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June 10, 2009
A Frustrated Fajardo Fights Back
There was an interview with Sergio Fajardo in today's El Colombiano, Medellin's main newspaper, dealing directly with recent criticisms related to organized crime in the city and other doubts about the popular but troubled former mayor, who is now a major candidate for the 2010 Presidential Election.
In response to claims that he had a silent implicit agreement with organized crime, Fajardo simply responded that there was no proof behind the accusations. He frequently referenced a rigorously-researched report by an independent, well-respected Colombian organization that concluded that Fajardo's Medellin was indeed Fajardo's and not don Berna's. In fact, the report praised Fajardo's approach to organized crime.
Fajardo inherited a city filled with paramilitaries, guerrillas, and other entirely apolitical drug gangs. He was mayor of Medellin as President Uribe was rapidly changing both Colombian politics and the nature of Colombia's armed conflict. Starting in 2002, President Uribe drove guerrillas out of major cities. Meanwhile, he signed a 'peace' agreement with paramilitary forces, which resulted an immensely complex process in which tens of thousands of paramilitary fighters (including thousands in Medellin) surrendered and, with government help, attempted to re-enter society as civilians.
In this complex and uncertain security context, the report claims, Fajardo chose the best approach possible. Avoiding both appeasement and direct confrontation, he instead tried to peacefully erode the power structure of armed groups and criminal organizations. For example, by bringing the state to previously stateless neighborhoods with schools, hospitals, police stations, and libraries, Fajardo effectively invaded the headquarters of armed criminal organizations. The report essentially argues that Fajardo, rather than directly attacking organized crime, transformed Medellin into a city where organized crime could not thrive as it once had.
I generally support Fajardo's self-defense campaign. It seems to me that, as an honest politician treated recently as something of a Messiah, Fajardo is now held to incredibly high standards. Judging from the tone of the interview, he is clearly frustrated with all the recent criticism. As one of Colombia's most honest, serious and genuinely independent politicians, he has been far more distant from criminal groups than pretty much any other political leader and deserves to be treated that way.
Hundreds of mayors, senators, and every other type of public figure in Colombia have been proven to work directly with illegal armed groups, almost always with paramilitaries. It is clear to me that there is at least an equal number of unknown cases, as many of these illegal collaborations are concealed by Colombia's powerful paramilitary structures and even more powerful political establishment. If Fajardo failed to eradicate criminal groups in Medellin, it was certainly not out of lack of interest and commitment.
On the other hand, the report's view of Medellin as a city entirely hostile to organized crime is clearly outdated today, and may have never been accurate. The Fajardo-era corruption scandals, while not directly attributable to the former mayor himself, certainly indicate that his hold on the city was weak and incomplete. Drug trafficking money, the deterioration of the national paramilitary reintegration process and a culture of corruption in some local governmental organizations seem to have overwhelmed Fajardo's attempt at honest government in a few areas, notably the police and judiciary.
Reading the interview, I mostly felt pity for Fajardo. In recent days I have heard countless Fajardistas express plenty of pessimism, which is ironic given that Fajardo's motto was 'From fear to hope' and that he is a politician credited with achieving the impossible in Medellin. They will vote for Fajardo but they also concede that he will never defeat Colombia's political establishment. The notion of such an establishment has greatly evolved in the 7 years since Alvaro Uribe was elected. President Uribe has re-shaped the national political landscape, challenging the power of the traditional Liberal and Conservative parties by forming his own political bloc.
Uribe, who was born into a wealthy and politically powerful family, has created an entirely new political establishment around himself. The political atmosphere in Colombia today is entirely polarized, not between Liberals and Conservatives, but between Uribistas and antiUribistas. Uribe has broad popular support, mainly because he has greatly improved security in most urban areas through 'mano dura', or hardline security policies.
On the other hand, many human rights abuses have been committed during his Presidency and most of the people charged with collaborating with paramilitaries are strong Uribe allies. There have been countless other corruption and human rights scandals during his Presidency, but there is simply no room to cover all of them.
President Uribe has already changed the Colombian constitution to allow for his second term. The central question of Colombian politics today is whether he will try to change it again to allow for a third. His political supporters are already trying to do so, but the President himself has largely avoided the question. Indeed, it would be quite worrisome for Uribe's many supporters in powerful countries (including President Obama) indeed if the president, who is seen as South America's anti-Chavez, as the man who has made Colombia a functional democracy, pulled such an undemocratic, Chavez-like move. If he does not run, it is likely that the favorite to win will be one of his many disciples.
These younger Uribistas may actually go farther than Uribe in terms of the President's already controversial security policies. For example, dozens of innocent civilians have been massacred by the Colombian army (there areinvestigations into hundreds of other cases) and recorded as guerrillas killed in combat and thereby claim military victories. In response to the scandal, Andres Felipe Arias, Uribe's former Agriculture Minister, has recently stated that NGOs, human rights organizations and political elements within Colombia are using false allegations of such massacres to harm the Colombian military.
Fajardo's main political problem now is the temendous power of the new Uribista establishment. Indeed, while Fajardo is a local hero in Colombia's second largest city, Uribe, a Medellin native, enjoys at least as much local support and is a far better-known messianic figure nationwide. His other problems include recent skepticism about the transformation of Medellin and a general sense that he has yet to take a position on some of Colombia's most pressing political questions, especially security-related ones.
Putting all those problems together, there is a growing sense that, while Fajardo was creative in dealing with local social problems, he is unprepared to deal with Colombia's significant security problems. Many Colombians are still recovering from the brutal violence of the early 2000's and, while Colombia is by no means a peaceful country today, they simply will not risk electing a president who they feel might mismanage their safety.
The past seven years have created a sense here that a hardline security policy is the only security policy. Growing insecurity in major cities and some rural areas, rather than discrediting Uribe's approach, has simply confirmed to many people that the country is still at war and needs some continuity in its leadership. Therefore, it will be quite difficult for Fajardo to present a politically viable alternative to Uribe´s mano dura.
Posted by Pablo Rojas at June 10, 2009 10:47 AM
