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July 07, 2009
Uribe's Political Capital
Adam Isacson, a Colombia expert at the Center for International Policy, just wrote an article in Foreign Policy about Uribe's political problems. Check it out at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/03/uribe_falls_to_earth
The article identifies a series of political challenges that are considerably limiting the President's political capital both at home and abroad.
1. The Economy
The first problem is the global economic crisis. While Colombia has not seen the statistical devastation of the United States or Japan, the crisis has definitely hit certain areas quite hard. There are cities withunemployment rates as high as 20%. These statistics are even more troubling given fact that many informally employed or underemployed people are not officially considered unemployed.
2. Security
The second problem is worsening security, especially in urban areas. Nearly every large city in Colombia has seen a significant rise in violent crime this year. In Medellin, the increase in violence has beenparticularly acute. Part of this rise in crime is due to local factors such as unemployment and flawed local security policies and part is due to the increased power of new paramilitary groups and drug mafias, as is clearly the case in Medellin. Meanwhile, FARC guerrillas have increased the frequency their attacks with small bombings and ambushes.
While the national murder rate may continue its downward trend this year, the fact that the millions of Colombians who live in its largest cities are feelingincreasingly unsafe undermines Uribe's recent success in reducing statistical indicators of violence. More specifically, the apparent power of the FARC and the growth of new paramilitary groups directly contradicts Uribe's message that the country is winning the war against the FARC and discredits his controversial peace process with the paramilitaries.
In Medellin, the influence of paramilitaries is palpable. In the Parque del Periodista, a block from my house, there is word that a new paramilitary boss has taken over the area and is planning to make his presence felt with a few shootings. In a vast crowded downtown bazaar area known as ElHueco , people used avoid wearing jewelery. Many people simply avoid the area altogether despite its cheap prices. These days people will tell you that the area is totally safe because it is controlled byparamilitaries. Indeed, a few years ago, a friend of mine saw armed men beating up a street kid in El Hueco after he had robbed a shopper.
Paramilitaries have always presented themselves themselves as defenders of order in Colombia. When they take over a town or a neighborhood, they often kill local street kids, criminals, prostitutes and drug dealers in what they call 'social cleansing' to rid the area of crime and undesirable people. A man who sellsempanadas near my office recently met a paramilitary at a bar and asked him who his ultimate boss was. The paramilitary answered, 'President Uribe, because our job is to keep Colombia safe and orderly.' Of course, paramilitary groups are also responsible for most of the drugs that flow out of Colombia and many of the murders that continue to devastate its society. Worryingly, however, this is a country with a remarkably high tolerance for criminal groups as enforcers of law and order.
3. Scandals: Murder and corruption
The third problem is a group of diverse scandals. The first scandal is 'false positives', the murder of hundreds of innocent civilians by the military, which I've talked about a few times on this blog. The second is the wiretapping scandal, in which Colombia's equivalent of the FBI was found to be monitoring opposition politicians, civil society leaders, etc and even selling delicateintelligence to drug trafficking organizations . The third is the rising murder rate for union leaders. Colombia accounted for about half of union leader murders worldwide in 2008. Fourth is the scandal regarding the vote to change theconstitution to allow Uribe to run for a second term in 2006: there are active investigations into allegations that legislators were bribed to support the reelection referendum. Finally, there is the very old and gradually expandinginvestigation into dozens of politicians, most of them Uribe allies, with links to paramilitary and mafia groups.
Isacson sees the fact that Uribe's approval rating is now in the low 70s, its lowest point in two years, as evidence of a general downward trend in his popularity. On theinternational front, many long-time Uribe supporters have expressed growing concern over the human rights situation in Colombia and many, including President Obama, have directly discouragedUribe from running for a third term.
Nevertheless, I think Isacson is slightly misreading Colombia's domestic political climate. As I see it (admittedly Medellin is a particularly pro-Uribe city), Uribe is as strong as ever on the domestic front. While the economy has tamed Colombians' enthusiasm about the direction of the country,Uribismo has suffered only slightly.
People don't necessarily see the worsening security situation as a reason for a change in leadership. Instead, they often say that Uribe's security policy, which has been so successful in rural areas, should be 'expanded' to urban areas, whatever that means. In reality, Uribe's policy has always had a strong focus on urban areas. The rise in urban crime, the increased frequency of FARC attacks and the emergence of new paramilitary drug trafficking groups may simply give people even more reason to support Uribe or one of his protegés in the 2010 elections.
Precisely because of Colombia's current security challenges and long history of violence, the vast majority of Colombians are not very concerned with the domestic human rights situation. Many simply don't know about or understand the scandals. Colombians are so accustomed to violence, including state violence, that they see false positives and human rights abuses almost as natural. To many voters,Uribe's brand of state violence is a mere side effect of his aggressive security policy, which they see as necessary in order to rid Colombia of guerrillas and drug traffickers.
Further, Uribe has managed to distance himself from many scandals. Even those Colombians with a decent knowledge of false positives, the wiretapping scandal, and theparapolitics scandal (politicians with links to paramilitaries) do not hold the Presdient accountable for them. The President has presented all scandals as cases of a few bad apples, fired some people, and sent some people to prison. That has been enough to save him from blame not justdomestically, but to some extent even internationally.
Deciding whether or not to run for a third term in 2010 is Uribe's true challenge. Since 2002, he has counted on the strong support of the United States and Europe, who have ignored or forgiven the Colombian government's terrible human rights record and growing tendency toward autocracy. If he decides to run for a third term, that support will probably disappear. Colombia, which depends heavily on American military aid and trade with the United States, has to manage itsrelationship with the U.S. very carefully.
So far, Uribe has refused to take a definitive stance on the third term question while his political allies in Congress have continued to push for a change in theconstitution allowing a third term. The President is very carefully maneuvering as he waits for the right opportunity to declare himself a candidate for 2010. If the opportunity does not arise, he will simply not run and Colombia's next president will likely be anUribista.
The Uribe coalition's main challenger for the moment is former Medellin mayor Sergio Fajardo. He is intelligent, likeable, thoughtful, serious and, unlike Uribe, openly respectful of human rights and mindful of the needs of Colombia's most marginalized people. Not all of these qualities seem to help Fajardo get political support, but, where he is known, he is well-liked.
People in Medellin seem to wish that Fajardo could be a viable Presidential candidate because they like him so much, but just don't think he has what it takes to handle Colombia's security problems. While voters don't feel any animosity toward Fajardo, most of them certainly don't want him to win because they feel that he might lead Colombia back into the intense violence of the 1980's through the early 2000's.
It would take plenty of political genius for Fajardo to change the security debate in Colombia because, in fact, there is no debate. In terms of security policy, Uribismo is the national religion.
Despite all these obstacles, Fajardo is gradually making some progress in the polls. While he is still very far behind Uribe and his allies, he is travelling the country and spreading his message. He is a charismatic politician with a very convincing success story. If he managed to transform Medellin - even in terms of security - why can't he do the same on national scale?
Although, as I've said in previous posts, Medellin's improvement in terms of security in the Fajardo era may be attributed to factors beyond the former mayor's control, I think he is capable of convincing at least a few people that he is ready for the Presidency. For now, he is simply making himself known throughout the country. Most people in Colombia have no idea who he is.
If he manages to even compete with the Uribistas, that alone will be a significant political achievement. Nevertheless, if anyone is capable of such a miracle, it is Fajardo. The more established left-leaning opposition is in the midst of bitter internal conflict and, even in times of more cohesion and coherence, has only managed to gain the support of about 15% of the Colombian population.
Posted by Pablo Rojas at July 7, 2009 09:38 AM
