject: Jerusalem Post, Fri, 22 Sep 2006 08:12:16 -0400
Demography's bottom line
Evelyn Gordon, THE JERUSALEM POST Sep. 20, 2006
Does anybody in Kadima still remember the "existential demographic threat" that
supposedly motivated its plan to unilaterally withdraw from most of the West
Bank - and hence the party's very formation?
Judging by the proposed 2007 budget, the answer is no - because the budget
contains not a single measure aimed at dealing with this threat. That might
have been excusable some months ago, when the jury was still out on whether
budgetary measures actually affect birthrates. But recent data seems to have
conclusively answered this question: In Israel, unlike in Europe, money is a
major factor in deciding whether to have more children.
This point was dramatically illustrated by last month's Central Bureau of
Statistics data on total fertility rates - the number of children an average
woman will have in her lifetime. According to the bureau, the TFR for Israeli
Muslims, which remained steady at 4.7 from 1985 to 2000, crept down to 4.5 over
the next three years. But between 2003 and 2005, it plunged from 4.5 to 4.0 - a
drop of half a child in only two years.
Among southern Beduin, the drop was even more dramatic: Between 2003 and 2005,
the TFR fell from 9.0 to 7.6 - a decline of 1.4 children in two years.
In contrast, the Jewish TFR remained at 2.6-2.7, just as it has for the past
decade.
WHAT HAPPENED in those two years to so dramatically change Muslim birthrates,
while leaving Jewish birthrates unaffected? The only plausible answer is the
drastic reduction in child allowances that began in June 2003.
Until then, child allowances were graduated: NIS 144 apiece for the first and
second child, NIS 195 for the third, NIS 454 for the fourth and NIS 522 for
each child thereafter. Thus a family of two would receive only NIS 288 a month,
but a family of six would receive NIS 1,981 - at that time, about 60 percent of
the minimum wage.
In 2003, however, the government decided to gradually cut child allowances to a
flat NIS 140 per child by 2009. For families with one or two children - some
two-thirds of all Jewish families - the change was negligible, and therefore
did not affect birthrates. But for families with four or more children - i.e.
most Muslim families - the financial impact was dramatic. And hence, the
dramatic drop in Muslim birthrates.
Then, in September, published data indicated that the converse also holds true:
Unlike elsewhere in the West - where the number of children declines as income
rises - in Israel, the number of children increases as income rises. Citing
Central Bureau of Statistics data, the article noted that while the average
Israeli household numbers 3.7 people, in families with monthly incomes of NIS
50,000 or more, the average rises to 4.3.
Nor is this surprising: According to a survey conducted by the Jewish Agency
last year, the average Jewish Israeli family would like at least three children
(the averages were 3.0 for secular couples, 3.6 for traditional couples, 5.5 for
religious Zionists and 8.9 for haredim). And the primary reason cited by
respondents for having fewer children was lack of money.
THUS THE bottom line is that in Israel, money is a powerful tool for influencing
demography. And since two-thirds of Jewish Israeli families have only one or two
children, while Muslim families average four, this money should clearly be aimed
at encouraging second or third births.
One way to do this would be to increase child allowances for the first and
second child - which would even make some financial sense, since the first
child is when a family incurs the "big-ticket" expenses (crib, high chair,
stroller, etc.). Raising the allowances enough to really matter might
eventually require a budget increase, but the initial step would be
budget-neutral: The money saved by the ongoing reduction in allowances for
large families could simply be redirected into larger allowances for the first
and second child.
THE OTHER possibility is to reduce the costs associated with having children -
particularly day care and education.
For low-income families, where two earners are often essential, subsidized day
care is critical to encouraging the birthrate. Currently, child care for
children below school age can cost thousands of shekels a month, meaning that
women who earn the minimum wage (about NIS 3,450 a month) come home with almost
nothing after paying for day care. Such women therefore have a strong financial
incentive to avoid having more children.
Theoretically, subsidized day care would help Jewish and Muslim families
equally. In practice, however, the main impact would probably be on the Jewish
birthrate, since in the Muslim community the social prejudice against working
women remains strong.
The second issue is schooling. By law, "free" public schools are allowed to
charge significant sums each year: Last year, for instance, the legal maximum
was NIS 1,493 per student for high schools. And in practice, schools often
exceed this limit: According to the Education Ministry, high schools actually
charged an average of NIS 3,939 per student last year.
To this must be added thousands of shekels a year for textbooks, which our
"free" public schools do not provide. Nor can textbooks be recycled from child
to child: Not only do they change frequently, but many are actually workbooks,
meaning they can be used only once.
FINALLY, many middle-class families spend thousands of shekels a year on
extracurricular schooling, since that is the only way to ensure their children
a decent education.
Taken altogether, these expenses are an obvious disincentive to additional
children for all but the wealthiest families. Significantly reducing these
outlays - for instance, by eliminating school fees and requiring schools to
provide textbooks - would make extra children much more affordable.
Again, this would theoretically affect Muslim and Jewish birthrates equally.
However, given the two communities' differing educational patterns, that might
not prove true in practice.
Thus if the government truly cares about the demographic issue, there is much it
could do to affect the situation. And this would be a far better use of its
energies than squabbling about inquiry commissions.
This article can also be read at
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1157913671284&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull