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June 09, 2009
Thoughts on Fajardo, Salazar and Organized Crime in Medellin
I just read an interesting opinion peace on security in Medellin. The author, who I think is from Bogota, argues that people in Medellin should seriously question former mayor Fajardo's paramilitary reintegration model, rather than current mayor Salazar's security policies and integrity. Building on the idea that Fajardo governed during an unsustainable and almost artificial period of peace, the author goes as far as to say that the Medellin which Salazar inherited from Fajardo was deeply corrupt.
The local attorney general and various heads of police who served under Fajardo have since been linked to new paramilitary drug trafficking organizations, meaning paramilitary groups which formed after the massive demobilization of paramilitary forces or that quietly did not participate in the demobilization process. Fajardo´s much praised model of paramilitary reintegration, the author argues, did not actually integrate thousands of criminals and warlords into society, but rather allowed their basic structures to survive.
Salazar, on the other hand, has been much tougher in dealing with organized crime in the city and has sought to tackle the corruption and extortion with which paramilitary gangs have taken control much of the city. Under his administration, several Fajardo-era figures have been charged with corruption-related crimes. This confrontation, which the author describes as courageous and admirable, is yet another reason why violence in the city has increased under Salazar: criminal groups under pressure are much more erratic than criminal groups which have found a stable, comfortable niche.
On that note, it is worth noting a zero-tolerance policy against organized crime is often not politically beneficial, as local public opinion clearly shows. These days, every Colombian politician claims to zero tolerance for organized crime, but those politicians who, in practice tolerate and even work with organize crime often reap significant political benefits. In the extreme but sadly frequent cases where politicians cooperate with organized crime, these benefits can include illegal funds and voter intimidation. In cases of tolerance and appeasement, as the author describes Fajardo's administration, the benefits can include an implicit peace deal that improves local security. On the other hand, when politicians confront organized crime as Salazar has done, the political costs of growing insecurity can be huge.
These are obviously generalizations and there is often overwhelming political pressure to confront organized crime. Nevertheless, for the past 5 years in Medellin, it seems that political incentives have encouraged tolerance for organized crime as long as it is not excessively disruptive.
There is plenty of proof that Fajardo's Medellin was not free of organized crime. The entire Medellin underworld was run by a paramilitary warlord nicknamed Don Berna, now imprisoned in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges. A veteran of Medellin's drug trafficking business, Don Berna managed, after the defeat of urban militias associated with the FARC (the main enemy of paramilitary forces), to bring most of the city's youth gangs, murder for hire offices and pretty much every other criminal network under his control. After he turned himself in and was sent to a high-security prison in Colombia, he was found to still be controlling Medellin from his jail cell. Don Berna became a huge political problem not just for Fajardo, but rather for Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's entire security policy and Berna was quickly extradited to the United States, where he is entirely powerless.
During Fajardo's administration, there were increasing reports about the 'Office of Envigado', as Don Berna's organization was called. In recent newspaper reports about underage assassination squads, many of the anonymously interviewed young hitmen refer to the Office of Envigado as the top of the city's entire criminal hierarchy, a mysterious and almost invisible leadership whose influence is nonetheless palpable in many areas of the city. The Office has been said to control most gangs and assassination squads, the city's casinos, a popular downtown bazaar, the private bus companies that operate in the city, and even Medellin's large agricultural marketplace, la Mayorista.
El Cebollero, or the Onion Man, an alleged head of the Office who recently turned himself in, claims that he is a successful businessman who was asked by the Fajardo and Salazar administrations to help with the reintegration of paramilitaries by giving them jobs at la Mayorista. In other words, the administration needed his help. His allegations are both attempts to claim innocence and displays of his power. Criminals in Medellin manage to exert tremendous influence, blurring the line between legal and illegal business and, more importantly, between organized crime and society in general.
For example, I am writing this, I have just sent my grandmother on an errand to buy me a phone card that allows me to call to the U.S. for 72 minutes for just 5,000 pesos (about $2). In Medellin, people see these unnaturally cheap prices as evidence of money laundering schemes. Similar things are said about the low prices at a vast bazaar downtown, about the proliferation of casinos in the city, etc. And they are often right: Colombia had its own Ponzi scheme in 2008, one in which tens of thousands of poor people got amazingly favorable loans and one which turned out to be a massive money laundering operation involving politicians and leading businessmen. The genius of the operation was how much popular support it developed. When the government finally took down the scheme, there were violent protests by poor clients throughout Colombia, the most intense ones in coca-growing regions. The mafia is very much alive.
These days, especially in Medellin, it seems quite obvious that organized crime has not been defeated. Nevertheless, until recently, it seemed to people throughout much Colombia and particularly in Medellin that the country was finally winning the war against criminal groups. On the opinion pages of Colombian weekly Semana, there was a heated debate on this question that lasted months. On one side were pro-Uribe columnists who attributed rumors about the mafia's resilience to baseless anti-government propaganda and outdated Colombian pessimism. On the other side were a few locally-based columnists who remained convinced that Medellin's unprecedented peace was simply concealing the strong influence of paramilitary groups and their unprecedented monopoly on crime in the city. It seems clear to me that the latter group was more in touch with Medellin's reality than many people here and throughout the country realized. As I see it, the city's current security challenges demand that the policies both at the national level and at the local level that were credited with saving Medellin from decades of violence have to be re-evaluated.
There have been many more corruption allegations launched against Salazar than against Fajardo, but in my opinion the evidence does not support such unequal treatment. In fact, there is no clear evidence that either mayor is actively corrupt and I think there may be some class-based discrimination involved. Salazar is essentially a Fajardo disciple, but, unlike Fajardo, he is from a working-class background and was elected in part because of his intimate knowledge of and commitment to the needs of the city's poor majority. On the other hand, evidence is growing that supports what many Medellin residents have known for decades: that organized crime is extremely difficult to eradicate and that local politicians often have very few political, economic and personal incentives to wage war against criminal networks and their immense influence.
Posted by Pablo Rojas at June 9, 2009 03:28 PM
